A Systematic Theory of Argumentation

The pragma-dialectical approach

FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
University of Amsterdam

ROB GROOTENDORST
Formerly, University of Amsterdam

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Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint.

This general definition of the term argumentation differs – because of the use of some technical jargon – from the way in which the meaning of the word “argumentation” would be described in everyday language. Although the definition is certainly in line with the way in which the word argumentation is used in ordinary usage, the meaning of the technical term argumentation is more precise, based on a conceptual analysis of the theoretical notion of argumentation. The definition that is given is stipulative in the sense that it introduces a specific, and to some extent new, convention of language use contrived to enable students of argumentation to deal with this concept in an adequate way. In this technical definition, the “process-product” ambiguity of the word “argumentation” is maintained: The term argumentation refers at the same time to the process of arguing (“I am about to complete my argumentation”) and to its product (“This argumentation is not sound”).

A number of theoretically important aspects of the notion of argumentation are explicitly mentioned in the definition: In principle,

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1 For an elucidation of this definition, See van Eemeren et al. (1996: 1–5).
A systematic theory of argumentation

Argumentation is a verbal activity, which takes place by means of language use, a social activity, which is as a rule directed at other people, and a rational activity, which is generally based on intellectual considerations. Another important characteristic of argumentation is that it always pertains to a specific point of view, or standpoint, with regard to a certain issue. The speaker or writer defends this standpoint, by means of the argumentation, to a listener or reader who doubts its acceptability or has a different standpoint. The argumentation is aimed at convincing the listener or reader of the acceptability of the standpoint.

An argumentation consists of one or more expressions in which a constellation of propositions is expressed. In the case of a positive standpoint (“It is the case that . . .”), the argumentation is used to justify the proposition expressed in the standpoint; in the case of a negative standpoint (“It is not the case that . . .”), the argumentation is used to refute it. The expressions that are part of the argumentation jointly constitute a complex speech act aimed at convincing a reasonable critic. When someone advances argumentation, that person makes an implicit appeal to reasonableness: He or she tacitly assumes that the listener or reader will act as a reasonable critic when evaluating the argumentation. Otherwise, there would be no point in advancing argumentation.

Argumentation theorists are interested in the oral and written production of argumentation and the analysis and the evaluation of argumentative discourse. The problems they are primarily concerned with can be indicated by distinguishing some central problem areas

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4 This part of the definition agrees with most ordinary manifestations of argumentation. In practice, argumentation can also be partly, or even wholly, non-verbal (see, e.g., Groarke 2002). As will be clear from its meta-theoretical principles explained in Chapter 3 of this volume, this is not adverse to our pragma-dialectical approach as long as the (constellation of propositions constituting the) argumentation is externalizable.

5 Even seemingly “monological” argumentation as used in self-deliberation can be considered social because it is part of a “dialogue intérieur.”

6 Of course, this does not mean that emotions have no role to play in argumentation. Not only can they be the causa of arguments, but they can also be used as arguments, rightly or wrongly.

8 See Searle (1969: 29–33) for the distinction between the proposition ("propositional content") involved in a speech act and its communicative ("illocutionary") force.

9 The assumption of some form of “reasonable critic” is inherent in the idea that there is a second party who needs to be convinced and that it makes sense to make the effort to convince this party by way of argumentation. Cf. Gilbert (1997).
Introduction

in the study of argumentation: “unexpressed elements in argumentative discourse,” “argumentation structures,” “argument schemes,” and “fallacies.”

It is important to realize right away that verbal expressions are not “by nature” standpoints, arguments, or other kinds of units of language use that are interesting to argumentation theorists. They only become so when they occur in a context where they fulfill a specific function in the communication process. Then these utterances are, in a specific way, instrumental in achieving a certain goal. For instance, an oral or written expression is a standpoint if it expresses a certain positive or negative position with respect to a proposition, thereby making it plain what the speaker or writer stands for. And a series of utterances constitutes an argumentation only if these expressions are jointly used in an attempt to justify or refute a proposition, meaning that they can be seen as a concerted effort to defend a standpoint in such a way that the other party is convinced of its acceptability.

In some cases, an argumentation centers on elements that are only implicitly represented in the text and can thus be regarded as “unexpressed.” This applies in particular to unexpressed premises. In ordinary argumentation, there is usually a premise of the reasoning underlying the argumentation that is left implicit. Most of the time, it can easily be detected. In some cases, however, it is much more difficult to determine exactly which unexpressed premise the arguer is committed to. A logical analysis that is exclusively based on the formal validity criterion is then not decisive. It does not make clear in actual practice which obligations the speaker or writer, as a rational agent, is committed to in certain cases. This also requires a pragmatic analysis that makes use of contextual information and background knowledge.

