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Contents Index of Gatt Panels liii Index of WTO Panels xxxviii 1.The World Trade Organization 1 1.Bretton Woods and the failure of the International Trade Organization 1 2.The GATT becomes an international organization 2 3.A summary of GATT obligations 3 4.The GATT tariff negotiating rounds 5 5.The creation of the WTO 6 6.The WTO: functions and structure 9 6.1Membership, accession, and withdrawal 11 6.2Decision-making 12 6.2.1General decision-making 12 6.2.2Interpretations 12 6.2.3Waivers 13 6.2.4Amendments 13 6.3The WTO as an international organization 14 7.Suggestions for improving the WTO 14 8.Current Work: The Doha Development Agenda 000 2.Sources of Law 19 1.WTO: a hybrid system 21 2.Setting the scene of discussion: three preliminary remarks 26 2.1Classification through interpretation: the method, and its externalities 26 2.1.1The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enters the WTO 26 2.1.2Externalities stemming from the interpretative process 30 2.1.2.1Identifying the interpretative elements 30 2.1.2.2Prejudging the legal value through interpretation 31 2.2The long road between identification and classification 32 2.2.1They (WTO adjudicating bodies) identified, but rarely classified 32 2.2.2An effort to classify: understanding the benchmarks 33 3.Sources of law 37 3.1The covered agreements 37 3.1.1Travaux preparatoires of the WTO agreement; legally relevant to confirm 38 3.1.1.1The content of the travaux preparatoires 40 3.1.1.2Conditions for recourse to travaux preparatoires in practice 50 3.1.2Subsequent practice 53 3.1.3Subsequent agreements 53 3.2International agreements reflected in the covered agreements 54 3.2.1The Havana Charter 54 3.2.2Agreements reflected in the TRIPs agreement 55 3.2.3Agreements reflected in the SCM agreement 55 3.2.4The legal relevance of the agreements mentioned in the WTO agreement 56 4.Interpretative elements 58 4.1GATT panel reports 58 4.1.1Adopted GATT reports 59 4.1.2Un-adopted GATT reports 60 4.2WTO panel and Appellate Body reports 61 4.3Discussions and recommendations by various WTO organs 64 4.3.1Discussions and recommendations by WTO committees 64 4.3.2WTO Working Party reports 66 4.4International agreements reflected in the WTO agreement 67 4.4.1The Tokyo round agreements 67 4.4.2Other international agreements 67 4.4.2.1Agreements referred to in WTO decisions 68 4.4.2.2Bilateral agreements among WTO members 68 4.4.2.3Multilateral agreements 69 4.5Acts adopted by various international organizations 71 4.5.1United Nations (UN) Resolutions 71 4.5.2ITU Recommendations 71 4.5.3OECD Guidelines 71 4.6Decisions by international courts 72 4.7Domestic law and practice 72 4.8Unilateral declarations by WTO members 73 4.8.1Unilateral declarations outside panel proceedings 73 4.8.2Unilateral declarations made during panel proceedings 74 4.9Customary international law 76 4.10Principles of law 81 4.10.1The nature of the general principles 81 4.10.2Estoppel 82 4.10.3Good Faith (Bona Fides) 83 4.10.4Error 84 4.10.5Res justicata 84 4.10.6In dubio mitius 85 4.10.7Non a dimplenti contractus 86 4.11Doctrine 86 5.Conclusions 87 3.WTO Law and Domestic Law (TS) 89 1.Introduction 89 2.The United States 91 2.1Overview of U.S. law 91 2.2The relationship between WTO law and U.S. law 92 3.The European Community 95 3.1External relations and the EU/EC 95 3.2The relationship between WTO law and the laws of the EC and its Member States 97 4.Japan 99 4.1Overview of Japanese law 99 4.DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 103 1.Introduction 104 2.Dispute settlement in the GATT 105 3.WTO dispute settlement 107 3.1General considerations 108 3.2Institutions 108 3.3Scope of application 109 3.4The legal effect of panel and Appellate Body reports 111 3.5Dispute resolution procedures 112 3.5.1Objectives 112 3.5.2Initiation: request for consultations 113 3.5.3Standing to bring claims 113 3.5.4Good offices, conciliation, and mediation 114 3.5.5Arbitration 115 3.6The panel process 115 3.7The appeal process 117 3.8Implementation 117 3.8.1Reasonable period for implementation 117 