FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER

Lectures on
Philosophical Ethics

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Introduction

1 Transition from critique to real depiction

1 The communication of a single distinct science cannot have any proper starting-point.
2 The individual science cannot have at its head a proposition which is immediately certain.
3 Even when deducing it from a higher science it can only be understood in conjunction with other knowledge which stands in opposition to it.
4 The establishment of this opposition can appear only as opinion.¹
5 Every science has a number of shapes. The very act of beginning creates a basis for one such shape, and yet it contains knowledge only inasmuch as it is comprehended historically in conjunction with the others. The history of the sciences cannot exist without the sciences themselves, however, which gives rise to a circularity.
6 We already know something of every science by virtue of common life and common critique.
7 This influence cannot be to the good where ethics is concerned, because of the unfavorable phenomenon whereby a number of approaches

¹ Marginal addition: Since the highest science is only in the process of becoming, and the sufficient deduction of the individual sciences will only be possible once it is perfected, the individual science must begin in imperfection in order to come into being. Everything is imperfect and diverse, and so various forms are posited etc., in such a way as to show how they can be comprehended historically with a diversity in which each refers to the others. In contrast to the necessity of such (perfect) knowledge, the actual beginning is arbitrary, with an order which fluctuates, or hypothetical, as if the highest knowledge were not yet constructed. The former is vulnerable to the unfavorable influence of what we know from common life and common critique.
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start from very different assumptions but end with the same results, thus [suggesting] either error or scientific inconsistency.

8 Eudaemonistic ethics are hypothetical in the individual instance, because a purpose can be achieved in various ways, which in reality are in opposition to one another, while only one of them may be chosen. At most, therefore, they are an exposition of inclination: in the individual instance on technical grounds, and as a whole, because choice is based on inclination.

9 The Kantian form of rational ethics posits guiding thoughts to any action and can therefore only correct or perfect; it cannot, even were one to submit to it entirely, construct out of nothing.

10 Without concerning itself with what exists, Kantian rationality posits the ought, as the characteristic feature of the ethical, in contrast to the physical. However, [for Kant] even in the physical domain appearance is never adequate to the concept, and in fact ethics must presuppose that the object of ethics, the force from which individual actions proceed, exists and is identical with what ought to be.

11 Both approaches are limited also in a material respect. Without any construction they presuppose much that arises only with acting. However, right behavior in given circumstances and the form that shapes these circumstances must be one and the same thing.

12 Ethics must therefore encompass and catalog all truly human action.

13 At this higher level the opposition between reasonableness and happiness disappears.

14 Ethics must contain a form for all life’s occurrences which is able to express its highest character.\(^2\)

15 As far as a scientific treatment of the subject is concerned, the most appropriate formula is clearly that of reasonableness.

16 We might provisionally define ethics, therefore, as the life of reason, the necessary antithesis of which is acting upon nature.

17\(^3\) We may not substitute personality for reason as the object of ethics because the action of the individual and the action of a group cannot be considered in isolation; thus, in a theory of human action, the opposition of personality must be superseded, and this leaves nothing but the life of reason in an organization.

\(^2\) Marginal note to 12–14 (1816): Omitted. \(^3\) Marginal note: Omitted.
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18 If the life of reason is conceived as acting upon nature, then ethics is conceived at the same time as the science that was opposed to it, namely physics.

II Deduction of ethics by dialectical reasoning

19 Lemma 1 of dialectic. Every kind of knowledge is narrower in scope the more it is determined by a diversity of opposites, and broader in scope the more it is the expression of higher and simpler oppositions.

20 Lemma 2 of dialectic. Absolute knowledge is the expression of no opposition whatsoever, but only of absolute being, which is identical with it.

21 Lemma 3. As such, however, it is not a definite form of knowledge in finite consciousness, that is, not one which may be expressed adequately in a plurality of concepts or propositions, but only the basis for and source of all particular forms of knowledge.

22 Lemma 4. All particular forms of knowledge, and therefore also their systematization, i.e. the real sciences, exist in the form of opposition.

23 Lemma 5. The totality of being as a finite entity must be expressed by means of a single highest opposition, because otherwise it would not be a totality but an aggregate and knowledge of it would have no unity, but would be chaotic.

24 Lemma 6. All finite being in the narrowest sense, i.e. every life, is an image of the absolute and thus an interaction of oppositions.

25 Lemma 7. Real knowledge in its totality is therefore the development of this interrelatedness of all oppositions under the power of both terms of the highest opposition.

