Table of contents for Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye.

Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog.

Note: Contents data are machine generated based on pre-publication provided by the publisher. Contents may have variations from the printed book or be incomplete or contain other coding.


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Acknowledgements 
Introduction
CHAPTER 1: PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
I. Some preliminary remarks
II. Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation
III. The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness
IV. Consciousness of things
V. Real world puzzle cases
CHAPTER 2: WHY CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT BE PHYSICAL AND WHY IT 
MUST BE
I. What is the thesis of physicalism?
II. Why consciousness cannot be physical
III. Why consciousness must be physical
CHAPTER 3: PHYSICALISM AND THE APPEAL TO PHENOMENAL 
CONCEPTS 
I. Some terminological points
II. Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts
III. Various accounts of phenomenal concepts
IV. My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts
V. Are there any phenomenal concepts?
VI. Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions
VII. Consequences for a priori physicalism
CHAPTER 4: THE ADMISSIBLE CONTENTS OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE. I. The 
existential thesis
II. The singular (when filled) thesis
III. Kaplanianism 
IV. The multiple contents thesis 
V. The existential thesis revisited
VI. Still more on existential contents
VII. Conclusion
CHAPTER 5: CONSCIOUSNESS, SEEING AND KNOWING
I. Knowing things and knowing facts
II. Nonconceptual content
III. Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational 
properties
IV. Phenomenal character and representational content: part I
V: Phenomenal character and representational content: part II
VI: Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it
CHAPTER 6: SOLVING THE PUZZLES
I. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow?
II: The explanatory gap
III: The hard problem
IV. The possibility of zombies
CHAPTER 7: CHANGE BLINDNESS AND THE REFRIGERATOR LIGHT 
ILLUSION 
I. A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses
II. The No-Seeum View
III. Sperling and the refrigerator light
IV. Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility
V. A further change blindness experiment
VI. Another brick in the wall
CHAPTER 8: PRIVILEGED ACCESS, PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, AND 
EXTERNALISM 
I. The threat to privileged access
II. A Burgean thought experiment
III. Social externalism for phenomenal character? 
IV. A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility
V. How do I know that I am not a zombie?
VI. Phenomenal externalism
References

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Consciousness.
Phenomenology.
Materialism.