Greasing the Wheels

Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress

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Introduction

In 1985 and 1986, Congress undertook the largest reform of the U.S. tax code since World War II. The goal of the reformers, particularly President Ronald Reagan, was to reduce personal income tax rates by raising corporate tax rates and closing most loopholes for wealthy individuals and businesses (Birnbaum and Murray 1987, p. 22). One of the key players in that process was former Representative Dan Rostenkowski of Chicago, chair of the House Ways and Means Committee. To pass the legislation in the committee required both political skill and resources, and his were considerable. The New York Times described how he did it:

On a Friday morning in November . . ., hours before the Ways and Means Committee was to vote . . ., Mr. Rostenkowski sat with a list in the committee's library and began calling other members to tell them of special tax breaks he had sneaked into the bill just for them. They included favorable tax treatment for stadiums in Cleveland, Miami and the Meadowlands in New Jersey, for waste-treatment plants in New York City and on Long Island, for a convention center in Miami, for parking garages in Memphis and Charleston, S. C., for St. Luke's Hospital and New York University in Manhattan, and, not surprisingly, for a savings and loan association in Chicago. Members who planned to vote against the bill got nothing for their districts. (Rosenbaum 1994)

Rostenkowski's horse trading is part of the tradition commonly known as pork barrel politics. It is a phenomenon with a long and widely despised history in the lore of politics. Yet the New York Times article that described the congressman's strategy in a manner that invited the reader's disapproval also noted its richest irony: By giving out a few new tax breaks, euphemistically called "transition rules," to key representatives, Rostenkowski played a central role in passing a broad reform of the tax
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code that “struck at the nerve of the nation’s most powerful lobbyists and special interests and ... was widely applauded by many of the same advocates of clean government who found Mr. Rostenkowski’s methods so objectionable” (Rosenbaum 1994).

The irony is this: pork barrelling, despite its much maligned status, gets things done. Simply put, that is the overriding thesis of this book. To be sure, it is a practice that succeeds at a cost, but it is a cost that many political leaders are willing to pay in order to enact the broader public policies that they favor. The pages that follow explore the complexities and subtleties of what pork barrelling political leaders accomplish and how they do it, but the arguments are at heart an elaboration of this theme: Pork barrel benefits are used strategically by policy coalition leaders to build the majority coalitions necessary to pass broad-based, general interest legislation. Leaders do so by tacking a set of targeted district benefits onto such bills, using the benefits as a sort of currency to purchase legislators’ votes for the leaders’ policy preferences, much as political action committees make campaign contributions in the hope of swaying members’ votes. In so doing, policy coalition leaders may even overcome the strictures of party loyalty, using pork to lure members of the other party away from their own leadership. The irony of this coalition-building strategy is that pork barrel legislation, the most reviled of Congress’s legislative products, is used by coalition leaders to produce the type of policy that is most admired: general interest legislation.

Pork barrelling is not the only way in which leaders create majority coalitions for general interest bills, but, especially in certain policy areas, it is an important one. This book explores the strategies by which leaders use pork barrel benefits to form majority coalitions and analyzes the impact of these strategies on the decisions of the legislators who receive the benefits. Additionally, to see how the process operates in the real world, the book examines the use of pork barrel benefits to pass a number of major pieces of legislation, including highway bills, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and an array of appropriations bills. The case studies include bills in both the House of Representatives and the Senate during years of both Democratic and Republican control.

The pork barrel is a popular metaphor for projects and favors for legislators’ districts. Although the origin of the term is somewhat murky, it probably derives from the pre–Civil War South, when on holidays slave owners set out barrels of salt pork for their slaves, who were frequently undernourished. The resulting frantic rush for the barrel inspired the unflattering popular image of much better-fed politicians grabbing benefits
for their constituents with the fervor of starving slaves scrambling for food. The term was used in Congress as early as the 1870s to describe legislation containing projects for members’ districts (Ashworth 1981; Safire 1988). Seen in this light, descriptions of pork barrel politics typically are overlaid with moral opprobrium.

