Table of contents for Did my neurons make me do it? : philosophical and neurobiological perspectives on moral responsibility and free will / Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown.

Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog.

Note: Contents data are machine generated based on pre-publication provided by the publisher. Contents may have variations from the printed book or be incomplete or contain other coding.


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Introduction: New Approaches to Knotty Old Problems
1 Avoiding Cartesian Materialism 15
2 From Causal Reductionism to Self-Directed Systems 42
3 From Mindless to Intelligent Action 105
4 How Can Neural Nets Mean? 147
5 How Does Reason Get its Grip on the Brain? 193
6 Who's Responsible? 238
7 Neurobiological Reductionism and Free Will 267
Postscript 307
Bibliography 309
Index 323
Detailed Contents
Introduction: New Approaches to Knotty Old Problems 1
1 The Problem and Our Goals 1
2 Our Approach 3
3 Terminological Tangles 7
4 Overview of the Book 10
1 Avoiding Cartesian Materialism 15
1 Descartes's Legacy 15
2 Cartesian Persons without Minds 17
3 Critiques of Cartesian Materialism 21
3.1 Brain-Body Dualism 22
3.2 Emotion 24
3.3 The Mind/Brain as Inner Theater 27
3.4 Cartesian Psychology 31
3.5 Brains in a Vat 33
3.6 Moral Solipsism 37
4 Conclusion 39
2 From Causal Reductionism to Self-Directed Systems 42
1 Reductionism in the Hierarchy of Complex Systems 42
1.1 World Views and Hierarchies 44
1.2 The Many Faces of Reductionism 47
1.3 Contemporary Challenges to the Atomist-Reductionist-Determinist World View 48
1.3.1 Where Have All the Atoms Gone? 49
1.3.2 The Effects of Wholes on Parts 49
1.3.3 Whence Motion? 50
1.3.4 How to Define Determinism? 50
1.3.5 What Are Causes? 51
1.4 Towards a Nonreductive World View 52
2 Defending Downward Causation 54
2.1 Shifts in Science: From Newton to Prigogine 55
2.2 Resources from Philosophy of Science 59
2.2.1 Laws of Nature versus Initial Conditions 59
2.2.2 Triggering and Structuring Causes 61
2.2.3 Defining Downward Causation 62
2.3 Prospect 66
3 Toward an Understanding of Self-Directed Systems 67
3.1 Feedback and Information 67
3.2 Cybernetics, Systems Theory, and Complexity Studies 71
3.2.1 Systems Theory 72
3.2.2 Nonlinearity and Chaotic Systems 73
3.2.3 A Paradigm Shift in Science 77
3.3 Emergence 78
3.4 Far-from-Equilibrium Dissipative Systems 84
4 Self-Causing Systems 85
4.1 How Do Downward Causes Cause? 87
4.2 Autonomous Systems 89
5 From Mechanisms to Ant Colonies 90
5.1 A ``Simple'' Complex System 91
5.2 The Paradigm Shift 94
5.3 How to Choose? 96
5.4 The Irrelevance of Determinism 100
5.5 Retrospect 102
6 Prospect: From Ant Colonies to Brains 103
3 From Mindless to Intelligent Action 105
1 From Machines to Organisms 105
2 Levels of Action and Adaptability 109
2.1 Reflexive Action 110
2.1.1 Responses of Single-Celled Organisms 111
2.1.2 Fixed Complex Activity 111
2.1.3 Human Reflexive Responses 114
2.2 Unreflective Adaptable Action 114
2.2.1 Pre-reflective Adaptations Learning by Trial and Error 115
2.2.2 Pre-reflective Adaptations Learning by Imitation 117
2.2.3 Pre-reflective Adaptability in Humans 117
2.2.4 Post-reflective Adaptations Automaticity 118
2.3 Reflective Adaptive Action 120
2.3.1 The Nature of Representation 120
2.3.2 Non-symbolic Reflective Action 123
2.3.3 Symbolic Reflective Action 125
3 Adaptive Action Loops and Nested Hierarchies 128
4 Brains that ``Go Meta'' 131
5 Consciousness and Adaptability 136
5.1 Disturbances of Consciousness 136
