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Contents Contributors vii Foreword Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn ix Introduction Charles Goodhart xi PART I INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE 1. Robust Regulators and Their Political Masters: Independence and Accountability in Theory 3 Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor 2. Independence and Accountability in Supervision: General Principles and European Settings 43 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi 3. The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Supervisors in Practice 65 Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael Taylor 4. Independence and Accountability: Why Politics Matters 119 Johnathan Westrup 5. Governance in Banking Supervision: Theory and Practices 155 Marco Arnone, Salim Darbar and Alessandro Gambini PART II THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS 6. Financial Supervision Architectures and Central Bank Independence 213 Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro 7. Architectures of Supervisory Authorities and Banking Supervision 265 Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini 8. Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and Quality of Supervision 313 Martin _ih¿k and Richard Podpiera 9. Financial Supervisors: Alternative Models in a European Perspective 349 Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine di Noia 10. Budgetary Governance of Banking Supervision: A Primer 387 Maria Nieto, Henriette Prast and Donato Masciandaro PART III IN SEARCH FOR THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 11. Bureaucrats or Politicians? 425 Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini 12. Agency Problems in Banking Supervision 447 Robert Eisenbeis Index
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Banks and banking -- State supervision.
Financial institutions -- State supervision.
Banks and banking, Central.