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Contents 1. Introduction and Overview 2. Why Courts Should Maximize Enactable Preferences when Statutes Are Unclear Part I. Current Preferences Default Rules 3. The General Theory for Current Preferences Default Rules 4. Inferring Current Preferences from Recent Legislative Action 5. Inferring Current Preferences from Agency Action Part II. Enactor Preferences Default Rules 6. From Legislative Intent to Probabilistic Estimates of Enactable Preferences 7. Moderation, Changed or Uncontemplated Circumstances, and a Theory of Meaning Part III. Preference-Eliciting Default Rules 8. Eliciting Legislative Preferences 9. Canons Favoring the Politically Powerless 10. Linguistic Canons of Statutory Construction 11. Interpretations that May Create International Conflict 12. Explaining Seeming Inconsistencies in Statutory Stare Decisis Part IV. Supplemental Default Rules 13. Tracking the Preferences of Political Subunits 14. Tracking High Court Preferences Part V. Objections 15. The Fit with Prior Political Science Models and Empirical Data 16. The Critiques of Politics by Interest Group Theory and Collective Choice Theory 17. Alternative Default Rules that Protect Reliance or Avoid Change or Effect 18. Rebutting Operational and Jurisprudential Objections Notes Index
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Law -- United States -- Interpretation and construction.
Statutes -- United States.