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Table of Contents Preface Chapter 1 Introduction: Naturalism, Deflationism, The Vienna Circle and the Protocol-Sentence Debate 1.1 Neurath's Boat as a Motto for Naturalism 1.1.1 Neurath's Boat and the Theory of Scientific Knowledge 1.1.2 Neurath and Quine on Naturalism 1.1.3 Naturalism and Deflationist Philosophy of Science 1.2 The Vienna Circle: Basic Doctrines and Aims 1.2.1 The Anti-Idealist Setting of Vienna Circle Philosophy 1.2.2 "Logical Empiricism" 1.2.3 The Unity of Science 1.2.4 The Point of "Scientific Philosophy" 1.3 Different Interpretations of Viennese Scientific Philosophy 1.3.1 The Traditional View of Vienna Circle Philosophy 1.3.2 The Neo-Kantian Reading of Carnap and its Deflationist Critics 1.3.3 The Neurathian Wing of Vienna Circle Scholarship 1.4 Approaching the Protocol-Sentence Debate 1.4.1 The Thematic Setting of the Debate 1.4.2 The Structure of the Debate 1.5 Course of Investigation Chapter 2 The Background of the Protocol-Sentence Debate: Carnap's Aufbau 2.1 Carnap, Language Constructor: Overview of the Aufbau 2.2 Reconstructional Choices: The Mechanics of the Aufbau 2.2.1 The Phenomenalist Choice of the Object Domain 2.2.2 The Structuralist Choices of Language Form 2.2.3 The Compatibility of Ground Plan and Method 2.3 The Aim of the Aufbau-Project: Three Readings 2.3.1 The Traditional Reading: Phenomenalist Foundationalism 2.3.2 An Alternative Reading: Structuralist Neo-Kantianism 2.3.3 The Two Readings Compared 2.3.4 A Third Contender: Radical Deflationism 2.4 The Neo-Kantian and Deflationist Readings Evaluated 2.4.1 The Problem of the Basic Relation 2.4.2 Rational Reconstructionism and Conventionalism 2.4.3 The Crucial Tension in the Aufbau 2.5 Towards the Protocol-Sentence Debate Chapter 3 Phase One, Stage Right: Schlick's Antiformalist Challenge to the Aufbau 3.1 Schlick before the Aufbau 3.1.1 The Central Problem of General Theory of Knowledge 3.1.2 The Method of Coincidences 3.1.3 The Role of Coordinative Definitions 3.2 Schlick's and Carnap's Early Agreements 3.2.1 Axiom Systems and Constitution Systems 3.2.2 Against Intuitive Content 3.3 Schlick's Conception of Philosophy ca. 1930 3.3.1 Meaning Determination Through Acts 3.3.2 The Point of Experiential Meaning Determination 3.3.3 The Certainty of Philosophical Knowledge 3.4 Schlick's Root Objection to the Aufbau 3.4.1 Wittgenstein and the Aufbau 3.4.2 The Representability of Logical Form 3.4.3 Carnap on the Representability of Logical Form 3.4.4 The Tension in Schlick's New Conception of Philosophy Chapter 4 Phase One, Stage Left: Neurath's Naturalistic Challenge to the Aufbau 4.1 The Points of Agreement between Carnap and Neurath 4.1.1 Neurath before the Aufbau 4.1.2 Neurath's Agreement with Carnap's Aufbau 4.1.3 Early Opposition to Wittgenstein's Ineffability Thesis 4.2 Neurath's Criticisms of the Aufbau 4.2.1 Neurath's 1926 Qualms 4.2.2 Neurath's 1928 Criticisms 4.2.3 Carnap's Response 4.2.4 The Scope of Neurath's Criticism 4.3 The Aufbau, Scheinprobleme and Neurath's K.3 4.3.1 K.3: "Unclean" Concept Formation 4.3.2 K.3: "Unclean" Cognition 4.3.3 Aufbau and Scheinprobleme: The Given as a Sign 4.3.4 Scheinprobleme: The Practical Irrelevance of 'Factual' Representations 4.4 Neurath's Prague Address 4.4.1 Against the 'Ideal Language' and the A Priori in Epistemology 4.4.2 Against Correspondence Truth 4.4.4 Neurath's Naturalism and Materialism 4.5 The Problem of Intersubjectivity 4.5.1 Carnap's Change of Position between 1928 and 1930 4.5.2 Intersubjectivity in the