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Contents Preface Foreword Kenneth A. Shepsle Part I: Strategic Games with Congress and the States Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the Supreme Court Andrew D. Martin Why Expert Judges Defer to (Almost) Ignorant Legislators: Accounting for the Puzzle of Judicial Deference James R. Rogers Institutions and Independence in Models of Judicial Review Christopher Zorn "John Marshall Has Made His Decision": Implementation, Transparency, and Public Support Georg Vanberg Court-State Interactions: National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers Part II: Strategic Games within the Judicial Hierarchy A Court of Appeals in a Rational Choice Model of Supreme Court Decision Making Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant Selection, and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies Charles Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communications Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson Decision Making by an Agent with Multiple Principals: Environmental Policy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire Afterword: Studying Courts Formally Lawrence Baum Appendix: A Primer on Game Theory James R. Rogers References Contributors Index
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
United States. Supreme Court.
United States. Congress -- Powers and duties.
Separation of powers -- United States.
Political questions and judicial power -- United States.