Table of contents for Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court / edited by James R. Rogers, Roy B. Flemming, and Jon R. Bond.

Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog.

Note: Contents data are machine generated based on pre-publication provided by the publisher. Contents may have variations from the printed book or be incomplete or contain other coding.


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Contents
Preface
Foreword 
		Kenneth A. Shepsle
Part I: Strategic Games with Congress and the States
Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the 
Supreme Court 
Andrew D. Martin
Why Expert Judges Defer to (Almost) Ignorant Legislators: 
Accounting for the Puzzle of Judicial Deference 
James R. Rogers
Institutions and Independence in Models of Judicial Review 
Christopher Zorn
"John Marshall Has Made His Decision": Implementation, 
Transparency, and Public Support 
Georg Vanberg
Court-State Interactions: National Judicial Power and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause 
Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers
Part II: Strategic Games within the Judicial Hierarchy
A Court of Appeals in a Rational Choice Model of Supreme 
Court Decision Making 
Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald 
S. Sheehan
Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection, and the Structure of 
Judicial Hierarchies 
Charles Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser
Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communications 
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson
Decision Making by an Agent with Multiple Principals: 
Environmental Policy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire
Afterword: Studying Courts Formally 
Lawrence Baum
Appendix: A Primer on Game Theory 
James R. Rogers
References 
Contributors 
Index 

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

United States. Supreme Court.
United States. Congress -- Powers and duties.
Separation of powers -- United States.
Political questions and judicial power -- United States.