3.8.2Compliance and the sequencing problem 118 3.9Compensation for failure to comply and retaliation 119 3.10Special dispute resolution procedures 121 3.10.1Non-violation complaints 121 3.10.2Situation complaints 122 3.11Adverse inference 123 3.12Amicus curiae 124 3.13Burden of proof 125 3.14Judicial economy 127 3.15Standard of review 128 3.16Critique of the DSU 131 4.Trade retaliation under national laws 133 4.1The European Union 133 4.2Japan 134 4.3The United States 135 4.4Critique of trade retaliation under national laws 138 5.Enforcement of WTO Obligations: Remedies and Compliance 141 1.Enforcing the WTO obligations 143 2.The type of the complaint matters 144 3.Recommendations and suggestions by WTO adjudicating bodies 145 3.1Recommendations 146 3.1.1The substantive content of a recommendations 147 3.1.2The function of a recommendation 147 3.1.3The legal force of a recommendation 147 3.2Suggestions 148 3.2.1The substantive content of a suggestion 148 3.2.2The function of a suggestion 148 3.2.3Requesting a suggestion 149 3.2.3.1Requests for suggestions must be specific 149 3.2.3.2Discretion to suggest, even when requested to do so 149 3.2.3.3.The dominant case for suggestions (when requested): no other way to implement 151 3.2.4Un-requested suggestions 153 3.2.4.1Legislative suggestion: the case of export subsidies 153 3.2.4.2Other cases 154 3.2.5Suggestions are not binding 154 4.Reasonable period of time (RPT) 154 4.1Bilateral definition of the RPT 155 4.2Multilateral definition of the RPT 155 4.2.1The regulatory framework 155 4.2.2The task of the Arbitrator 155 4.2.3Measuring the RPT under Art.21.3c DSU 156 4.2.3.1The function of the 15 month guideline 156 4.2.3.2Attendant circumstances 157 5.Compliance panels 160 5.1The mechanics 160 5.2The rationale for compliance panels and the sequencing issue 160 5.3The mandate of compliance panels 163 5.4Compliance panel reports can be appealed 165 5.5More than one compliance panel on the same dispute? 165 6.Requesting countermeasures 165 6.1The right to request countermeasures 165 6.2The function of compensation, suspension of concessions or other obligations 166 6.3The form of countermeasures 168 6.4The procedure to follow 169 6.5The legal constraint of Art. 22.4 DSU 175 6.6Agreement between the parties 175 6.7Disagreement between the parties 176 6.7.1Compulsory submission to the Arbitrators 176 6.7.2The task of the Arbitrators 176 6.7.3The burden of proof 178 6.7.4The Arbitrators decision: first and last resort 179 6.7.5Calculating the level of suspension of concessions 180 6.7.5.1Economics matter 180 6.7.5.2Standard of review 182 6.7.5.3No room for punitive damages 183 6.7.5.4Retroactive or prospective remedies? 185 6.7.5.5Indirect benefits 187 6.7.5.6 Only value added matters 189 6.7.5.7Litigation costs are not recoverable 190 6.7.5.8Calculating countermeasures following a GATS-violation 190 6.7.5.9The special case of prohibited subsidies 191 7.Compliance following the adoption of countermeasures 196 8.To conclude 196 6.The Most-Favored-Nation Principle 201 1.MFN: some basic economic intuitions (may be institutions awaiting author) and institutional realities 202 2.The MFN-discipline as enshrined in Art. I GATT 205 2.1The coverage in a nutshell 205 2.2The policies (conferring an advantage) covered 206 2.2.1Border measures of fiscal character 206 2.2.2Border measures of non fiscal character 208 2.2.3Internal measures 209 2.3The original beneficiary of the advantage 209 2.4The extension of the advantage of WTO membership 209 2.4.1Extension to like products 209 2.4.2Like products originating in WTO Members 211 2.4.3Extending MFN-treatment immediately and unconditionally 212 2.5The standard of review 217 2.5.1De jure and de facto discrimination covered 217 2.5.2No demonstration of effects or intent required 218 2.5.3No rebalancing allowed 219 3.Exceptions to the MFN clause 219 3.1Special and differential treatment for developing countries 220 3.1.1The Enabling clause 220 3.1.2Some historical features 221 3.1.3The placement of the Enabling clause in the WTO legal order 226 3.1.4An exception to Art. I GATT 226 3.1.5Non-discrimination in the context of the Enabling clause 227 3.1.6Allocation of burden of proof 229 3.2Discriminatory quotas (Art. XIV GATT) 229 3.3Waivers 231 7.The National Treatment Principle 233 1.What is the national treatment principle? 