The Hellenistic philosophers

VOLUME 2

Greek and Latin texts with notes and bibliography

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Early Pyrrhonism

1 Scepticism

A Diogenes Laertius 9.61–2 (Caizzi 1A, 6, 7, 9)

(1) *Πύρρων Ἠλεῖος Πλειστάρχου μὲν ἦν υἱός, καθὰ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἱστορεῖ· ὥς φησι δ' Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, πρότερον ἦν ζωγράφος, καὶ ἤκουσε Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στίλπωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς, εἶτ' Ἀναξάρχου, ξυνακολουθῶν πανταχοῦ, ὡς καὶ τοῖς γυμνοσοφισταῖς ἐν Ἰνδίᾳ συμμῖξαι καὶ τοῖς Μάγοις.* (2) *ὅθεν γενναιότατα δοκεῖ φιλοσοφῆσαι, τὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας καὶ ἐποχῆς εἶδος εἰσαγαγών, ὡς Ἀσκάνιος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης φησίν.* (3) *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄδικον· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον.* (4) *ἀκόλουθος δ' ἦν καὶ τῷ βίῳ, μηδὲν ἐκτρεπόμενος μηδὲ φυλαττόμενος, ἅπαντα ὑφιστάμενος, ἁμάξας, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ κρημνοὺς καὶ κύνας καὶ ὅλως μηδὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπιτρέπων. σώζεσθαι μέντοι, καθά φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύστιον Ἀντίγονον, ὑπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων παρακολουθούντων. Αἰνεσίδημος δέ φησι φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγον, μὴ μέντοι γ' ἀπροοράτως ἕκαστα πράττειν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐνενήκοντα ἔτη κατεβίω.*

3 *Βρύσωνος* Ménage e Suda: *δρύσωνος* codd. *τοῦ* codd.: *ἢ* Nietzsche, Röper *ὡς–Διαδοχαῖς* om. F 6 *Ἀσκάνιος* codd.: *Ἑκαταῖος* Müller 12 *ὅλως* Cobet: *ὅσα* codd.: *ὅσα* ⟨*τοιαῦτα*⟩ Stephanus *ἐπιτρέπων* BP: *ἐπιτρέπειν* F 14 *τῆς* om. BP

Context: the opening of Diogenes' life of Pyrrho. The life is a patchwork of various sources and periods, extending from the near-contemporary Antigonus, 13, and Eratosthenes (D.L. 9.66) down to at least the first-century B.C. Aenesidemus, 14.

1 On the sources, Diocles, Apollodorus and Alexander, cf. Mejer [32].

2 **ζωγράφος** This early career, embellished in **B** 1–3 and by Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.27), fits Pyrrho's subsequent scepticism suspiciously well; cf. *σκηνογραφίᾳ*, **D** 4.

3 **Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στίλπωνος** A notorious crux, cf. Giannantoni [62], 26–30. Pyrrho cannot have been taught by any son of Stilpo's, since he and Stilpo were of much the same age; and Stilpo is named as Timon's first teacher (D.L. 9.109). The mention of Bryson and Stilpo is an attempt by the 'succession' writers to connect Pyrrho with the Megarians and perhaps thereby to Socrates; cf. Suda s.v. *Σωκράτης*,

an entry which gives Pyrrho a further Socratic pedigree via the local Elean school of Phaedo (note too the connexions drawn between Phaedo, Stilpo and Menedemus at D.L. 2.105). The Socratic succession for Pyrrho was a rival to his Eleatic-Democritean pedigree, as in Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.17.10. Megarian influence on Pyrrho's scepticism has often been posited (cf. Brochard [52], 52 n. 1; von Fritz [71], col. 93; Berti [75], 75), but too uncritically. There are striking similarities between the Megarian Stilpo's Cynic style of moralizing and Timon; cf. Long [69], 71–3. But Timon seems to distance Pyrrho from any interest in Megarian metaphysics; and note his contemptuous dismissal of all Socratics including Megarians, **3D**. On Timon himself, see notes on **3l–m**.

4 **Ἀναξάρχου** Material in 72 DK, and cf. von Fritz [71], cols. 94–5. Timon's one reference to him is partly pejorative, fr. 832, but this should not count against his having had decisive influence on Pyrrho. **γυμνοσοφισταῖς** Described by Megasthenes and the Cynic Onesicritus at Strabo 15.1.59–65; and cf. Plutarch, *Alex.* 64. Pyrrho's astounding imperturbability (cf. **B–C**) can certainly be compared with the reported anecdotes on Indian asceticism and indifference to conventional values.

5 **ὅθεν** The scope of the conjunction probably extends back only to the Indian sages. On *γενναιότατα φιλοσοφῆσαι* as a characteristically Cynic commendation of Pyrrho's mental and moral pre-eminence, cf. Brancacci [83], 219–30.

6 **τὸ . . . εἰσαγαγών** As technical terms, *ἐποχή* and *ἀκαταληψία* probably postdate Pyrrho, originating with Zeno and Arcesilaus; see **68** and cf. Couissin [73], 381–6. But **F** and **G** entitle us to attribute concepts of suspension of judgement and non-cognition to early Pyrrhonism, though these should not be assimilated to the use of *ἐποχή* and *ἀκαταληψία* in Stoic-Academic debates; cf. Caizzi ad loc. **Ἀσκάνιος** Otherwise unknown, and hence emended by C. Müller, *FHG* II p. 384 n., to 'Hecataeus' of Abdera, a pupil of Pyrrho (D.L. 9.69) and a historian best known for his ethnography. However, the postulated corruption is hard to account for.

7–10 Democritus had contrasted the *conventionality (νόμῳ)* of secondary qualities (*γλυκύ, πικρόν* etc.) with the *reality* of atoms and void (cf. KRS 549, and vol. 1, 57) and is also credited with saying that 'truth is in the depths', **68A 2.** Pyrrho's claim is that *νόμος* and *ἔθος* account for all predications and grounds for action (cf. **I**), since 'nothing exists in truth'. The complete generality of Pyrrho's thesis, as stated here, accords with **F**. But his particular concern with outlawing objective values is evident in the priority given to *καλόν, αἰσχρόν, δίκαιον, ἄδικον*. For the Democritean background of *οὐ μᾶλλον*, cf. De Lacy [80]; Graeser [81].