26 Lemma 8. There are thus only two real sciences, which must incorporate all subordinate disciplines.

27 Lemma 9. The sense of opposition is inborn in the form of soul and body, the ideal and the real, reason and nature.

28 Lemma 10. Ethics is thus the depiction of finite being under the power of reason, i.e. viewed from that aspect where, in the interrelatedness of oppositions, reason is the active principle and reality that which is acted upon; physics is the depiction of finite being under the power of nature, i.e. where reality is the active principle and the ideal is what is acted upon.
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29. Lemma 11. In finite existence, just as in finite knowledge as a depiction of the absolute, opposition is only relative. In their perfected state ethics is physics and physics ethics.

30. Lemma 12. Thus, as we progress towards this destination, the life of the ideal is an acting upon the real and the life of the real is an acting upon the ideal.

III Ethics considered as a process of becoming

31. In the face of this identity every science is incomplete: it is conditional upon the state of the others and has disintegrated into diverse shapes.

32. Ethics is directly conditional upon physics, inasmuch as its depictions of reality must be based upon the concept of the object to be considered, that is, nature.

33. And indirectly inasmuch as science is conditional upon disposition, which in its turn is conditional upon our domination of nature, which is dependent upon cognition of nature.

34. At no time therefore is ethics better than physics; the two must always run parallel.

35. As long as science is incomplete it will also exist in diverse forms, none of which can have universal validity. What is scientifically uncertain must reveal itself in a diversity of appearances.

36. The form taken by incompleteness may be one-sidedness of viewpoint. Here very frequently a false sense of certainty and the least appropriate respect for other points of view.4

37. It may also take the form of an insufficient thinking-through, both in relating backwards to causes and forwards to consequences. Here very frequently an apparent arbitrariness in the face of a robust reality in matters of detail, and very frequently a hidden feeling of uncertainty.5

38. Or else a coexistence of certainty and uncertainty in equal measure. Here very frequently a straightforward approaching of the goal and, as a result of the clearcut divergence of certainty and doubt, the most accurate evaluation of others.

39. Reason is to be found in nature, and ethics does not depict any action in which it arose originally. Ethics can only depict the possibility of penetrating and forming nature to an ever-increasing degree, of spreading

4 Marginal note: 8–10 belong here. 5 Marginal note: 11 and 12 here, also 17.
as broadly as possible the unification of reason and nature, taking as its starting-point the human organism, which is a part of general nature in which, however, a unification with reason is already given.

It is also not within the scope of ethics to depict the perfect unification of reason and nature, because for that to take place such isolated shapes must already have come to an end.

Ethics has therefore to depict a sequence, where each element consists of a unification which both has and has not taken place, and whose exponent expresses an increase in one factor and a decrease in another.

The ethics of imperatives addresses only the side of the equation where unification has not taken place, and therefore cannot express the gradual disappearance of this factor.

Consultative ethics addresses only the side of the equation where unification has taken place, for only then can it be a matter of indifference whether this is to be expressed in the form of reason or of sensibility.

A complete account must therefore supersede the opposition of the two forms.

Since all knowledge of reality is the imprint left in the ideal by finite existence, there cannot be any form other than depiction or narrative.

Physics and ethics, given their interdependence and the fact that they are opposed only in the proportional relationship of their material, can only have one and the same form.

Since there can be no real anti-reason, in which case there would also have to be an anti-God, the opposition of good and evil can only express the positive and negative factors in the process of gradual unification, and therefore can nowhere be better understood than in the pure and complete depiction of that process.

Since the opposition between freedom and physical necessity indicates in its product these two factors, which are based predominantly a) in reason and b) in nature; and in action points to something that expresses a) the inner character of the person who is acting and b) its coexistence with an external factor, that opposition can only clearly be understood by contemplating the way in which reason and nature coexist in totality.

Since the opposition between freedom and moral necessity is principally concerned with the discrepancy between an individual and a whole of which he is a part, where the extent of unification in the individual represents freedom, and that of the whole necessity, it can also only be
correctly understood by means of a depiction which shows how the de-
velopment of an individual and of a whole are mutually dependent.

50 Ethics, as the depiction of the way in which reason and nature coexist,
is the science of history.

51 Just as ethical development in its entirety consists not only of a practical
side, but also of a theoretical one, in the same way ethics is not merely a
matter of action in the narrow sense of the word, but also of knowledge
as a form of action.

52 Just as natural science renders both the fixed forms and the fluid
functions of nature comprehensible, and reduces each to an aspect of
the other, in the same way ethics explains both the fixed forms of moral
existence, family, state, etc., and the fluid functions, or their various moral
capacities, and reduces each to an aspect of the other.