The pejorative term “pork barrel politics” is frequently replaced in the scholarly literature by the more neutral term “distributive politics,” which refers to the process by which distributive policy is made. Definitions of the latter vary somewhat, but the following is satisfactory for our purposes: Distributive policy targets discrete benefits to specific populations such as states and congressional districts but spreads the costs across the general population through taxation. Such benefits have so little policy connection to each other that changing or even removing one district’s benefit from a bill would have no impact on the benefits given to other districts (Shepsle and Weingast 1981, p. 96), although it might diminish the bill’s prospects of passage by reducing its supporting coalition. Packages of such benefits, according to Theodore Lowi, “are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule” (Lowi 1964, p. 690).

The scholarly literature on distributive politics focuses on omnibus pork barrel bills, legislation that consists of nothing but distributive projects. By contrast, this book focuses on the use of distributive benefits to win votes for general interest legislation, defined here as broad-based measures that affect the whole nation or a large segment of it. General interest legislation need not, by this definition, fall evenly on all districts or individuals; all that is necessary is that it affect all districts or all of those in a broad category. Nor does this definition imply that general interest legislation is in the “public interest.” Losers might well outnumber winners, or the total costs might be greater than the total benefits. All I mean is that such legislation provides a collective benefit, defined as a “good, such that if any person . . . in a group . . . consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group” (Olson 1965, p. 14). The “group” in this case extends far beyond individual congressional districts. The argument of this book is that distributive benefits are added to general interest bills as “sweeteners” to buy the votes of enough members to create a majority coalition in favor of such bills.

The two terms, “distributive” and “pork barrel,” will be used interchangeably here, despite the fact that some scholars do not treat them as synonymous. Rather, they define pork barrel policy as that subset of
distributive policy that is inefficient, where the costs of the policy exceed the benefits (Ferejohn 1974, p. 235; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Baron 1991). However, I do not employ that distinction here, where the point is to explicate the political uses of distributive politics in policy making, not its economic implications. The efficiency or inefficiency of a policy, while economically important, is rarely central to decisions in Congress about whether to request or provide benefits. More important, although some members of Congress routinely oppose distributive policy because of its presumed inefficiency, most members ignore the distinction in practice, as the case studies in this book show. Their incentive to do so stems in part from the fact that project costs in the form of money spent in a member’s district can be reinterpreted politically as benefits to the district. As those costs are shared nationally by all taxpayers (Shepsle and Weingast 1981), a legislator normally has little reason to care about the economic efficiency of his or her own project or of any bill that contains it (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). Furthermore, the readiness with which federal agencies claim that a project’s benefits equal or exceed its costs highlights the practical difficulties of making judgments about project efficiency in any case (Maass 1951).

Pork barrel or distributive policy dates from the earliest years of the Republic. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Congress’s distributive policies consisted mainly of projects of physical improvement such as lighthouses, roads and canals, dams and harbors; the classic source of those benefits was rivers and harbors legislation. The purpose of such projects was described in 1888 by James Bryce, who wrote that “grants from the federal treasury for local purposes” were routinely employed by members of Congress seeking to secure their renominations (Bryce 1959, p. 40). Today distributive benefits are found in nearly all policy areas, especially in appropriations bills, where targeted funding is granted for a broad range of purposes, including highway interchanges, supercomputers for universities, detention centers for illegal immigrants, and studies of agricultural pests, such as fire ants.

However, with the advent of the environmental movement, some of the more traditional types of pork barrel projects, such as dams and river and harbor dredging, have aroused considerable public opposition for their negative environmental impact. More broadly, John Ferejohn (1974, pp. 52–54) shows that district projects can impose local costs in addition to offering benefits. In those cases, the emergence of opposition depends on whether the costs are concentrated, falling on those who may already be organized and thus capable of quick action, or dispersed,
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falling on those who are less likely to be organized. If river navigation is improved for barges by dredging, other commercial interests, such as trucking, consequently may lose business, producing winners who will support and losers who will oppose a district project. Similarly, dams destroy upstream wildlife habitat, stimulating opposition from environmental groups. Congress has adapted, responding to such opposition with what has been called “post industrial” pork, which includes money for such things as environmental cleanup projects and university research, otherwise known as academic pork (Starobin 1987; Savage 1999).