234 2.National treatment: some key issues 236 2.1Like products 236 2.1.1Article III:2, first sentence 237 2.1.2Article III:2, second sentence 237 2.1.3Article III:4 238 2.1.4The aim and effects test 239 2.2The product-process distinction 240 2.3Technical regulations and sanitary and phytosanitary measures 241 2.4Application of Article III to state-trading monopolies 242 2.5Application of Article III national treatment obligations to sub-federal units of WTO Members 243 2.6The relationship between Article III and Article XI of the GATT 244 3.Taxes 245 3.1Scope 246 3.2Border tax adjustment 246 3.3The non-discrimination principle 247 4.Government regulations 249 5.De Facto discrimination 252 6.Article XX exceptions 256 8.TARIFFS, QUOTAS, AND OTHER BARRIERS TO MARKET ACCESS 257 1.Introduction 258 2.Tariffs and customs rules 259 2.1The nature of a tariff 259 2.2Welfare effects of tariffs 259 2.3Tariff modifications 261 2.4Reclassification 262 2.5Valuation 263 2.6Rules of origin 265 2.7Customs laws and procedures 267 2.8Customs fees and formalities 268 2.9Preshipment inspection (PSI) 268 3.Quotas 269 3.1The nature of a quota 269 3.2Welfare effects of quotas 270 3.3Prohibition on quotas and other measures that restrain trade 270 3.4Exceptions to the prohibition on quotas and other measures 272 3.5Licensing 274 4.State-trading enterprises 275 5.Technical barriers to trade 278 6.Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 279 7.Sectoral market access agreements 281 7.1Agriculture 281 7.2Textiles and clothing 282 7.3Information technology 283 7.4Electronic commerce 284 9.Agriculture 287 1.Trading farm products in the GATT era 288 1.1The legal framework 288 1.2Reality bites 291 2.With the Uruguay round comes a change 291 2.1Negotiators with export interest pushed 292 2.2and internal (EC) reform helped as well 293 2.3to make a start 294 3.The WTO agreement on Agriculture in a nutshell 295 3.1How to liberalize farm trade 295 3.2The AG Agreement in context 296 3.3No hierarchy? The AG Agreement and the national schedules of concession 297 3.4Product-specific coverage of the AG Agreement 299 4.The discipline on domestic studies 299 4.1The obligations to convert existing process into tariffs 299 4.2Calculating the level of protection 300 4.2.1The AMS is the benchmark for commitments 300 4.2.2What comes under the AMS 303 4.2.3Exemptions from the AMS 305 4.2.3.1De minimis thresholds 305 4.2.3.2Production limiting programmes (Blue box) 306 4.2.3.3Support to low-income producers in developing countries 306 4.2.3.4Minimal, or no trade-distorting schemes (Green box) 306 4.3The resulting image: tariff peaks, no ad valorem duties 309 5.Export subsidy commitments 315 5.1What is an export subsidy 315 5.1.1Export subsidies explicitly mentioned 315 5.1.2De facto export subsidies 318 5.2The discipline with respect to export subsidies 318 5.2.1The discipline in a nutshell 318 5.2.1.1Scheduled goods, schemes covered by Art 9.1 AG 322 5.2.1.2Unscheduled goods, schemes covered by Art. 9.1 AG 322 5.2.1.3Scheduled and unscheduled goods, schemes not covered by Art 9.1AG 322 5.2.2The standard of review for violations of export subsidy commitments (Art. 3.3 AG) 323 5.2.3The standard of review for violation of the anti-circumvention provision (Art. 10 AG) 323 5.3WTO Members commitments on export subsidies 324 6.Other commitments 327 6.1Due restraint (Peace Clause) 327 6.2Export prohibition 327 6.3Transparency requirements 327 6.4Least developed and net food-importing developing countries 327 7.Agriculture in the development round 329 10.Subsidies and countervailing duties 331 1.Thou shalt not subsidize 332 2.A subsidy in the SCM-sense of the term 336 2.1Financial contribution 336 2.1.1Direct and indirect financial contribution 336 2.1.2Financial contribution: an expansive interpretation 337 2.1.3The special case of double taxation 341 2.1.4Recourse to