53 Just as ethics is not the intuition of reason in itself, which would be
absolutely simple and therefore a part of absolute knowledge, but instead is
the intuition of reason which has become nature in a plurality of functions
in the form of oppositions, in the same way it is not the intuition of the
individual aspects of an appearance, which might indeed be subsumed
under the universal but cannot with any certainty be constructed from it.

54 [Ethics] is a realistic form of knowledge, in that it is not absolute, and
a speculative one in that it is not empirical.

55 The distinction between pure and applied ethics is false in this form,
which is borrowed from mathematics, but is rooted in the matter itself.

56 Ethical principles in their complete determination cannot be applied
to anything belonging outside the domain of ethics.

57 Anything constructed in ethics contains the potential for an infinite
number of manifestations. Besides interpreting these empirically, there
arises a need to link the empirical more closely with speculative depiction,

58 This is the essence of criticism, and there is therefore a cycle of critical
disciplines which build on ethics.

59 To the extent that the individual and his moral capacity is compre-
hended in the production of a given phenomenon, he is placed among
particular oppositions and particular natural conditions, and there is a
particular need to survey how these are to be regarded.

Marginal note: Omitted.
This is the essence of technology, and there is therefore a cycle of technical disciplines which proceed from ethics.
The most telling examples are: the state, political science and statesmanship, art – all forms of moral production may be seen as art – aesthetics, practical instructions for the arts.
As a form of knowledge which is indeed speculative and yet at the same time realistic, ethics is concerned neither with pure reason in opposition to nature, nor with pure nature in opposition to reason.
However, in general it rests on and is brought into community with the absolute through a form of opposition; for the side of the opposition that is orientated towards the real, no one member exists without the other, while for the side orientated towards the absolute, everything represents the absolute in the identity of the existing [members].
The higher critical process, which demonstrates the presence of the absolute in everything which is demonstrably real, transposed onto the level of totality, is a mediation between knowledge of reality and absolute knowledge.
Now, given that pure nature and pure reason do not occur in ethics, everything which does occur there is reasonable nature and natural or organic reason.
Given that relative identity is to be depicted in the form of becoming, one pole of depiction is a minimum of becoming, the other a maximum of becoming.
Ethics begins with a minimum of becoming, that is, by positing a nature in which reason is already present, and by positing a reason in which nature is already present, where the interrelatedness in each form can be traced back to an earlier phase of the same thing.
Since nature in the next lowest stage in the identity of the ideal and the real is animal nature, the fundamental intuition of ethics is of human nature in a form such that nothing purely animal can be found, and therefore nothing is merely material any more.
What essentially differentiates the human from the animal can be demonstrated first of all in the operation of the senses of perception and feeling, but equally it is also to be assumed in the subordinate functions of animal and vegetable life.
Just as reason is not to be posited as a separate entity, apart from its existence in nature, because each individual entity, in relative opposition to the whole, forms a coexistence of receptivity and spontaneity in life, so the
original positing of reason in human nature means that it is submerged in
the receptivity of nature in the form of understanding and in the
spontaneity of nature in the form of will.

71 [Inadvertently omitted by Schleiermacher.]

72 Each appearance of reason in this form is, however, to be posited as
something which has come about, that is, as presupposing that previously
it was present to a lesser degree, thus never merely as the capacity for
reason, but as a capacity which only comes about with and through the
activity of reason.7

73 Because the identity of reason and nature only appears in ethics in
the form of becoming, the maximum is only a minimum of separateness
between reason and nature.

74 In the relative opposition [put forward in no. 63] nature appears on
the positive side as the organ and symbol of reason – which are merely
two different aspects of the same thing – and on the negative side as the
task, that is, as raw material.

75 The ethical process is thus to be extended in every direction until the
raw material dwindles to a minimum.

76 The original ethical positing of reason in the form of understanding
and will within a nature which is originally organic and symbolic is its
positing in the human individual.

77 It is a fault of disposition to posit this beginning as a general formula
and to posit reason as definitively personal, as is revealed through the
argument that a) in terms of the individual nothing truly emerges as the
organ or symbol of reason and b) in terms of the whole the essential
distinction between physics and ethics is superseded by placing reason
wholly under the power of nature.8

78 Only individual beings are to be posited as the original organs and
symbols of reason; the action of reason on nature, on the other hand,
is the action of the whole of reason on the whole of nature; the ethical
process is only complete when the whole of nature – by means of human
nature – has been appropriated organically or symbolically to reason, and
the life of individuals is not a life lived merely for those individuals, but
for the totality of reason and the totality of nature.

