Table of contents for Strategy : an introduction to game theory / Joel Watson.

Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog.

Note: Contents data are machine generated based on pre-publication provided by the publisher. Contents may have variations from the printed book or be incomplete or contain other coding.

1. Introduction
2. The Extensive Form
3. Strategies and the Normal Form
4. Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payoffs
5. General Assumptions and Methodology
6. Dominance and Best Response
7. Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance
8. Location and Partnership
9. Nash Equilibrium
10. Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting
11. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
12. Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
13. Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings
14. Details of the Extensive Form
15. Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
16. Topics in Industrial Organization
17. Parlor Games
18. Bargaining Problems
19. Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
20. Games with Joint Decisions; Negotiation Equilibrium
21. Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up, Options, and Ownership
22. Repeated Games and Reputation
23. Collusion, Trade Agreements, and Goodwill
24. Random Events and Incomplete Information
25. Risk and Incentives in Contracting
26. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
27. Lemons, Auctions, and Information Aggregation
28. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
29. Job-Market Signaling and Reputation
Appendix A: Review of Mathematics
Appendix B: The Mathematics of Rationalizability

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Game theory.
Economics -- Psychological aspects.
Strategic planning.