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Table of Contents [Series Page] [About the Contributors] [Foreword?] [Acknowledgments] List of Tables and Figures 1. Corporate Governance in Latin America Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Introduction Legal Protection to Investors in Latin America and its Evolution Shareholder Rights in the 1990s The Evolution of Shareholder protection until 2005 Access to External Finance in Latin America The Size and Breath of Capital Markets Ownership Concentration Insider Trading Firm Level Corporate Governance Firm-level Samples and Corporate Governance Indicators Firm-level Corporate Governance Practices and their Impact Firm Migration and The Disappearing Latin American Stock Markets Conclusion and Policy Implications References 2. Insider Trading and Corporate Governance in Latin America Juan J. Cruces and Enrique Kawamura Introduction Testable Hypotheses Estimation of the Informed Trading Probability Methodological Review Does Informed Trading Probability Really Measure What We Want to Measure? Data Sources and Sample Construction Stock Data Country Data Corporate Announcements Data Results Distribution of Informed Trading Probability Cross-Sectional Determinants of Informed Trading Categorical Decomposition of Informed Trading Informed Trading and Corporate Governance Measures Used in the Literature Event Study: Informed Trading Probability Around Corporate Announcements The Market Value of Informed Trading Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Directions for Future Research References Appendix 3. Corporate Governance and Ownership: Measurement and Impact on Corporate Performance and Dividend Policies in Argentina Ricardo N. Bebczuk Literature Review and Working Hypotheses Corporate Governance, Ownership and Performance Corporate Governance, Ownership and Dividend Policies Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure in Argentina Determinants of Corporate Performance Baseline Results Robustness Checks Endogeneity Checks Ownership and Performance Determinants of Dividend Policies Summary Statistics and Additional Regressors Econometric Results Conclusions References 4. Corporate Governance and Value in Brazil (and in Chile) Ricardo P. C. Leal and Andre L. Carvalhal-da-Silva Introduction Brief Review of Literature and Working Hypothesis A Governance Practices Index for Brazil Data Sources Index Components Empirical Results Ownership Measures Value, CGI, and Control Variables Multivariate Regression Analysis Extensions and Additional Robustness Checks Alternative Implementations of the Multivariate Model Endogeneity Checks Discussion of Potential Biases Comparative Analysis with Chile Conclusion and Policy Implications References Appendix 5. The Effect of Corporate Governance Practices on Company Market Valuation and Payout Policy in Chile Fernando Lefort and Eduardo Walker Introduction Chilean Capital Markets and Institutional Environment: An Overview Conceptual Framework and Working Hypothesis Conglomerates, Corporate Governance and Company Valuation: Corporate Governance and Payout Policy Data Sources and Corporate Governance Measures Data Sources Ownership and Control Structures of Chilean Listed Firms Dividend Policies and Payout ratios in Chile Agency Problems Corporate Governance Practices in Chile Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Agency Problems on Firm's Market Valuation Econometric Concerns Empirical Results on Agency Problems and Firm Valuation Robustness Checks Endogeneity Checks Dividend Payout Ratios Do Corporate Governance Practices Affect Firm Market Valuation and Payout Policy? Correlations with Firm Market Valuation Controlling for Endogeneity Conclusions References 6. Corporate Governance and firm Valuation in Colombia Luis H. Gutierrez and Carlos Pombo Introduction Data and Methodology Ownership and Control Definitions Valuation and Performance Measures Corporate ownership and control Ownership Statistics. Separation between ownership and control Corporate best practices The Index of Corporate Governance Sample of Companies Survey Results Ownership, control and firm valuation Working hypotheses Variable Statistics Econometric results Final remarks and policy implications References Appendixes 7. Corporate Governance and Firm Value in Mexico Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Introduction Mexico¿s Capital Markets in the last 30 years The Birth of the Modern Stock Exchange and the Initial Collapse (1975-1987) The Spurt: Economic Stabilization and NAFTA (1987-1997) Back to the Same Place (1997-2006) What explains the poor status of Mexico¿s capital markets? Shareholder Protection in 1995 The Evolution of Shareholder protection from 1995 to 2005 Consequences of Poor Investor Protection for Pension Funds Corporate Governance, Valuation and Investor Returns in Mexico The Sample Data on Corporate Governance Practices in Mexico Econometric Results Robustness Checks Impact of Different Areas of Firm-level Governance Reforms for Deepening Mexico's Financial Markets Further Legal Reform Market-based Mechanisms Conclusions and Policy Implications Bibliography Appendixes Appendix Bibliography 8. CEO and Director Turnover in Venezuela Urbi Garay and Maximiliano Gonzalez Introduction Institutional Characteristics An Overview of the Venezuelan Economy and its Stock Market The Venezuelan Capital Market's Legal Framework Corporate Governance Practices in Venezuela Data Summary Statistics Empirical Analysis on CEO and Director Turnover CEO and Director Turnover, a Univariate Approach CEO Turnover, a Logit Approach Director Turnovers, a Poisson Approach Robustness Checks Lagged Values of Performance Measures Macroeconomic Controls Ownership Structure Endogeneity Problem Forced Turnover Conclusions and policy recommendations References Appendixes Index
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Corporate governance.
Investments.