Table of contents for Global economic institutions : critical writings on global institutions / edited by Willem Molle.

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 Global Economic Institutions: Critical Writings on Global Institutions.
Volume I, General
General introduction to the four volumes, by Willem Molle
1 Rationale
Keohane, R.O. (1982) The demand for international regimes, International Organization, 36.2, 325-555 
Fratianni, M. and J. Pattison (1982) The economics of international organization, Kyklos, 35, 244-66.
Stein, A.A. (1982) Coordination and collaboration, regimes in an anarchic world, International Organization, 36.2, 299-324
Tinbergen , J. (coord) and A.J. Dolman (ed) (1977) Reshaping the International Order, A report to the Club of Rome, Hutchinson, 11-24
Grubel, H.G. (1977) The case against the new international economic order, Weltwitschaftliches Archiv, 2, 284-307
2 Principles
Amrasinghe, C.F. (1996) Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, Cambridge, CUP, Chapter 1, pp. 1-23.
3 Organisations, structures
Frey, B.S. (1984) How do international organisations function? Chapter 8 in B.S. Frey; International Political Economics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, New York, 143-164
Woods, N. and A. Narlikar (2001) Governance and the limits of accountability, The WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, International Social Science Journal, 53.170, 569-583 
Vaubel, R. (2006) Principal agent problems in international organizations, Review of International Organizations, 1, 125-138
Slaughter, A.M. (2000) ¿Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks¿, in: M. Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International Relations and International Law, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 177-205.
4 Compliance
Raustiala, K. (2000) Compliance and effectiveness in international regulatory cooperation; part 2 Compliance, implementation and effectiveness, Case Western Journal of International Law, 32, 387-398 
Simmons, B. (1998) Compliance with international agreements, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 75-93
Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (2001), International standards and international governance, Journal of European Public Policy, 8.3, 345-370
Merills, J. (2003) The means of dispute settlement, in: Evans, M. (ed) International Law, Oxford, OUP, pp 529-557
Keohane, R.O, Moravcsik, A. and Slaughter, A.M. (2000) ¿Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational¿, International Organization, 54.3, 457-488.
5 Results
Molle, W. (2003) Evaluation and outlook (chapter 12) of Global Economic Institutions, Routledge, London, 261-283
Volume II, Trade.
Introduction to the Volume, by Willem Molle
1 Rationale (problems, solutions)
Molle, W. (2003) From protection to free trade in goods and services, Chapter 7 of: Global Economic Institutions, London, Routledge, 135-143
Prebisch, R. et al (1950) The Economic Development of Latin America, and its principal problems, UN, ECLA, New York, Chapters 1 to 3, 1-18 
Frankel, J. and Romer, D. (1999) Does trade cause growth? American Economic Review, 89.3, 379-99 
Yanikkaya, H. (2003) Trade openness and economic growth: a cross ¿country empirical investigation, Journal of Development Economics, 72, 57-89
2 Principles 
Bailey, S.H. (1932) The political aspect of discrimination in international economic relations, Economica, 35, 89-115
Horn, H. and Mavroidis, P. (2001), Economic and legal aspects of the Most Favored Nation clause, European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 233-79
Mc Calman, P. (2002) Multi-lateral trade negotiations and the Most Favored Nation clause, Journal of International Economics, 57, 151-76.
Hindley, B. (1987) Different and more favourable treatment- and graduation, in: Finger, J.M. and Olechowski, A. (eds) The Uruguay Round, A handbook for the multilateral trade negotiations, The World Bank, Washington DC, 67-74 
Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R.W. (2001) Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system, European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 281-325
3 Organisation, operations, structure) 
Dixit, A. (1998) Transaction cost politics and economic policy: a framework and a case study; in: Baldassarri, M. Paganetto, L. and Phelps, E.S. (ed.) Institutions and economic organization in advanced economies; the governance perspective, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 139-75
Orcalli, G. (2003) A constitutional interpretation of the GATT/WTO, Constitutional Political Economy, 14, 141-154 
Finger, J. M. (1991) The GATT as an international discipline over trade restrictions; a public choice approach, in: Vaubel, R. and Willett, T.D. (eds): The political economy of international organizations; a public choice approach, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 125-141 
McMillan, J. (1989) A game theoretic view of international trade negotiations; implications for developing countries, in: Whalley, J. (ed) Developing countries and the global trading system, Vol. 1 Thematic studies, Macmillan, Houndsmill Basingstoke, 26-44 
4 Compliance 
Bhagwati, J. N. (1976) Market disruption, export market disruption, compensation and GATT reform, World Development, 4.12, 989-1020 
Busch, M.L. and Reinhardt, E. (2000) ¿Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlements in GATT/WTO Disputes¿, Fordham International Law Journal, 24, 158-172 
Buetler, M. and Hauser, H. (2000) The WTO Dispute Settlement System; a first assessment from an economic perspective, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16.2, 503-33 
Picciotto, S. (2005) The WTO Appellate Body; Legal formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, Governance; an International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 18.3, 477-503
5 Results
Rose, A.K. (2004) Do we really know that the WTO increases trade, American Economic Review, 94.1, 98-114 
Volume III, Finance
Introduction to the volume, by Willem Molle
1 Rationale, problems, solutions
Wyplosz, Ch. (1999) International financial instability in: Kaul, I, Grunberg, I. and Stern, M. (eds), Global Public Goods, Geneva, UNDP, 152-89 
Rogoff, K. (1999) International institutions for reducing global financial instability, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13.4, 21-42
Aglietta, M. (1995) The International Monetary System, in R. Boyer and Y. Saillard (eds) Regulation Theory; the state of the art, London, Routledge, 64-71
