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1. Getting to work: 1.1 Politics sets the stage 1.2 Designing for multiple goals 1.3 Comparing seller revenues 1.4 The academic critics 1.5 Plan for this book Section I. The Mechanism Design Approach: 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms: 2.1 Formulation 2.2 Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies 2.3 Balancing the budget 2.4 Uniqueness 2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction 2.6 Conclusion 3. The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence: 3.1 Hottelling's lemma 3.2 The envelope theorem in integral form 3.3 Quasi-linear payoffs 3.4 Conclusion 4. Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences: 4.1 The single crossing conditions 4.2 Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies 4.3 Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model 4.4 Expected-revenue maximizing auctions 4.5 Conclusion 5. Interdependence of types and values: 5.1 Which models and assumptions are 'useful'? 5.2 Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions 5.3 Wilson's drainage tract model 5.4 Correlated types model interdependent values 5.5 Conclusion 6. Auctions in context: 6.1 The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant 6.2 Symmetric models with costly entry 6.3 Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition 6.4 After the bidding ends 6.5 Conclusion Section II. Multi-Unit Auctions: 7. Uniform price auctions: 7.1 Uniform price sealed bid auctions 7.2 Simultaneous ascending auctions 7.3 Conclusion 8 Package auctions and combinatorial bidding: 8.1 Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems 8.2 Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions 8.3 Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions 8.4 Conclusion.