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CONTENTS Preface to the Third Edition / ix 1. "PEACE," 1918_1933 / 1 November 11, 1918 / 1 The Treaty of Versailles / 3 The League of Nations / 13 French "Security" / 16 German "Good Faith" / 20 Economic Crisis / 23 2. THE UNEASY PEACE, 1933_1935 / 25 Adolf Hitler / 25 Rearmament and Disarmament / 31 The Four Power Pact / 34 The Dollfuss Affair / 35 Germany's Military Renaissance / 36 The Franco-Soviet Pact / 40 The Anglo-German Naval Agreement / 43 3. YEARS OF CRISIS, 1935_1938 / 47 Mussolini and Ethiopia / 47 Hitler in the Rhineland / 56 The Popular Front and the Spanish Civil War / 67 Appeasement and Appeasers / 72 4. THE ROAD TO WAR, 1938 / 80 The Reichschancellery Meeting / 80 The Anschluss / 84 Crisis in Czechoslovakia / 96 The Munich Conference / 113 The End of Czechoslovakia / 120 5. WAR, 1939 / 129 Danzig / 129 Appeasement Fails / 141 Conclusion / 170 Bibliographical Essay / 175 Index / 191 Maps: German Territorial Losses in Central Europe, 1919 / 5 Nazi Aggression in Central Europe, 1933_1939 / 108 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION Since the original writing of this book, new publications on the origins of World War II have made the study of this topic more complex. There still remains no simple answer to the question: "Why World War II?" Nevertheless, if we are to search for answers, it is necessary to examine the policies, the outlook, and the experience of the statesmen and politicians who wrestled with Adolf Hitler's demands, as well as the military, political and economic conditions of their nations. In addition, Hitler's responsibility for World War II has mounted as new evidence indicates that he craved the war he got in 1939 but failed to get in 1938. It is important also to study the policies of those who had to confront Hitler but did not understand his intentions and policies until it was too late. They preferred peace to another bloody conflict. The aim of this book is to explain the origins of the world war that began in 1939 and ended in 1945 with 30,000,000 people dead and unbelievable devastation over much of the world. This book seeks answers to these questions. Why, after the ordeal of 1914_1918, did Western powers err in assessing the threat that loomed across the Rhine? Why was there so much reluctance on the part of Britain and France to confront the once defeated foe? Why had Germany been permitted to rearm? Why should Germany be allowed to occupy independent nations without a struggle? Part of the answer, as I argue in these pages, can be attributed to the illusion that sufficient security measures were in place to maintain peace. The memories of the terrible destruction and loss of life during the years 1914_1918 seemed to make another world war unthinkable. But this illusion misled men and women into imagining that they were safe from another world conflict until they faced the necessity of choosing between surrender to an aggressor's demands or going to war again. A major theme in this book is the role of appeasers in dealing with Hitler and in trying to avoid war. What was the purpose of a policy of appeasement? Why did the appeasers fail to perceive Hitler's intentions? Why were appeasers so reluctant to confront Hitler? Was there actually a purpose in appeasement? I have tried to show that appeasement was a policy with a history that had public approval. In analyzing appeasement, it is also necessary to examine the role of the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, who was not as foolish as some have imagined. As it turns out, Chamberlain does have his defenders. The Western democracies have been denounced for their failure to go to war against Germany before 1939. Such accusations fail to take into account the public mood and the lack of military preparedness on the part of France and Great Britain. It is important to realize that the Western leaders who had to make the decision for war or peace had grave doubts about the capabilities of their armed forces. The myths that have emerged from the history of this era still flourish. They include the notion that Britain and France could have halted the German reoccupation of the Rhineland with ease had they only tried; that appeasement of Hitler was tantamount to cowardice on the part of Neville Chamberlain; and the fiction of Stalin's eagerness to save the world from Hitler. I have sought to reassess Soviet policies in the light of more recent research which shows that they were never as altruistic as some have imagined. Some historians have condemned the French and British for failing to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939; indeed, one can blame them for their shortsightedness in dealing with Stalin. At the same time, Moscow cannot be acquitted for its duplicity and opportunism in allowing Hitler to unleash his war which ultimately brought death and destruction to the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, American politicians were influenced by the failure to confront Hitler in the years before 1939. Consequently alliances were created, plans developed and American troops stationed in Europe to prevent Soviet aggression. When a crisis erupted over Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, sufficient American military forces were mobilized to force a resolution of the crisis. The United States government did not intend to pursue a policy of appeasement. My intention in writing this book has been to present a concise explanation of the origins of this war in the light of recent research. I have tried to update this book and to provide new details about the events of this significant period of history. I hope that the bibliographical essay will aid readers in learning more about this subject. These pages have profited from discussions with my students and colleagues when I was teaching at Queens Collage and at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. I am grateful to the staff of the Benjamin Rosenthal Library of Queens College for seeking out-of-print books. More recently I am indebted to the staff of the Alderman Library at the University of Virginia for their kind and efficient aid. As always, I must take full responsibility for whatever errors and shortcomings are found in these pages. Keith Eubank Charlottesville, Virginia
Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication: World War, 1939-1945 Causes, Europe Politics and government 1918-1945, Germany Foreign relations 1933-1945, National socialism, Germany Military policy History 20th century