regulatory diversity to determine whether financial contribution exists 342 2.1.5Attributing financial contribution to a government 343 2.2A benefit is conferred 346 2.2.1The private investor-test 347 2.2.2The cost of production 351 2.3The recipient: specific (and unintended too?) 352 2.4Methods for calculating the benefit 352 2.5Classification of subsidies 360 2.5.1Prohibited subsidies 360 2.5.2Actionable subsidies 364 2.5.3Non-actionable subsidies 364 3.Counteracting subsidies 364 3.1The multilateral option 365 3.1.1Prohibited subsidies 365 3.1.2Adverse effects 369 3.1.2.1Adverse effects resulting in serious prejudice 369 3.1.2.2Adverse effects resulting in nullification or impairment 374 3.1.2.3Legal action to eliminate adverse effects 374 3.2The unilateral option: countervailing duties (CVDs) 375 3.2.1The conditions for a lawful imposition 375 3.2.1.1The substantive requirement 375 3.2.1.2The procedural requirements 382 3.2.2Imposition of CVDs 384 3.2.2.1The level of CVDs (Lesser duty rule) 384 3.2.2.2The imposition of CVDs on an aggregate basis 384 3.2.2.3Retroactive application of CVDs 385 3.2.3Review of CVDs 385 3.2.3.1The sunset review 386 3.2.3.2The administrative review 387 4.Thou shalt not be punished in any other way 390 5.Special and differential treatment 392 6.Standard of review 393 7.Concluding remarks 393 11.ANTIDUMPING 395 1.What is dumping? 396 1.1Dumping as sales below cost 397 1.2Dumping as international price discrimination 398 1.3Duration 399 1.4Cost analysis 399 1.5Welfare effects 400 1.6Measures to counteract dumping 400 2.The regulation of antidumping duties 401 2.1The legal framework of antidumping in the GATT/WTO regime 401 2.1.1GATT Article VI 402 2.1.2The Antidumping Agreement 402 2.1.3Institutions and notifications 403 2.1.4Developing countries 403 2.2Investigation 403 2.2.1Initiating an investigation 403 2.2.2Evidentiary issues 404 2.2.3The duties of the investigating authority 406 2.3Determination of dumping 406 2.3.1Like product 407 2.3.2Comparison of third-country prices 409 2.3.3Constructed value 409 2.3.4Arm's-length transactions and transactions between affiliated parties 411 2.3.5Sales below cost 412 2.3.6Fair price comparisons 413 2.3.7Averaging 414 2.3.8Zeroing 415 2.4Determination of injury 417 2.4.1Material injury or threat of material injury 417 2.4.2Factors to be considered when determining injury 418 2.4.3Factors to be considered when determining threat 419 2.4.4Cumulation of injuries 419 2.4.5Causation 420 2.5Domestic industry 421 2.6The imposition of antidumping measures 422 2.6.1Provisional measures 422 2.6.2Definitive measures 423 2.6.3Retroactivity 423 2.6.4Duration and review 423 2.7Price undertakings (suspension of antidumping duty investigations) 424 2.8Anti-circumvention 424 2.9Dispute settlement 425 3.Criminal penalties and private remedies 427 3.1The U.S. 1916 Antidumping Act 428 3.2Future implications of the panel and the Appellate Report on the 1916 Act case 430 3.3The U.S. Offset Act 431 4.Conclusions 433 12.SAFEGUARDS 437 1.Introduction 438 2.The legal and policy framework for safeguards in the GATT/WTO regime 439 3.GATT Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards 440 3.1GATT Article XIX 440 3.2The Safeguards Agreement 440 3.3The relationship between GATT Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement 441 3.4Investigation 442 3.5Provisional application 443 3.6Determination of increased imports 443 3.7Unforeseen developments 444 3.8Determination of injury 446 3.8.1Serious injury or threat of serious injury 446 3.8.1.1Serious injury 447 3.8.1.2Threat of serious injury 447 3.8.1.3Factors to be considered when determining injury or threat thereof 448 3.8.1.4Domestic industry 449 3.8.2Causation 449 3.9Limits on the application of safeguard measures 451 3.9.1Parallelism 451 3.9.2Extent of safeguards 454 3.9.3Non-attribution 455 3.9.4Selectivity 455 3.9.5Developing countries 456 3.9.6GATT Article XIII 456 3.9.7Duration and review 457 3.10Notification and consultation 457 3.11Compensation 458 3.12The standard of review for safeguard disputes 460 4.Safeguard measures for balance-of-payment