79 To place reason at the service of personality in the ethical process is
at one and the same time to subordinate intuition to feeling, to accept

7 Marginal note to nos. 68–72: Omitted. 8 Marginal note to nos. 74–7: Omitted.
knowledge only as a means to pleasure, and, by superseding the equality in the opposition of reason and nature, to draw the absolute on to the side of reality, i.e. it leads to materialism.

80 The depiction of the ethical process, in which it is posited that reason and nature are ultimately at one, thus posits the totality of everything which is in the process of an ethical becoming as ultimately at one, i.e. the various functions of nature and the various orientations of reason becoming one with those functions as an organic whole.

81 Since reason only exists in the form of personality, the opposing view will only be superseded by showing that reason, completely united with personality, is the elemental force which produces the ethical process in its total perfection.

82 In personality, the action of reason is conditional upon place and time. If an action is absorbed by its spatial and temporal determinants so that it is an absolutely isolated occurrence, then in each action the totality of the moral process is negated. In this form too, reason must therefore be depicted as equal to itself, and it must be demonstrated that the totality of the moral process is posited in every action by virtue of its reasonableness.

83 Everything which has become moral is a good, and the totality of that [process] a single entity, hence the highest good. The objective depiction of the ethical is therefore the depiction of the idea of the highest good.

84 Every function of human nature raised to the power of reason is a virtue, and hence the first part of an indirect depiction is the doctrine of virtue.

85 It is because an action can only be understood in the context of the totality of a life, raised up out of momentary limitations, that it corresponds to the concept of duty; thus the other part of indirect depiction is the doctrine of duty.

86 Historically these forms have always coexisted without any consciousness of distinction, in such a way, however, that in antiquity the idea of the good dominated most and duty receded most, whereas now the idea of the good has almost completely disappeared and the concept of duty dominates even the concept of virtue.

87 Only a depiction concerned with the idea of the highest good can stand alone, because here production and product are identical, and so the moral process finds its complete depiction.
88 In the doctrine of virtue the product does not appear but is merely implicit, invisible. It is merely reason in human nature, or — what amounts to the same thing — human nature raised to the power of reason.  
89 In the doctrine of duty only a system of formulae is put forward directly; the product does not appear any more than a curve appears in its function.  
90 These two last-named depictions thus refer back to the first and are incomplete in themselves.  
91 Their genesis rests in a need. The doctrine of virtue is a polemic against that point of view which subordinates reason to personality; for where the latter views man as a system of inclinations, the former presents him as an organism of virtues, and is thus polemic.  
92 The doctrine of duty is also founded on a need — since in every individual that false notion also rumbles and might disturb the smooth course of the ethical process — to be able to find one’s bearings at any given moment.  
93 The historical transition from the objective form to the most subjective is not a regression, simply because the first attempts of that kind were not carried through, nor could they have been. — Active progression within the ethical process had first to furnish the material for this.  
94 The form which concerns itself with virtue proceeds from technical interest, in that it demonstrates what someone must be like who is to work successfully within the ethical process.  
95 The form which concerns itself with duty proceeds from critical interest, in that it distinguishes what is to be regarded as ethically real from what is ethically empty.  
96 The form which concerns itself with virtue was therefore the natural product of a productive age, just as the form which concerns itself with duty was the work of an empty, contemplative age.  
97 Every instance where reason is at one with nature, and thus every virtue, too, must also appear in the depiction of the highest good.  
98 The essence of duty, namely that in every moral action as such we find a relationship to the totality of the process, must also appear in the objective depiction, because every organic term can only be posited in its relationship to the totality, and together with it.  
99 The continued existence of these subordinate depictions alongside the superior one thus points to the limited state of the discipline, i.e. the
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necessity of examining for their own sake the limited forms of being taken by reason in nature.

100 The doctrine of virtue, in that it is the depiction of the reasonable personality orientated towards the outside world, is the depiction of the moral microcosm.

101 The doctrine of duty, in that it is the depiction of the reasonable moment, is the depiction of the infinitely small, of the element in the moral process.

102 The depiction of the moral as the highest good is parallel to the depiction of nature as the totality of forms.

103 The doctrine of virtue is parallel to its depiction as a system of forces, which has also arisen out of a technical interest and in which the world is also posited only implicitly.

104 The doctrine of duty is parallel to its depiction in the form of a totality of movements, which is also the product of a passive view, and in which the specific nature of those forces also ultimately disappears.

