Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog.
Note: Contents data are machine generated based on pre-publication provided by the publisher. Contents may have variations from the printed book or be incomplete or contain other coding.
Preface and Acknowledgments ii Introduction 1 Part 1 Historical Background: Practical Reasoning in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant 1. Aristotle on Practical Reasoning and the Structure of Action 11 I Deliberation xx II The practical syllogism xx III Weakness of will xx IV Practical and theoretical reasoning xx V The explanation of action xx VI Intrinsically motivated action VII The structure of action xx VIII The ultimate ground of action IX Conclusion xx 2. Hume and the Instrumentalist Conception of Practical Reasoning 48 I The instrumental role of reason xx II Reasoning as an element in the genesis of action xx III Reasoning conceived as essentially comparative IV Reason, rational action, and moral judgment xx V. Weakness of will and Humean internalism VI. Humean instrumentalism xx VII Conclusion xx 3. Kant and the Autonomy of Practical Reason 77 I Practical reason in the moral sphere xx II Practical reasoning and intention in the application of the Categorical Imperative III The motivational and normative power of reason xx IV Weakness of will and the conflict between reason and inclination xx V The unity of practical and theoretical reason xx VI Conclusion xx Part 2 Practical Reasoning and Intentional Action 4. The Varieties and Basic Elements of Practical Reasoning 110 I The diversity of practical reasoning xx II Practical reasoning, practical argument, and means-end inference xx III Conclusions of practical reasoning xx IV A cognitive-motivational conception of practical reasoning xx V Some basic schemata for representing practical reasoning xxx VI Practical and theoretical reasoning xxx VII Practical reasoning and actions for reasons xxx 5. Practical Reasoning and Intentional Action 141 I The range of intentional action xxx II The phenomenology of reasoning xxx III The reconstructive role of practical arguments xxx IV Inferentialism and the realization of practical arguments xxx V Unconscious and self-deceptive elements in practical reasoning xxx VI Practical reasoning and reasoned action xxx 6. Practical Reasoning in the Dynamics of Action 165 I The need for a dynamic account xxx II Practical reasoning as a causative process xxx III Perceptual and motivational triggers of action xxx IV Causality, lawlike connections, and intentional action xxx V The dynamics of incontinence xxx VI Causality and freedom xxx Part 3 Practical Reasoning, Ethical Decision, and Rational Action 7. The Assessment of Practical Reasoning 186 I The range of criteria for appraising practical Reasoning xxx II Some patterns of practical reasoning xxx III Criteria for assessing practical reasoning xxx IV A Kantian distinction generalized: basis in, vs. mere xxx conformity with, practical reasoning V Some applications of the criteria of assessment xxx VI The defeasibility of practical reasoning xxx VII Combination and compositionality in xxx practical reasoning VIII Rationality and relativity xxx IX The special role of moral reasons xxx 8. General Principles of Practical Appraisal 213 I The special role of moral reasons xxx II A range of substantive principles of practical reason xxx and practical reasoning III Hypothetical imperatives xxx IV Three kinds of normative principle xxx V Two kinds of inference xxx VI Toward sound practical principles xxx 9. Practical Reasoning and Moral Judgment 232 I Moral judgment and moral decision xxx II A framework of moral principles xxx III Moral principles as constituents in practical reasoning xxx IV Normative hierarchies xxx 10. Practical Reasoning in Ethical Decisions 250 I The status of moral principles xxx II Sketch of a model for making difficult ethical decisions xxx III Practical reason, moral decision, and morally justified action xxx 11. The Rationality of Action and the Plurality of Value 264 I The connection between practical reasoning and rational action II Practical reasoning and rationalization xxx III Reasoned action and action for reasons xxx IV Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian views of rational action xxx V A pluralistic conception of rational action xxx Conclusion 289 Notes xxx Index xxx
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication:
Practical reason.
Ethics.
Decision making.
Aristotle.
Hume, David, 1711-1776.
Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804.