reasons 460 4.1The GATT 460 4.2The WTO 463 5.Safeguard measures in textile and clothing trade 465 6.Prohibition on voluntary export restraints 467 6.1Prohibition in the Safeguards Agreement 467 6.2Tension between voluntary export restraints and competition policy 468 6.2.1The automobile VER case 469 6.2.2The steel VER Case 472 6.2.3Analysis of the conflict between trade policy and competition policy 473 13.Technical barriers to trade: TBT and SPS 475 1.The role of TBT and SPS 477 2.The legal relationship between GATT, TBT, and SPS 481 3.TBT 483 3.1Coverage 483 3.2Technical regulations 485 3.2.1National treatment and MFN 485 3.2.2International standards 486 3.2.2.1The definition of international standards in TBT 489 3.2.2.2International standards and the necessity-requirement 491 3.2.2.3Technical regulations must be based on international standards 491 3.2.2.4Legitimate objectives pursued through international standards 492 3.2.2.5Deviating from inappropriate or ineffective international standards 493 3.2.2.6Burden of proof in case of deviation 494 3.2.3Unilateral technical regulations 496 3.2.3.1The necessity- requirement 497 3.2.3.2Performance requirements 497 3.2.3.3Mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) 498 3.2.3.4Additional obligations 498 3.3Standards 499 3.3.1National treatment 499 3.3.2Code of Good Practice 500 3.4Common(to technical regulations and standards)provisions 501 3.4.1Conformity assessment 501 3.4.2Special and differential treatment 501 3.4.3Expert groups 502 4.The SPS 502 4.1Coverage 502 4.2International standards 503 4.2.1Recourse to international standards 503 4.2.2International standards and the necessity-requirement 505 4.2.3SPS measures must be based on international standards 505 4.2.4Deviating from international standards 507 4.2.5Burden of proof in cases of deviation from international standards 508 4.3National SPS measures 509 4.3.1National treatment and MFN for nationally-defined SPS measures 509 4.3.2SPS Measures on scientific evidence 510 4.3.2.1The obligation to have recourse to scientific evidence 510 4.3.2.2Defining risk 510 4.3.2.3Defining risk assessment 512 4.3.3The necessity-requirement in the trade context: least restrictive option 523 4.3.3.1The test for consistency with Art. 5.6 SPS 524 4.3.3.2The appropriate level of protection 524 4.3.4Consistency in the application of the appropriate level of protection 527 4.3.5SPS measures adopted on precaution 532 4.3.5.1Precautionary principle in the WTO and in customary international law 532 4.3.5.2Precaution and scientific evidence 534 4.4Remaining SPS provisions 537 4.4.1Control inspection and approval procedures 537 4.4.2Equivalence 538 4.4.3Procedural obligations 539 4.5Special and differential treatment 539 5.Recourse to experts 540 5.1Appointment of experts 540 5.2The legal relevance of expertise 541 5.3To keep in mind 542 6.Standard of review 544 7.Concluding remarks 544 14.Preferential Trade Agreements 547 1.Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the WTO: FTAs and CUs 548 2.Globalization yes, preferences yes as well 549 3.What matters when discussing preferential trade? 551 4.PTAs in the GATT 554 4.1No per se inconsistency 554 4.2The Art. XXIV GATT test in a nutshell 555 4.3Designed at home, approved (?) in Geneva 555 4.3.1Two tracks available to review the consistency of FTAs and CUs 555 4.3.2Choosing between the tracks 556 4.4The multilateral track 559 4.4.1The duty to notify a PTA 559 4.4.1.1A brief presentation of the CRTA 559 4.4.1.2To notify when? 560 4.4.2The external requirement 562 4.4.2.1Free Trade Areas (FTAs) 562 4.4.2.2Customs unions 564 4.4.3The internal requirement 568 4.4.3.1The test in a nutshell 568 4.4.3.2Substantially all trade 568 4.4.3.3Other restrictive regulations of commerce 570 4.4.4To conclude (?) 