Table of contents for Modern industrial organization / Dennis W. Carlton, Jeffrey M. Perloff.

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Part 1
Introduction and theory 1
Chapter 1
Price Theory&tab;000
Transaction Costs&tab;000
Game Theory&tab;000
Contestable Markets&tab;000
Basic Theory&tab;000
Market Structures&tab;000
Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct&tab;000
Information, Advertising, and Disclosure&tab;000
Dynamic Models and Market Clearing&tab;000
Government Policies and Their Effects&tab;000
Chapter 2
The Firm and Costs&tab;000
The Firm&tab;000
The Objective of a Firm&tab;000
Ownership and Control&tab;000
Mergers and Acquisitions&tab;000
Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions&tab;000
Merger Activity in the United States&tab;000
Merger Activities in Other Countries&tab;000
Empirical Evidence on the Efficiency and Profitability of Mergers&tab;000
Cost Concepts&tab;000
Types of Costs&tab;000
Cost Concepts&tab;000
Economies of Scale&tab;000
Reasons for Economies of Scale&tab;000
Total Costs Determine Scale Economies&tab;000
A Measure of Scale Economies&tab;000
Empirical Studies of Cost Curves&tab;000
Economies of Scale in Total Manufacturing Costs&tab;000
Survivorship Studies&tab;000
Cost Concepts for Multiproduct Firms&tab;000
Adaptation of Traditional Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm&tab;000
Economies of Scope&tab;000
Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope&tab;000
Specialization in Manufacturing&tab;000
An Example of an Industry with Economies of Scope&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 2A
Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm&tab;000
Example 2.1
Value of Limited Liability&tab;000
Example 2.2
Conflicts of Interest Between Managers and share holders&tab;000
Example 2.3
Specialization of Labor&tab;000
Example 2.4
Indiana Libraries&tab;000
Example 2.5
The Baking Industry&tab;000
Example 2.6
Electricity Minimum Efficient Scale and Scope&tab;000
Part 2
Market Structures&tab;000
Chapter 3
Perfect Competition&tab;000
The Behavior of a Single Firm&tab;000
The Competitive Market&tab;000
Elasticities and The Residual Demand Curve&tab;000
Elasticities of Demand and Supply&tab;000
The Residual Demand Curve of Price Takers&tab;000
Efficiency and Welfare&tab;000
Entry and Exit&tab;000
Restrictions On Entry&tab;000
Competition with Few Firms-Contestability&tab;000
Definition of Barriers to Entry&tab;000
Identifying Barriers to Entry&tab;000
The Size of Entry Barriers by Industry&tab;000
Limitations of Perfect Competition&tab;000
The Many Meanings of Competition&tab;000
Example 3.1
Are Farmers Price Takers?&tab;000
Example 3.2
Restrictions on Entry Across Countries&tab;000
Example 3.3
FTC Opposes Internet Bans That Harm Competition&tab;000
Example 3.4
Increasing Congestion&tab;000
Chapter 4
Monopolies, Monopsonies, and Dominant Firms&tab;000
Monopoly Behavior&tab;000
Profit Maximization&tab;000
Monopoly Power&tab;000
The Incentive for Efficient Operation&tab;000
Monopoly Behavior over Time&tab;000
The Costs and Benefits of Monopoly&tab;000
The Deadweight Loss of Monopoly&tab;000
Rent-Seeking Behavior&tab;000
Monopoly Profits and Deadweight Loss Vary with the Elasticity of Demand&tab;000
The Benefits of Monopoly&tab;000
Creating and Maintaining a Monopoly&tab;000
Knowledge Advantage&tab;000
Government-Created Monopolies&tab;000
Natural Monopoly&tab;000
Profits and Monopoly&tab;000
Is Any Firm That Earns a Positive Profit a Monopoly?&tab;000
Does a Monopoly Always Earn a Positive Profit?&tab;000
Are Monopoly Mergers to Eliminate Short-Run Losses Desirable?&tab;000
Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe&tab;000
Why Some Firms Are Dominant&tab;000
The No-Entry Model&tab;000
A Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Example 4.1
Monopoly Newspaper Ad Prices&tab;000
Example 4.2
Monopolizing by Merging&tab;000
Example 4.3
Controlling a key Ingredient&tab;000
Example 4.4
Preventing Imitation-Cat Got Your Tongue?&tab;000
