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Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, va Tardos, and Vijay V. Vazirani; Part I. Computing in Games: 1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues va Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani; 2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou; 3. Equilibrium computation for two-player games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel; 4. Learning, regret minimization, and equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour; 5. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani; 6. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan; 7. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns; 8. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin; Part II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design: 9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan; 10. Mechanism design Without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra; 11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen; 12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi; 13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin; 14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira, and Scott Shenker; 15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian; 16. Online mechanisms David C. Parkes; Part III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria: 17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equillibria Tim Roughgarden and va Tardos; 18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden; 19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games va Tardos and Tom Wexler; 20. Selfish load balancing Berthold Vcking; 21. The price of anarchy and the design of scalable resource allocation Ramesh Johari; Part IV. Additional Topics: 22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant; 23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems Moshe Babaioff, John Chuang, and Michal Feldman; 24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg; 25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja, Andy Ozment; 26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami; 27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick, and Rahul Sami; 28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi, and Rakesh V. Vohra; 29. Computational evolutionary game theory Sid Suri
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