Table of contents for Public administration and public management : the principal-agent perspective / by Jan-Erik Lane.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: The Public And The Private Sectors
Need Of Public Administration Or Public Management
New Public Management: The General Framework
Public Management: Merit And Accountability
Public administration and Public Policy: A Contracting Perspective
Conclusion
Chapter 1: 	THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK AND THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR
Introduction
Why is the Principal-Agent Framework Popular?
Principals and Agents: Contracting as the Essence of Interaction
Incentives: How to recognize egoism and social value?
Principal-Agent Games
The Principal-Agent Approach and the Public Sector
Management, Public Organisation and the Principal-Agent Model
Accountability and Competence in Government
Public Management and the Politics/Administration Separation
Conclusion
Chapter 2: 	PUBLIC PRINCIPALS AND THEIR AGENTS
Introduction
From Public Finance to Public Management
The Public Principal
Social Priorities as Incentives
The Fundamental Agency problem in the Public Sector
Public Sector Agency: Hidden Action
Public Sector Agency: Hidden Knowledge
The Two Main Solutions to the Agency problems 
Budgeting: The Principal-Agent perspective
Conclusion
Chapter 3: 	THE ECONOMIC REASONS OF GOVERNMENT
Introduction
Imperium .- Patrimonium
Crown Jewels are not merely Regalia
Eminent Domain
Public Goods and Merit Goods
Public Necessity
Government as Employees, Money and Law
Transaction Costs and Coordination
The Enforcement Mechanism and Groups
Contractarian Schools
Contracting in the Public Sector
The Two Kinds of Transaction Costs
The State and Transaction Costs
Transaction Costs and Fairness
Conclusion
Chapter 4: 	PUBLIC ORGANISATION, INCENTIVES AND RATIONALITY 
IN 
GOVERNMENT
Introduction
Rational Public Administration
Rationality in Policy Making: Will transitivity prevail?
Whose Rationality in Policy Implementation?
Micro Rationality versus Macro Rationality
Cooperation and Coordination Failures
Politics and Administration
Politics as the Arena of Policy Making
Public Organisation as the Implementation of Policy
Political Organisation: Three Basic Types
Public Organisation: The Basic Logic
Accountability
Macro and Micro Rationality and the NPO:s
Conclusion
Chapter 5: 	THE ESSENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: LEGALITY 
AND THE 
RULE OF LAW
Introduction
Legal-Rational Authority
What is Legitimacy?
Legality
Rights
Separation of Powers
Legal Review
Public Administration and Regulation: A Principal-Agent Perspecive
The Hayek Argument about Law and Rule of Law
An Anti-Hayek Argument: Creating Rule of Law
Growing Demand for Rule of Law: Judicialisation
Public Regulation from a Principal-Agent Perspective
Conclusion
Chapter 6: PUBLIC POLICY CRITERIA: THE CAMBRIDGE AND 
CHICAGO
POSITIONS
Introduction
The Chicago Revolution: The Ends or Means of Policy?
The World According to the Chicago Gospel: The Key Hypotheses
Law and Markets: what is the Role of the state?
Chicago School Implications
The World According to the Cambridge Gospel: The Relevance of Social Policy
Conclusion
Chapter 7: 	PUBLIC TEAMS ARE DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATE TEAMS
Introduction
Macro View Upon Public Organisation
Country Specific Models of Public Organisation
Public Teams: People and Rules
Micro perspective on Public Organisation
Limits of New Managerialism
Public Organisation and Public Teams
Conclusion
Chapter 8: 	PUBLIC FIRMS
Introduction
The Contradictions inherent in the public enterprise
Public enterprises and the Economy
Behavioural Consequences of the new System
Overall Assessment of "Like to Like"
Conclusion
Chapter 9: 	PUBLIC INSURANCE
Introduction
The Elements of Pension Systems
The Organisation of Public Insurance
The Economic Dependency Ratio
From Welfare to Workfare: The Moral Hazard Perspective
Social Security and Social Policy
Conclusion
Chapter 10: 	WHAT IS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT POLICY?
Introduction
NPM: Country Specific Models or Experiments
Guiding Principles of Public Management Policy
Toward a Post-Modern Public Organisation
Public Management Reform: What is the drive?
The Public Management Function
Core Management Functions
Does Public Management Matter?
Conclusion
CONCLUDING CHAPTER: CONTRACTING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Introduction
Two Kinds of Transaction Costs
The State and Transaction Costs: The Old Theory
Transaction Costs and Market Failures?
Wagner's Law: Citizen Needs and Modernisation and Public Choice: Supply of 
Public Programs
Transaction Costs: Groups as N-person coordination
Relevance of the Principal-Agent Framework
(a) Different Approaches and Frameworks - is There a Common Core?
(b) The Advantages of the Principal-Agent Approach
© Reasonable and Unreasonable Reform Attempts
Conclusion
LITERATURE
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1	Merit and Accountability
Figure 1. Costs, effort and benefits
Figure 2. Wage, effort and output
Figure 1.1. Principal-Agent Interaction: the general picture
Appendix 1. General government total outlays in per cent of nominal GDP 1986-2005
Table 2.1	Public Sector Reform: Privatisation and Outsourcing
Figure 2.1	Spending Upon Social and Private Objectives
Table 2.2	The Public Sector: Motives and Output
Figure 2.2	Principal-Agent Contracting
Table 2.3	Effort and Output
Figure 2.3	Principal Agent Interaction I
Figure 2.4	Principal Agent Interaction II
Figure 2.5	Principal Agent Interaction III
Figure 2.6	Transaction Costs
Table 4.1	Rationality in Public Administration
Table 4.2	The PD Game
Table 4.3	The Chicken Game
Table 4.4	The Battle of Sexes
Table 4.5	Assurance Game
Table 4.6	The Samaritan's Problem
Table 4.7	The Civic Duty Game
Table 5.1	Rights according to Hohfeld
Appendix 5.1. Hohfeld's' Fundamental Legal Concepts
Figure 6.1	Social Policy and Economic Growth
Appendix 6A, B, C: Categories of social spending in OECD countries
Figure 7.1	In-House and Outhouse Production
Figure 7.2	Monitoring costs and Value
Figure 8.1	Public firms: Strategies and Outcomes
Figure 8.1. 	Looting in a Principal-Agent Perspective
Table 10.1	The Bureaucratic and Post-Bureaucratic Organisation
Table 10.2	Public Management: The Black Box
Figure 11.1	Principal-Agent Interaction I
Figure 11.2	Principal-Agent Interaction II
Figure 11.3	Principal-Agent Interaction III
Figure 11.4	Transaction Costs

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Public administration.
Agency (Law).