Productivity Growth, Inflation, and Unemployment

The Collected Essays of Robert J. Gordon

ROBERT J. GORDON
Northwestern University

With a Foreword by ROBERT M. SOLOW

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Contents

Foreword by Robert M. Solow  ix
Preface xi

Introduction 1

PART ONE. THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND MEASUREMENT OF
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 7
Part One: Introduction 7
1. Does the “New Economy” Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past? 22
2. Interpreting the “One Big Wave” in U.S. Long-term Productivity Growth 50
3. The Disappearance of Productivity Change 90
4. The Concept of Capital 134
5. Is There a Tradeoff between Unemployment and Productivity Growth? 143
6. Forward into the Past: Productivity Retrogression in the Electric Generating Industry 172

PART TWO. INTERPRETING PRODUCTIVITY FLUCTUATIONS
OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE 219
Part Two: Introduction 219
7. Fresh Water, Salt Water, and Other Macroeconomic Elixirs 226
8. Are Procyclical Productivity Fluctuations a Figment of Measurement Error? 239
## Contents

### PART THREE. THE THEORY OF THE INFLATION-UNEMPLOYMENT TRADEOFF

- Part Three: Introduction
- 10. Alternative Responses of Policy to External Supply Shocks
- 11. Supply Shocks and Monetary Policy Revisited
- 12. The Theory of Domestic Inflation
- 13. The Phillips Curve Now and Then

### PART FOUR. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF INFLATION DYNAMICS IN THE UNITED STATES

- Part Four: Introduction
- 14. Can the Inflation of the 1970s be Explained?
- 15. The Output Cost of Disinflation in Traditional and Vector Autoregressive Models
  *with Stephen R. King*
- 16. German and American Wage and Price Dynamics: Differences and Common Themes
  *with Wolfgang Franz*

*Subject Index* 489  
*Author Index* 501
Introduction

Economic growth, inflation, and unemployment are the “big three” topics of macroeconomics. Explicitly embodied in legislation in the United States and other countries are the goals of achieving rapid economic growth, a low rate of inflation, and a low rate of unemployment. When I teach lecture classes on elementary or intermediate macroeconomics to large auditoriums full of fresh-faced undergraduates, the semester begins with simple examples to show how much better off they will be in thirty years with fast rather than slow economic growth, how rapid inflation could erode their savings and that of their parents, and how much easier it will be to find a job for the summer or after graduation if the nation’s overall unemployment rate is low rather than high.

THE LAY OF THE LAND

This book, then, is about the big topics of macroeconomics. It is divided into four parts, of which the first is undeniably the most important. Why was American economic growth faster between 1913 and 1972 than before or after? What caused productivity growth to slow down after 1972 and accelerate after 1995? In my view the driving forces of twentieth-century growth were the “great inventions” of the late nineteenth century, especially electricity and the internal combustion engine. The central theme of Part One is the role of these inventions in creating faster growth early in the twentieth century and then, as their influence waned around 1970, slower economic growth. Along the way, Part One asks whether the new internet economy of the late 1990s measures up to the great inventions, how we disentangle the role of technical progress from raw data on output and inputs, and how America’s famous job machine that created 23 million new jobs between 1992 and 2000 may also be, in a subtle way, a source of slow productivity growth.

Part Two asks why productivity growth fluctuates over shorter intervals of a decade or so. While this question may seem to be of less than cosmic importance, its interpretation turned out, somewhat surprisingly, to be the key issue on which debates about macroeconomic doctrine were centered in the past two decades. This question also must be addressed in trying to figure out how much of the
2 Introduction

post-1995 U.S. productivity growth revival was “structural” and how much was a temporary cyclical phenomenon caused by an unsustainable burst of output growth, especially in 1999–2000.

Then Part Three examines the theoretical relationship between output, inflation, and unemployment. Why cannot the central bank (Federal Reserve or “Fed”) keep interest rates so low that the unemployment rate eventually declines to zero? The usual answer is that the Fed fears an acceleration of inflation if the unemployment rate is allowed to drop too low. But that answer presupposes that there is a negative “trade-off” between inflation and unemployment, a proposition that appeared to be effectively demolished in the late 1960s and early 1970s by two winners of the Nobel Prize in economics, Milton Friedman and independently by the equally perceptive Edmund S. Phelps.

The papers in Part Three constitute one of the most exciting developments in postwar macroeconomics, the introduction of a symmetric analysis of supply and demand shocks to replace the old-fashioned Keynesian analysis that was limited to the role of demand fluctuations. The traditional sources of demand shocks, investment cycles, wars, monetary policy, and fiscal policy boosted demand relative to supply and caused the same response that occurs in the elementary microanalysis of the supply and demand for corn or furniture – spurred by a positive demand shock, both aggregate output and the aggregate price level rise.

