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TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Extensive Form 3. Strategies and the Normal Form 4. Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs 5. General Assumptions and Methodology 6. Dominance and Best Response 7. Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 8. Location and Partnership 9. Nash Equilibrium 10. Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting 11. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 12. Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies 13. Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings 14. Details of the Extensive Form 15. Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection 16. Topics in Industrial Organization 17. Parlor Games 18. Bargaining Problems 19. Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 20. Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium 21. Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, and Ownership 22. Repeated Games and Reputation 23. Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill 24. Random Events and Incomplete Information 25. Risk and Incentives in Contracting 26. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability 27. Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation 28. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 29. Job-Market Signaling and Reputation Appendix A: Review of Mathematics Appendix B: The Mathematics of Rationalizability
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Economics -- Psychological aspects.