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Contents Acknowledgements 7 Notes on Abbreviations, Translations, and References 9 Introduction. 12 Part I: Determinism Chapter 1. The basis of Stoic determinism (a): everything has a cause. 33 1.1. Bivalence, future truth and causation. 33 1.2. Fatalism and idleness 45 1.3. Incoherent fatalism, non-causal fatalism and Chrysippean fatalism 60 Chapter 2. The basis of Stoic determinism (b): causation is necessitating 66 2.1. The orthodox version of the doctrine of everlasting recurrence 66 2.2. The argument for transcyclical indiscernibility 74 2.3. Transcyclical identity and determinism. 85 Part II: Compatibilism Chapter 3. The threat of external determination. 90 3.1. The Stoic psychology of action. 92 3.2. æEpicurusÆ and the threat of external determination. 103 3.3. ChrysippusÆ internal causes 110 3.4. How much is the theory intended to prove? 124 Chapter 4. Reflection and responsibility. 126 4.1. Overview of the evidence. 127 4.2. ChrysippusÆ account of human nature. 133 4.3. The role of reflection in the psychology of action. 136 4.4. The argument for compatibilism. 148 4.5. Chrysippus and Harry Frankfurt. 153 Chapter 5. The three compatibilist theories of Chrysippus. 165 5.1. The dispute over the authorship of T3. 166 5.2. The differences between T1 and T3. 174 5.3. T3 and Aristotle. 185 5.4. The relation between T2 and T3. 217 Chapter 6. Epictetus on responsibility for unreflective action. 211 6.1. The psychology of unreflective action. 213 6.2. EpictetusÆ normative argument. 224 6.3. Ought and can: responsibility and Epictetan therapy 259 Select Bibliography. 256 Index of Places Index of Names Index of Subjects
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Stoics.
Free will and determinism.