Starting in the mid-1970s, the analysis of business cycles was broadened to give an equal starring role to supply shocks, like the sharp increase in the price of farm products that occurred in 1972–3 or of oil in 1973–5. An adverse aggregate supply shock operates just like a crop failure in microeconomics – output declines but prices increase, moving in the opposite direction. The papers of Part Three show that when prices and wages in the economy outside of the “shocked” sector are slow to adjust (or “sticky”), the adverse supply shock creates a “macroeconomic externality.” The total loss of output to the entire economy can be many times as large as the size of the crop shortfall or reduction in oil supplies that sets off the reaction. The teaching of macroeconomics today is much like it was in 1980. It was the five years between 1975 and 1980 that witnessed a revolutionary change in the development of the symmetric supply–demand analysis, as shown in Part Three, as well as its instantaneous introduction into undergraduate macro textbooks.

Then Part Four provides empirical evidence to support the theories of Part Three. Did those supply shocks actually cause the “twin peaks” of unemployment and inflation in the 1970s? Why was inflation so low in the late 1990s? Why was unemployment in the United States in the late 1980s and 1990s so much lower than in most of the large European countries? Was the American economic miracle of the late 1990s due to good luck, the emergence of a new paradigm that loosened previous constraints, and can it continue?

There is no reason for anyone to be interested in a collection of papers. Many authors of collected essays choose the papers and publish them, without the connecting threads that show how they emerged, whether they are still
interesting or valid, and why papers on the same topic written two decades apart reach the same or different conclusions. I take it as the job of the introductions in this book to make these papers interesting – to connect them to important themes and to each other and also to help the next generation of economists see where these ideas came from.

Each of the four parts of the book includes a substantive introduction to the main issues that, by and large, can be read independently of the papers themselves. The introduction to Part One is a new essay on twentieth-century growth that attempts to link together the themes of all six papers included there. The introductions to the other three parts are shorter and less ambitious but nevertheless provide a useful overview showing how the topic developed over the past twenty or thirty years.

HOW THE IDEAS AND PAPERS EMERGED

While the introductions are largely substantive, they do include a few remarks about the sources of ideas. Young economists may be interested in the circumstances that led to some of these papers. In many cases, an easy summary is that “events precede ideas.” This is most obvious in the role of the inflation of the late 1960s and the inflationary recession of 1974–5 in revealing the inadequacy of then-current economic paradigms and pressing us to figure out what was wrong and how to fix it.

The initial catalyst for my interest in economic growth came during a two-year stay at Oxford, England, in 1962–4. There my previous interest in the microeconomic topic of industrial organization soon faded away. Britain in that era had finally recovered from the strains of postwar rationing and currency non-convertibility, but otherwise seemed to this outsider to be an economic basket case. The combative unions of “I’m All Right, Jack” held sway, the standard of living was far below that in the United States and had recently been overtaken by rapid recoveries in France and Germany, and history presented a dismal record in which the level of British productivity barely grew at all from 1895 to 1938. Clearly, the siren blared out that differences in the economic growth experience across nations and historical eras were the topic to study, and that is still true today. Perhaps the most important single piece of reading to which I was exposed at Oxford was Edward Denison’s seminal 1962 study of the sources of growth (cited in Chapter Two), and especially his imaginative translation of dry data on educational attainment into implications for the sources of growth.

As described in the Introduction to Part One, much of my research on economic growth, and especially Chapter Two, can be traced to a summer job I had at MIT in 1965 as a new graduate student. Puzzles in then newly developed macro data on the history of U.S. economic growth led to my Ph.D. dissertation and to my interest in measurement errors of all types, but especially in important measurement problems that were big enough to skew the historical record over decades. From the beginning, my career developed along two parallel tracks. The first was to pursue these measurement puzzles and to make a
4  Introduction

serious investment in creating new data, particularly on the prices of investment goods, both structures and equipment. Much of this work could be likened to working as a medieval scribe in the library, converting data from the Sears catalogue, *Consumer Reports*, and other sources into alternative price indexes for investment goods. This work took almost twenty years before a book emerged (see the references to Chapter One). Yet along the way there were lots of ideas that involved substantive problems rather than measurement, and these were the sources for the six papers in Part One.

The second research track was motivated by the central debate in macroeconomics that was boiling as I moved in 1968 from a pleasant life as graduate student at MIT to the intellectual cauldron of the University of Chicago. Just as inflation was accelerating in the late 1960s, Chicago’s most famous macroeconomist, Milton Friedman, had delivered his perfectly timed presidential address launching the natural rate hypothesis, contending that in the long run inflation is independent of the unemployment rate. As a new assistant professor, I had to plunge into the hot water and figure out how, if at all, to reconcile my Keynesian MIT training with Friedman’s distinction between the negatively sloped short-run Phillips curve (based on expectational errors) and the vertical long-run Phillips curve. From then on, my major topic in time-series macroeconomics was the inflation–unemployment tradeoff, which created the papers in Parts Three and Four of this book.