Example 4.5
Protecting a Monopoly&tab;000
Example 4.6
Eu Allows merger to Eliminate Losses&tab;000
Example 4.7
Priest Monopsony&tab;000
Example 4.8
Price Umbrella&tab;000
Example 4.9
China Tobacco Monopoly to Become a Dominant Firm&tab;000
Chapter 5
Why Cartels Form&tab;000
Creating and Enforcing the Cartel&tab;000
Factors That Facilitate the Formation of Cartels&tab;000
Enforcing a Cartel Agreement&tab;000
Cartels and Price Wars&tab;000
Consumers Gain as Cartels Fail&tab;000
Price-Fixing Laws&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 5A
The Effects of Cartel Size&tab;000
Example 5.1
An Electrifying Conspiracy&tab;000
Example 5.2
The Viability of Commodity Cartels&tab;000
Example 5.3
Concrete Example of Government-Aided Collusion&tab;000
Example 5.4
Relieving the Headache of Running a cartel&tab;000
Example 5.5
Vitamins Cartel&tab;000
Example 5.6
How Consumers Were Railroaded&tab;000
Example 5.7
The Social Costs of Cartelization&tab;000
Example 5.8
Prosecuting Global Cartels&tab;000
Chapter 6
Game Theory&tab;000
Single-Period Oligopoly Models&tab;000
Nash Equilibrium&tab;000
The Cournot Model&tab;000
The Bertrand Model&tab;000
The Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model&tab;000
A Comparison of the Major Oligopoly Models&tab;000
Multiperiod Games&tab;000
Single-Period Prisoners' Dilemma Game&tab;000
Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game&tab;000
Types of Equilibria in Multiperiod Games&tab;000
Experimental Evidence on Oligopoly Models&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 6A
A Mathematical Derivation of Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria&tab;000
Appendix 6B
Mixed Strategies&tab;000
Example 6.1
Do Birds of a Feather Cournot-Flock Together?&tab;000
Example 6.2
Oligopoly Welfare Losses&tab;000
Example 6.3
Mergers in a Cournot Economy&tab;000
Example 6.4
Roller Coaster Gasoline&tab;000
Example 6.5
Copying Pricing&tab;000
Example 6.6
Car Wars&tab;000
Chapter 7
Product Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition&tab;000
Differentiated Products&tab;000
The Effect of Differentiation on a Firm's Demand Curve&tab;000
Preferences for Characteristics of Products&tab;000
The Representative Consumer Model&tab;000
A Representative Consumer Model with Undifferentiated Products&tab;000
A Representative Consumer Model with Differentiated Products&tab;000
Conclusions about Representative Consumer Models&tab;000
Location Models&tab;000
Hotelling's Location Model&tab;000
Salop's Circle Model&tab;000
Hybrid Models&tab;000
Estimation of Differentiated Goods Models&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 7A
Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Homogeneous Products&tab;000
Appendix 7B
Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Differentiated Products&tab;000
Example 7.1
All Water Is Not the Same&tab;000
Example 7.2
Entry Lowers Prices&tab;000
Example 7.3
The Jeans Market&tab;000
Example 7.4
A Serial Problem&tab;000
Example 7.5
Combining Beers&tab;000
Chapter 8
Industry Structure and Performance&tab;000
Theories of Price Markups and Profits&tab;000
Measures of Market Performance&tab;000
Rates of Return&tab;000
Price-Cost Margins&tab;000
Measures of Market Structure&tab;000
The Relationship of Structure to Performance&tab;000
Modern Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis&tab;000
Empirical Research&tab;000
Value of Modern Approaches to measuring Performance&tab;000
Appendix 8A
Relationship Between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Price-Cost Margin&tab;000
Appendix 8B
Identifying Market Power&tab;000
Example 8.1
Supermarkets and Concentration&tab;000
Example 8.2
How Sweet It Is&tab;000
Part 3
Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct&tab;000
Chapter 9
Price Discrimination&tab;000
Nonuniform Pricing&tab;000
Incentive and Conditions for Price Discrimination&tab;000
Profit Motive for Price Discrimination&tab;000
Conditions for Price Discrimination&tab;000