Aufbau 4.5.3 Neider's Argument Explicated 4.5.4 The Inception of Physicalism Chapter 5 The Background of Phases Two and Three: Carnap's Logical Syntax Project 5.1 Phase Two and Logical Syntax 5.1.1 The Emergence and Point of Carnap's Logical Syntax Project 5.1.2 The Different Stages of the Logical Syntax Project 5.1.3 Neurath's Adoption of Carnap's Syntactic Turn 5.2 The Distinctive Doctrines of Carnap's Logical Syntax 5.2.1 The Dissolution of Philosophical Disputes through Logical Tolerance 5.2.2 The Material and the Formal Modes of Speech 5.3 The Anomalies of Carnap's Syntacticism 5.3.1 Analyticity as a Syntactic Notion 5.3.2 Form as Meaning 5.3.3 Carnap's Syntacticism Reconsidered 5.4 Neurath's Adoption of the Syntactic Turn Assessed Chapter 6 Phase Two, Overview and Substage One: Two Early Physicalisms 6.1 Overview of Phase Two 6.1.1 The Three Substages 6.1.2 The Influence of Wittgenstein-in-Transition: Waismann's "Theses" 6.1.3 Phase Two, Wittgenstein and the Development of the Syntax Project 6.2 Substage One 6.2.1 The Documentation of Substage One 6.2.2 The Significance of Substage One 6.2.3 Substage One and Wittgenstein: Waismann in the Circle, July 1930 6.3 Carnap's Proto-Physicalism 6.3 1 Two Universal Languages 6.3.2 Epistemology in Carnap's Proto-Physicalism 6.4 Neurath's Proto-Physicalism 6.4.1 The Uniformity of the Domain of Unified Science 6.4.2 Antifoundationalist Holism 6.4.3 The Physical Languages of Unified Science Chapter 7 Phase Two, Substage Two: Neurath's Challenge Radicalized 7.1 Discussions of Physicalism in Early 1931 7.1.1 In the Circle, February 1931: Against Elementary Propositions 7.1.2 Carnap's Physicalism in Early 1931 7.1.3 Neurath's Physicalism in Early 1931 7.2 Neurath's 1931 Physicalist Charge in Publications 7.2.1 Neurath's Private Language Argument: A First Analysis 7.2.2 Neurath on Truth and Confirmation 7.2.3 Neurath's Naturalistic Theory of Scientific Knowledge 7.3 Carnap's Physicalism in Early 1932 7.3.1 The "Primitive" Protocol Language Retained 7.3.2 The Physicalization of the Autopsychological and the Material/Formal Mode Distinction 7.3.3 The Epistemological Privilege of "Primitive" Protocol Statements 7.4 Carnap's and Neurath's "Essential" Agreement Chapter 8 Phase Two, Substage Three: Neurath's Challenge Sustained 8.1 The State of the Debate, Spring 1932 8.1.1 Carnap's and Neurath's Protocols Compared 8.1.2 Did Carnap and Neurath Misunderstand Each Other? 8.2 Neurath's Rejoinder 8.2.1 The Anti-Carnapian Argument of "Protocol Statements" 8.2.2 Neurath's Alternative Proposal for Protocol Statements 8.3 Carnap's Considered Response 8.3.1 The Defense of the Phenomenalistic Protocol Language 8.3.2 The Preference for a Physicalistic Protocol Language 8.4 The Outcome of Substage Three of Phase Two 8.4.1 Two Surface Disagreements and a Deep Suspicion 8.4.2 Zilsel's Query To Carnap 8.4.3 Carnap's Problematic Defense of Empiricism 8.5 Popper's Contribution to the Protocol-Sentence Debate, August 1932 8.5.1 The Birth of Critical Rationalism: The Clash of Two Narratives 8.5.2 Popper's Criticisms of the Aufbau 8.5.3 Popper's Characterization of Vienna Circle Positions Queried 8.5.4 Popper's Characterization of Neurath's Position Assessed 8.5.5 Carnap and Popper's Anti-Psychologism 8.5.6 Popper's Role in the Development of Carnap's Views Chapter 9 Phase Three: Schlick's Critique Of Radical Physicalism 9.1 The End of an Era 9.1.1 From Phase Two to Phase Three: In the Circle 9.1.2 The Darkening Political Situation 9.1.3 Phase Three Begins: The Circle after Hahn 9.2 Phase