My research on economic growth could have been carried out almost anywhere and did not require a particular university location. But the combination of graduate school at MIT and a first job at Chicago were crucial in making possible the research on the inflation–unemployment tradeoff. Being at Chicago with an MIT education was like watching two sticks rubbing together. The flame soon ignited, especially when I found that my students were teaching me more in my first Chicago graduate class than I was teaching them. But a second crucial piece of luck in timing and location came when Arthur M. Okun had the idea to start the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity as a triannual series of meetings, with the papers and discussions to be published almost immediately, within three months of the meeting rather than the two-year lag typical of conference volumes then and now.¹

¹ The Brookings Panel held three meetings per year during 1970 to 1978 and two meetings per year since then, for a total of seventy-five meetings through the end of 2002. I have been to seventy-four of the seventy-five meetings, and coorganizer George Perry has been at every meeting.
Introduction

of these papers had a lasting influence but none of them are included in this volume. Events, particularly the ongoing acceleration of inflation in 1969–70, the Nixon price controls, and the supply shocks of 1972–5, happened so fast that most of those papers were subject to rapid obsolescence. Nevertheless, the rapid publication schedule of BPEA gave me a rare and perhaps unfair advantage in always having the last word on the latest puzzle involving inflation. Another advantage conferred by BPEA also was of immeasurable value, the chance to interact with the top macroeconomists at the regular BPEA meetings, be exposed to the latest data that we could not explain, and start figuring out what to tackle next. In that sense, my two-track career was schizophrenic in nature, with the measurement research resembling a traditional cloistered ivory-tower experience, whereas the inflation research centered on the BPEA directed my communication and energy outside the confines of the local university campus.

Some acclaimed academics have succeeded by moving from topic to topic as the occasion emerged, often in collaboration with coauthors. My professional hero, next to Bob Solow, was the late Zvi Griliches, whose prolific research career was exactly the opposite. Zvi “owned” the production function as a topic—when he moved to a new subtopic, whether hedonic price deflators, capital measurement, ability and human capital, patents, or research and development, it was part of a broad lifelong research plan to dig away at the outstanding puzzles related to the production process. My approach was similar but in a narrower area. I kept coming back to the same topics, whether price, output, and input measurement, cyclical productivity fluctuations, the Phillips curve, or aggregate supply shocks, both because macroeconomics is constantly creating new puzzles and new data, but also because I felt a responsibility to see whether my old theories and empirical results still worked. If they did not, I wanted to figure out why. There is no way to give advice to younger scholars on these different research strategies. To stick to the same topics over decades, those topics had better be important and longlasting in relevance. To move from topic to topic and have striking insights on a variety of unrelated topics, exactly the opposite of my own research approach, you had better be very smart.

CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AND OMISSIONS

Selecting the seventeen papers for this volume was painful. The publisher set a page limit, which ruled out numerous long empirical time-series papers. Page limits also ruled out several long survey articles, including two from the Journal of Economic Literature on the sources of price and wage rigidities.

This volume includes papers that fit together tightly into the four themes, and three of the seventeen are papers have not been published before. Many of my other papers are ruled out on the basis of length or topics that do not fit within

---

2 In Michael Szenberg’s fascinating book Passion and Craft: Economists at Work (Michigan, 1998), I was struck at the ease with which such subjects as Greg Mankiw, Avinash Dixit, and others could move from topic to topic, reflecting their innate brilliance and analytical ability.
Introduction

the framework of this volume, whether on corporate tax shifting, government investment during World War II, or remeasuring the volatility of U.S. GDP before 1929. Also, I have leaned toward including papers from lesser-known sources rather than my articles from well-known journals like the *American Economic Review* or the *Journal of Political Economy*.

The topics of the four parts of this book have the virtue that all are still relevant as the economy inches its way into the twenty-first century. We wonder when reading Part One whether productivity growth in the next decade will look more like the ebullient five years after 1995 or the dismal twenty-three years before 1995. Part Two makes us wait eagerly for the next quarterly productivity report, to see in retrospect how much of the post-1995 revival was cyclical rather than structural, and whether the 2001 recession and 2002–3 recovery adhered to old cyclical patterns or created a new one. Parts Three and Four help us to understand explicitly why inflation was so quiescent in the late 1990s and why, for the first time in decades, there was no sharp upward spike of interest rates as previously had been necessary to quell a significant acceleration of inflation. Since tight monetary policy did not cause the 2001 recession, its causes are to be found elsewhere, especially in the collapse of the New Economy investment boom.

A final word is needed on the ground rules for reproducing these papers. All of them have been newly typeset. Every paper is reproduced exactly in its original form, including any forecasts that were made long ago, no matter whether they turned out to be right or wrong (the introductions provide hindsight retrospective on several of these forecasts). No changes were made except to provide the final published reference for items of the reference lists that were originally “forthcoming,” i.e., not yet published at the time the paper went to press, and also to clarify references to dates (e.g., “four years ago” in a 1982 paper is changed here to “in 1978”).