Types of Price Discrimination&tab;000
Perfect Price Discrimination&tab;000
Different Prices to Different Groups&tab;000
Other Methods of Third-Degree Price Discrimination&tab;000
Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 9A
An Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders&tab;000
Example 9.1
Example 9.2
Thank You, Doctor&tab;000
Example 9.3
Halting Drug Sales from Canada&tab;000
Example 9.4
Vertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal&tab;000
Example 9.5
A Discriminating Labor Union&tab;000
Example 9.6
Does Competition Always Lower Price?&tab;000
Chapter 10
Advanced Topics in Pricing&tab;000
Nonlinear Pricing&tab;000
A Single Two-Part Tariff&tab;000
Two Two-Part Tariffs&tab;000
Tie-in Sales&tab;000
General Justifications for Tie-in Sales&tab;000
Tie-in Sales as a Method of Price Discrimination&tab;000
Package Tie-in Sales of Independent Products&tab;000
Interrelated Demands&tab;000
Quality Choice&tab;000
Other Methods of Nonlinear Pricing&tab;000
Minimum Quantities and Quantity Discounts&tab;000
Selection of Price Schedules&tab;000
Premium for Priority&tab;000
Appendix 10A
The Optimal Two-Part Tariff&tab;000
Appendix 10B
Nonlinear Pricing with an Example&tab;000
Example 10.1
Football Tariffs&tab;000
Example 10.2
You Auto Save from Tie-in Sales&tab;000
Example 10.3
Stuck Holding the Bag&tab;000
Example 10.4
Tied to TV&tab;000
Example 10.5
Not Too Suite-Mixed Bundling&tab;000
Example 10.6
Price Discriminating on eBay&tab;000
Chapter 11
Strategic Behavior&tab;000
Strategic Behavior Defined&tab;000
Noncooperative Strategic Behavior&tab;000
Predatory Pricing&tab;000
Limit Pricing&tab;000
Investments to Lower Production Costs&tab;000
Raising Rivals' Costs&tab;000
Welfare Implications and the Role of the Courts&tab;000
Cooperative Strategic Behavior&tab;000
Practices That Facilitate Collusion&tab;000
Cooperative Strategic Behavior and the Role of the Courts&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 11A:
The Strategic Use of Tie-in Sales and Product Compatibility to Create or Maintain Market Power with Applications to Networks&tab;000
Example 11.1
Supreme Court Says Alleged Predation Must Be Credible&tab;000
Example 11.2
Evidence of Predatory Pricing in Tobacco&tab;000
Example 11.3
The Shrinking Share of Dominant Firms&tab;000
Example 11.4
And Only a Smile Remained&tab;000
Example 11.5
Strategic Behavior and Rapid Technological Change: The Microsoft Case&tab;000
Example 11.6
Value of Preventing Entry&tab;000
Example 11.7
The FTC Versus Ethyl, et al.&tab;000
Example 11.8
Information Exchanges: The Hardwood Case&tab;000
Chapter 12
Vertical Integration and Vertical Restrictions&tab;000
The Reasons for and Against Vertical Integration&tab;000
Integration to Lower Transaction Costs&tab;000
Integration to Assure Supply&tab;000
Integration to Eliminate Externalities&tab;000
Integration to Avoid Government Intervention&tab;000
Integration to Increase Monopoly Profits&tab;000
Integration to Eliminate Market Power&tab;000
The Life Cycle of a Firm&tab;000
Vertical Restrictions&tab;000
Vertical Restrictions Used to Solve Problems in Distribution&tab;000
The Effects of Vertical Restrictions&tab;000
Banning Vertical Restrictions&tab;000
Empirical Evidence&tab;000
Evidence on Vertical Integration&tab;000
Evidence on Vertical Restrictions&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Example 12.1
Example 12.2
Preventing Holdups&tab;000
Example 12.3
Own Your Own Steel Mill&tab;000
Example 12.4
Double Mark up&tab;000
Example 12.5
Blockbuster's Solution to the Double Manginalization Problem&tab;000
Example 12.6
Free Riding on the Web&tab;000
Example 12.7
Brewing Trouble; Restructing Vertical Integration in Alcoholic Beverage Industries&tab;000
Part 4
Information Advertising, and Disclosure&tab;000
Chapter 13
Why Information is Limited&tab;000
Limited Information About Quality&tab;000
The Market for "Lemons"&tab;000
Solving the Problem: Equal Information&tab;000
Evidence on Lemons Markets&tab;000
Limited Information About Price&tab;000
