

Human Growth: Assessment and Interpretation

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1. Language and Emotion Concepts

This chapter describes some aspects of emotion language that have not yet received a great deal of attention but are clearly important in the study of emotion concepts. Most important of these is the role of figurative language in the conceptualization of emotion. Do metaphor and other figurative language matter at all in how we think about the emotions? Do metaphors simply reflect a preexisting, literal reality, or do they actually create or constitute our emotional reality? Is it of any consequence that speakers of English use expressions like *boiling with anger*, *being swept off one's feet*, *building a relationship*, and *being madly in love*?

I will suggest that it is of serious consequence. If we are not clear about why people engage in this way of talking, we cannot really understand why lay people categorize the emotions as passions, while some experts categorize them as states and others as actions; if we do not pay a great deal of attention to figurative language, it is impossible to see precisely how the lay view of emotion differs from the lay view of human relationships or that of rational thought or morality; if we do not examine this kind of language, we will never understand why we have the theories of emotion in psychology, philosophy, and anthropology that we do; and if we do not analyze this kind of language in cultures other than our own, we will never find out whether the way we think about our emotions is shared (and, if it is, to what extent) by speakers of other languages. I will contend that metaphor, and figurative language in general, does matter in all of these issues, and crucially so.

But in order to see in precisely what ways metaphor matters in all this, we have to clarify first what we mean by the language of emotion; second, what the competing theories of emotion language and

emotion concepts are; and third, what the more specific issues are that emerge in connection with emotion language. The survey to follow is divided into three sections: (1) words and emotion, (2) meaning and emotion, and (3) some issues that inevitably arise in the study of everyday conceptions of emotion.

As is obvious from the goals above, I will not deal with certain important aspects of emotion language and emotional implications of language in general. I will have nothing to say about the syntactic, phonetic, and pragmatic properties of this language, although a great deal of high-quality work is being done in all these fields (see, e.g., Iván Fónagy's extremely interesting work, such as Fónagy, 1981, on the relationship between emotion and human sound systems).

Words and Emotion

When they deal with emotion language, many scholars assume that this language simply consists of a dozen or so words, such as *anger*, *fear*, *love*, *joy*, and so forth. I will challenge this view in this section and claim that this is just a small fraction of our emotion language. I will briefly discuss the most general functions and organization of emotion-related vocabulary, and then focus attention on a large but neglected group of emotion terms.

Expression and Description

A first distinction that we have to make is between expressive and descriptive emotion words (or terms or expressions). Some emotion words can *express* emotions. Examples include *shit!* when angry, *wow!* when enthusiastic or impressed, *yuk!* when disgusted, and many more. It is an open question whether all emotions can be expressed in this way, and which are the ones that cannot and why. Other emotion words can *describe* the emotions they signify or that "they are about." Words like *anger* and *angry*, *joy* and *happy*, *sadness* and *depressed* are assumed to be used in such a way. We should note that under certain circumstances descriptive emotion terms can also "express" particular emotions. An example is "*I love you!*" where the descriptive emotion word *love* is used both to describe and express the emotion of love.

The categories of descriptive and expressive emotion terms are analogous to Searle's (1990) categories of assertive and expressive

speech acts, in that descriptive terms have an assertive function and expressive terms often constitute expressive speech acts.

In this work, I will be concerned only with that part of the emotion lexicon that is used “to describe” emotional experience. As we will see below, this is a much larger category of emotion terms than the one that “expresses” emotions.

Basic Emotion Terms

Within the category of descriptive emotion words, the terms can be seen as “more or less basic.” Speakers of a given language appear to feel that some of the emotion words are more basic than others. More basic ones include in English *anger*, *sadness*, *fear*, *joy*, and *love*. Less basic ones include *annoyance*, *wrath*, *rage*, and *indignation* for anger and *terror*, *fright*, and *horror* for fear.

Basicness can mean two things (at least, loosely speaking). One is that these words (the concepts corresponding to them) occupy a middle level in a vertical hierarchy of concepts (in the sense of Rosch, 1975, 1978). In this sense, say, *anger* is more basic than, for example, *annoyance* or *emotion*. *Anger*, because it is a “basic-level” emotion category, lies between the superordinate-level category *emotion* and the subordinate-level category of *annoyance*. This is depicted in Figure 1.1.

