Table of contents for Empiricism at the crossroads : the Vienna Circle's protocol-sentence debate / Thomas Uebel.

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Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Naturalism, Deflationism, The Vienna Circle and the 
Protocol-Sentence Debate
1.1	Neurath's Boat as a Motto for Naturalism
1.1.1	Neurath's Boat and the Theory of Scientific Knowledge
1.1.2	Neurath and Quine on Naturalism
1.1.3	Naturalism and Deflationist Philosophy of Science
1.2	The Vienna Circle: Basic Doctrines and Aims
1.2.1	The Anti-Idealist Setting of Vienna Circle Philosophy
1.2.2	"Logical Empiricism"
1.2.3	The Unity of Science
1.2.4	The Point of "Scientific Philosophy" 
1.3	Different Interpretations of Viennese Scientific Philosophy
1.3.1	The Traditional View of Vienna Circle Philosophy 
1.3.2	The Neo-Kantian Reading of Carnap and its Deflationist Critics
1.3.3	The Neurathian Wing of Vienna Circle Scholarship
1.4	Approaching the Protocol-Sentence Debate
1.4.1	The Thematic Setting of the Debate
1.4.2	The Structure of the Debate
1.5	Course of Investigation
Chapter 2 The Background of the Protocol-Sentence Debate: Carnap's Aufbau 
2.1	Carnap, Language Constructor: Overview of the Aufbau
2.2	Reconstructional Choices: The Mechanics of the Aufbau
2.2.1	The Phenomenalist Choice of the Object Domain
2.2.2	The Structuralist Choices of Language Form
2.2.3	The Compatibility of Ground Plan and Method
2.3	The Aim of the Aufbau-Project: Three Readings 
2.3.1	The Traditional Reading: Phenomenalist Foundationalism
2.3.2	An Alternative Reading: Structuralist Neo-Kantianism
2.3.3	The Two Readings Compared
2.3.4	A Third Contender: Radical Deflationism
2.4	The Neo-Kantian and Deflationist Readings Evaluated
2.4.1	The Problem of the Basic Relation
2.4.2	Rational Reconstructionism and Conventionalism
2.4.3	The Crucial Tension in the Aufbau
2.5	Towards the Protocol-Sentence Debate
Chapter 3 Phase One, Stage Right: Schlick's Antiformalist Challenge to the Aufbau
