Table of contents for The cognitive structure of scientific revolutions / Peter Barker, Hanne Andersen, Xiang Chen.

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Table of contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
1. Revolutions in Science and Science Studies
1.1 The Place of Kuhn's Work in Studies of Science
1.2 Revolutions in Science
1.3 Theories of Concepts
1.3.1 The Classical Theory of Concepts
1.3.2 The Roschian Revolution
1.3.3 Three Responses to the Roschian Revolution
1.4 Nature and Scope of the Present Work
2. Kuhn's Theory of Concepts
2.1 Exemplars
2.2 The Learning Procedure
2.3 Similarity, Dissimilarity and Kind Hierarchies
2.4 Knowledge of Ontology and Knowledge of Regularities
2.5 Individual Differences and Graded Structures
2.6 Generalization to Scientific Concepts
2.7 Nomic and Normic Concepts
2.8 A Scientific Conceptual Structure: Early Nuclear Physics
3. Representing Concepts by Means of Dynamic Frames
3.1 Constituents of Dynamic Frames
3.2 Frames in Human Cognition
3.2.1 Evidence for Attribute-Value Sets
3.2.2 Evidence for Intraconceptual Relations
3.3 Family Resemblance and Graded Structure in Frames
3.4 Frames and Kind Hierarchies
3.5 Knowledge of Regularities and Ontological Knowledge
3.6 Value Constraints and Causal Theories
4. Scientific Change
4.1 The Phase Model of Scientific Development
4.2 Hierarchical Principles of Stable Conceptual Structures
4.2.1 The No-Overlap Principle
4.2.2 The Exhaustion Principle
4.2.3. The Inclusion Principle
4.3 Anomalies as Violations of the Hierarchical Principles
4.3.1. Sundevall's Taxonomy: Conceptual Revision in
Normal Science
4.3.2 Core Concepts of Nuclear Physics in the 1930s
4.3.3 Anomalies in Nuclear Physics During the 1930s
4.4 Types of Conceptual Change
4.5 Revolutionary Change
4.5.1. The Gadow Taxonomy: Revolutionary Change
without Communication Failure
4.5.2 Noddack, Fermi and Fission: Revolutionary Change
with Communication Failure
4.6 Conclusion: A Place For the Cognitive History of
Science
5. Incommensurability
5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Development of Kuhn's Concept of
Incommensurability
5.3 Representing Incommensurability in Frames
5.4 Galileo's Discoveries and the Conceptual Structure of
Astronomy
6. The Copernican Revolution
6.1 The Conceptual Structure of Ptolemaic Astronomy
6.2 The Conceptual Structure of Copernican Astronomy
6.3 The Problem of the Equant Point
6.4 From Orbs to Orbits
6.5 The Conceptual Structure of Kepler's Astronomy
6.6 Incommensurability, Incremental Change and the
Copernican Revolution
7. Realism, History and Cognitive Studies of Science
7.1 Results
7.2 Realism
7.2.1 Incommensurability and Realism
7.2.2. Entities in a Phenomenal World
7.2.3. Anomalies and Restructuring of the Phenomenal
World
7.2.4. Chains-of-Reasoning, Conceptual Continuity and
Incommensurability
7.3 The Symmetry Thesis
References

Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:

Science -- Philosophy -- History -- 20th century.
Science -- History -- 20th century.
Paradigm (Theory of knowledge).
Cognition.
Constructivism (Philosophy).
Kuhn, Thomas S.