572 4.5The bilateral track 573 4.5.1GATT panels: conflicting, (scarce) evidence 574 4.5.2WTO panels: potential PTA- busters 575 4.6Taking stock of the GATT-practice 577 5.PTAs in the GATs-context 578 5.1The procedural obligation 578 5.2The substantive obligation 578 5.2.1The internal requirement 578 5.2.2The external requirement 579 5.3Extending the benefit to outsiders 580 5.4Two tracks available 580 5.5The standard review 580 5.6Labour market integration agreements 581 5.7GATS: no practice 581 5.8Should PTAs cover both GATTS and GATS? 581 6.No panel practice (for good reasons) 582 6.1The outsiders: if I dont do it, somebody else will 583 6.1.1Risk averse agents (panels) 584 6.1.2Cost of litigation 585 6.1.3Is it really a problem? Less enforcement, better (export) opportunities 586 6.1.4Why narrow down future options 586 6.1.5Side payments 586 6.1.6Too much at stake? 587 6.2The incumbents: I wont do it, you shouldnt either (no room for an eye for an eye) 587 6.3Is there a third group of countries? 588 7.MFN is LFN 588 15.Export Controls and National Security 591 1.Introduction 591 2.Export restraints 592 3.Export taxes 593 4.Security exceptions 594 5.Extraterritorial application of export controls 598 6.Conclusions 600 16.Trade in Services 601 1.The advent of GATS 604 2.The relationship between GATT and GATS 609 3.The scope of GATS: liberalization of trade in services 611 3.1Defining service 611 3.2Defining measures affecting trade in services 613 3.3Modes of supply 616 4.Non-retroactivity of obligations assumed under GATS 617 5.General obligations 619 5.1MFN 619 5.1.1Likeness of services(and service suppliers) 620 5.1.2Automatically and unconditionally 621 5.1.3The standard of review: de jure, de facto discrimination 622 5.1.4MFN exceptions 623 5.2Transparency 626 5.3Economic integration 627 5.4Domestic regulation 627 5.5Mutual recognition 630 5.6Competition-related disciplines 632 5.7Safeguards 633 5.8Payments and transfers 633 5.9Subsidies 634 5.10General exceptions 635 5.10.1A brief overview of Art.XIV GATS 635 5.10.2Necessity in Art. XIV GATS 636 5.10.2.1Necessary to protect public moralspublic order 638 5.10.2.2Necessary to secure compliance 639 5.10.2.3Compliance with the chapeau of Art. XIV GATS 639 5.11Institutional provisions 640 6.Specific commitments 640 6.1The primacy of CPC 640 6.2The scheduling modalities 642 6.2.1The 1993 and 2001 Scheduling Guidelines 642 6.2.2Horizontal and sector-specific commitments 645 6.2.3The level of commitments: none, unbound and in-between 646 6.3Interpreting commitments by WTO members 647 7.Art. XVI GATS: Market access under the GATS 648 7.1The objective function of Art. XVI GATS 648 7.2How to schedule XVI commitments 654 7.3Can WTO Members restrict access to their market through measures other than those reflected in Art. XVI.2 GATS? 655 7.4relationship with other provisions 657 7.4.1Art. XVI Art. XVII GATS 657 7.4.2Art. XVI Art. VI GATS 657 8.Art XVII GATS: national treatment 659 8.1The scope of national treatment 659 8.2The test of Art. XVII GATS in a nutshell 662 8.3Putting the test into practice 662 8.3.1Specific commitments must have been undertaken 662 8.3.2Measure affecting trade in services 662 8.3.3Like services service suppliers 663 8.3.4Treatment no less favourable 664 8.4Standard of review: de jure and de facto violations 666 8.5Relationship with other provisions 667 8.5.1Art. XVII Art. XVI GATS 667 8.5.2Art. XVII Art. VI GATS 667 8.5.3Art. XVII Art. XIV GATS 667 9.Art XVIII GATS: additional commitments 668 9.1The scope of additional commitments 668 9.2The mechanics of scheduling additional commitments 669 9.3Relationship with other provisions 669 9.3.1Art XVIII Art. II GATS 669 9.3.2Art. XVIII Art. XIV GATS 669 9.3.3Art. XVIII Art. XXI GATS 669 10.Changes in the specific commitments 670 10.1Replacing and adding to past commitments 670 10.2Multilateral modification of schedules 673 10.3Unilateral modification of schedules 673 11.Liberalizing trade in services; an empirical look 674 12.The WTO Telecoms Agreement 677 12.1The long negotiation 677 12.2Sources of law 678 12.2.1The Annex 679 12.3The Reference Paper 680 12.3.1The rationale for negotiating the Reference Paper 680 12.3.2The Reference Paper in a nutshell 682 12.3.3Anti-competitive practices envisaged 683 12.3.4Interconnection 684 12.3.4.1Who should abide by? Defining the major supplier 684 12.3.4.2International (?) interconnection 685 12.3.4.3Cost-orientated rates