10–15 The picture of Pyrrho's consistent refusal to make conventional discriminations resembles Aristotle's account of how someone (counterfactually) would behave who really rejected the principle of non-contradiction, *Metaph. Γ*.4, 1008b12–26; cf. Long [57], 94–7, and see further note on **F** 12–14. However fanciful, the picture goes back to Antigonus in the 3rd century B.C., in contrast with Aenesidemus' much later claim that Pyrrho's suspension of judgement *qua* philosopher did not make him careless in daily life.

B Diogenes Laertius 9.62–4 (Caizzi 10, part, 28, 11)

Ἀντίγονος δέ φησιν ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Πύρρωνος τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄδοξός τε ἦν καὶ πένης καὶ ζωγράφος. σώζεσθαί τε αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἤλιδι ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ λαμπαδιστὰς μετρίως ἔχοντας. (1) *ἐκπατεῖν τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρημάζειν, σπανίως ποτ' ἐπιφαινόμενον τοῖς οἴκοι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἀκούσαντα Ἰνδοῦ τινος ὀνειδίζοντος Ἀναξάρχῳ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἕτερόν τινα διδάξαι οὗτος ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸς αὐλὰς βασιλικὰς θεραπεύων. ἀεί τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καταστήματι, ὥστ' εἰ καί τις αὐτὸν καταλίποι μεταξὺ λέγοντα, αὐτῷ διαπεραίνειν τὸν λόγον . . .* (2) *καταληφθεὶς δέ ποτε καὶ αὐτῷ λαλῶν καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔφη μελετᾶν χρηστὸς εἶναι. ἔν τε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς κατεφρονεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἐξοδικῶς λέγειν καὶ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν· ὅθεν καὶ Ναυσιφάνην ἤδη νεανίσκον ὄντα θηραθῆναι. ἔφασκε γοῦν γίνεσθαι δεῖν τῆς μὲν διαθέσεως τῆς Πυρρωνείου, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. ἔλεγέ τε πολλάκις καὶ Ἐπίκουρον θαυμάζοντα τὴν Πύρρωνος ἀναστροφὴν συνεχὲς αὐτοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. οὕτω δ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος τιμηθῆναι ὥστε καὶ ἀρχιερέα καταστῆσαι αὐτὸν καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον πᾶσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀτέλειαν ψηφίσασθαι.*

1 *ἐν–Πύρρωνος* om. F 10 *τὸ* ⟨*καὶ δι*⟩*εξοδικῶς* Kühn 15 *καταστῆσαι* BP: *τιμηθῆναι* F

Context: immediately following **A**.

3 **μετρίως ἔχοντας** 'Well proportioned' (cf. Plato, *Tht.* 191d), not 'indifferent' (Hicks in Loeb ed.). **ἐκπατεῖν** A characteristic of other philosophers in Diogenes; cf. 1.112, 4.19, 9.3

4–6 The Indian's reproach to Anaxarchus recalls Diogenes the Cynic's contempt for flattery; cf. his frr. 422–5 Giannantoni [36].

6 **ἀεί . . . καταστήματι** Cf. **2B–D**.

9 **μελετᾶν** Cf. Epicurus' advice to Menoeceus, **25A 3** and **23J** 1. Pyrrho's pupil Philo was described by Timon as *τὸν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτόσχολον αὐτολαλητήν* (D.L. 9.69).

10 **ἐξοδικῶς . . . ἐρώτησιν** These expressions seem to imply that Pyrrho was equally effective in extended or rhetorical discourse (*ἐξοδικῶς*) and in dialectic (*πρὸς ἐρώτησιν*); cf. S.E., *M.* 2.6 (= *SVF* 2.294). On Timon's evidence, however (cf. **2C–D**), Pyrrho's philosophical stance was one of indifference to conventional styles of argument or inquiry.

10–14 The atomist Nausiphanes' interest in Pyrrho is made the more credible by his scepticism about empirical knowledge (Seneca, *Ep.* 88.43–5). On the philosophical significance of Epicurus' admiration for Pyrrho, cf. Sedley [104], 136–7, and Gigante [106], 37–49.

14–15 For discussion, cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc.

C Diogenes Laertius 9.66–7 (Caizzi 15A, 16, 51, 20, part)

(1) *καὶ κυνός ποτ' ἐπενεχθέντος διασοβηθέντα εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν αἰτιασάμενον, ὡς χαλεπὸν εἴη ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκδῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· διαγωνίζεσθαι δ' ὡς οἷόν τε πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ γε λόγῳ. φασὶ δὲ καὶ σηπτικῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τομῶν καὶ καύσεων ἐπί τινος*

ἕλκους αὐτῷ προσενεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὰς ὀφρῦς συναγαγεῖν. καὶ ὁ Τίμων δὲ διασαφεῖ τὴν διάθεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πύθωνα διέξεισιν. (2) ἀλλὰ καὶ Φίλων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, γνώριμος αὐτοῦ γεγονώς, ἔλεγεν ὡς ἐμέμνητο μάλιστα μὲν Δημοκρίτου, εἶτα δὲ καὶ Ὁμήρου, θαυμάζων αὐτὸν καὶ συνεχὲς λέγων "οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν" . . . προφέρεσθαι δὲ καὶ . . . ὅσα συντείνει εἰς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ κενόσπουδον ἅμα καὶ παιδαριῶδες τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

2 τὸν om. F

Context: life of Pyrrho.

1–2 The same story, with minor modifications, is cited by Aristocles on Antigonus of Carystus' authority at Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.26 (Caizzi 15B). **ἐκδῦναι** Cf. ἔκδυσιν in Timon **2C** 3, and the uses of ἀπεκδύνομαι cited by Caizzi [64] in her note on the latter passage.