The other sense of “basicness” is that a particular emotion category can be judged to be more “prototypical” (i.e., a better example) of emotion than another at the same horizontal level (again, “prototypical” in the sense of Rosch, 1975, 1978). This horizontal level coincides with the basic level of the vertical organization of concepts. For example, *anger* is more basic in this sense than, say, *hope* or *pride*, which, in the previous sense, are on the same level (see Figure 1.2).

These organizations of emotion terms have been extensively studied in the past decade for English (e.g., Fehr and Russell, 1984; Shaver,




Figure 1.1. Levels of emotion terms in a vertical hierarchy

4 Metaphor and Emotion




Figure 1.2. Prototypical vs. nonprototypical emotion terms on the horizontal level of conceptual organization. (The circle indicates that, e.g., *anger*, *fear*, and *sadness* are better examples of emotion terms than *hope*, *pride*, *surprise*, and *lust*.)

Schwartz, Kirson, and O'Connor, 1987). Cross-cultural research along these lines is just beginning. Using a methodology borrowed from Fehr and Russell (1984), Frijda, Markan, Sato, and Wiers (1995) arrive at five general and possibly universal categories of emotion in 11 languages. These basic emotion categories include happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and love. Smith and Tkel-Sbal (1995) investigate the possibility that emotion terms are prototypically organized in the Micronesian language of Palau, and Smith and Smith (1995) attempt to do the same for Turkish.

Metaphor and Metonymy

There is another kind of emotion-related term, the group of figurative terms and expressions. Since figurative terms also describe (and do not primarily express) emotions, this is a subgroup within descriptive terms. This subgroup may be larger than the other two groups combined. Here, unlike the previous group, the words and expressions do not literally “name” particular kinds of emotions, and the issue is not how basic or prototypical the word or expression is. The figurative words and expressions that belong in this group denote various *aspects* of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, control, and so forth. They can be metaphorical and metonymical. The metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Conceptual metaphors bring two distant domains (or concepts) into correspondence with each other. One of the domains is typically more physical or concrete than the other (which is thus more abstract). The correspondence is established for the purpose of understanding the more abstract in terms of the more concrete. For example, *boiling with anger* is a linguistic example of the very productive conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID (cf. Lakoff and

Kövecses, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Kövecses, 1986, 1990, 1995a), *burning with love* is an example of LOVE IS FIRE (cf. Kövecses, 1988), and *to be on cloud nine* is an example of HAPPINESS IS UP (cf. Kövecses, 1991b). All three examples indicate the intensity aspect of the emotions concerned.

Linguistic expressions that belong in this large group can also be metonymical. Conceptual metonymies, unlike conceptual metaphors, involve a single domain, or concept. The purpose of metonymy is to provide mental access to a domain through a part of the same domain (or vice versa) or to a part of a domain through another part in the same domain (for more explanation of the nature of metonymy, see Kövecses and Radden, 1998). Thus, metonymy, unlike metaphor, is a “stand-for” relation (i.e., a part stands for the whole or a part stands for another part) within a single domain. Emotion concepts as wholes are viewed as having many parts, or elements. For instance, one part or element of the domain of anger is to be upset, and one part or element of the domain of fear is an assumed drop in body temperature. Thus, linguistic examples for these two emotion concepts include *to be upset* for anger and *to have cold feet* for fear. The first is an instance of the conceptual metonymy PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR ANGER, while the second is an example of the conceptual metonymy DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR FEAR (see Kövecses, 1990).

A special case of emotion metonymies involves a situation in which an emotion concept B is part of another emotion concept A (see, e.g., Kövecses, 1986, 1990, 1991a, 1991b). In cases like this, B can metonymically stand for A. This can explain why, for instance, the word *girlfriend* can be used of one’s partner in a love relationship. Since love (A), at least ideally, involves or assumes friendship (B) between the two lovers, the word *friend* (an instance of B) can be used to talk about an aspect of love (A).

We can represent the three types of emotion language in Figure 1.3. Of the three groups identified (expressive terms, terms literally denoting particular kinds of emotions, and figurative expressions denoting particular aspects of emotions), the group of figurative expressions is the largest by far, and yet it has received the least attention in the study of emotion language. Figurative expressions are deemed completely uninteresting and irrelevant by most researchers, who tend to see them as epiphenomena, fancier ways of saying some things that could be said in literal, simple ways. Further, the expressions in group one are usually considered literal. Given this, we can understand better why the expressions in group three received scant attention. If one




Figure 1.3. Summary of types of emotion language

holds the view that only literal expressions can be the bearers of truth and that figurative expressions have nothing to do with how our (emotional) reality is constituted, there is no need to study “mere” figurative language. However, there is also an increasing number of scholars who do not accept this view of the function of language in how human beings create their emotional realities (see, e.g., Baxter, 1992; Duck, 1994; Gibbs, 1994; Holland and Kipnis, 1995; Kövecses, 1990).