The Tourist-Trap Model&tab;000
*The Tourists-and-Natives Model&tab;000
Providing Consumer Information Lowers Price&tab;000
How Information Lowers Prices&tab;000
An Example: Grocery Store Information Programs&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 13A
Market Shares in the Tourists-and-Natives Model&tab;000
Example 13.1
Genetically Modified Organisons: Do Consumers NOT care or Not Read?&tab;000
Example 13.2
Understanding Consumer Information&tab;000
Example 13.3
Counteriest Halal Heat&tab;000
Example 13.4
Certifying Thoaugh Breads&tab;000
Example 13.5
Price Dispersion and Search Costs in the Talmud&tab;000
Example 13.6
Price Dispersion&tab;000
Example 13.7
Tourist Cemeras&tab;000
Chapter 14
Advertising and Disclosure&tab;000
Information and Advertising&tab;000
"Search" Versus "Experience" Goods&tab;000
Informational Versus Persuasive Advertising&tab;000
Profit-Maximizing Advertising&tab;000
Effects of Advertising on Welfare&tab;000
Price Advertising Increases Welfare&tab;000
Advertising to Solve the Lemons Problem&tab;000
When Advertising Is Excessive&tab;000
False Advertising&tab;000
Limits to Lying&tab;000
Antifraud Laws&tab;000
Disclosure Laws&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 14A
Profit-Maximizing Advertising&tab;000
Example 14.1
Branding and Labeling&tab;000
Example 14.2
Celebrity Endorsements&tab;000
Example 14.3
Milk Advertising&tab;000
Example 14.4
Social Gain from Price Advertising:&tab;000
Example 14.5
Welfare Effects of Restricting Alcohol Ads&tab;000
Example 14.6
Let All Who Are Hungry Come and Eat&tab;000
Part 5
Dynamic Models and Market Clearing&tab;000
Chapter 15
Decision Making Over Time: Durability&tab;000
How Long Should a Durable Good Last?&tab;000
Competitive Firm's Choice of Durability&tab;000
The Monopoly's Choice of Durability&tab;000
Costly Installation and Maintenance&tab;000
Renting Versus Selling by a Monopoly&tab;000
Resale Market&tab;000
*Consumers' Expectations Constrain the Monopoly&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Appendix 15A
Multiperiod Durable Goods Monopoly&tab;000
Example 15.1
United Shoe&tab;000
Example 15.2
The Importance of Used Goods&tab;000
Example 15.3
The Alcoa Case: Secondhand Economics&tab;000
Example 15.4
Leasing Under Adverse Selection
Example 15.5
Sales versus Rentals&tab;000
Example 15.6
Lowering the Resale Price of Used Textbooks&tab;000
Chapter 16
Patents and Technological Change&tab;000
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks&tab;000
Distinctions Between Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks&tab;000
Incentives for Inventions are Needed&tab;000
Imitation Discourages Research&tab;000
Patents Encourage Research&tab;000
Patents Encourage Disclosure&tab;000
*Patents, Prizes, Research Contracts, and Joint Ventures&tab;000
Determining the Optimal Number of Firms&tab;000
No Government Incentives&tab;000
Government-Financed Research&tab;000
Relaxing Antitrust Laws: Joint Ventures&tab;000
Government Uncertainty&tab;000
Patent Holders May Manufacture or License&tab;000
Eliminating Patents&tab;000
Market Structure&tab;000
Market Structure Without a Patent Race&tab;000
Optimal Timing of Innovations&tab;000
Monopolies in Patent Races&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Example 16.1
Example 16.2
Patents Versus Secrets&tab;000
Example 16.3
Monkey see, Monkey Do&tab;000
Example 16.4
Joint Public-Private R&D&tab;000
Example 16.5
Example 16.6
Mickey Mouse Legislative&tab;000
Example 16.7
European Patents&tab;000
Example 16.8
Patent, Thicket&tab;000
Chapter 17
How Markets Clear: Theory and Facts&tab;000
How Markets Clear: Three Simple Theories&tab;000
Oligopoly Models&tab;000
Empirical Evidence on the Role of Price in Allocating Goods&tab;000
The Rigidity of Prices&tab;000
Movements in Prices and Price-Cost Margins over the Business Cycle&tab;000
Explaining the Evidence&tab;000
Extensions to the Simple Theory: The Introduction of Time&tab;000
Fixed Costs of Changing Price&tab;000