Clearly, pork barrel politics occurs because members of Congress believe that district benefits enhance their chances for reelection. In studies of distributive politics, the electoral connection is axiomatic. In his study of Congress’s allocation of water projects, Ferejohn speculates that there are three reasons why such projects are valuable to members. All of those reasons are related either directly or indirectly to reelection. First, members believe that bringing home projects gives them a record of constituency service on which they can campaign. A second and related benefit is that assiduous attention to constituents can help to create an impression of invulnerability, redirecting to more opportune targets the ambitions of high-quality potential election challengers. Third, like old-time machine politicians, members of Congress can buy with projects the freedom to do as they wish, or as their party leadership wishes, on issues of more importance to them on Capitol Hill (Ferejohn 1974, pp. 49–51). In other words, they can buy leeway for their activities in Congress (Fenno 1978) with the credit that pork barrel service earns for them with constituents.

In mass media accounts of pork barrel politics, the tone is typically critical, with an emphasis on the self-serving aspects of “bringing home the bacon.” Journalist Brian Kelly quoted a White House aide’s cynical comment: “If you’re a congressman and you want to get reelected – and you do because it’s a pretty great job despite all the whining you hear from them – then you give things to the people who can vote for you. In return they keep electing you. The hell with what it means for the rest of the country” (Kelly 1992, p. 6). The electoral benefits of pork may be concentrated or dispersed within the constituency. When organized interests or businesses benefit, as they do, for example, when the project entails highway construction contracts, the benefits can be said to be concentrated. When benefits go (perhaps simultaneously) to a large group of unorganized constituents, as would a new highway interchange that relieves downtown congestion, the benefits are dispersed. In either case, members of Congress
expect to profit electorally. Where benefits are dispersed, they expect to be rewarded with the votes of grateful constituents. When benefits are concentrated, they may receive a smaller direct electoral reward but gain substantial campaign contributions, which, incumbents hope, eventually can be parlayed into votes.

The following sections present views of pork barrel or distributive politics as seen from quite different perspectives. First, the journalistic view is the most familiar to political observers; it is a largely negative view of pork barrel politics. While the journalistic perspective provides insight into the distribution of pork barrel projects, it generally fails to place the use of such projects in a broader strategic context. In particular, journalists typically overlook the utility of pork barrel benefits for crafting broad-based legislation. Second, in the realm of scholarship, I examine important literature on the theory of distributive politics, as well as literature that deals with how Congress passes general interest bills and how that literature treats pork barrel politics. I argue that this literature also fails to recognize fully the use of pork barrel benefits for passing general interest legislation.

THE JOURNALISTIC VIEW OF PORK BARREL POLITICS

Journalistic reports of the impact of pork barrel politics suggest that bringing large amounts of money home to the district can indeed protect members of Congress. Well known in the 1970s was Pennsylvania’s Eleventh Congressional District, an impoverished coal-mining area whose citizens showed their gratitude to the colorful Representative Daniel Flood by reelecting him after his indictment on various bribery and corruption charges. Flood was beloved not only for his theatrical style, but also for the millions of dollars in benefits that he funneled to the district as vice chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. After pleading guilty to reduced charges, Flood left Congress in 1980 (Kelly 1992, pp. 72–74).

Next door in Pennsylvania’s Tenth District, Joseph McDade’s constituents similarly benefited from his position on the Appropriations Committee. The Greater Scranton Chamber of Commerce estimated in 1992 that federally financed projects valued at $420 million were currently under construction in the district, nearly all of them due in large part to McDade’s efforts. In 1992, he too was indicted, in this case on five counts of bribery, racketeering, and other corruption charges, including allowing his son to accept $7,500 in tuition money from a defense contractor.
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Like the voters of the Eleventh District, McDade’s constituents gave him the benefit of the doubt, reelecting him twice by large margins during his unsuccessful legal challenges to the indictment. As the mayor of Scranton said about the tuition payments, “Maybe Joe didn’t know his son was getting a scholarship” (Hinds 1992). When he was finally acquitted of all charges during his 1996 reelection campaign, his constituents reelected him again; he retired in 1998.

Brian Kelly’s *Adventures in Porkland* (1992) offers a number of examples of what the author considers pork barrel profligacy. He traces, among other things, the battle over an item in an agriculture appropriations bill that earmarked $500,000 to make a memorial of Lawrence Welk’s childhood home in Strasburg, North Dakota. The effort to remove that item from the budget was one of the few successful attacks on hundreds of pork barrel projects in appropriations bills in 1991. However, a project that survived the winnowing process was Senator Ted Stevens’s (R-Alaska) $25 million supercomputer for the University of Alaska. On paper, this was an unremarkable if expensive example of the increasingly common practice of earmarking money for scientific research for specific universities. Kelly notes that this project, part of Senator Stevens’s plan to harness the solar energy that creates the aurora borealis, evidently, if surprisingly, passed the “laugh test” that a source told Kelly was being applied to appropriations project requests that year; that is, projects that “sounded just too downright stupid for words [were] going to get cut out” (Kelly 1992, pp. 206–207). Despite passing that test, Stevens’s project evidently was the object of some skepticism: “One . . . physicist noted that to collect the energy would require an antenna stretching from Mount McKinley to Mount Fuji, and then it would power nothing more than a microwave oven” (Savage 1999, p. 172).