Meaning and Emotion

The isolation and description of emotion language is just the beginning in the process of uncovering the significance of this language in human conceptualization. The more difficult problem is to deal with the question of meaning. The issue of what constitutes the meaning of emotion words is a hotly debated topic in several disciplines – from psychology through anthropology to philosophy. There are several distinct views that scholars have offered in an attempt to characterize emotional meaning.

The “Label” View

The label view of emotional meaning maintains that the meaning of emotion terms is simply an association between a label, like the words *anger* and *fear*, plus some real emotional phenomena, like physiological processes and behavior. This view is the simplest lay view of emotional meaning. It is based on the folk theory of meaning in general according to which meaning is merely an association between sounds (forms) and things. This understanding of meaning in general also

forms the basis of a scientific theory of emotion. Schachter and Singer (1962) proposed that emotion involves three things: a label, plus something (emotionally) real, plus a situation. This view is an improvement on the simplest lay view. However, they both exclude the possibility that emotion terms can have much conceptual content and organization. But, as several studies indicate (see, e.g., Wierzbicka, 1995; Shaver et al., 1987; and Kövecses, 1990, among others), emotion terms have a great deal of conceptual content and structure.

The “Core Meaning” View

It is customary in semantics to distinguish between core (denotative, conceptual, cognitive, etc.) and peripheral (connotative, residual, etc.) meaning (see, e.g., Lyons, 1977). What characterizes core meaning is a small number of properties or components that are taken to define a category in an adequate manner. This means, in this view of meaning, that core meaning should be capable of minimally distinguishing between the meaning of any two words; that is, by virtue of the smallest possible number of components. Since, in this view, the major function of definitions is systematic differentiation of meaning, the more important kind of meaning, the kind of meaning that really matters, is typically thought to be core meaning, while peripheral meaning is viewed as less important in giving the meaning of words and expressions. (For a more detailed discussion, see Kövecses, 1990, 1993a). Peripheral meaning or connotation is usually seen as being made up of various social, situational, or affective properties – any properties that are not taken to contribute to the cognitive content of words in a significant way. Connotations are assumed to vary from person to person and from culture to culture. However, according to some researchers, like Osgood (1964), certain connotations are universal: namely, the general meaning dimensions of evaluation (good vs. bad), activity (fast vs. slow), and potency (strong vs. weak).

The core meaning view of emotion categories typically assumes the idea that emotional meaning is composed of *universal* semantic primitives. A leading proponent of this view is Wierzbicka (see, e.g., Wierzbicka, 1972, 1995). For example, she defines the English emotion and *anger* in the following way: “X feels as one does when one thinks that someone has done something bad and when one wants to cause this person to do something he doesn’t want to do” (1972, p. 62). This definition makes use of some universal semantic primitives, such as

THINK, DESIRE, WANT, BAD, GOOD, CAUSE, DO, and so forth. One of the major points of Wierzbicka's approach is that it is a mistake to think of emotion words in particular languages, such as English, as being universal (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1986, 1992a, 1995). Thus, for example, the English word *emotion* is anything but universal; it does not seem to exist even in languages otherwise closely related to English (Wierzbicka, 1995). What is universal instead, Wierzbicka maintains, are the semantic primitives that make up the conceptual content of particular emotion words in particular languages. (Because Wierzbicka's work also fits another group, her views will be discussed further in a later section.)

In one respect, however Wierzbicka's approach is not very representative of the core meaning view. In defining an emotion, one uses universals to make a clause that describes a scene or scenario: "X feels as one does when. . . ." In a typical core meaning theory, the mere presence or absence of the primitives is defining and there is no syntax that governs their construction as concepts. But in Wierzbicka, syntax matters because the semantic universals are combined in contingent clauses to construct scenes and scenarios ("X feels as one does when one thinks that . . .").

To take another example of the core meaning view, Davitz (1969) characterizes the meaning of the English emotion word *anger* as being composed of HYPERACTIVATION, MOVING AGAINST, TENSION, and INADEQUACY. These (and other) components, or clusters, of meaning are derived from linguistic data produced by speakers of English. The clusters are taken to be capable of successfully distinguishing each emotion word in English. Furthermore, it is suggested that the same clusters can be applied to the study of emotion concepts in other cultures (such as Ugandan).

