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Contents Preface, by Armando Rigobello Introduction What is Modern Philosophy? 1 Chapter 1 Modern Philosophy and the Problem of God 5 Chapter 2 The Problem of God. The 'rationalist' and 'empiricist' perspectives 11 Chapter 3 The Kantian Critique and the Hegelian Solution to the 'Problem' of God 17 Chapter 4 Philosophical Theology and the 'Demonstration' of God's Existence 27 Conclusion Questioning the 'Immanentist' Interpretation of Modern Philosophy 31 Appendix Modern Thought and The Search for God 39 Notes 57 Preface The conversation about God is always an appropriate one to our times, even though there are moments in which, in a man's life or in an historical period, such a conversation seems particularly apropos. Those moments usually represent a profound crisis, when we are faced with events that force us to reflect on that which is essential. Leonardo Messinese's essay, which was the Author's Inaugural Address for the Chair of the History of Modern Philosophy at the Lateran University, highlights how one cannot begin a conversation today (concerning the proposed subject matter, and probably any philosophical theme) without joining the theoretical aspects to one's historical situation. More specifically, we should notice that after Descartes the conversation about God is not merely a theme, but rather a problem that is developed from a critical point of view, i.e., from the problem of knowledge as being problematic. Kant, even though he arrives at conclusions that differ from Descartes, follows a path that begins by asking about the conditions of possibility of the knowledge of the theological subject concerning, specifically, the existence of God. He thus arrives at a solution of the problem that is no longer theoretical but practical, even of practical reason. An analogous observation can be made concerning the same question within empiricism: the subject matter is the idea of God, not God in Himself. The object of the empiricist investigation is more the content of the idea of God than the affirmation of his existence. However, the innovation truly arrives with Hegel, who certainly is influenced by the critical path of Kantian philosophy, but who radically separates himself from that philosophy when, in his own system, human knowledge opens itself to the life of the Absolute, and the real becomes the Totality. From the anthropological problem of knowledge and certainty, one arrives at the ontological and metaphysical theme of Truth. Therefore, Hegel, more than the fulfillment of the Cartesian itinerary of modern philosophy, would represent its interruption, or better yet a return to the classical themes about Being and about the Absolute, although re-packaged after having passed through the awareness of the problematic question of critical gnoseology that is at the beginning of modern thought and which has conditioned developments leading up to our own times. We thus arrive at the speculative nucleus of the conversation: "The thesis I wish to assert here," writes Messinese, "is that, after a more attentive reading of the texts, it is difficult to inscribe Hegelian philosophy within modern philosophy in the same sense in which such an operation is perfectly legitimate with regards the other previously mentioned philosophers [he refers to Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant]. One could say that Hegel is not worried so much about affirming the modern principle of doing philosophy, but rather the principle of doing philosophy, i.e., philosophy's proper capacity of having as the content of knowledge nothing less than the Absolute." (p. 21 f) It seems to us that one can summarize this interpretation as it is proposed through the confrontation of three pairs of comparisons: certainty and truth, form and content, faith and knowledge. Certainty and truth are typical Augustinian terms, taken by Descartes: certainty as the solution of doubt inasmuch as truth critically grounded. Form, in this context, is the idealistic knowledge which the Absolute has as content. Certainty, initially, is empty form; once filled with content, it becomes truth. And this is the most mature position of Hegel's thought in which form and content are not separable. Within this position, we have the further specification between knowledge and faith, where knowledge that is not expressed in the empty, rationalistic Enlightenment formality is concrete knowledge. From within this dense, concrete knowledge we discover a dialectical tension between faith and reason, where reason, however, is no longer the illuministic intellect, but rather concrete thought, and faith is Christian faith, which from the narration of salvation or eschatological witness assumes the form of full knowledge, of truth. A further problem, which is indicated as a following task, is the internal clarification of this dialectical tension between an absolute, concrete knowledge and a faith as the content of the Christian message. The problematic tension between faith and reason is thus transferred to the internal workings of philosophy itself. It is about "producing a kind of philosophical transcription of the 'Christian religion,' through which the history of metaphysics becomes also the history of Christian theology, which is concluded with the Christian definition of God as Spirit." (p. 23) Is it possible to bring about, within the most mature Hegelian concept of thought, a divine reality, the Spirit that vivifies the world but also transcends it? Although Hegel's position certainly presents an advantage over past conflicting positions, there is still a risk: "that of erasing the irreducible difference between philosophy and (Christian) religion, between philosophy and theology, i.e., of not recognizing the difference between what could be called the 'religious transcendence' and the 'philosophical transcendence.'" (p. 24) The risk that the Author alludes to opens a series of questions and stimulates further research. The inaugural lesson of Leonardo