Implications of an Unchanging Price for Inventories&tab;000
Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard&tab;000
Toward a General Theory of Allocation&tab;000
Market Structure is More Than Concentration&tab;000
Produce-to-Order Versus Produce-to-Stock&tab;000
Transmission of Shocks in Industries with Fixed Prices&tab;000
Example 17.1
Price Rigidity: It's the Real Thing&tab;000
Example 17.2
How Much Is That Turkey in the Window?&tab;000
Example 17.3
The Cost of Changing Prices&tab;000
Example 17.4
Creating Futures Markets&tab;000
Part 6
Government Policies and Their Effects&tab;000
Chapter 18
International Trade&tab;000
Reasons for Trade Between Countries&tab;000
Comparative Advantage&tab;000
Intra-Industry Trade in Differentiated Products&tab;000
Free Riding, International Price Differences, and Gray Markets&tab;000
Tariffs, Subsidies, and Quotas&tab;000
Creating and Battling Monopolies&tab;000
Strategic Trade Policy&tab;000
Industries with Positive Externalities&tab;000
Empirical Evidence on Intervention in International Trade&tab;000
Appendix 18A
Derivation of the Optimal Subsidy&tab;000
Example 18.1
Gray Markets&tab;000
Example 18.2
Timber Wars and Retaliation&tab;000
Example 18.3
Foreign Doctors&tab;000
Example 18.4
Being Taken for a Ride: Japanese Cars&tab;000
Example 18.5
Wide-Body Aircraft&tab;000
Example 18.6
Steeling from U.S. Customers&tab;000
Chapter 19
Antitrust Laws and Policy&tab;000
The Antitrust Laws and Their Purposes&tab;000
Antitrust Statutes&tab;000
Goals of the Antitrust Laws&tab;000
Who May Sue?&tab;000
Economic Theory of Damages&tab;000
The Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws&tab;000
Private Litigation&tab;000
Market Power and the Definition of Markets&tab;000
Market Power&tab;000
Market Definition&tab;000
Cooperation Among Competitors&tab;000
Price-Fixing and Output Agreements&tab;000
Not All Agreements Among Competitors Are Illegal&tab;000
Information Exchanges Among Competitors&tab;000
Oligopoly Behavior&tab;000
Exclusionary Actions and Other Strategic Behavior&tab;000
Competition Between Rivals&tab;000
Competitive Behavior Deemed Undesirable by the Court&tab;000
Vertical Arrangements Between Firms&tab;000
Price Discrimination&tab;000
Price Discrimination Under Robinson-Patman&tab;000
Tie-in Sales&tab;000
Effects of Antitrust Laws on the Organization of Firms&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Example 19.1
Using the Government to Create Market Power: Misuse of the Orange Book&tab;000
Example 19.2
Conflict Between European an U.S. Antitrust Authorities: GE-Hneywell&tab;000
Example 19.3
The Merger Guidelines&tab;000
Example 19.4
Antitrust Laws in Other Countries&tab;000
Example 19.5
Colleges and Antitrust: Does Your School Belong to a Cartel?&tab;000
Example 19.6
The FTC Plays with Toys 'Я' Us&tab;000
Chapter 20
Regulation and Deregulation&tab;000
The Objectives of Regulators&tab;000
Market Inefficiencies&tab;000
Correcting Market Inefficiencies&tab;000
Capture Theory and Interest-Group Theory&tab;000
Making Monopolies More Competitive&tab;000
Government Ownership&tab;000
Franchise Bidding&tab;000
Price Controls&tab;000
*Rate-of-Return Regulation&tab;000
Quality Effects&tab;000
Making Competitive Industries More Monopolistic&tab;000
Limiting Entry&tab;000
Agricultural Regulations: Price Supports and Quantity Controls&tab;000
Ground Transportation&tab;000
Suggested Readings&tab;000
Example 20.1
Pizza Protection&tab;000
Example 20.2
Example 20.3
Legal Monopolies&tab;000
Example 20.4
Public, Monopolistic, and Competitive Refuse Collection&tab;000
Example 20.5
Rent Control&tab;000
Example 20.6
Brewing Trouble&tab;000
Example 20.7
Deregulating Electricity: California in Shock&tab;000
Example 20.8
International and U.S. Deregulation in Telecommunications&tab;000
Example 20.9
European Deregulation of Airlines&tab;000
Answers to Odd-Numbered Problems&tab;000
Legal Case Index&tab;000
Author Index&tab;000
Subject Index&tab;000

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