Table of contents for Combinatorial auctions / edited by Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg.


Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog
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I Mechanisms 15
1 The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction  17
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom
2 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions 41
David C. Parkes
3 Ascending Proxy Auctions 79
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom
4 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions 99
Peter Cramton
5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design 115
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and Paul Milgrom
6 PAUSE: A Computationally Tractable Combinatorial Auction  139
Ailsa Land, Susan Powell, and Richard Steinberg
II Bidding and Efficiency  159
7 Pseudonymous Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions 161
Makoto Yokoo
8 From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions 189
Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph M. Ostroy
9 Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions 215
Noam Nisan
10 Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions 233
Tuomas Sandholm and Craig Boutilier
11 The Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems 265
Ilya Segal
III Complexity and Algorithmic Considerations 295
12 The Winner Determination Problem 297
Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Miller, and Tuomas Sandholm
13 Tractable Cases of the Winner Determination Problem 319
Rudolf Miiller
14 Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms 337
Tuomas Sandholm
15 Incentive Compatibility in Computationally Feasible Combinatorial Auctions 369
Amir Ronen
16 Noncomputational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems in
Combinatorial Auctions 395
Aleksandar Peke& and Michael H. Rothkopf
IV Testing and Implementation 413
17 Observations and Near-Direct Implementations of the Ascending Proxy
Auction 415
Karla Hoffman, Dinesh Menon, Susara van den Heever, and Thomas Wilson
18 A Test Suite for Combinatorial Auctions 451
Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham
19 Empirical Hardness Models for Combinatorial Auctions 479
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Eugene Nudelman, and Yoav Shoham
V Applications 505
20 Auctions for the Safe, Efficient, and Equitable Allocation of Airspace System
Resources 507
Michael O. Ball, George L. Donohue, and Karla Hoffman
21 Combinatorial Auctions for Truckload Transportation 539
Chris Caplice and Yossi Sheffi
22 Auctioning Bus Routes: The London Experience 573
Estelle Cantillon and Martin Pesendorfer
23 Industrial Procurement Auctions 593
Martin Bichler, Andrew Davenport, Gail Hohner, and Jayant Kalagnanam



Library of Congress subject headings for this publication: Auctions