Terms that are usually virtually synonymous with unexpressed premise are implicit, hidden, tacit, and suppressed premise (or assumption).

Taken literally, an argument in which a premise has been left unexpressed is invalid. The premise that is logically required to remedy the invalidity normally goes against the norms for rational language use because of its lack of informative content. When the unexpressed premise is made explicit, it should therefore be checked to see whether there is pragmatic information available that makes it possible to complete the argument in a more sensible way. Instead of leaving it at stating the “logical minimum” required to make the argument valid, a pragma-dialectical analysis of unexpressed premises is aimed at establishing the “pragmatic optimum.”

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A systematic theory of argumentation

Argumentation for or against a standpoint can be simple, as in “single argumentation,” which consists of only one explicit reason for or against the standpoint. But the argumentation can also have a more complex argumentation structure, depending on the way in which the defense of the standpoint has been organized in view of (anticipated) doubts or criticism. In an argumentation with a more complex structure, several reasons are put forward for or against the same standpoint. These reasons can be alternative defenses of the standpoint that are unrelated, as in “multiple argumentation,” but they can also be interdependent, so that there is a “parallel chain” of mutually reinforcing reasons, as in “coordinative argumentation,” or a “serial chain” of reasons that support each other, as in “subordinative argumentation.” A problem in the analysis of complex argumentation is that the literal presentation often makes insufficiently clear whether the argumentation is multiple, coordinatively compound, subordinatively compound, or some combination of these possibilities. In these cases, too, all kinds of contextual and other pragmatic factors need to be taken into account in the analysis.

Argumentation theorists are also interested in the “internal organization” of each individual single argumentation. To analyze the defense mechanism employed in single argumentation, they refer to justificatory principles that are covered by the concept of an argument scheme. Argument schemes pertain to the kind of relationship between the explicit premise and the standpoint that is established in the argumentation in order to promote a transfer of acceptability from the explicit premise to the standpoint. Argument schemes are more or less conventionalized ways of achieving this transfer. We distinguish between three main categories of argument schemes: “causal argumentation,” “symptomatic argumentation” (or “sign argumentation”), and “argumentation based on a comparison.” In most cases, some interpretative effort is required to identify the argument scheme

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9 Other terms used to distinguish between the various argumentation structures include convergent (for independent or multiple) argumentation, linked (for dependent or coordinative) argumentation, and serial (for subordinative) argumentation.

10 Argument schemes are, just like logical argument forms such as modus ponens, abstract frames that allow for an infinite number of substitution instances.

that is being employed and to discover the topos on which the argumentation rests. Then, again, pragmatic knowledge must be brought to bear.

Another problem area argumentation theorists are especially interested in is that of the fallacies. One of the main objections to the logico-centric approach to the fallacies that was dominant until recently is that fallacies were merely viewed as invalid arguments that seemed valid, so that a great many familiar imperfections in argumentative discourse fell outside the scope of the definition.\(^{12}\) When the old definition is dropped and the notion of a fallacy is taken in a much broader sense – for example, as a wrong discussion move – the communicative and interactional context in which the fallacies occur needs to be taken into account in the analysis. This means that beside logical insight, pragmatic insight should be used.

The current state of the art in the study of argumentation is characterized by the co-existence of a variety of approaches. These approaches differ considerably in conceptualization, scope, and degree of theoretical refinement.\(^ {13}\) So far, none of these approaches has resulted in a generally accepted theory that deals satisfactorily with the four problem areas mentioned earlier.\(^ {14}\) In this book, we shall make clear what our approach to argumentation amounts to, and show that it creates a theoretical basis for solving the problems. We shall do so by putting the various problem areas within the integrating perspective of critical discussion.

In Chapter 2, we present a coherent overview of the various components of our research program. In Chapter 3, we sketch the model of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion that is the conceptual focal point of our theorizing. In Chapter 4, we discuss the important problem of determining the relevance of the different parts of an argumentative text or discussion – a problem arising in

\(^{12}\) This state of affairs in the study of the fallacies, which is characteristic of the “standard approach” to the fallacies in the 1950s and 1960s, was earlier fundamentally criticized by Hamblin (1970).

\(^{13}\) For a survey of the most prominent theoretical approaches in the study of argumentation, see van Eemeren et al. (1996).