The obvious appeal of distributive politics notwithstanding, Congress has long had its anti-pork crusaders. A group composed of members of Congress and representatives of nonprofit taxpayer groups attempted to purge the 1991 appropriations bills of what they considered the most egregious examples of pork. Led by Representatives Tim Penny (D-Minn.) and Harris Fawell (R-Ill.), this group called themselves the “Porkbusters.” They introduced legislation in 1991 to cut 325 projects worth $1 billion from that year’s appropriations bills (Kelly 1992, p. 56). Despite their best efforts, hundreds of the projects that they tried to kill survived, and a number of Porkbusters were embarrassed on the floor by Appropriations Committee members, who pointed out that the sponsors themselves had benefited from the committee’s largesse in the past. Nevertheless,
the group continued to introduce legislation to remove large numbers of projects from spending bills. Perhaps not surprisingly, it enjoyed only modest success (Pound 1994; “Who Ya Gonna Call?” 1997).

The Porkbusters worked closely with the nonprofit Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), a group formed in the wake of the Reagan administration’s Grace Commission (named for its chair, industrialist J. Peter Grace) to seek out government waste. Grace himself went on to become co-founder of CAGW in 1984, along with columnist Jack Anderson. That organization’s major activity is to track projects earmarked for states and congressional districts in annual appropriations bills and publicize them at a press conference held jointly each year with members of Porkbusters. In an effort to attract maximum coverage, the press briefing is clearly designed as theater:

Rep. David Minge, D-Minn., co-chairman of the House’s self-proclaimed Porkbuster Coalition, joined other budget hawks at a news conference, where they were flanked by a pig eating novelty dollar bills and a person in a pink pig suit. The Citizens Against Government Waste put out the “2000 Congressional Pig Book,” which lists members of Congress who secured funding for more than 4,000 home-state “pork” projects worth $17.7 billion. (“Minnesota Ranks Near the Bottom” 2000)

Despite Congress’s continued enthusiasm for distributive benefits, press accounts of the 1994 congressional elections suggested that there may be a limit to the degree to which pork barrel projects can inoculate incumbents against electoral defeat. In those elections, thirty-five Democratic House incumbents were defeated by Republican challengers. If that year was remarkable for the number of incumbents unseated, it was also noted in the press for the defeat of a number of members who for years had showered their districts with federal benefits. Once considered invulnerable, representatives such as House Speaker Thomas Foley and Texas Democrat Jack Brooks were defeated. In a pre-election visit to Brooks’s district, reporter Michael Wines quoted the representative’s description of some of the reasons for his forty-two years of electoral success:

The big Pontiac glided past a local television station (“Helped them with the FCC.”); a brief stop at the intracoastal canal in nearby Port Arthur (“I widened it; deepened it.”); a pause at the seawall (“Forty, fifty-million dollars”).

Later he fired up a cigar and cruised past the site of the new Federal prison (“2,000 jobs, $150 million”) and Lamar University at Beaumont, where a cigar-clutching statue honors the 71-year-old Congressman whose labors elevated the school from backwater junior college to four-year university. (Wines 1994)
But such successes may have played differently with voters in 1994 than in the past; they certainly did not save Jack Brooks. As an analysis in the *New York Times* noted, “Once there was a time when clout and seniority were good. . . . [But] worthwhile local projects are no longer easily distinguishable from simple pork in the minds of many voters. . . .” (Toner 1994).

Notwithstanding the Republicans’ loud condemnation of pork barrel politics during the 1994 election campaigns, Republican freshmen in the 104th Congress quickly began to serve their constituencies in the traditional manner. For example, George Nethercutt (R-Wash.), who unseated Speaker Thomas S. Foley by depicting him as a pork barrel politician, quickly became a strong advocate of farm subsidies in his agricultural district once in office (Wines 1995). Additionally, a *New York Times* tally of 1995 awards of highway and urban mass transit projects by the House Appropriations Committee’s transportation subcommittee shows that Republicans and Democrats alike received projects, but members of the congressional majority, the Republicans, received considerably more than the Democrats (Wines 1995), despite the party’s denunciation of pork barrel politics in the 1994 election campaign.