of interconnection 687 12.3.4.4Interconnection on reasonable terms and conditions 689 12.4Scheduling commitments in telecoms 689 12.4.1The telecoms-specificity of the Services Sectoral Classification list 689 12.4.2Level of commitments by mode of supply 690 12.4.3Types of limitation maintained 691 13.Concluding remarks 692 17.INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 695 1.Introduction 696 2.Types of intellectual property rights addressed in the TRIPS Agreement 699 3.Overview of the TRIPS Agreement 704 4.Institutional arrangements 706 5.Provisions relating to developing countries 707 6.Public policy criticisms 708 6.1Benefits and costs of higher IP standards for developing countries 709 6.2Protection of traditional knowledge and culture 711 6.3Biological diversity 712 6.3.1Access to genetic resources 713 6.3.2Patentability 716 6.3.3Transfer of technology 717 6.4Health 718 6.4.1Compulsory licensing 719 6.4.2Parallel imports 720 6.4.3Beyond the TRIPS Agreement 722 6.5Food 723 7.The general principles of the TRIPS Agreement 724 7.1The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and other intellectual property treaties 724 7.2Acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights 724 7.3National treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment 725 8.Minimum substantive standards 725 8.1Copyright and related rights 725 8.2Patents 726 8.2.1Patent excludability 726 8.2.2Limited exceptions 727 8.2.3Compulsory licensing 728 8.2.3.1Differing views on compulsory licensing 728 8.2.3.2Provisions in the TRIPS Agreement 729 8.3Trademarks and service marks 730 8.4Geographical indications 730 8.5Undisclosed information or trade secrets 731 8.6Industrial designs 731 8.7Layout designs of integrated circuits 731 9.Enforcement of intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement 732 9.1General principles 732 9.2Civil and administrative procedures and remedies 732 9.3Criminal procedures 732 9.4Border measures 733 9.5Provisional measures 733 9.6Dispute settlement 734 10.Exhaustion of intellectual property rights 734 11.Restrictive business practices 735 11.1Types of restrictive business practices involved in technology licensing agreements 735 11.2Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement 736 12.Conclusions 737 18.Government Procurement 739 1.The Government Procurement Agreement as a Plurilateral Agreement 740 2.The background of the Agreement on Government Procurement 742 2.1General background 742 2.2The Tokyo Round Agreement 743 3.Major features of the Agreement on Government Procurement 744 3.1In general 744 3.2Scope and coverage 744 3.3National treatment and non-discrimination 745 3.4Rules of origin 745 3.5Special and differential treatment for developing countries 746 3.6Technical specifications 747 3.7Tendering procedures 747 3.8Abnormally low tendering 748 3.9Challenge procedures 749 3.10Consultations and dispute settlement 749 3.11Exceptions 750 3.12Taking effect of the Agreement 750 4.Domestic implementations 751 4.1Article XXIV of the Agreement 751 4.2The European Communities 751 4.3The United States 752 4.4Japan 753 5.Dispute settlement in relation to the Agreement on Government Procurement 754 5.1In general 754 5.2GATTWTO dispute cases 755 5.2.1The Trondheim Case 755 5.2.2The Korean Inchon Airport Case 757 5.2.3The State of Massachusetts Case 759 5.2.4The Japan Railway (JR) Case a dispute settlement at challenge procedures 760 19.Developing Countries 763 1.The developing world 763 2.A bit of history 765 3.GATT Article XX(h) 770 4.GATT Article XVIII 770 5.Part IV of the GATT 772 6.The generalized system of preferences 773 7.The Global System of Trade Preferences 777 8.Special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries in the Uruguay Round 777 9.Trade and economic development 779 10.Trade and the right to development 781 11.Enhancing market access 782 12.New initiatives 782 20.Environmental Protection and Trade 785 1.Introduction 786 2.Environmentalist trade demands: a critical analysis 790 3.The environmental impact of trade 790 4.The Tuna Dolphin cases: a false start 794 5.The WTO approach