Table of contents for Efficiency wage models of the labor market / edited by George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen.

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Acknowledgments for reprinted articles
1. Introduction George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen
2. The theory of underemployment in densely populated backward areas Harvey Leibenstein
3. Another possible source of wage stickiness Robert M. Solow
4. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz
5. Involuntary unemployment as a principal-agent equilibrium James E. Foster and Henry Y. Wan, Jr.
6. Labor contracts as partial gift enchange George A. Akerlof
7. A model of the natural rate of unemployment Steven C. Salop
8. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages Andrew Weiss
9. Hierarchy, ability, and income distribution Guillermo A. Calvo and Stanislaw Wellizs
10. Incentives, productivity, and labor contracts Edward P. Lazear and Robert L. Moore
11. Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets James M. Malcomson.

Library of Congress subject headings for this publication: Wages Econometric models