3.1	Schlick before the Aufbau
3.1.1	The Central Problem of General Theory of Knowledge
3.1.2	The Method of Coincidences
3.1.3	The Role of Coordinative Definitions
3.2	Schlick's and Carnap's Early Agreements
3.2.1	Axiom Systems and Constitution Systems
3.2.2	Against Intuitive Content
3.3	Schlick's Conception of Philosophy ca. 1930
3.3.1	Meaning Determination Through Acts
3.3.2	The Point of Experiential Meaning Determination
3.3.3	The Certainty of Philosophical Knowledge
3.4	Schlick's Root Objection to the Aufbau
3.4.1	Wittgenstein and the Aufbau
3.4.2	The Representability of Logical Form
3.4.3	Carnap on the Representability of Logical Form
3.4.4	The Tension in Schlick's New Conception of Philosophy
Chapter 4 Phase One, Stage Left: Neurath's Naturalistic Challenge to the Aufbau
4.1 	The Points of Agreement between Carnap and Neurath
4.1.1	Neurath before the Aufbau
4.1.2	Neurath's Agreement with Carnap's Aufbau
4.1.3	Early Opposition to Wittgenstein's Ineffability Thesis
4.2	Neurath's Criticisms of the Aufbau 
4.2.1	Neurath's 1926 Qualms
4.2.2	Neurath's 1928 Criticisms
4.2.3	Carnap's Response
4.2.4	The Scope of Neurath's Criticism
4.3	The Aufbau, Scheinprobleme and Neurath's K.3
4.3.1	K.3: "Unclean" Concept Formation
4.3.2	K.3: "Unclean" Cognition
4.3.3	Aufbau and Scheinprobleme: The Given as a Sign
4.3.4	Scheinprobleme: The Practical Irrelevance of 'Factual' Representations
4.4	Neurath's Prague Address
4.4.1	Against the 'Ideal Language' and the A Priori in Epistemology
4.4.2	Against Correspondence Truth
4.4.4	Neurath's Naturalism and Materialism
4.5	The Problem of Intersubjectivity
4.5.1	Carnap's Change of Position between 1928 and 1930
4.5.2	Intersubjectivity in the Aufbau
4.5.3	Neider's Argument Explicated
4.5.4	The Inception of Physicalism 
Chapter 5 The Background of Phases Two and Three: Carnap's Logical Syntax 
5.1	Phase Two and Logical Syntax
5.1.1	The Emergence and Point of Carnap's Logical Syntax Project
5.1.2	The Different Stages of the Logical Syntax Project 
5.1.3	Neurath's Adoption of Carnap's Syntactic Turn
5.2	The Distinctive Doctrines of Carnap's Logical Syntax 
5.2.1	The Dissolution of Philosophical Disputes through Logical Tolerance
5.2.2	The Material and the Formal Modes of Speech
5.3	The Anomalies of Carnap's Syntacticism
5.3.1	Analyticity as a Syntactic Notion
5.3.2	Form as Meaning
5.3.3	Carnap's Syntacticism Reconsidered
5.4	Neurath's Adoption of the Syntactic Turn Assessed 
Chapter 6 Phase Two, Overview and Substage One: Two Early Physicalisms
6.1	Overview of Phase Two
6.1.1	The Three Substages
6.1.2	The Influence of Wittgenstein-in-Transition: Waismann's "Theses"
6.1.3	Phase Two, Wittgenstein and the Development of the Syntax Project
6.2	Substage One
6.2.1	The Documentation of Substage One
6.2.2	The Significance of Substage One
6.2.3	Substage One and Wittgenstein: Waismann in the Circle, July 1930
6.3	Carnap's Proto-Physicalism
6.3 1	Two Universal Languages
6.3.2	Epistemology in Carnap's Proto-Physicalism
6.4	Neurath's Proto-Physicalism
6.4.1	The Uniformity of the Domain of Unified Science
6.4.2	Antifoundationalist Holism
6.4.3	The Physical Languages of Unified Science
Chapter 7 Phase Two, Substage Two: Neurath's Challenge Radicalized
7.1	Discussions of Physicalism in Early 1931
7.1.1	In the Circle, February 1931: Against Elementary Propositions
7.1.2	Carnap's Physicalism in Early 1931
7.1.3	Neurath's Physicalism in Early 1931
7.2	Neurath's 1931 Physicalist Charge in Publications 
7.2.1	Neurath's Private Language Argument: A First Analysis
7.2.2	Neurath on Truth and Confirmation 
7.2.3	Neurath's Naturalistic Theory of Scientific Knowledge
7.3	Carnap's Physicalism in Early 1932
7.3.1	The "Primitive" Protocol Language Retained
7.3.2	The Physicalization of the Autopsychological and the Material/Formal Mode 
7.3.3	The Epistemological Privilege of "Primitive" Protocol Statements
7.4	Carnap's and Neurath's "Essential" Agreement
Chapter 8 Phase Two, Substage Three: Neurath's Challenge Sustained
8.1	The State of the Debate, Spring 1932
8.1.1	Carnap's and Neurath's Protocols Compared
8.1.2	Did Carnap and Neurath Misunderstand Each Other?
8.2	Neurath's Rejoinder
8.2.1	The Anti-Carnapian Argument of "Protocol Statements" 
8.2.2	Neurath's Alternative Proposal for Protocol Statements
8.3	Carnap's Considered Response
8.3.1	The Defense of the Phenomenalistic Protocol Language
8.3.2	The Preference for a Physicalistic Protocol Language