under GATT 1994 797 5.1GATT Article XX(g) 797 5.2GATT Article XX(b) 799 5.3The chapeau of Article XX 801 6.Multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements 803 7.Unilateral measures 805 8.Protection of natural resources 806 9.Environmental standards and process and production methods 807 9.1Standards and technical regulations 807 9.2Process and production methods 808 9.2.1Environmental agreements 811 9.2.2Environmental management systems 813 9.2.3Investment 815 10.Recycling and packaging 816 11.Eco-labels 818 12.The export of hazardous substances and wastes 820 12.1Domestically prohibited goods 820 12.2Waste 821 13.Environmental taxes 823 13.1Taxes on products 826 13.2Taxes on resource use 827 13.3Taxes on inputs 827 14.Conclusions 829 21.Trade and Investment 831 1.Trade and investment in the WTO: from modest initial steps to high hopes and back where we started 831 2.TRIMs 838 2.1The scope of TRIMs 838 2.2TRIMs after GATT: what is the value added? 839 2.3TRIMs and other WTO Annex 1A agreements 844 2.4Substantive provisions 845 2.4.1Standstill 845 2.4.2Transitional phase 845 2.4.3TRIMs inconsistent with Art.III GATT 846 2.4.4TRIMs inconstitent with Art. XI GATT 847 2.5Procedural obligations 848 2.5.1Notification of TRIMs 848 2.5.2Transparency 848 2.6Remaining provisions 848 2.6.1The review of TRIMs 848 3.Concluding remarks 849 22.COMPETITION POLICY AND TRADE 851 1.WTO and competition policy 852 1.1Introduction 852 1.2Anti-competitive conduct that adversely affects international trade 853 1.2.1International cartels, export cartels, and import cartels 853 1.2.2Boycotts, tie-in contracts, and vertical restraints 855 1.2.3Mergers and acquisitions 856 2.Provisions on competition policy in the WTO agreements 858 2.1Agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT Agreement) 858 2.2Trade in services 860 2.3Intellectual property and trade-related investment measures 862 2.4Safeguards and antidumping 863 3.Extraterritorial application of domestic competition laws 864 3.1In general 864 3.2The United States 865 3.3The European Community 869 3.4Germany 871 3.5Japan 872 4.Conflict of jurisdictions 874 4.1In general 874 4.2The ICI case 874 4.3The Swiss Watch case 876 4.4The Laker case 877 4.5The GE/Honeywell case 879 4.6Summary 880 5.Trade policy and competition policy 881 5.1Trade policy and competition 881 5.2The Semiconductor case 882 5.3Competition policy implications of the Semiconductor Agreement 883 6.International cooperation in competition policy 885 6.1Globalizing economy and the need for convergence of competition law and policy 885 6.2International cooperation in competition policy 886 6.2.1Types of cooperation in competition policy 886 6.2.2Positive comity 888 6.2.3Cooperation in investigation 889 6.2.4Convergence of competition policy and law 890 6.2.5The ICPAC Report 892 7.The competition policy debates in the WTO 893 7.1Activities of the working group on trade and competition policy in the WTO 893 7.2Review of the working group's reports 896 7.2.1Consensus 896 7.2.2Divergent views 897 7.3The Ministerial Declaration on Competition Policy adopted at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001 899 8.Conclusions 901 8.1Option 1: A declaration that competition policy is an integral part of the WTO regime 901 8.2Option 2: A plurilateral agreement 901 8.3Option 3: A non-binding multilateral framework for cooperation in competition policy 902 8.4Option 4: A partly-binding multilateral framework 904 23.FUTURE CHALLENGES 907 1.Four crises 907 1.1Internal decision-making 908 1.2Civil society 910 1.3Developing countries 912 1.4Regional and bilateral free trade agreements 913 2.The multilateral trading system at a crossroads 914 3.Societal issues 918 3.1The environment 918 3.2Health 920 3.3Workers' rights 921 3.4Human rights 923 3.5The poor 924 3.6Intellectual property 926 3.7Transparency 927 3.8Governance 927 4.The Doha negotiating agenda 928
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
World Trade Organization.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization).
Tariff -- Law and legislation.
Foreign trade regulation.