By the fall of election year 2000, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that things were back to normal:

. . . the more aggressive Republican approach has been to provide vulnerable incumbents opportunities to address their districts’ local concerns. And that, in turn, has meant that year-end appropriation bills are laden with local projects. “You can’t point to a single vulnerable incumbent who hasn’t been taken care of in the appropriations process,” boasts Tony Rudy, deputy chief of staff to House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Texas). “Since Day One, we’ve asked our vulnerable members what they need and how we can help them get it. These guys don’t have to run a one-size-fits-all race.” (Hook 2000)

The kind of pork barrel politics that is the focus of this book – trading projects for members’ votes for broad public policy – is characterized in the media as negatively as any other pork barrel deal. For example,
President Clinton received a considerable amount of bad press for buying the votes of members of the House of Representatives for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As one account described that effort, “. . . the vote on NAFTA last month came down to old-fashioned bribery” (Anderson and Silverstein 1993, p. 752).

Nevertheless, a description of former Public Works and Transportation Committee Chair Robert Roe’s generosity to his colleagues reveals the benefits in terms of personal power: “The bills that went before his subcommittee were his personal handiwork, and drew votes from legions of members owing him a personal debt” (Davis 1987, p. 2594). This and similar accounts typically leave the impression that although it may be legal, such vote buying is corrupt and immoral, as legislators sell out the national interest for something as trivial as a highway or, in the case of NAFTA, favorable treatment for their district’s farmers, such as broomcorn growers and tomato farmers.

However, there is some recognition that, as this book argues, such spending can help speed the passage of legislation of national importance: “Pork has . . . come to play a role in passing major bills with sweeping national impact. . . . As part of such deal making, those trying to pass a given bill will sweeten it by adding dozens and sometimes hundreds of items of interest to individual members” (Kelly 1992, p. 11). And “when applied with skill, pork can act as a lubricant to smooth passage of complex legislation”; “perhaps the most time-honored rule of pork-barreling is that any member getting a project is duty bound to support the rest of the bill” (Starobin 1987, p. 2583 and 2587).

The New Republic, almost alone among journalistic publications, recognized the strategic use of pork and went so far as to praise it as a tool for creating majority coalitions:

Even if every single pork barrel project really were a complete waste of federal money, pork still represents a very cheap way to keep our sputtering legislative process from grinding to a halt. In effect, pork is like putting oil in your car engine: it lubricates the parts and keeps friction to a minimum. This is particularly true when you are talking about controversial measures. (Cohn 1998, p. 23)

Similarly, Ellwood and Patashnik (1993), themselves academics, writing in Public Interest, praised the practice, arguing that it allows legislators to take risky actions for the public good and protect themselves from electoral retaliation. Yet none of these authors systematically examines how pork is used to gain votes or the effectiveness of this strategy for passing
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general interest bills. Nor does the scholarly literature on distributive politics, discussed in the following section, do so.

THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS

A careful reading of any serious newspaper shows that congressional leaders exert great effort to enact public policy of national scope; moreover, political parties struggle over competing visions of the public good. The following section of this chapter and Chapter 2 analyze the serious difficulties that Congress faces in its efforts to pass general interest legislation and how the distribution of pork barrel projects helps them to do so. Yet despite those problems, journalistic accounts show that Congress traditionally has had little trouble taking collective action to provide legislative packages made up exclusively of distributive or pork barrel benefits, defined earlier as benefits that are targeted to discrete populations, such as a geographic area, and paid for through general taxation.

A large and distinguished body of scholarship focuses explicitly on the passage of purely distributive legislation. Formal theories of distributive politics examine legislative bargaining to pass omnibus bills that provide distributive benefits for a majority of legislators’ districts. Such bills are composed of nothing but pork barrel benefits and therefore do not include general interest provisions. Formal distributive theories assume, first, that members seek distributive benefits for their constituents in order to get reelected (e.g., Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1984).2 Second, they assume that legislatures operate under majority rule arrangements; thus, in order for any member to secure a pork barrel project, a majority must receive them. After all, no one has a direct personal interest in other members’ projects, but each has a strong interest in his or her own; therefore, each member has an incentive to vote for other legislators’ projects in exchange for those members’ votes for his or her own. In a majoritarian institution, each project must obtain the support of at least 50 percent plus one of the members present and voting in order to pass. The way to achieve that is to give at least a minimal majority of the voting members a personal interest in voting for other members’ projects by including in the bill projects for all members of the prospective majority. The resulting legislation consists of an omnibus bill of pork barrel projects.