The "Dimensional" View

Emotional meaning is also viewed as being constituted by values on a fixed set of dimensions of meaning. Solomon (1976), for example, postulates 13 dimensions that are sufficient to describe any emotion. These include DIRECTION, SCOPE/FOCUS, OBJECT, CRITERIA, STATUS, EVALUATIONS, RESPONSIBILITY, INTERSUBJECTIVITY, DISTANCE, MYTHOLOGY, DESIRE, POWER, and STRATEGY. The definitions of emotion concepts make use of all or some of these dimensions. The core meaning and dimensional views are not always easy to distinguish. Thus, ac-

According to Frijda the dimensions that apply to a given emotion provide a “component profile” that uniquely characterizes an emotion (Frijda, 1986, pp. 217–219). Researchers working in the dimensional approach attempt to eliminate a major alleged pitfall of the “core meaning” view in general: the large gap between emotional meaning and emotional experience. For example, de Rivera (1977) states that “there is bound to be a tension between these two poles – the one insisting that the investigator be faithful to experience, the other requiring the sparse elegance of precise relations between a few abstract constructs” (p. 121). Clearly, de Rivera is aware of a gap between emotional meaning as defined in terms of “a few abstract constructs” (i.e., semantic components and dimensions) and the totality of emotional experience, that is, complex experience of people who are in particular emotional states. Another well-known advocate of the dimensional approach is Frijda (1986). Frijda distinguishes among even more dimensions (26 altogether). Obviously, the aim is to reduce the meaning-experience gap.

The “Implicational” View

While the “core meaning” and “dimensional” views are based on the core meaning in general, the implicational view takes connotative meaning as its main point of departure. In the words of a major figure: “To study what something means is to study what it entails, implies, or suggests to those who understand it” (Shweder, 1991, p. 244). For example, according to Shweder, the sentence “One of my grandparents was a surgeon” suggests that my grandfather was a surgeon and the sentence “She is your mother” implies that she is under an obligation to care about your health (pp. 244–245). As these examples suggest, for Shweder, meaning is connotative meaning, not denotative meaning. It is the periphery, rather than the core, that counts in this view of meaning.

Shweder relativizes this approach to emotional meaning. One of his examples is *anger*. Shweder writes: “Anger suggests explosion, destruction, and revenge” (p. 245). As we will see in the discussion of yet another view of emotional meaning, these properties of anger, together with others, will show up in the representation of the meaning of *anger*.

The particular version of the connotative view of meaning that Shweder endorses is the nonuniversalist one. Unlike Osgood (1964),

Shweder believes, with anthropologists in general, that connotative meaning, and in particular emotional meaning, varies considerably from culture to culture. Making reference to work by several anthropologists, Shweder (1991) writes:

Emotions have meanings, and those meanings play a part in how we feel. What it means to feel angry . . . is not quite the same for the Ilongot, who believe that anger is so dangerous it can destroy society; for the Eskimo, who view anger as something that only children experience; and for working-class Americans, who believe that anger helps us overcome fear and attain independence. (p. 245)

Thus, in Shweder's view the connotative meaning of anger varies cross-culturally. This is a tack that is the opposite of the one taken by Osgood (1964) whose interest lies in what is universal about connotative meaning.

Heider (1991) took a connotative approach in his study of Minangkabau (Sumatra) and Indonesian terms for emotions. Heider discovered clusters of synonyms for emotion terms. We are here regarding synonyms as a kind of verbal connotation. He constructed lists of over 200 emotion terms in each language and obtained synonyms from 50 Minangkabau, 50 Minangkabau Indonesian, and 50 Indonesian subjects for each term in the list. By drawing lines from each term to all its synonyms in each language, he was able to draw extensive maps of the lexical domain of emotion. Heider (1991, p. 27) suggested that each of the clusters of similar words "correspond[s] best to what we mean by 'an emotion.'" Those who think in terms of a small number of basic emotions might be surprised by Heider's discovery of "some forty clusters" with each having ties to "only one or two other clusters" (1991, p. 28). Heider also studied emotion prototypes, as discussed in the following section.