5.2 Models of Consciousness 139
5.3 A Plausible Neuroscience of Consciousness 141
5.3 Consciousness and Mental Efficacy 145
6 Retrospect and Prospect 145
4 How Can Neural Nets Mean? 147
1 The Mystery of Meaning 147
2 Representation and Intentionality 151
2.1 A Hierarchy of Representations 151
2.2 From Indices to Intentionality 155
3 The Leap to Symbolic Language 159
3.1 From Indices to Symbols 160
3.2 Creation of Symbolic Systems via Context-Sensitive Constraints 164
3.3 The Biology of Symbolic Reference 166
3.3.1 Brain Regions and Reorganization 166
3.3.2 Language, the Prefrontal Cortex, and Top-Down Causation 170
3.4 Semantic Networks, Neural Nets, and Ontogenic Landscapes 172
4 The Meaning of Meaning 174
4.1 Modern Theories of Meaning 175
4.2 Concepts as Embodied Metaphors 178
4.3 Wittgensteinian Language Games 181
4.4 Language in Action 183
4.5 Metaphors and Philosophical Therapy 187
4.6 Mysteries Solved? 190
5 Retrospect and Prospect 191
5 How Does Reason Get its Grip on the Brain? 193
1 What's the Problem? 193
2 Why Mental Phenomena Cannot be Reduced 195
2.1 An Informative Analogy 196
2.2 A Phylogenetic Progression 198
2.3 Redefining Supervenience 205
2.4 The Contextualization of Brain Events 209
2.4.1 Mind on the Hoof: From Animals on Up 210
2.4.2 Action and Cognition: The Same Neurobiology 212
2.4.3 Conceptual Considerations 214
2.5 Excursus: Why Not Functionalism? 216
3 Couldn't We Be Zombies? 217
4 Beliefs as Structuring Causes 221
5 From Animal Beliefs to Human Reasoning 223
5.1 Meta-Level Self-Supervision 223
5.2 Off-Line Simulations 224
5.3 External Scaffolding and Symbolic Language 225
5.4 The Dynamics of Intentional Action 227
6 Formal Reasoning 229
7 The Enigma of Mental Causation 233
8 Retrospect and Prospect 236
6 Who's Responsible? 238
1 Retrospect and Prospect 238
2 A MacIntyrean Account of Moral Responsibility 240
3 Cognitive Prerequisites for Moral Responsibility 243
3.1 A Symbolic Sense of Self 244
3.2 The Narrative Unity of Life 247
3.3 Running Behavioral Scenarios 251
3.4 Evaluation of Predicted Outcomes in the Light of Goals 253
3.5 Evaluation of Goals in the Light of Abstract Concepts 254
3.6 An Example 256
4 Ability to Act 259
4.1 Weakness of Will as Temporal Discounting 260
4.2 Weakness of Will as a Dynamical Process 264
5 Reflections on Free Will 265
7 Neurobiological Reductionism and Free Will 267
1 Prospect 267
2 The Stalled Debate 268
2.1 Interminable Arguments 269
2.2 A Clutter of Terms 270
3 Defining the Determinist Threat 272
3.1 Defusing the Threat of Neurobiological Determinism 273
3.2 The Irrelevance of Indeterminism in Animal Behavior 274
4 Libertarian Reductionism 277
4.1 Robert Kane: Indeterminism in the Cartesian Theater 277
4.2 Our Critique 280
4.3 The Ubiquity of Self-Forming Actions 283
4.4 Ultimate versus Primary Responsibility 285
5 Questioning the Regress Argument 288
5.1 The Nonlinearity of Human Responsibility 288
5.2 From Mechanism to Teleology 290
6 Daniel Dennett's Compatibilist Reductionism 291
6.1 Striking Parallels 291
6.2 The Deep Difference: Reductionism 294
7 Determinism Revisited 298
8 Constructing a Concept of Free Will 299
8.1 Alternative Conceptions 299
8.1.1 Freedom as Acting for a Reason 299
8.1.2 Free Will as Autonomy 301
8.1.3 Hierarchical Mesh Theories of Freedom 302
8.1.4 Agent Causation 303
8.2 The Achievement of Free Will 304
9 Conclusion: An Agenda for Future Research 305
Postscript 307
Bibliography 309
Index 323

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Ethics.
Reasoning.
Cognitive neuroscience.