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Introduction 1 The Problem 1 The Practice Theory of Law 2 The Philosophy of Pragmatic Rationalism 4 Plan of the Book 10 Part One The Grounds of Knowledge 13 1 Knowledge and Objectivity 15 1.1 Introduction 15 1.2 Objectivity as Asymmetry 18 1.3 Conceptions of Objectivity 23 1.4 Wittgenstein's Idea of Grammar 35 2 Objectivity and Grammar 39 2.1 Introduction 39 2.2 Intentional Realism 42 2.3 An Anti-representationalist Theory of Content 48 2.4 Mind-independence and Realism 58 2.5 Inferentialism and Truth 68 2.6 Grammar, Criteria and the Need for Practice 79 3 Grammar and Rule-following 87 3.1 Introduction 87 3.2 Rule-following and Content 90 3.3 Conceptions of Practice 99 3,4 Beyond Mind-World Dualism 110 3.5 Meaning, Use and Truth 114 4 Practice, Normativity and Reasons 127 4.1 Introduction 127 4.2 Reasons and the Reflexive Character of Practice 128 4.3 Grammar as the Fundamental Practice 136 4.4 Grammar, Persons and Autonomy 141 4.5 Pragmatic Rationalism 151 4.6 Where does Law Fit in All This? 156 Part Two Knowledge and Legal Theory 159 5 Conventionalism and the Grammar of Law 161 5.1 Introduction 161 5.2 Conceptual Analysis and the Grammar of Law 163 5.3 The External and the Internal Aspect of Rules: Legal Theory's Split Personality 173 5.4 Two Criticisms 178 5.5 Conclusion 182 6 Interpretivism and the Menace of Essentialism 185 6.1 Introduction 185 6.2 Interpretivism and the Depth of Practice 188 6.3 Rationalist Objectivity 195 6.4 Anti-rationalism and the Rejection of Grammar 198 6.5 Normativity of Practice 207 7 The Practice Theory of Law 211 7.1 Introduction 211 7.2 Failure of Conventionalism and Interpretivism 213 Concluding Remarks 239 The Practice Theory of Law in a Nutshell 239 Outcomes and Some Applications 240 Bibliography 49