The "Prototype" View

In the section on "Words and Emotion," I mentioned that some emotion words are more prototypical than others. There the question was: What are the best examples of the category of *emotion*? As we saw, the best examples of the category in English include *anger*, *fear*, *love*, and others. We can also ask: What are the best examples, or cases, of *anger*, *fear*, and *love*, respectively? Obviously, there are many different kinds of anger, fear, and love. When we try to specify the structure and

content of the best example of any of these lower-level categories, we are working within the “prototype” view of emotional meaning as it relates to individual basic-level categories. This view has produced some intriguing results. Heider (1991), for example, found that anger is less of a focal emotion in Indonesian than it is in English. Sadness and confusion, on the other hand, are more central emotions in Indonesian than in English.

The structure of emotion concepts is seen by many researchers as a script, scenario, or model (e.g., Fehr and Russell, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987; Rimé, Philippot, and Cisalono, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1990, 1992b; Heider, 1991; Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987; Kövecses, 1986, 1988, 1990; Rosaldo, 1984; Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988; Palmer and Brown, 1998, etc.). For example, Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) describe *anger* as a sequence of stages of events: (1) cause of anger, (2) anger exists, (3) attempt at controlling anger, (4) loss of control over anger, (5) retribution. That is, anger is viewed as being conceptualized as a five-stage scenario. Fehr and Russell (1984) characterize *fear* in the following manner:

A dangerous situation occurs suddenly. You are startled, and you scream. You try to focus all your attention on the danger, try to figure a way out, but you feel your heart pounding and your limbs trembling. Thoughts race through your mind. Your palms feel cold and wet. There are butterflies in your stomach. You turn and flee. (p. 482)

In other words, we have the unfolding of a variety of events that are temporally and casually related in certain specifiable ways. The particular *sequence* of events make up the structure of the prototypical concept of any given emotion, like fear, while the particular *events* that participate in the sequence make up the content of the concepts.

One particularly interesting example of the scenario approach is that of Ortony et al. (1988), who define 22 emotion types. These are defined in terms of their eliciting conditions and independently of language. Examples of such types include being displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event, being pleased about the disconfirmation of the prospect of an undesirable event, and being displeased about the confirmation of the prospect of an undesirable event (p. 173). Their theory involves an element of appraisal: Events may be desirable or undesirable; actions may be praiseworthy or blameworthy; and objects may be appealing or unappealing.

Ortony et al. (1988) argue that they have the best of two worlds: a

theory that is culture-free and applies universally, but nevertheless allows for culturally defined variation in emotional experience:

At least at the meta-level, we feel comfortable that we have a theory based on culturally universal principles. These principles are that the particular classes of emotions that will exist in a culture depend on the ways in which members of a culture carve up their world. (Ortony, et al., 1988, p. 175)

But this position is not as relativistic as it may at first appear because all cultures must carve along the same joints as defined by the researchers: The particular classes of emotions allowed to any culture are presumably limited to the 22 types in their theory.

Ortony et al. (1988) believe it is wrong to start with language in the investigation of emotions. They regard it as a separate enterprise to investigate “the way in which emotion words in any particular language map onto the hypothesized emotion types” (p. 173). If we compare their approach to the characterization of anger offered by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), we can see that the eliciting conditions would have to be subsumed entirely within stage one, “cause of anger.” The emotion language pertaining to the subsequent four stages would not map directly onto the emotion types proposed in the psychological approach of Ortony et al. Thus, the psychological approach would ignore much of the conceptual content that can be discovered by the inspection of emotion language. On the other hand, their approach might provide leads for a more fine-grained linguistic analysis of stage one. This suggests that the two approaches could complement each other to the benefit of both.

Sometimes the prototype approach is combined with some other view of emotional meaning. For example, Wierzbicka (1990) states:

The definition of an emotion concept takes the form of a prototypical scenario describing not so much an external situation as a highly abstract cognitive structure: roughly, to feel emotion E means to feel as a person does who has certain (specifiable) thoughts, characteristic of that particular situation. (p. 361)

As can be seen, this definition combines the “core meaning” approach with the prototype approach. The “(specifiable) thoughts” are constituted by the semantic primitives WANT, BAD, DO, SOMEONE, and others.