3–4 **ἔργοις . . . λόγῳ** Not flinching at extreme pain, 4–5, presumably exemplifies διαγωνίζεσθαι . . . ἔργοις, and back-up by λόγος, if one does succumb, should involve reflection on the complete indifference of everything, **A** 7–10. Cf. the involuntary reactions of the Stoic wise man, which do not command his assent, **65Y**.

6 **Πύθωνα** **G** is quoted from this work, on which see Ferrari [88], 208.

6–11 Aristocles, probably following Antigonus of Carystus, elaborates Pyrrho's relation to Democritus into 'an encounter with Democritus' books' (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.27), a characteristic biographical touch (cf. D.L. 7.2 on Zeno of Citium). For interesting suggestions about what Pyrrho found so attractive in Democritus, cf. Caizzi [82]. Sextus also records and elaborates Pyrrho's love of Homer, *M.* 1.272,281. On the quotation of Homer, *Il.* 6.146, and the other Homeric lines omitted here, cf. Conche [72], 26. On the Cynic resonance of the terms ἀβέβαιον . . . παιδαριῶδες, and on Timon's *Silloi* as the source of such characterizations of Pyrrho, see Long [69], 69.

D Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.87–8

οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ ἦσαν, ὡς προεῖπον, οἱ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Μητρόδωρον καὶ Ἀνάξαρχον ἔτι δὲ Μόνιμον φήσαντες ἀνῃρηκέναι τὸ κριτήριον, ἀλλὰ Μητρόδωρον μὲν ὅτι εἶπεν "οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴσμεν", Ἀνάξαρχον δὲ καὶ Μόνιμον ὅτι σκηνογραφίᾳ ἀπείκασαν τὰ ὄντα τοῖς τε κατὰ ὕπνους ἢ μανίαν προσπίπτουσι ταῦτα ὡμοιῶσθαι ὑπέλαβον.

Context: doxography of the criterion of truth.

For Metrodorus of Chios see 70 DK, and for Monimus of Syracuse, frr. 1–5 Giannantoni [36]. Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.19.8, after citing a version of Metrodorus' dictum, comments: ἥτις εἰσβολὴ κακὰς ἔδωκεν ἀφορμὰς τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένῳ Πύρρωνι. The Cynic Monimus was probably somewhat younger than Pyrrho; his affinity with early Pyrrhonism is evident in S.E., *M.* 8.5: τάχα δὲ καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων [*sc.* μηθὲν εἶναί φησιν ἀληθές], τῦφον εἰπὼν τὰ πάντα. On τῦφος as a favourite Cynic term for self-importance and self-deception, and its use by Timon and later Pyrrhonism, cf. Long [69], 74–5, and the wide-ranging study by Caizzi [84].

4 **σκηνογραφίᾳ** Cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc.

E Diogenes Laertius 9.60

οὗτος [sc. Ἀνάξαρχος] διὰ τὴν ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὐκολίαν τοῦ βίου Εὐδαιμονικὸς ἐκαλεῖτο· καὶ ἦν ἐκ τοῦ ῥᾴστου δυνατὸς σωφρονίζειν.

Context: life of Anaxarchus.

1 **ἀπάθειαν** See note on **2F** 5–7.

F Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.1–5; Caizzi 53)

(1) *ἀναγκαίως δ' ἔχει πρὸ παντὸς διασκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν γνώσεως· εἰ γὰρ αὖ μηδὲν πεφύκαμεν γνωρίζειν, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων σκοπεῖν. ἐγένοντο μὲν οὖν καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς οἱ ἀφέντες τήνδε τὴν φωνήν, οἷς ἀντείρηκεν Ἀριστοτέλης.* (2) *ἴσχυσε μὲν τοιαῦτα λέγων καὶ Πύρρων ὁ Ἠλεῖος· ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ καταλέλοιπεν, ὁ δέ γε* 5 *μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μέν, ὁποῖα πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δέ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακεῖσθαι· τελευταῖον δέ, τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσι.* (3) *τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνειν ἐπ' ἴσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπίκριτα·* (4) *διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις* 10 *ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. διὰ τοῦτο οὖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι, περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν.* (5) *τοῖς μέντοι γε διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀφασίαν, ἔπειτα δ' ἀταραξίαν,* 15 *Αἰνησίδημος δ' ἡδονήν.* (6) *τὰ μὲν οὖν κεφάλαια τῶν λεγομένων ἐστὶ ταῦτα.*

2 *αὖ* codd.: *αὐτοὶ* Diels 4 *μὲν τοιαῦτα* I[b]: *μέντοι ταῦτα* OD 5 *δέ γε* I[b]: *δὲ* ON 10 *ἀνεπίκριτα* ON: *ἀνέγκριτα* I[b] *διὰ τοῦτο* codd.: *διὰ τὸ* Zeller 12 *ἑνὸς* ON: om. I[b] 14 *ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν* om. I[b]

As the richest single item of evidence for Pyrrho's philosophy, this extract requires careful scrutiny. We need to determine first its value as historical testimony, and secondly the nature of the inferences in section 4, which answer the second question in section 2.

Eusebius' main purpose in *Pr. ev.* 14 is to contrast Greek philosophers' disagreements with the consistency of the Hebrews (14.2.7ff.). From 14.16.13 to 14.21.7 he deals with philosophers' discrepant views on epistemology, structuring his polemical surveys around the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness they ascribe to sense-perception. Five groups of philosophers are treated: (a) Eleatics (including Xenophanes) and Megarians, 14.17.1–9; (b) Pyrrhonian Sceptics, 14.18.1–30; (c) Cyrenaics, 14.18.31–14.19.7; (d) 'Those who say bodily sensations are entirely trustworthy', including Protagoras and Metrodorus of Chios, 14.19.8–14.20.12; (e) Epicureans (presented as an offshoot of Cyrenaics), 14.20.13–14.21.7. Nearly all this material purports to be virtually verbatim quotation from Aristocles of Messene's *On philosophy* (probably book 8, so *Pr. ev.* 14.16.13 in most codd.). Eusebius begins his extract from Aristocles on Pyrrho by saying one can learn to refute such opinions *ἀπὸ τοῦ δηλωθέντος συγγράμματος ὧδέ πη πρὸς λέξιν ἔχοντος*. Many of his quotations

are given this 'verbatim' authorization (e.g. 11.10.16, 11.18.26, 11.23.12), and the independent survival of some of the cited texts (e.g. 11.26.5ff. = Plato, *Alc.*1) justifies the claim.