Messinese is necessarily schematic and just as necessarily programmatic. Its finality is essentially to pinpoint the terms of the problem and indicate a working hypothesis to solve it, once he has delineated in an historical setting the context in which the problem arises in modern thought. Having done this, he skilfully takes a position concerning the very concept of modernity and thus concerning the anti-modern aspects of Hegel's thought: the return to the ontological-metaphysical dimension, interrupting the anthropological turn by overcoming the preliminary character of gnoseology. There are still essential points that await clarification and, perhaps, signal a limitation that is not easily overcome: the justification of the finite dimension found in Totality; the interiorization and purification of thought that should open a path to transcendence passing through immanence. Of particular interest, we can point out the confrontation of the Kantian critique of the modern demonstrations of the existence of God, which would open a pathway from the debated demonstration to the "elevation of the human spirit to God." (p. 30) In order to understand the meaning of this approach it is convenient to read the few pages in Philosophical Theology and the 'Demonstration' of the Existence of God where demonstration and mediation are compared and contrasted. The traditional proofs would be demonstrations and therefore would always be situated in the environment of knowledge; whereas an authentic way (via), rather than a proof would be a mediation, i.e., a dialectical confrontation that would lead to an Aufhebung, i.e., to a definitive improvement, analogous to that which would be typical of Hegel's system. Philosophical Theology is precisely the place of this mediation that brings about the aforementioned elevation. The conversation begins from the premise that "by definition, God is not only an object, even the highest, of philosophy, but rather he is the Totality of being and of thought," and it thus follows that, in a certain sense, it is more a question of recognizing, through thought, the existence of God than demonstrating it, thus distinguishing between "mediation" (in a philosophical sense) and "demonstration" (in a scientific sense) (cf. p. 28). This is a subtle consideration, and to a certain degree, an original one, attempting to legitimize the primacy of mediation as an instrument of philosophical Theology. Armando Rigobello Introduction What is Modern Philosophy? The attempt to represent the philosophy of a specific historical period in a unitary fashion is an increasingly difficult task to pursue. Furthermore, if the philosophy in question is that of the modern period, the doubt spontaneously arises that even attempting such a task would be the expression of an incautious trust in the 'magical' virtues of conceptual thought, in which one can see once again a certain vice at the origin of modern philosophy, at least in its 'rationalistic' version. Nevertheless, one cannot forget that unitary representations of modern philosophy are very wide-spread in our culture, whether philosophical or not. Among the interpretations that describe the arch of knowledge to which our attention is drawn here, I wish to ponder in an introductory way two of these that are the most common and useful for the discussion that I intend to follow. In terms of the first interpretation, the philosophy inaugurated by Cartesian 'rationalism' is constituted by a 'systematization' unknown by previous thought - also in virtue of the role played by the mathematical comprehension of being - which achieves its fulfillment in the 'panlogistic' Hegelian system. Post-Hegelian philosophy, which we could unify under the label of an 'anthropological turn,' would have tried to do justice to an immense pretence regarding the possibilities of human reason and would have cleared the way for itineraries of thought which are closer to a 'human scale,' even allowing for their diversity and opposition. The second interpretation, however, sees in modern philosophy an enterprise which must recognize nihilism as its fulfillment, of which Nietzsche would offer the best diagnosis, and which constitutes, according to different modalities, the common base (albeit not always recognized as such) of important sectors of contemporary thought. The 'nihilistic' success of modern philosophy would be attributed to the attempt, proper to the same philosophy, of substituting man for God as the foundation of being.1 Beyond the common link between these two 'interpretations' - in both, actually, modern thought is presented as a radical opposition with regards to 'Christian-mediaeval' thought - the following difference can be seen. In terms of the first interpretation, modern philosophy would have required too much from reason; as if here the echo of the vindication of a 'strong' reason (albeit in its neo-enlightenment version) can be heard in the thesis that reads modernity in terms of the 'legitimization' of the modern period.2 In terms of the second interpretation, 'modern' reason, apparently strong in its own autonomy, in reality would contain within itself the roots of its own weakness and of the eventual nihilistic success, having lost its authentic foundation, God. On this view, the thesis that regards modernity as a 'secularization' of Christianity should in fact be recognized as being the expression of an implicit nihilism, and where not recognized as such, it would become inconsequential.3 It is possible, however, to hypothesize a less 'radical' interpretation of modern thought, with regards both to its beginnings and its end, and therefore to tend towards a vision of the entire history of philosophy in which the elements of 'novelty' should not prevent the understanding of those 'permanent' elements of the different historical periods. The following reflections should be regarded in the light of this pre-comprehension.
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
God.
Philosophy and religion.
Philosophy, Modern.