In the “prototype” approach, two kinds of views can be distinguished: the literal and the nonliteral conceptions of emotion. For example, Shaver et al. (1987) and Wierzbicka (1990) apparently do not

think that metaphorical and metonymical understanding play a role in the way emotion concepts are understood and constituted. Others, however, believe that metaphorical and metonymical understanding does play a role. Some of these researchers disagree about the exact nature of this role (see, e.g., Holland, 1982; Quinn, 1991; Geeraerts and Grondelaers, 1995). Despite the disagreements, however, many believe that metaphors are important. Authors from a variety of disciplines, such as Averill (1974, 1990), Averill and Kövecses (1990), Baxter (1992), Duck (1994), Holland and Kipnis (1995), Quinn (1987, 1991), Lakoff and Kövecses (1987), Lakoff (1987), Kövecses (1986, 1988, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1993b, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b), discuss the role and possible contribution of conceptual metaphors and metonymies to the conceptualization of emotional experience.

Finally, in a variety of publications I have suggested (see Kövecses, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991a, 1991b) that many emotions, such as love, fear, and happiness, have not just one, but several prototypical cognitive models associated with them (i.e., they each have multiple prototypes). That is, the proposal is that several members (or cases) can acquire the status of “best example” within an emotion category. This is because, given a category with several members, one member can be typical, another can be salient, a third can be ideal, and so on. (On metonymic models such as these, see Lakoff, 1987.)

The “Social-Constructionist” View

Several scholars take emotion concepts to be social constructions. For example Lutz (1988) gives the following account of *song* (roughly corresponding to anger) in Ifaluk:

1. There is a rule or value violation.
2. It is pointed out by someone.
3. This person simultaneously condemns the act.
4. The perpetrator reacts in fear to that anger.
5. The perpetrator amends his or her ways.

As can be seen, this model is considerably different from the one associated with the English word *anger*. To account for the difference, Lutz claims that this model of Ifaluk *song* is a social-cultural construction whose properties depend on particular aspects of Ifaluk society and culture. For example, while the view linked with the English word *anger* emphasizes properties of anger that relate to individuals,

the view linked with *song* highlights the essentially social nature of this emotion concept. To account for the difference, Lutz claimed that this model of Ifaluk *song* is a socio-cultural construction whose properties depend on particular aspects of Ifaluk society and culture.

The social-constructionist view of emotion concepts is also based, at least in the work of its leading proponents (like Lutz and Averill), on the notion of prototype. The structure of most emotion concepts is seen as a highly conventionalized script from which deviations are recognized and linguistically marked in any given culture. Where the explicitly social-constructionist views differ from other prototype-based but nonconstructionist approaches is in their account of the content of emotion concepts.

The “Embodied Cultural Prototype” View

The account of *song* can be seen as diametrically opposed to that of *anger* as discussed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987). Lakoff and Kövecses claim that to the degree that the metaphors (especially the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID metaphor) that constitute anger are motivated by physiological functioning (e.g., increased body heat), the concept will be motivated by the human body, rather than being completely arbitrary, being just a social-cultural product.

In this work I will propose that it is necessary to go beyond both the view that the concept of anger is simply motivated by human physiology and the view that it is simply a social construction. I will suggest that it is *both* motivated by the human body *and* produced by a particular social and cultural environment. That is, I will attempt to reconcile the two apparently contradictory views (see chapters 8, 9, and 10). In this way, social constructions are given bodily basis and bodily motivation is given social-cultural substance.

Some Issues in the Study of Emotion Language

There are several issues that emerge from the foregoing discussion. I will mention only some of them, those that I find particularly important in the study of emotion concepts and emotional meaning and that will be explored further in this study.

The “Validity” Issue

Given our survey, one of the most important issues that arises is this: Which one of the views above *really* or *best* represents our everyday conception of emotion? Is it the “label” view, the “core meaning” view, the “dimensional” or some other view, or a combination of several of these? This is a tough question, and it seems that at the present time we have no reliable criteria to decide which of the views listed above is the one that can be considered a psychologically valid representation of emotion concepts. Although we have no direct evidence on the basis of which to favor any of the ways of representing emotional meaning, work in cognitive science in general suggests that prototypical cognitive models are our best candidates. “Prototype” views seem to offer the greatest explanatory power for many aspects of emotional meaning. These views, it will be remembered, come in at least two major versions: social-constructionist and experientialist (i.e., bodily based, in the sense of Lakoff, 1987, and Johnson, 1987). In my view, the two complement each other, and I will suggest a certain “marriage” between these rival theories.