2 However, it should be noted that the more general theories of distributive politics are not inconsistent with a variety of motivations. See Shepsle and Weingast 1994.
Formal theories concentrate in part on the important question of the size of the majority – minimal versus universal – whose members will receive projects and thus vote for the bill. Theorists have debated the equilibrium size of such pure distributive policy coalitions. On one hand, it is argued that the victorious coalition for distributive legislation will be minimal winning, in which only a bare majority of members gets projects (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Riker 1962; Riker and Ordeshook 1973; Snyder 1991). The incentive to join such a coalition is that the total benefit pie, which is paid for by all taxpayers, is divided up fewer ways.

Others argue that omnibus pork barrel bills will be passed by universalistic coalitions (Barry 1965; Ferejohn 1974; Mayhew 1974; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Niou and Ordeshook 1985), which form when legislators “seek unanimous passage of distributive programs through the inclusion of a project for all legislators who want one” (Weingast 1979, p. 249). A norm of universalism develops out of members’ uncertainty as to whether they will be included in any given minimal winning coalition, because the number of such potential coalitions is very large and, without a structurally induced equilibrium, equally likely to form. Each legislator worries about the risk of not being in the benefit-winning coalition that finally does emerge and losing his or her seat as punishment for not bringing home the bacon. A universalistic approach obviously minimizes this uncertainty and maximizes the legislator’s chances of getting an electorally beneficial project; an institutional norm of universalism therefore produces a greater expected net benefit for each member than a minimal winning coalition. Thus, it is argued that members prefer universalistic distribution of government benefits.

However, the role of distributive benefits in passing general interest legislation is typically not recognized in the formal literature on distributive politics, largely because it ignores general interest legislation altogether. An exception is found in the work of Groseclose and Snyder (1996), who employ the language and analytic approach of distributive theories but develop implications for a more general theory of distributive politics. They derive a model in which leaders attempt to buy as cheaply as possible votes for their preferred policies, of whatever type. Although the point is not explicit, in their model the legislative package need not consist only of a set of pork barrel projects; rather, it could contain as its base a general interest policy, such as NAFTA, an example to which they refer but do not
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examine empirically. Like other theorists, they are primarily concerned with the size of winning coalitions and the price that must be paid for members’ votes.

Despite the general lack of attention to the use of special projects by leaders to win votes for their broad public policy goals, scholars have recognized that legislative coalition leaders use logrolling for broader purposes than benefits targeted to individual districts. For example, it has long been known that supporters of agricultural commodity programs and backers of the food stamp program created legislative majorities by supporting each other’s broad-based programs (Ferejohn 1986). Likewise, supporters of different agricultural commodities, each one of which affects numerous districts but by itself would be unlikely to win majority support, have created majority coalitions by voting for subsidies for each others’ commodities (Stratmann 1992). Logrolling also occurs among supporting coalitions for bills of even more general interest, including consumer protection and minimum wage legislation (Kau and Rubin 1979). These and other studies established empirically that logrolling occurs on several types of policies, not just for packages of individual projects aimed at single congressional districts. More to the point of the argument made here, the scholarly literature refers to — but, except for the start made by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), does not systematically examine — the role of distributive benefits in the passage of general interest legislation. Thus, although there is some recognition that trading individual pork barrel benefits for votes occurs, scholars have not fully considered the strategies by which it is done nor examined such exchanges using data from cases in which it was attempted.

Groseclose (1996), making a similar theoretical argument, does test the vote-buying hypothesis empirically, if indirectly (lacking data on specific favors used to buy votes), but uses as his case the Byrd Amendment to the 1990 Clean Air Act, which would have provided benefits to coal miners who lost their jobs due to the Clean Air Act. Although it would have benefited people in more than one state had it passed, this amendment meets the definition of distributive benefits, in that it was targeted to a discrete group of geographically concentrated people. Thus, that paper does not provide an example of the use of distributive benefits to pass general interest legislation, although the argument itself could be applied to such cases.