Three, Substage One: The Schlick-Neurath Exchange 9.2.1 Schlick's Rejection of Radical Physicalism 9.2.2 Neurath's Rejoinder to Schlick 9.2.3 The Outcome of Substage One: Communication Breakdown 9.3 Phase Three, Substage Two: The Hempel-Schlick Exchange 9.3.1 Hempel's Intervention 9.3.2 Schlick's Response and Hempel's Rejoinder 9.3.3 The Outcome of Substage Two: A Twist in the Tale 9.4 Phase Three, Substage Three: Schlick's Coda 9.4.1 Schlick's "On 'Affirmations'" 9.4.2 The Appropriation of Wittgenstein's "Grammar" 9.4.3 The Outcome of Substage Three: Schlick's Position Clarified Chapter 10 Phase Four: Carnap's New Turn and Schlick's Last Stand 10.1 Phase Four, Substage One: Carnap at the Paris Congress 10.1.1 Carnap's Discovery of Tarski's Theory of Truth 10.1.2 The Distinction between Truth and Confirmation 10.1.3 The Liberalization of Empiricism 10.2 Schlick's Critique of Carnap 10.2.1 The Interpretation of Wittgenstein 10.2.2 How to Theorize about Language 10.2.3 The Limits of Conventionalism 10.2.4 Different Conceptions of Language and Philosophical Concerns 10.3 Schlick's "Foundationalism" Assessed 10.3.1 Getting the Measure of Schlick's Affirmations 10.3.2 Interpreting Schlick's Affirmations 10.3.3 Evaluating Schlick's Theory of Affirmations Chapter 11 Neurath's Theory of Protocol Statements 11.1 The Viennese Reception of Neurath's Proposal 11.2 Neurath's Continuing Advocacy of his Proposal 11.2.1 Further Remarks on Protocol Statements 11.2.2 How to Answer Neurath's Critics 11.3 Neurath's Proposal Decoded 11.3.1 The Decomposition of Neurath's Protocols 11.3.2 The "Formal" Conditions on the Acceptance of Protocol Statements 11.3.3 The "Pragmatic" Condition on Theory Testing 11.3.4 Protocol Statements as Scientific Testimony 11.4 Neurath's Proposal Vindicated 11.4.1 The Inapplicability of the Standard Criticisms 11.4.2 Carnap's Non-Psychologistic Alternative 11.4.3 Comparison with Quine's Observation Sentences 11.4.4 Comparison with Contemporary Work on Observation 11.4.5 Comparison with Contemporary Work on Testimony Chapter 12 Neurath and Carnap: Naturalism Or Rational Reconstructionism? 12.1 Neurath's pre-Wittgensteinian Private Language Argument 12.1.1 Carnap's and Neurath's Private Language Arguments Compared 12.1.2 Later Uses of Neurath's Private Language Argument 12.1.3 The Prehistory of Neurath's Argument 12.1.4 Carnap's Deflection of Neurath's Argument Assessed 12.2 Is Neurath's Naturalism Incompatible with Carnap's Reconstructionism? 12.2.1 Neurath's Ballungen Against Rational Reconstruction? 12.2.2 The Commensuration of Observation and System Language 12.3 Neurath's Naturalism Is Compatible With Carnap's Reconstructionism 12.3.1 Neurath and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 12.3.2 On the Unity and Objectivity of Science 12.3.3 On Truth, Semantics and Logic 12.4 Open Issues Chapter 13 Conclusion: Three Defenses Of Empiricism 13.1 The "Critical" Protocol-Sentence Debate 13.2 The Content, Form and Status of Basic Evidence Statements 13.2.1 The Content of Basic Evidence Statements 13.2.2 The Form of Basic Evidence Statements 13.2.3 The Epistemological Status of Basic Statements 13.2.4 The Answers to the Basis Question 13.3 Foundationalism Again: The Case of Carnap 13.4 The Underlying Problems of the Debate 13.5 Three Conceptions of the Theory of Scientific Knowledge 13.6 Coda: The Image of Scientific Reason in the Protocol-Sentence Debate Index
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Schlick, Moritz, 1882-1936.
Carnap, Rudolf, 1891-1970.
Neurath, Otto, 1882-1945.