F, then, should be regarded as an authentic excerpt from Aristocles, a Peripatetic philosopher recently redated by Moraux [14], 83–92, from the late second century A.D. to a period not later than the early first century A.D. Aristocles was bitterly hostile to all the groups of philosophers for whom Eusebius quotes him; in *Pr. ev.*, 14.18.5–7, immediately following **F**, he refutes the Timon passage (**F** 5–15) at length, and then passes to objections to Pyrrhonism closely based on Aristotle, *Metaph. Γ*.5–6, returning to Pyrrho and Timon at 14–19, 26–8. He cites Timon's *Pytho* at 14.18.14 and his *Silloi* at 14.18.16ff., and Antigonus of Carystus' life of Pyrrho at 14.18.26. Aenesidemus is mentioned at **F** 16, and Aristocles also refers to his *Ὑποτύπωσις* (14.18.11) and his *Μακραὶ στοιχειώσεις* (14.18.16). In his conclusion he speaks of Pyrrhonism as 'only recently' revived in Alexandria by Aenesidemus (14.18.29), a remark which speaks strongly in favour of the new chronology of Aristocles' life proposed by Moraux [14], 89.

Aristocles' knowledge of Aenesidemus seems extremely sketchy (cf. Krüger [87], 112–13), and his refutations of Pyrrhonism recall Sextus Empiricus very little (contrast **71D**). He never uses the standard terms *ἐποχή* and *φαινόμενον*, and his list of Aenesidemus' nine (*sic*) Modes is defective and garbled (14.18.11). All this tends to suggest that Aristocles' report of Timon is based upon an authentic document of early Pyrrhonism, and is little if at all contaminated by later scepticism. The vocabulary of the text supports this conclusion: Sextus does not use *ἀστάθμητος*, *ἀκλινής* or *ἀκράδαντος*, all of which words are pre-Hellenistic; cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc. (Timon's *Pytho* would be a highly appropriate work in which to report Pyrrho's revelation of the sources of happiness; cf. **C** 6 and Ferrari [88], 208.)

None of these suggestions implies that Aristocles' report of Timon should be regarded as quotation rather than paraphrase; cf. Stopper [63], 271. but Stopper, 273, is unduly suspicious when he suggests that *ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν*, **F** 13–14, may be an Aristotelian importation by Aristocles. See below.

5–14 In vol. 1, 16–17, we opt for the metaphysical interpretation of lines 9–11 proposed by Caizzi [64], 225–7, instead of the narrowly epistemological reading fashionable since Zeller [1]. Conceivably Pyrrho argued thus: (a) If the world has a determinate nature, it will be truly or falsely describable by a definite theory. (b) But all existing definite theories about the world conflict with one another in such a way that there is no reason to prefer one such theory to another. (c) Nor is it possible to think of some other definite theory T* which is immune to this absence of preference. (d) Therefore there is no reason to think that the world is truly or falsely describable by a definite theory. (e) But (d) contradicts (a). (f) Therefore the world does not have a determinate nature. (g) And a world which does not have a determinate nature is not something which can be truly or falsely perceived or opined. (h) Therefore our perceptions or opinions are neither true nor false. (Some support for step (b) in this argument may be found in Aenesidemus' report of Pyrrho at **71A 1**.)

12–14 The striking similarity between what the Pyrrhonist should say about each thing and Aristotle's characterization of the *ἀφασία* of someone who denies the principle of non-contradiction, *Metaph. Γ*.4, 1008a30–5, is pointed out by Long [57], 91–3, and Reale [74], 315–21. The triadic structure of 6–14 (cf. Ferrari [78], 362) goes

against Stopper's suggestion (see above) that the second and third disjuncts in 13–14 are importations by Aristocles from Aristotle. But Stopper is probably right to object to any formal rejection of the principle of non-contradiction by Timon's Pyrrho. These expansions of the *οὐ μᾶλλον* formula are best interpreted as indications of the utterly non-committal language that the Pyrrhonist recommends.

16 **ἡδονήν** For discussion of this unexpected term, see Caizzi [64] ad loc.

G Diogenes Laertius 9.76 (Caizzi 54, part)

σημαίνει οὖν ἡ φωνή [sc. "οὐ μᾶλλον"], καθά φησι καὶ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι "τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀπροσθετεῖν."

For *οὐ μᾶλλον* in later Pyrrhonism, cf. **71C 6–7**. *ἀπροσθετεῖν*, a *hapax*, expresses the opposite of *προστίθεσθαι* in its familar sense, 'vote for', 'assent to'. *πρόσθεσις* and *προστίθεσθαι* are found in sceptical texts as synonyms for *συγκατάθεσις* and *συγκατατίθεσθαι*, which, by Chrysippus' date, are the standard Stoic expressions for 'assent'. See **69A** 7, and, for the combination of both words, S.E., *M.* 7.225. Timon's use of *ἀπροσθετεῖν* rather than *ἐπέχειν* vel sim. probably indicates the absence of any fixed sceptical terminology at this time.