The Universality of Emotion Prototypes

As several anthropologists and psychologists have argued (especially Berlin and Kay, 1969, and Rosch, 1975, 1978), focal colors appear to be universal. Is this also the case for the emotions? That is, is the prototype (the central member) for emotion X in language L a prototype (a central member) in other languages as well? Evidence that we have so far seems to indicate that it is not. The constructionists (like Harré and Lutz) argue that it is only natural that this is not the case, while others (like Russell, 1991) argue that prototypical scripts, or at least large portions of them, are the same across languages and cultures. Wierzbicka (1995) maintains, with the constructionists, that emotion prototypes are different cross-culturally, but the semantic primitives with which these differences are expressed can be, and are, universal.

It can also be suggested that what is universal are some general structures within the emotion domain, corresponding, as Frijda et al. (1995) put it, to an “unspecified positive emotion” (the happiness/joy range), an “unspecified negative emotion” (the sadness range), “an emotion of strong affection” (the love range), “an emotion of threat”

(the fear range), and an angerlike range. However, the prototypical or focal members of the basic emotion categories (or ranges) in different languages tend to be different to varying degrees (compare Ifaluk *song* with English *anger*). This situation seems to be unlike the situation for color. In color, the focal members of particular colors are exactly the same across languages. In emotion, the “focal” members of basic emotion categories in different languages differ from each other to varying degrees – despite the fact that the same general basic emotion categories exist in possibly all languages and cultures. In the final chapters, I will make some suggestions concerning some of the details of cross-cultural similarities and differences.

The Universality of Conceptual Tools

So far we have seen a variety of conceptual tools or elements that scholars utilize in their attempts to provide a cognitive representation of emotional meaning. These include semantic primitives (components), connotative properties, dimensions of meaning, scripts or scenarios, and conceptual metaphors and metonymies. The question arises: Which of these conceptual elements are universal? Again, authors disagree. Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) suggest that none of these are. Instead, what is universal, they argue, are certain basic image schemas, as these arise from certain fundamental bodily experiences. In this work, I will take this general direction. However, others, like Wierzbicka (1995), suggest that there is a small set of universal semantic primitives with the help of which all concepts (including emotion concepts) in all languages can be adequately described and defined.

Are Emotion Metaphors Unique to the Emotions?

As research so far has established, there is a large number of metaphors, or more precisely metaphorical source domains, that speakers of English use to understand their emotions, like anger, love, fear. These include HOT FLUID, FIRE, DANGEROUS ANIMAL, OPPONENT, BURDEN, NATURAL FORCE, etc. Why do speakers need all these different metaphors? And even more important, is this set of metaphorical source domains unique to the understanding of emotions or does it overlap with the source domains that people use to understand other

experiences? (See chapter 3 for a discussion.) What is at stake here is the issue of whether we have a conceptual system from which the emotions “carve out” a unique part or not. My answer to this will be both yes and no. I will claim that at one level of generality, at the level where the specific conceptual metaphors cited above work, the emotions are not conceptualized in terms of a unique set of metaphors. However, I will claim that at another level there is something like a unique conceptualization of emotions. Drawing on Len Talmy’s (1988) work on force dynamics, I will isolate an extremely general “master metaphor” for emotion that I will call the *EMOTION IS FORCE* metaphor (see chapter 5). I will show that most of the specific-level metaphors are merely instantiations of this generic-level metaphor. The *FORCE* metaphor will be shown to have several important consequences for the study of emotion. Given the *FORCE* metaphor, we will see that (1) it is impossible to conceptualize most aspects of the emotions in other than metaphorical terms; (2) this is a universal way of understanding emotion (see chapter 8); and (3) we can systematically contrast the domain of emotion with that of human relationships, like friendship, love, and marriage (see chapter 6).

The Role of Metaphor and Metonymy

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued that many everyday metaphors are conceptual in nature, that is, they are not mere words used in a non-literal sense. Rather, metaphors are conceptual devices used for important cognitive jobs. One of these is that metaphors can actually “create,” or constitute social, cultural, and psychological realities for us. What is the role of conceptual metaphor in emotion concepts in a given culture? The more specific issue is this: Are the conceptual metaphors constitutive of the cultural models associated with emotions or do they simply reflect them? In a recent debate and based on data concerning the American conception of marriage, Quinn (1991) proposes that the latter is the case. Here again, I will take the opposite tack and argue in chapter 7, on the basis of the prevalent “unity” metaphor for love and marriage, that conceptual metaphors, together with other factors, can contribute to how abstract concepts are constituted. However, as Holland (personal communication) suggests, this “either/or” view of the role of metaphor might not be the best way of looking at the issue. Moreover, it seems closer to the truth to believe

that some metaphors have the capacity to constitute reality, while others do not. Which ones do and which ones don't can only be decided on the basis of detailed future research.