Vines, D. and Gilbert, C.L. (2004) The IMF and international financial architecture; solvency and liquidity, in: D. Vines and C.L. Gilbert (eds) The IMF and its critics; reform of the global financial architecture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 8-35 
2 Principles 
Mosley, P. (1992) A theory of conditionality, in P. Mosley (ed) Development Finance and Policy Reform, St Martins Press, London, pp. 129-153 
Collier, P., Guillaumont, P., Guillaumont, S. and Gunning, J.W. (1997) Redesigning conditionality, World Development, 25.9, 1399-1407
Dreher, A. (2004) A public choice perspective on IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality, Public Choice, 119, 445-464 
3 Organisations; operations, structure 
Thacker, S. C. (1999) The high politics of IMF lending, World Politics, 52.1, 38-75 
Vaubel, R. (1991) The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund; a Public Choice Analysis, in Vaubel, R. and Willett, Th. (eds) The Political Economy of International Organisations; a public choice approach, Westview Presss, Boulder, 204-244
Stiglitz, J.E. (2003) Democratizing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; Governance and Accountability, Governance; an International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 16.1, 111-139
4 Compliance 
Simmons, B. A. (2000) International Law and state behaviour; Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs, American Political Science Review, 94.4, 819-835 
Vreeland, J.R. (2006) IMF program compliance; aggregate index versus policy specific strategies, Review of International Organisations, 1, 359-378 
Ho, D.E. (2002) Compliance and international soft law; Why do countries implement the Basle accord? Journal of International Economic Law, 5, 647-688 
5 Results
Bird, G. (1996) The International Monetary Fund and the developing countries; a review of the evidence and policy options, International Organization, 50.3, 477-512
Evrensel, A.Y. (2002) Effectiveness of IMF supported stabilization programs in developing countries, Journal of Money and Finance, 21, 565-87.
Volume IV, Environment
Introduction to the volume, by Willem Molle
1 Rationale, problems, solutions
Hardin, G. (1968) The tragedy of the Commons, Science, 162, 1243-8 
Meadows, D. (1972) The limits to growth; a global challenge; Report to the club of Rome Project on the predicament of mankind, New York, Universe Books, 122-128
Barrett, S. (1990) The problem of global environmental protection, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6.1, 68-79
Young, O. R. (1989) The politics of international regime formation; managing natural resources and the environment, International Organization, 43.3, 349-76 
World Commission on Environment and Development (Bruntland Report) (1987) Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1-23
UNCED (1992) Agenda 21, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Environment, Rio Declaration, UN Publication sales nr. E 73.II A 14 and corrigendum (Chapter 1) 
2 Principles 
OECD (1975) The polluter pays principle, definition, analysis and implementation, Paris, OECD, 15-7, 22-36
Bugge, H. Ch. (1996) The principle of ¿ Polluter Pays¿ in Economics and Law, in: Eide, E. and van den Bergh, R. (eds) Law and Economics of the Environment, Oslo, Juridiks Forlag, 53-90
Foster, K.R., Vecchia, P. and Repacholi, M.H. (2000) Risk Management; Science and the Precautionary Principle, Science, 288, 979-81 
Cameron, J. (1994) The status of the precautionary principle in international law, In: O¿Riordan, T and Cameron, J. (eds) Interpreting the precautionary principle, London, Earthscan, 262-91 
Matsui, Y. (2002) Some aspects of the principle of ¿Common but Differentiated Responsibilities¿ International Environmental Agreements; Politics, Law and Economics, 2, 151-71 
Rajamani, L. (2000) The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and the balance of commitments under the climate regime, RECIEL, 9.2, 120-31
3 Organisations; operations, structure 
Hey, E. (2007) International Institutions, In: Bodansky, D., Brunnee, J. and Hey, E. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, 750-69
Carraro, C. and Siniscalco, D. (1998) International environmental agreements; incentives and political economy, European Economic Review, 42, 561-72
Petrakis, E. and Xepapadeas, A. (1996) Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment, Journal of Public Economics, 60, 95-110.
Congleton, R. (2001) Governing the global environmental commons; the political economy of international environmental treaties and institutions, in: Schulze, G. and Ursprung, H.W. (eds) International environmental economics; a survey of the issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 241-263
Cashore, B. (2002) Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance; How non-state-market-driven (NSMD) governance systems gain rule-making authority, Governance, An International Journal of policy, Administration and Institutions, 15.4, 503-29
4 Compliance
Mitchell, R.B. (1996) Compliance theory, an overview in: Cameron, J. et al. (eds) Improving compliance with international environmental law, London, Earthscan, 3-28 
Raustiala, K and Victor, D.G. (1998) Conclusions, in: Victor, D.G., Raustiala, K. and Skolnikoff, E.B. (eds) The implementation and effectiveness of international environmental commitments; Theory and Practice, Cambridge (Mass), MIT Press, 659-669 and 677-707 
Barrett, S (1994) Self enforcing international environmental agreements, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, 46, 878-94
Faure , M. and Lefevere, J. (1999) Compliance with international environmental agreements in Vig, N.J. and Axelrod, R.S. (eds) The global environment; institutions, law and policy, Washington, CQ Press, 138-56.
Boyd, R. and Ibarraran, M.E. (2002) Cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol; a developing country perspective, Energy Economics, 24, 21-39
5 Results
Young, O.R. and Levy, M. (with Osherenko, G.) (1999) The effectiveness of international environmental regimes, , in Young, O.R. (ed) The effectiveness of international environmental regimes; causal connections and behavioral mechanisms, Cam Mass, MIT Press, 1-32 

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

International economic relations.
Financial institutions, International .
International trade agencies.
International agencies.
International organization.