\(^{14}\) For an overview of the state of the art in the theorizing in these and other crucial problem areas in the study of argumentation, see van Eemeren (ed. 2001).
every pragmatic approach to argumentative discourse. In Chapter 5, we explain how the analysis of argumentative discourse can be viewed as a methodical reconstruction of the text or discussion concerned. This reconstruction is motivated theoretically by the ideal model of a critical discussion and supported empirically by knowledge of argumentative reality. In Chapter 6, we describe the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure consisting of rules for the conduct of a critical discussion. Starting from these rules, we treat the fallacies in Chapter 7 as discussion moves that obstruct or hamper the resolution of a difference of opinion. Finally, in Chapter 8, we translate the main insights contained in the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure into ten basic requirements that together form a code of conduct for reasonable discussants.

Chapter 2, “The Realm of Argumentation Studies,” charts the various estates of the study of argumentation. We explain that in our opinion, argumentation theory is part of “normative pragmatics” – that is, that argumentative discourse as a phenomenon of ordinary language use is viewed from a critical perspective. This vision can be implemented in the study of argumentation by making a clear distinction between philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical research. We indicate what the consequences of making these distinctions are for our research program. As an illustration, we contrast our pragma-dialectical approach in each of the five components of the program with a different approach.

Chapter 3, “A Model of a Critical Discussion,” begins by disclosing the classical roots of the study of argumentation. This is followed by the observation that the historical development has gradually led to the present ideological division within argumentation theory into two approaches, which can be characterized as “new rhetorics” and “new dialectics.” After an exposition of the meta-theoretical points of departure of the pragma-dialectical approach, we describe the dialectical stages that can be distinguished in the process of resolving a difference of opinion and the types of pragmatic moves that need to be made in the resolution process.

Chapter 4, “Relevance,” begins with a characterization of the main approaches to relevance favored in research concerning the interpretation and analysis of oral and written discourse. Next, we explain the pragma-dialectical notion of relevance. This notion serves as the point
of departure for explaining how the step can be made from the interpretation of argumentative texts and discussions to their analysis. In this endeavor, we make use of an integration of Searlean insight regarding language use as the performance of different kinds of speech acts and Gricean insight regarding the rational principles underlying a regular conduct of verbal discourse. After putting pragmatic notions such as “adjacency pair” and “argumentative repair” within an analytic perspective, we return to the problems of determining relevance.

Chapter 5, “Analysis as Reconstruction,” mentions a number of complications that we are bound to encounter when dealing with argumentative reality in analyzing a text or discussion. Four transformations that are carried out in analytic reconstruction are discussed. We explain how such a reconstruction can be justified, and conclude with a discussion about drawing up analytic an overview in which all aspects of an argumentative text or discussion that are relevant to a critical evaluation are dealt with.

Chapter 6, “Rules for a Critical Discussion,” opens with a discussion of the notion of reasonableness. This is followed by a treatment of the concepts of reasonableness that, due to the works of Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, have become predominant in the study of argumentation. We explain our choice of a dialectical conception of reasonableness and give an overview of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure. In explaining this procedure, we discuss the right to challenge, the obligation to defend, the allocation of the burden of proof, the division of the discussion roles, agreements concerning the rules of discussion and the point of departure, the attacking and defending of standpoints, the “intersubjective identification procedure,” the “intersubjective testing procedure,” the “intersubjective explicitization procedure,” the “intersubjective inference procedure,” the conclusive attack and defense of standpoints, the optimal use of the right to attack, the optimal use of the right to defend, the orderly conduct of the discussion, and the rights and obligations with respect to the performance of what we call “language use declaratives.”

Chapter 7, “Fallacies,” starts with a brief survey of the various theories about fallacies that have been proposed over the years. Then, fallacies are connected with the ideal model of a critical discussion, and the relationship between the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure and the analysis of fallacies is indicated. Following on from
this, we discuss violations of the rules for the “confrontation stage,”
the “opening stage,” the “argumentation stage,” and the “concluding
stage” of a critical discussion. To illustrate our position, we give an
analysis of two prominent and well-known fallacies: begging the ques-
tion (“circular reasoning” or petitio principii) and the argumentum ad
hominem. After we have pointed out that there is an important con-
nection between fallacies and implicit language use, we discuss the
problems involved in the identification of fallacies.

Chapter 8, “A Code of Conduct for Reasonable Discussants,” pro-
vides ten basic requirements, or “commandments,” for conducting a
critical discussion. Each of them is briefly explained. Finally, an outline
is given of the characteristics of a reasonable discussion attitude. It is
explained that the reasonableness of an argumentative text or discus-
sion depends not only on the degree to which the procedural rules
for a critical discussion are observed, but also on the satisfaction of
certain preconditions regarding the participants’ states of mind and
the political, social, and cultural reality in which their discussion takes
place.