H Diogenes Laertius 9.104–5 (including Caizzi 55, 63A)

πάλιν οἱ δογματικοί φασιν καὶ τὸν βίον αὐτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ βίος συνέστηκεν. οἱ δὲ ψεύδεσθαί φασιν αὐτούς· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν ἀγνοεῖν. (1) *καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα, οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν. καὶ ὅτι τὸ πῦρ καίει αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικὴν ἐπέχομεν. καὶ ὅτι κινεῖταί τις βλέπομεν, καὶ ὅτι φθείρεται· πῶς δὲ ταῦτα γίνεται οὐκ ἴσμεν. μόνον οὖν,* 5 *φασίν, ἀνθιστάμεθα πρὸς τὰ παρυφιστάμενα τοῖς φαινομένοις ἄδηλα. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε τὴν εἰκόνα ἐξοχὰς λέγομεν ἔχειν, τὸ φαινόμενον διασαφοῦμεν· ὅταν δ' εἴπωμεν μὴ ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐξοχάς, οὐκέτι ὃ φαίνεται ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν·* (2) *ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει "ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ* 10 *σθένει οὕπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ."* (3) *καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ αἰσθήσεών φησι, "τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι, τὸ δ' ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ."*

2 *ἀναιρεῖν* dgt: *ἀναιρεῖ* BFP 5 *οὖν* om. F 10 *πάντῃ* F, Galenus, *De diagnosc. puls.* 1.2, 8.781 Kühn: *παντὶ* BP et S.E., *M.* 7.30 11 *μέλι* Cobet: *μὲν* codd.

Context: Diogenes is reporting later Pyrrhonist replies to the objection by doctrinaire philosophers that scepticism makes life impossible; cf. S.E., *PH* 1.13, 19–24, 92.

Anecdotes such as **A 4** and **C 1** imply that such charges were already being advanced against Pyrrho, with Timon answering them as here. Cf. **2D** for Pyrrho's ease of action. Note that in the gallery of philosophers who make life impossible, Timon's Epicurean contemporary Colotes (cf. note on context of **68H**) includes the Academic sceptics but not the Pyrrhonists. Is this due to Epicurean sympathy for Pyrrho (cf. **B 2**), which may have led them, like Cicero, to emphasize his moral stance rather than his scepticism?

11 **σθένει** The verb has an archaic and poetic ring; cf. Aeschylus, *Ag.* 296;

Euripides, *Hec.* 49. **οὔπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ** For *οὗ* = *οἷ* in later Greek, cf. LSJ s.v. *ὅς* A b.2. It is odd to write of 'the appearance' as going anywhere; perhaps take an unexpressed *τις* to be the subject of *ἔλθῃ*, or suppose a personal subject to have been indicated in the previous line.

11–12 The only surviving reference to this work, which may have dealt with the kind of material found in Aenesidemus' third mode; cf. **72D.** In any case Sextus repeats Timon at *PH* 1. 19–20. At Aristotle, *Metaph.* *Γ*.4, 1008b20 'sweet or not sweet' exemplifies the kind of opinions that anyone who 'does anything' must have. It is conceivable that the interpretation we give in vol. 1 imputes to Timon too much of later Pyrrhonism. Instead of adumbrating the use of *τὸ φαινόμενον* as a practical criterion, he might be simply registering the admission that, notwithstanding the complete indeterminacy of nature, things do manifest themselves to human beings in a determinate way; cf. Caizzi [79], 93–5.

I Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.140 (Timon fr. 844, Caizzi 64)

μόνως οὖν ἔσται φυγεῖν ταύτην [sc. ἀοχλησίαν], εἰ ὑποδείξαιμεν τῷ ταραττομένῳ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγὴν ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δίωξιν, ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθόν τι φύσει ἔστι οὔτε κακόν, "ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόμῳ κέκριται", κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.

3 *νόμῳ* Hirzel: *νόῳ* codd.

Context: Sextus is concluding an argument that mental disturbance is caused by efforts to pursue the good and avoid the bad. Timon's pentameter line is quoted in support of the non-naturalness of anything good or bad. It probably comes from his *Indalmoi*, the only one of his works known to have been written in elegiacs.

3 Hirzel's emendation is widely accepted, and fits **A 3** very well.

J Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.85 (Caizzi 69L)

haec [*sc.* Stoicorum, Epicuri, Hieronymi *etc.*] sunt sententiae quae stabilitatis aliquid habeant; nam Aristonis Pyrrhonis Erilli non nullorumque aliorum evanuerunt.

Context: doxography of *bonum*.

For Cicero's grouping of Pyrrho, Aristo and Herillus, see notes on **2G–H**.

K Seneca, *NQ* 7.32.2 (Caizzi 71)

itaque tot familiae philosophorum sine successore deficiunt: Academici et veteres et minores nullum antistitem reliquerunt; quis est qui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis?

Context: the decline of philosophy as a sign of general degeneration.

Glucker [42], 340, takes Seneca to know of Aenesidemus' revival of Pyrrhonism at Alexandria, and also to know of it as 'already extinct after the death of Aenesidemus and his pupils'. But this presumes too much. Even if neo-Pyrrhonism was not a formal school, the list of Aenesidemus' successors at D.L. 9.116 speaks against such an extinction, which Glucker posits, it seems, in order to justify his belief in Seneca's

knowledge of Alexandrian philosophy. There were many contemporary developments in philosophy of which Seneca makes no mention. Unlike Cicero, however, Seneca does associate Pyrrhonists with scepticism; cf. *Ep.* 88.44.

2 Tranquillity and virtue

A Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.17; Timon fr. 782, Caizzi 57, part)

εἰ δ' οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐστι τῶν λόγων, τί ἡμῖν ἐνοχλοῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τί Τίμων φησίν· "οὐκ ἂν δὴ Πύρρωνί γ' ἐρίσ⟨σ⟩ειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος;"

1 ἡμῖν Stephanus: μὴν codd.

Context: Aristocles confronts the Pyrrhonists with a dilemma: either their λόγοι are intended to improve us, in which case they are not sceptical; or their λόγοι are useless, and it is pointless for Timon to hold up Pyrrho for admiration.

Timon's line is a parody of Homer, *Il.* 3.223: οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆί γ' ἐρίσσειεν βροτὸς ἄλλος.

B Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.19; Timon fr. 783, Caizzi 58, part)

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο φαίη τις ἄν, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους δεδοίκασι καὶ τὰς τιμωρίας οἱ τοιοῦτοι· πῶς γὰρ οἵ γε ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀτάραχοι, καθάπερ αὐτοί φασιν, ὄντες; ὅ γέ τοι Τίμων ταῦτα καὶ λέγει περὶ τοῦ Πύρρωνος·

ἀλλ' οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἴδον ἠδ' ἀδάμαστον
πᾶσιν ὅσοις δάμνανται ὅμως ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε, 5
λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοθήκης.

4 ἀλλ' οἷον ON: ἄλλοιον I^b 5 δάμνανται ὅμως Wachsmuth: δάμνανται βροτῶν I^b 6 βαρυνόμεν' Stephanus: βαρύνομεν I^b: βαρυνόμενος ON

Context: continuation (cf. **A**) of Aristocles' criticism of Pyrrhonism.

4 **ἀλλ' οἷον** and **ἴδον** indicate the Homeric Nekuia as the model of Timon's parody, as in **3F**; cf. *Od.* 11.519,568 etc. **ἄτυφον** Pyrrho is immune to the τῦφος characteristic of people in general, as too is the Stoic wise man (D.L. 7.117), though not the school's founder in Timon's satire, **3F**; see note on **1D**. **ἀδάμαστον** Of Hades in Homer, *Il.* 9.158.

5 **ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε** So Hesiod, *Erg.* 3.

6 **λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα** Cf. Homer, *Il.* 13.495 and Parmenides, 28 B 6.7 DK.

7 **εἰκαίης νομοθήκης** Epicurus condemns 'legislation' in cosmology, **18C 3**, a passage whose language has much in common with Pyrrhonism. For εἰκαίης, cf. **3G**; the Stoics made ἀνεικαιότης a dialectical virtue, **31B 3**.

C Diogenes Laertius 9.64 (Timon fr. 822, Caizzi 60)

καὶ δὴ καὶ ζηλωτὰς εἶχε πολλοὺς τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν οὕτως ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις·

ὦ γέρον, ὦ Πύρρων, πῶς ἢ πόθεν ἔκδυσιν εὗρες
λατρείης δοξῶν [τε] κενεοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν,
καὶ πάσης ἀπάτης πειθοῦς τ' ἀπελύσαο δεσμά; 5
οὐδ' ἔμελέν σοι ταῦτα μεταλλῆσαι, τίνες αὗραι
Ἑλλάδ' ἔχουσι, πόθεν τε καὶ εἰς ὅ τι κύρει ἕκαστα.

3 ἔκδυσιν BP: ἔκλυσιν FP(corr.) 4 κενεο- Usener: τε κενο- codd. 6 οὐδ' ἔμελεν P: οὐδε μέλε B: οὐδὲ μέλει F μεταλλῆσαι Wachsmuth: μεταλλήσειν P(corr): μετάλλησι B: μεταμελήσειν F τίνες Cobet: τινὸς (τίνος F) codd.

Context: life of Pyrrho.

1 **ἀπραγμοσύνης** Contrast the σοφισταί of **3A**; Pyrrho's indifference to science recalls Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates.

3–4 Cf. Timon's characterization of two of Pyrrho's disciples (D.L. 9.69): he calls Eurylochus πολεμιώτατος τοῖς σοφισταῖς, and Philo indifferent to δόξα and ἔριδες.

6–7 We follow Diels [68], fr. 48 note, in taking these lines to refer to speculation on meteorology and cosmology (for πόθεν . . . ἕκαστα, cf. Simplicius' account of Anaximander, ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, 12 B 1 DK). Lloyd-Jones/Parsons [66] ad loc. favour taking αὗραι to refer to currents of philosophical opinion, and perhaps reading ἑκάστη (Wilamowitz) for ἕκαστα.

D Diogenes Laertius 9.65, Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.1, 1.305 (Timon fr. 841, Caizzi 61)

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ Πύρρων, ἱμείρεται ἦτορ ἀκοῦσαι,
πῶς ποτ' ἀνὴρ διάγεις ῥῇστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ
μὴ προσέχων δίνοις ἡδυλόγου σοφίης,
μοῦνος δ' ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύεις, 5
ὃς περὶ πᾶσαν ἐλῶν γαῖαν ἀναστρέφεται,
δεικνὺς εὐτόρνου σφαίρης πυρικαύτορα κύκλον.

2 ἀνὴρ διάγεις Caizzi: ἀνὴρ ὅτ' ἄγεις vel sim. codd. 4 δίνοις Nauck: δειλοῖς codd. 5 δ' Sextus: ἐν Diogenes ἡγεμονεύεις Sextus: -ων Diogenes 6 ἐλῶν Stephanus: ἑλῶν codd. 7 σφαίρης Diels: σφαίρας codd.

Lines 1, 2, 5 are cited by Diogenes from Timon's *Indalmoi*; line 2, ῥῇστα to end of 4, by Sextus at *M.* 11.1, and 5–7 at *M.* 1.305. For discussion of the language, cf. Caizzi [64] ad loc. Timon's description here of Pyrrho's equipoise, together with other such descriptions (cf. Timon fr. 838), may well be the source of such biographical embellishments as D.L. 9.62–3, 66–8; cf. Long [69], 69.

6–7 With Timon's sun comparison, cf. Lucretius 3.1043–4, on Epicurus. Epicureans and Pyrrho could derive support for their supreme evaluation of tranquillity from such accounts of Democritus as are recorded at D.L. 9.45.

E Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.19–20 (Timon fr. 842, Caizzi 62)

περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποστάσεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων ἱκανοί πώς εἰσιν ἡμῖν ἀγῶνες πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς· κατὰ

δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδαλμοῖς ἔοικε δηλοῦν, ὅταν φῇ· 5

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὀρθὸν ἔχων κανόνα,
ὡς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τἀγαθοῦ αἰεὶ
ἐξ ὧν ἰσότατος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

4 Ἰνδαλμοῖς Fabricius: σινδήμοις vel sim. codd. 6 ἦ Gen.: ἡ N: ἢ LE 8 ὡς ἡ codd.: ὡς ζῇ Bury αἰεί Gen.: ἀεί codd.: ἔχει Natorp: comma post αἰεί del. Burnyeat

6–9 These lines are plausibly taken to be Pyrrho's answer to Timon's question in **D**, i.e. they explain the source of his extraordinary equipoise (cf. ἰσότατος, 9). Traditionally, it was generally supposed that 8 is a complete sentence, meaning 'that the nature of the divine and the good exists for ever'; but the omission of any verb was always found difficult. In vol. 1, 21, we accept the radically different interpretation proposed by Burnyeat [77], whereby the verb to be understood is a predicative ἐστι and no comma should be placed at the end of the line. On this construal 9 tells us what the nature of the divine and the good consists in/has as its source, and no claims about an everlasting nature are made. The great advantage of this interpretation is its ridding Pyrrho of 'an independent and eternally existing nature' (Burnyeat, 88). Undeniably, Pyrrho offers a positive rule of life, though qualified by 'how it appears to me', but one he advances as a truth about himself (cf. the divine equipoise attributed to him in **D**) and in such a way that it is also applicable to any man.

Reale [74], 308–9, has challenged this interpretation. None of his objections to Burnyeat seem to us decisive. However, Reale's own positive suggestions deserve consideration, especially his observation of close parallels between Parmenides' characterization of 'what is' and Pyrrho's equipoise. Reale's thesis in turn is criticized by Stopper [63], 270–1, who advances the radical suggestion that 9 did not originally follow directly after 8, so that we have no idea of what Timon's Pyrrho said about the divine and the good.

9 **ἰσότατος** Note the rarely quoted epitaph of the Pyrrhonist Menecles, dating from perhaps the 1st. century A.D., and found at Ali-Aga in Phocaea. We cite it from Peek's *Griechische Vers-Inschriften* 1.603: ὁ τὰς ἀοιδ[ὰ]ς ἀγεμὼν ἂν Ἑλλάδα | ὁ παντάπασιν ἐξισώσας τὰν λόγῳ | καὶ τὰν ἀτάραχον ἐν βροτοῖς θεύσας ὁδόν | Πυρρωνιαστὰς Μενεκλέης ὅδ' εἴμ' ἐγώ.

F Cicero, *Acad.* 2.130 (Caizzi 69A)

hos [*sc.* Eretriacos et Elios] si contemnimus et iam abiectos putamus, illos certe minus despicere debemus: Aristonem, qui cum Zenonis fuisset auditor re probavit ea quae ille verbis, nihil esse bonum nisi virtutem nec malum nisi quod virtuti esset contrarium; in mediis ea momenta quae Zeno voluit nulla esse censuit. huic summum bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri, quae ἀδιαφορία 5

ab ipso dicitur. Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quae ἀπάθεια nominatur.

6 ἀπάθεια Asconius²: *apati* codd.

Context: part of Cicero's refutation of Lucullus' defence of Stoic/Antiochean ethics, indicating all the schools' disagreements.

Cicero invariably couples Pyrrho with Aristo (cf. also Caizzi 69D–M), and frequently with the Stoic Herillus. This appears to be due to the Academic tradition, according to which these three philosophers' views on the *summum bonum* failed to fit the *Carneadea divisio* (**64E**) because none of them specified any natural objective for the mind's primary impulse (cf. **G–H**). For Aristo and Herillus, cf. **58F–G**, **I**, with notes.

5–7 ἀδιαφορία is applied to Pyrrho by D.L. 9.66, and ἀπάθεια by Aristocles (ap. Euseb., *Pr. ev.* 14.18.18). Aristotle refers to ἀπάθεια and ἠρεμία as virtues (*EN* II.3, 1104b24); Pohlenz [76], 25, took these to allude to Pyrrho, but this is unconvincing; cf. Democritus ap. D.L. 9.45. ἀπάθεια seems to begin its main ethical life with the Cynics (cf. Polystratus, *De contemptu* 21), thereby entering Stoicism (cf. *SVF* 1.449, 3.144, 448 etc.). By the time of Cicero ἀπάθεια could be used interchangeably with ἀταραξία. Hirzel [30], 15–19, tried to argue that only ἀταραξία expresses Pyrrho's ethical end, while Brochard [52], 58–9, defended ἀπάθεια as well. There is no reason to exclude any of these terms: ἀδιαφορία, as the attitude of acknowledging no differences of value; ἀπάθεια, as the absence of all emotional attachment; and ἀταραξία, as the resulting freedom from disturbance.

G Cicero, *Fin.* 2.43 (Caizzi 69B, part)

quae [*sc.* quae prima natura approbavit] quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est disputari. dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse voluerunt, ut eam rerum selectione expoliarent nec ei quicquam, aut unde oriretur, darent, aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam, quam amplexabantur, sustulerunt.

1 *quod* Madvig: *cum* codd.

Context: survey of ethical ends.

For the originally Stoic concepts deployed here, see vol. 1, 357–9. If it is not historically accurate to call Pyrrhonian tranquillity *virtus*, the error is understandable in the light of **E**; and cf. **1B** 5, 9.

H Cicero, *Fin.* 4.43 (Caizzi 69C, part)

itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse, qui finem bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis; Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino, quod appetendum sit, relinquat; deinde

Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, quodcumque in mentem incideret, et quodcumque tamquam occurreret. 5

Context: Cicero's Antiochean criticism of Stoic ethics.

4–5 On Aristo's doctrine, cf. Ioppolo [346], 179–83.

I Athenaeus 337A (Timon fr. 845, Caizzi 65)

παγκάλως δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἔφη· "πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα κακῶν ἐπιθυμία ἐστί."

Context: Athenaeus probably found this line in a gnomologium (cf. Caizzi ad loc.); Timon's *Indalmoi* (cf. **E**) would be suitable for its original context, and similarly for that of the half-line in **J**. See Burnyeat [77], 89–92, for discussion of the conceptual connexions between **I–J** and **E**.