However, a systematic support-buying strategy for broad-based legislation has been studied in the executive branch, where officials build legislative coalitions by distributing some of the benefits under their control to members of Congress who can help their programs. Arnold (1979) found that executive agencies allocate district benefits so as to maintain supportive congressional coalitions for the agencies’ programs, attempting to buy at least tacit acquiescence from program opponents and active assistance from supporters.
In fact, the major dilemma faced by Congress is how to achieve collective action to pass general benefit legislation, given the individualistic impulses generated by the desire to be reelected. The argument of this book, an argument generally neglected by the literature on distributive politics, is that pork barrel benefits help policy coalition leaders to resolve that dilemma, one which is faced by any legislative body organized, like the U.S. Congress, on the basis of geographic representation with, during most of the twentieth century, relatively weak formal mechanisms for enforcing party discipline, compared with parliamentary democracies and some state legislatures. The solution that is examined systematically here is that legislative leaders form coalitions to support major general benefit legislation by buying enough votes to create a majority.

However, some scholars have proposed other theories of how Congress achieves majority coalitions; in several of these approaches, distributive benefits play a role, albeit a less central one than the role described in this book. The following section examines, first, the nature of the collective action dilemma and, second, several prominent theories of how that dilemma is resolved and the role that distributive benefits play in the process. In the following chapter, I develop my own model, one in which distributive politics plays a more central role than in these theories, and show how that model advances our understanding of the process of creating majority coalitions in an individualistic legislature.

PORK BARREL POLITICS AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA

Collective action simply consists of the coordinated activities of two or more individuals (Sandler 1992, xvii). Of course, it is well known that the larger the size of the group needed to take collective action, the more difficult it is to do so on the merits; that is, the more people there are who share a collective goal, the harder it is to organize them for action, because in large groups, each potential member has an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others (Olson 1965). In a legislature, collective action by a majority is normally required for the body to make authoritative decisions; in some cases, an extraordinary majority is required, as it is to override a presidential veto or, in the Senate, to cut off debate. However, collective action does not necessarily produce collective benefits or general interest legislation. In fact, most of the literature on distributive politics concerns how Congress takes collective action to provide distributive benefits, as discussed earlier.
Finding incentives to get Congress to take collective action to provide general benefits is more problematic. The difficulties involved in doing so comprise Congress’s collective action dilemma, the major symptom of which is that members of Congress have more incentive to pass pork barrel bills than general benefit legislation. The source of the problem, it is argued, is the reelection goal, whose primacy has for several decades been a fundamental premise of the literature on Congress. As David Mayhew contends, “[reelection] has to be the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained” (Mayhew 1974, p. 16). To be sure, important work has considered additional goals, specifically making good public policy and gaining influence in the House or Senate (Fenno 1973); but the electoral goal in particular drives the distribution of benefits to constituents (Fenno 1973; Ferejohn 1974; Murphy 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Fiorina 1989), even if it does not motivate everything that members of Congress do.

Given the importance of reelection, the supreme challenge for Congress arguably is to provide itself with incentives to engage in collective action to achieve broad national goals. The problem is most vividly illuminated by David Mayhew (1974) in his elegant extended essay on the impact of the reelection goal on Congress members’ behavior and the resulting implications for public policy. Mayhew argues that, on its own, the reelection incentive gives rise to a bias toward particularized (i.e., distributive or pork barrel) legislation, as it is for such benefits that members believably can claim credit and are held individually accountable by the constituents and interest groups who determine their reelection chances. Such credit claiming is believable because pork barrel benefits are of a relatively small scale and are precisely targeted; constituents therefore reasonably believe, with the member’s encouragement, that no one else cares enough about the district to bother to provide them (Mayhew 1974, p. 54).

Members of such a radically individualistic body need never take action to form coalitions to pass nonparticularized or general interest legislation, because their constituents do not hold them personally responsible for broad-based policies. Electoral benefits arise from merely taking positions on general interest legislation, not from mobilizing to pass it. On the other hand, in the arena of distributive benefits, members must actually work to get concrete results for their supporters in order to obtain electoral rewards.

These incentives create a collective action problem: In large legislative bodies, the impact of most members’ individual contributions to passing broad-based legislation is so dilute that there is no incentive for them to