The same issue arises in connection with scientific or expert theories of emotion. Are the metaphors used in scholarly discussions "merely explanatory, pedagogical" devices, or do the metaphors actually constitute the theories? Soyland (1994), for one, argues that the latter is the case. I will return to this question in chapter 7.

"Lay Views" Versus "Scientific Theories"

What is the relationship between everyday emotion concepts (as revealed in conventional language use) and scientific conceptions of emotion? That is, how are lay and scientific theories of emotion related? This is an issue that, among others, Parrott (1995) addresses in an explicit way in relation to the lay "heart-head" and the corresponding expert "emotion-cognition" distinction.

More generally, assuming that there *is* a relationship and that the relationship can be either strong or weak (somewhat on the analogy of distinct interpretations of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), we can imagine four theoretical possibilities (with several additional in-between cases not specified here):

1. folk conception determines expert theory
2. folk conception influences expert theory
3. expert theory determines folk theory
4. expert theory influences folk theory

In the strong version, "determines" is intended in the sense of "leads to, produces." In the weak version, "influences" covers such disparate cases as "constrains," "builds on," or "makes it natural and popular."

Given this admittedly ad hoc classification, we can look at specific instances in emotion research and try to identify the specific relation that might obtain between a given lay view and a given expert theory. In some publications (e.g., Averill and Kövecses, 1990; Kövecses, 1991a), Averill and I make some preliminary observations concerning some of these possibilities. For instance, I point out (1991a) how a number of expert theories of love build and focus on various aspects of the language-based folk model of love. The nature of the relationship between lay and expert theories in psychological domains, such as the domain of emotion, is a hotly debated topic today, as indicated

by several recent collections of articles that bear on this question, such as those by Siegfried (1994) and Russell, Fernández-Dols, Manstead, and Wellenkamp (1995). I will explore this issue at some length in chapter 7.

Subcategorizing Emotions

Indeed, what are the emotions? Do we subcategorize them as states, events, actions, or passions? Is the psychologist right who says they are states, or the lay public that says they are passions? Can they be thought of as actions at all? And most intriguingly, how can we find out? Recently, George Lakoff (1990, 1993) proposed that much of our understanding of states, events, actions, and activities is structured by what he calls the “Event Structure” metaphor. To shed some light on these issues, I will make use of this complex metaphor to see the extent of the overlap between the domain of emotions and the event system in chapter 4.

These are the issues that I wish to address in subsequent chapters. However, before we plunge into deep water, it will serve us well to see which English emotion concepts have been studied so far from a cognitive semantic perspective and what the results are. This will provide us with a good foundation in the discussion of the issues introduced above and in comparing English with other languages. I will survey some of the results for English in chapter 2, while languages other than English will be examined in chapters 8 and 9.

2. Metaphors of Emotion

In this chapter I wish to survey and summarize the research that has been done on metaphorical aspects of emotion concepts in English in the past decade or so. (The research on figurative emotion language in other cultures will be presented in chapters 8 and 9.) I will limit myself to the presentation of results that have been acquired by using a cognitive linguistic framework within the tradition that was established in the 1980s and early 1990s by the work of such figures as George Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Turner, 1989), Ronald Langacker (1987, 1991), Mark Johnson (Johnson, 1987, 1993), Mark Turner (1987), Eve Sweetser (1990), Ray Gibbs (1994), and others. Clearly, it is this framework that takes figurative (metaphoric and metonymic) language most seriously in the study of human conceptual systems.

The emotion concepts that have received attention from a variety of scholars in this tradition include anger, fear, happiness, sadness, love, lust, pride, shame, and surprise. I take this set to be a fairly representative sample of emotion concepts. Many of them are prototypical emotion concepts and occur on most lists of "basic emotions" (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, sadness), and some of them such as love and surprise, represent at least arguable cases of basic emotions. In regard to their cognitive status as linguistic categories in a vertical hierarchy of concepts, they are all basic-level categories.

The focus in this chapter will be predominantly on conceptual metaphor, since I will claim that metaphor not only pervades the language people use about the emotions, but also that it is essential to the understanding of most aspects of the conceptualization of emotion and emotional experience. Several questions arise in connection with the use of such metaphorical language: (1) Is such language actually