8.4	The Outcome of Substage Three of Phase Two
8.4.1	Two Surface Disagreements and a Deep Suspicion
8.4.2	Zilsel's Query To Carnap
8.4.3	Carnap's Problematic Defense of Empiricism
8.5	Popper's Contribution to the Protocol-Sentence Debate, August 1932 
8.5.1	The Birth of Critical Rationalism: The Clash of Two Narratives
8.5.2	Popper's Criticisms of the Aufbau
8.5.3	Popper's Characterization of Vienna Circle Positions Queried
8.5.4	Popper's Characterization of Neurath's Position Assessed
8.5.5	Carnap and Popper's Anti-Psychologism
8.5.6	Popper's Role in the Development of Carnap's Views
Chapter 9 Phase Three: Schlick's Critique Of Radical Physicalism
9.1	The End of an Era
9.1.1	From Phase Two to Phase Three: In the Circle 
9.1.2	The Darkening Political Situation
9.1.3	Phase Three Begins: The Circle after Hahn
9.2	Phase Three, Substage One: The Schlick-Neurath Exchange
9.2.1	Schlick's Rejection of Radical Physicalism
9.2.2	Neurath's Rejoinder to Schlick
9.2.3	The Outcome of Substage One: Communication Breakdown
9.3	Phase Three, Substage Two: The Hempel-Schlick Exchange
9.3.1	Hempel's Intervention 
9.3.2	Schlick's Response and Hempel's Rejoinder 
9.3.3	The Outcome of Substage Two: A Twist in the Tale
9.4	Phase Three, Substage Three: Schlick's Coda
9.4.1	Schlick's "On 'Affirmations'"
9.4.2	The Appropriation of Wittgenstein's "Grammar"
9.4.3	The Outcome of Substage Three: Schlick's Position Clarified
Chapter 10 Phase Four: Carnap's New Turn and Schlick's Last Stand
10.1	Phase Four, Substage One: Carnap at the Paris Congress
10.1.1	Carnap's Discovery of Tarski's Theory of Truth 
10.1.2	The Distinction between Truth and Confirmation 
10.1.3	The Liberalization of Empiricism 
10.2	Schlick's Critique of Carnap
10.2.1	The Interpretation of Wittgenstein
10.2.2	How to Theorize about Language
10.2.3	The Limits of Conventionalism
10.2.4	Different Conceptions of Language and Philosophical Concerns
10.3	Schlick's "Foundationalism" Assessed
10.3.1	Getting the Measure of Schlick's Affirmations 
10.3.2	Interpreting Schlick's Affirmations 
10.3.3	Evaluating Schlick's Theory of Affirmations
Chapter 11 Neurath's Theory of Protocol Statements
11.1	The Viennese Reception of Neurath's Proposal
11.2	Neurath's Continuing Advocacy of his Proposal
11.2.1	Further Remarks on Protocol Statements
11.2.2	How to Answer Neurath's Critics
11.3	Neurath's Proposal Decoded
11.3.1	The Decomposition of Neurath's Protocols
11.3.2	The "Formal" Conditions on the Acceptance of Protocol Statements
11.3.3	The "Pragmatic" Condition on Theory Testing
11.3.4	Protocol Statements as Scientific Testimony
11.4	Neurath's Proposal Vindicated
11.4.1	The Inapplicability of the Standard Criticisms 
11.4.2	Carnap's Non-Psychologistic Alternative
11.4.3	Comparison with Quine's Observation Sentences
11.4.4	Comparison with Contemporary Work on Observation 
11.4.5	Comparison with Contemporary Work on Testimony 
Chapter 12 Neurath and Carnap: Naturalism Or Rational Reconstructionism?
12.1	Neurath's pre-Wittgensteinian Private Language Argument
12.1.1	Carnap's and Neurath's Private Language Arguments Compared
12.1.2	Later Uses of Neurath's Private Language Argument
12.1.3	The Prehistory of Neurath's Argument
12.1.4	Carnap's Deflection of Neurath's Argument Assessed
12.2	Is Neurath's Naturalism Incompatible with Carnap's Reconstructionism?
12.2.1	Neurath's Ballungen Against Rational Reconstruction?
12.2.2	The Commensuration of Observation and System Language
12.3	Neurath's Naturalism Is Compatible With Carnap's Reconstructionism
12.3.1	Neurath and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
12.3.2	On the Unity and Objectivity of Science
12.3.3	On Truth, Semantics and Logic
12.4	Open Issues
Chapter 13 Conclusion: Three Defenses Of Empiricism
13.1	The "Critical" Protocol-Sentence Debate
13.2	The Content, Form and Status of Basic Evidence Statements 
13.2.1	The Content of Basic Evidence Statements
13.2.2	The Form of Basic Evidence Statements
13.2.3	The Epistemological Status of Basic Statements
13.2.4	The Answers to the Basis Question
13.3	Foundationalism Again: The Case of Carnap
13.4	The Underlying Problems of the Debate
13.5	Three Conceptions of the Theory of Scientific Knowledge
13.6	Coda: The Image of Scientific Reason in the Protocol-Sentence Debate

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Vienna circle.
Logical positivism.
Schlick, Moritz, 1882-1936.
Carnap, Rudolf, 1891-1970.
Neurath, Otto, 1882-1945.