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Acknowledgements Introduction CHAPTER 1: PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS I. Some preliminary remarks II. Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation III. The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness IV. Consciousness of things V. Real world puzzle cases CHAPTER 2: WHY CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT BE PHYSICAL AND WHY IT MUST BE I. What is the thesis of physicalism? II. Why consciousness cannot be physical III. Why consciousness must be physical CHAPTER 3: PHYSICALISM AND THE APPEAL TO PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS I. Some terminological points II. Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts III. Various accounts of phenomenal concepts IV. My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts V. Are there any phenomenal concepts? VI. Phenomenal concepts and Burgean intuitions VII. Consequences for a priori physicalism CHAPTER 4: THE ADMISSIBLE CONTENTS OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE. I. The existential thesis II. The singular (when filled) thesis III. Kaplanianism IV. The multiple contents thesis V. The existential thesis revisited VI. Still more on existential contents VII. Conclusion CHAPTER 5: CONSCIOUSNESS, SEEING AND KNOWING I. Knowing things and knowing facts II. Nonconceptual content III. Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties IV. Phenomenal character and representational content: part I V: Phenomenal character and representational content: part II VI: Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it CHAPTER 6: SOLVING THE PUZZLES I. Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? II: The explanatory gap III: The hard problem IV. The possibility of zombies CHAPTER 7: CHANGE BLINDNESS AND THE REFRIGERATOR LIGHT ILLUSION I. A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses II. The No-Seeum View III. Sperling and the refrigerator light IV. Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility V. A further change blindness experiment VI. Another brick in the wall CHAPTER 8: PRIVILEGED ACCESS, PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, AND EXTERNALISM I. The threat to privileged access II. A Burgean thought experiment III. Social externalism for phenomenal character? IV. A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility V. How do I know that I am not a zombie? VI. Phenomenal externalism References
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