The harmfulnessof *ἐπιθυμία* is a stock theme both of popular morality (cf. Dover, *Greek popular morality*, 208–9) and of Greek philosophical ethics. In particular, early Pyrrhonism could invoke the support of Democritus (cf. 68 B 70, 223, 236, 284 DK) and the Cynics (cf. Diogenes frr. 152–246 Giannantoni [36]).

J Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 11.164 (Timon fr. 846, Caizzi 66, part)

ὑπὸ τυράννῳ ποτὲ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἀρρήτων τι ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ τὸ προσταττόμενον, ἀλλ' ἑκούσιον ἑλεῖται θάνατον, ἢ φεύγων τὰς βασάνους ποιήσει τὸ κελευόμενον, οὕτω τε οὐκέτι "ἀφυγὴς καὶ ἀναίρετος ἔσται" κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἑλεῖται, τοῦ δ' ἀποστήσεται.

Context: Sextus is stating the objection to Pyrrhonism that suspension of judgement is inconsistent with the firm choices the victim of a tyrant would make. Cf. **58F 4** for Aristo's rejoinder to the tyrant case.

3 Timon's polemics

A Diogenes Laertius 9.111 (Timon fr. 775)

τῶν δὲ Σίλλων τρία ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ὡς ἂν σκεπτικὸς ὢν πάντας λοιδορεῖ καὶ σιλλαίνει τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἐν παρῳδίας εἴδει. ὧν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοδιήγητον ἔχει τὴν ἑρμηνείαν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον ἐν διαλόγου σχήματι. φαίνεται γοῦν ἀνακρίνων Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον περὶ ἑκάστων, ὁ δ' αὐτῷ διηγούμενός ἐστι· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ τῶν 5 *ἀρχαιοτέρων, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν ὑστέρων· ὅθεν δὴ αὐτῷ τινες καὶ Ἐπίλογον ἐπέγραψαν. τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ταὐτὰ περιέχει πράγματα, πλὴν ὅτι μονοπρόσωπός ἐστιν ἡ ποίησις· ἀρχὴ δ' αὐτῷ ἥδε· "ἔσπετε νῦν μοι ὅσοι πολυπράγμονές ἐστε σοφισταί."*

Context: life of Timon.

4 Xenophanes is the subject of Timon frr. 833–4.

8–9 The pejorative invocation of all 'intellectuals' is a parody of Homer, *Il.* 2.484, and Hesiod, *Theog.* 114.

9 **πολυπράγμονες** Contrast Pyrrho's *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, **2C** 1.

B Aristocles (Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 14.18.28; Timon fr. 785, Caizzi 48A, part)

αὐτὸς [sc. *Πύρρων*] *δ' ὕστερον τοῦτον τὸν τῦφον περιβαλλόμενος καὶ καλῶν ἄτυφον ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ κατέλιπεν. ἐγένετο δὲ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων Φλιάσιος, ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐχόρευεν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, ἔπειτα δ' ἐντυχὼν αὐτῷ συνέγραψεν ἀργαλέας παρῳδίας καὶ βωμολόχους, ἐν αἷς βεβλασφήμηκε πάντας τοὺς πώποτε φιλοσοφήσαντας. οὗτος γὰρ ἦν ὁ τοὺς Σίλλους γράψας καὶ λέγων· "σχέτλιοι ἄνθρωποι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἷον, | τοίων* 5 *ἔκ τ' ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν πέπλασθε" καί· "ἄνθρωποι κενεῆς οἰήσιος ἔμπλεοι ἀσκοί."*

3 *παρῳδίας* ON: *τραγῳδίας* I^b

Context: polemical account of Pyrrho and Timon.

5–6 **σχέτλιοι . . . πέπλασθε** = Timon fr. 784, with the second line a virtual quotation of Empedocles 31 B 124.2 DK.

6 **κενεῆς οἰήσιος** Cf. **1C** 10; **2C** 4, and for further instances of *κενός* in Timon, frr. 794–5. **ἀσκοί** Cf. Lloyd-Jones/Parsons [66] ad loc.

C Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 9.57 (Timon fr. 779)

μέμνηται δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἱστορίας καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Σίλλων ταῦτα διεξερχόμενος·

⟨τό⟩τε καὶ μετέπειτα σοφιστῶν
οὔτ' ἀλιγυγλώσσῳ οὔτ' ἀσκόπῳ οὔτ' ἀκυλίστῳ
Πρωταγόρῃ· ἔθελον δὲ τέφρην συγγράμματα θεῖναι, 5
ὅττι θεοὺς κατέγραψ' οὔτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι
ὁπποῖοί τινές εἰσι καὶ εἴ τινες ἀθρήσασθαι,
πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικείης. τὰ μὲν οὔ οἱ
χραίσμησ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο, ὄφρα μὴ οὕτως
Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον Ἀίδα δύῃ. 10

3 *ὥστε* LEABR: *ὅς τε* V: *ἔσητε* N: ⟨*πάντων πρωτίστῳ τό*⟩*τε* Diels 5 *συγγράμματα* Fabricius: *-τι* codd. 7 *εἴ* Bekker: *οἴ* codd. 10 *Ἀίδα* Ménage: *-δι* codd. *δύῃ* Meineke: *δύῃ* codd.

For the anecdote and its context, cf. D.L. 9.51–2. In Timon fr. 821 Protagoras is described as *ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδώς;* cf. **B** 6, **D**, and contrast Pyrrho at **2C–D**.

D Diogenes Laertius 2.107 (Timon fr. 802)

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτά φησι Τίμων, προσπαρατρώγων καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς Σωκρατικούς·

ἀλλ' οὔ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλου
οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος ὅτις γένετ', οὐδ' ἐριδάντεω
Εὐκλείδεω, Μεγαρεῦσιν ὃς ἔμβαλε λύσσαν ἐρισμοῦ. 5

4 *ὅτις γένετ'* Diels: *ὅστις γε τ'* vel sim. codd.

Context: Eucleides' logic-chopping.

3 **φλεδόνων** Also applied to Antisthenes, Timon fr. 811. Such consistency in