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Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction I. International Law at Work II. Methodology III. Compliance and Effectiveness in International Law IV. The Scope of the Book Chapter 2: A General Theory of International Law I. Games States Play A. Simple Cooperation: Common Interests, Coordination, and Battle-of-the-Sexes B. Difficult Cooperation: Prisoner¿s Dilemma II. The Three Rs of Compliance A. Reputation B. Reciprocity C. Retaliation III. International Tribunals and State Responsibility A. International Tribunals B. State Responsibility IV. Payoffs and Strategies Over Time V. Modulating the Level of Commitment VI. Coercion and International Agreements VII. Multilateral Cooperation A. Reciprocity and Multilateral Agreements B. Retaliation and Multilateral Agreements C. Reputation and Multilateral Agreements Chapter 3: Reputation I. Introduction II. How Reputation is Gained and Lost A. The Compliance Decision B. Compliance Decisions and Their Effect on Reputation C. The Role of Non-Reputation Payoff and Existing Reputations D. The Importance of the Obligation III. Managing Reputation Over Time IV. The Role of Information A. Uncertainty about Payoffs B. Uncertainty about Legal Rules C. Uncertainty about Actions D. The Impact of Uncertainty V. The Compartmentalizing of Reputation A. Reputation by Issue Area B. Reputation by Regime C. Reputation by Dyad D. The Impact of Multiple Reputations VI. Limits and Caveats A. The Limits on Reputation¿s Ability to Generate Compliance B. Other Kinds of Reputation Chapter 4: International Agreements I.Why Do States Make Agreements? A. Basic Assumptions B. States and Risk C. States and Cooperation D. Negotiation of an Agreement II.Matters of Form A. Substance and Form B. What States Want C. Commitment, Credibility, and Reputation 1. The Problem with Flexibility 2. Fear of Losing 3. Credibility Can Be Costly D. Soft law E. Reservations, Exit, and Escape 1. Understanding Reservations, Exit, and Escape 2. Reservations, exit, escape, and membership 3. Permitting and Prohibiting Reservations III. The Interaction of Form and Substance A. Tradeoffs Between Form and Substance B. How is the Tradeoff Made? IV. Substance: The Scope of Agreements A. The Narrowest Possible Scope B. Broadening the Scope to Ensure Effectiveness C. Broadening the Scope to Generate Transfers D. Broadening the Scope to Generate Economies of Scope V. Membership in International Agreements A. Federalism, Treaties, and Membership B. Substance, Form, and Membership C. Externalities and Membership D. Signing Treaties VI. Conclusion Chapter 5: Customary International Law I. The Traditional Definition of CIL II. Rational Choice Critics III. Compliance and CIL IV. Opinio Juris V. State Practice VI. An Example of CIL ¿ Pacta Sunt Servanda VII. CIL and Other International Law Chapter 6: Understanding International Law Bibliography
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
International law.