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TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: The Public And The Private Sectors Need Of Public Administration Or Public Management New Public Management: The General Framework Public Management: Merit And Accountability Public administration and Public Policy: A Contracting Perspective Conclusion Chapter 1: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR Introduction Why is the Principal-Agent Framework Popular? Principals and Agents: Contracting as the Essence of Interaction Incentives: How to recognize egoism and social value? Principal-Agent Games The Principal-Agent Approach and the Public Sector Management, Public Organisation and the Principal-Agent Model Accountability and Competence in Government Public Management and the Politics/Administration Separation Conclusion Chapter 2: PUBLIC PRINCIPALS AND THEIR AGENTS Introduction From Public Finance to Public Management The Public Principal Social Priorities as Incentives The Fundamental Agency problem in the Public Sector Public Sector Agency: Hidden Action Public Sector Agency: Hidden Knowledge The Two Main Solutions to the Agency problems Budgeting: The Principal-Agent perspective Conclusion Chapter 3: THE ECONOMIC REASONS OF GOVERNMENT Introduction Imperium .- Patrimonium Crown Jewels are not merely Regalia Eminent Domain Public Goods and Merit Goods Public Necessity Government as Employees, Money and Law Transaction Costs and Coordination The Enforcement Mechanism and Groups Contractarian Schools Contracting in the Public Sector The Two Kinds of Transaction Costs The State and Transaction Costs Transaction Costs and Fairness Conclusion Chapter 4: PUBLIC ORGANISATION, INCENTIVES AND RATIONALITY IN GOVERNMENT Introduction Rational Public Administration Rationality in Policy Making: Will transitivity prevail? Whose Rationality in Policy Implementation? Micro Rationality versus Macro Rationality Cooperation and Coordination Failures Politics and Administration Politics as the Arena of Policy Making Public Organisation as the Implementation of Policy Political Organisation: Three Basic Types Public Organisation: The Basic Logic Accountability Macro and Micro Rationality and the NPO:s Conclusion Chapter 5: THE ESSENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: LEGALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW Introduction Legal-Rational Authority What is Legitimacy? Legality Rights Separation of Powers Legal Review Public Administration and Regulation: A Principal-Agent Perspecive The Hayek Argument about Law and Rule of Law An Anti-Hayek Argument: Creating Rule of Law Growing Demand for Rule of Law: Judicialisation Public Regulation from a Principal-Agent Perspective Conclusion Chapter 6: PUBLIC POLICY CRITERIA: THE CAMBRIDGE AND CHICAGO POSITIONS Introduction The Chicago Revolution: The Ends or Means of Policy? The World According to the Chicago Gospel: The Key Hypotheses Law and Markets: what is the Role of the state? Chicago School Implications The World According to the Cambridge Gospel: The Relevance of Social Policy Conclusion Chapter 7: PUBLIC TEAMS ARE DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATE TEAMS Introduction Macro View Upon Public Organisation Country Specific Models of Public Organisation Public Teams: People and Rules Micro perspective on Public Organisation Limits of New Managerialism Public Organisation and Public Teams Conclusion Chapter 8: PUBLIC FIRMS Introduction The Contradictions inherent in the public enterprise Public enterprises and the Economy Behavioural Consequences of the new System Overall Assessment of "Like to Like" Conclusion Chapter 9: PUBLIC INSURANCE Introduction The Elements of Pension Systems The Organisation of Public Insurance The Economic Dependency Ratio From Welfare to Workfare: The Moral Hazard Perspective Social Security and Social Policy Conclusion Chapter 10: WHAT IS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT POLICY? Introduction NPM: Country Specific Models or Experiments Guiding Principles of Public Management Policy Toward a Post-Modern Public Organisation Public Management Reform: What is the drive? The Public Management Function Core Management Functions Does Public Management Matter? Conclusion CONCLUDING CHAPTER: CONTRACTING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR Introduction Two Kinds of Transaction Costs The State and Transaction Costs: The Old Theory Transaction Costs and Market Failures? Wagner's Law: Citizen Needs and Modernisation and Public Choice: Supply of Public Programs Transaction Costs: Groups as N-person coordination Relevance of the Principal-Agent Framework (a) Different Approaches and Frameworks - is There a Common Core? (b) The Advantages of the Principal-Agent Approach © Reasonable and Unreasonable Reform Attempts Conclusion LITERATURE TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1 Merit and Accountability Figure 1. Costs, effort and benefits Figure 2. Wage, effort and output Figure 1.1. Principal-Agent Interaction: the general picture Appendix 1. General government total outlays in per cent of nominal GDP 1986-2005 Table 2.1 Public Sector Reform: Privatisation and Outsourcing Figure 2.1 Spending Upon Social and Private Objectives Table 2.2 The Public Sector: Motives and Output Figure 2.2 Principal-Agent Contracting Table 2.3 Effort and Output Figure 2.3 Principal Agent Interaction I Figure 2.4 Principal Agent Interaction II Figure 2.5 Principal Agent Interaction III Figure 2.6 Transaction Costs Table 4.1 Rationality in Public Administration Table 4.2 The PD Game Table 4.3 The Chicken Game Table 4.4 The Battle of Sexes Table 4.5 Assurance Game Table 4.6 The Samaritan's Problem Table 4.7 The Civic Duty Game Table 5.1 Rights according to Hohfeld Appendix 5.1. Hohfeld's' Fundamental Legal Concepts Figure 6.1 Social Policy and Economic Growth Appendix 6A, B, C: Categories of social spending in OECD countries Figure 7.1 In-House and Outhouse Production Figure 7.2 Monitoring costs and Value Figure 8.1 Public firms: Strategies and Outcomes Figure 8.1. Looting in a Principal-Agent Perspective Table 10.1 The Bureaucratic and Post-Bureaucratic Organisation Table 10.2 Public Management: The Black Box Figure 11.1 Principal-Agent Interaction I Figure 11.2 Principal-Agent Interaction II Figure 11.3 Principal-Agent Interaction III Figure 11.4 Transaction Costs
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