Table of contents for Punishment, compensation, and law : a theory of enforceability / Mark R. Reiff.

Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog.

Note: Contents data are machine generated based on pre-publication provided by the publisher. Contents may have variations from the printed book or be incomplete or contain other coding.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements v
Introduction 1
1. The Means of Enforcement 33
1.1 Physical Force
1.2 Strategic Power
1.3 Moral Condemnation and Regret
1.4 Social Criticism and the Withdrawal of Social Cooperation
1.5 Automatic Sanctions
1.6 Legal Remedies
2. The Goals of Enforcement 90
2.1 The Three Critical Stages Of Enforcement
2.2 Pre-Violation Enforceability and the Facilitation of Social
2.2.1 Enabling Non-Simultaneous Exchange
2.2.2 Encouraging Risk-Taking and Reducing Precautions
2.2.3 Solving Collective Action Problems
2.2.4 Solving Problems of Coordination
2.2.5 Prohibiting Socially Pernicious Cooperation
2.2.6 Instantiating Distributive Justice
2.3 Post-Violation Enforceability and the Facilitation of Social Conflict
2.3.1 Three Retaliatory Strategies
2.3.2 Problems with Tit for Tat
2.3.3 The Objective of Containment
2.4 Acceptance and the Restoration of Social Cooperation
3. Measuring Enforceability in the Pre-Violation State of Affairs 153
3.1 The Threat of Punishment and Pre-Violation Enforceability
3.1.1 The Mathematics of Deterrence
3.1.2 Deterrence and Pre-Violation Enforceability Compared
3.1.3 The Concept of Critical Risk
3.1.4 Rational Beliefs and Beneficiaries
3.2 The Promise of Compensation and Pre-Violation Enforceability
3.2.1 Calculating Compensatory Effect
3.2.2 Problems with the Indifference Test
3.2.3 Indifference and Critical Risk
4. Measuring Enforceability in the Post-Violation State of Affairs 222
4.1 The Role of Deterrence
4.2 Retribution Reconceived
4.2.1 The Retributive Point of View
4.2.2 The Components of the Retributive Equation
4.2.3 Calculating Retributive Equivalence
4.3 Retribution and Post-Violation Enforceability
4.3.1 Retribution as a Sufficient Condition
4.3.2 Retribution as a Necessary Condition
4.3.3 Moral Significance and the Ultimatum Game
4.4 Compensation and Post-Violation Enforceability
4.4.1 The Limits of Compensation
4.4.2 Uncompensable Suffering and Punishment
4.4.3 The Incentive but not the Duty to Compensate
4.5 Pre-Violation and Post-Violation Enforceability Compared
5. The Relationship between Pre-violation Expectations and
Post-Violation Practice 354
5.1 Pre-Violation Expectations and Post-Violation Practice
5.2 Publicity and Pre-Violation Expectations
5.3 Uncertainty and Pre-Violation Expectations
6. Limitations on the Means of Enforcement 388
6.1 Legal Rights and Legal Remedies
6.2 Legal Rights and Lawful Remedies
6.3 The Threat or Imposition of Counter-Sanctions
6.4 Coda on the Advantages of a Unified Theory
7. Special Problems with Legal Remedies 431
7.1 Uncollectability
7.2 Insurance and Other Forms of Burden Shifting
7.3 Transaction Costs
7.4 Nominal Damages
7.5 Failures of Proof
7.6 Errors in Determination
7.7 The Enforcement of Rights in International Law
8. The Value of Nominal Rights 474
8.1 Sources of Pre-Violation Value
8.2 Sources of Post-Violation Value
8.3 Naked Rights and the Provision of Public Reasons for Action
References 490

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Obedience (Law).
Law enforcement.
Punishment -- Philosophy.
Compensation (Law).