105 The doctrine of virtue can only be understood inasmuch as it demonstrates that every moral form exists only through the totality of all virtues.

106 The doctrine of duty [can be understood] only inasmuch as it demonstrates that every moral action as such has an influence on the totality of all moral forms.

107 The depiction of the highest good by its very form makes no claim to ascetic usefulness; the other two do not possess it either.

108 The depiction of the highest good must necessarily come first and the others follow.

The highest good

Introduction

1 The ethical process is set in motion once the ideal principle has been given to the real as inherent in the form of perfect consciousness, that is, as cognition and hence reason.

2 The minimum of original unification with which it starts off is that to be found where nature is the organ of reason, i.e. that by which reason acts on the rest of nature.
3 Now, inasmuch as the process is only one of broadening and heightening the original unification as a result of the activity of reason, it is thus only complete when the whole of nature has become the organ of reason by means of reason, and the activity of reason is the organizing principle.

4 However, inasmuch as reason has no existence other than as cognition, its action on nature and its unification with nature is only the molding of nature by means of cognition.

5 Inasmuch as reason in nature is only to be found in the form of life, and every life, given that it is both a relative being-posited-in-one’s-own-right and a being-posited-in-community, is merely an interaction and sequence of taking-things-into-oneself and taking-things-out-of-oneself-and-putting-them-down; the being of reason also comes under this opposition, so that the molding of cognition is on the one hand more receptive, cognition in the precise sense of the word, and on the other hand more productive, hence depiction, which coincides with § 70 of the Introduction.

6 The two main functions of reason, the organizing function and the cognitive function, are not separate in reality, but in fact every act is subsumed a parte potiori under one or the other, for through the forming of the organ cognition is strengthened, and with every instance of cognition a new organ is posited. Thus with each depiction there is cognition, and each organ is also a symbol.

7 We must look at each in isolation, however, by means of abstraction, though not unconscious abstraction, in order to arrive in due course at a state of intuition which is all the more perfect and lively.

8 Since both are bound up together in reality, any scientific depiction would give no real priority to either, in that organs are only formed by use and cognition can only occur when mediated through organs.

9 Since nature is the organ of reason from the very beginning, though this can only be so in the form of personality, and personality rests on the opposition between the general and the particular, the entering of reason into this opposition was an aspect of the unification and its essential form from the very beginning.

10 In reality the two terms of the equation – that reason is inherent in human nature as a general principle, and inherent in the individual as a particular characteristic – cannot be separated. For without the character of generality, being cannot be something reasonable, and without the character of particularity, action cannot be something natural; in each
case then one would appear to come to the fore, while the other was forced into the background.

11 In abstraction they must be separated, but subsequently the opposite character must be stamped on each as a subordinate quality.

12 The former opposition modifies the latter as form upon material, and thus there is an organizing action with a predominantly general character and one with a predominantly particular character, and likewise a cognitive action.

13 Since the opposition of general and particular is mediated across a gradual scale, this holds true for all gradual scales given by nature in this respect.

14 Just as the particularity of personality is put in place by the original presence of reason in nature and given as a minimum, so the formation of the personality into particularity is merely the unattainable maximum; at every given stage, however, we assume a difference between personality and particularity.

15 Because personality, abstracted from particularity, contains only spatial and temporal limitations, which would overcome the fundamental nature of reason, personality must, through its actions, be both posited and superseded.

16 In the form of time this can only occur by means of oscillation, and this takes place, as demonstrated in § 5 above, and § 70 of the Introduction, in the way cognition passes over into depiction and the organ into a symbol.9

17 The character of particularity is not bound up with personality, for identity is also only a matter of persons, and there are particularities which are identical in a plurality of persons; on the contrary, this opposition of the identical and the particular is to be found in the form of finite being, which can only be given in the interaction of unity and plurality.

18 The fact that every activity of reason is limited in space and time in the form of individual consciousness – a limitation for which personality in itself is responsible – would prevent what is acted upon being there for reason in itself, i.e. for the totality of the ideal principle in the form of cognition, if it were not for the fact that personal consciousness is also

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9 Marginal note: N.B. It will be necessary to make some rearrangements here, probably also modifications with ref. to [para.] XVI.
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endowed with the consciousness of the unity of reason in the totality of persons, and thus the activity of reason would always stand in relation to an absolute community of persons.

19 The unity of every activity of reason thus rests in a duality of moments, in one of which [the presence of] personality is posited, while in the other – following the analogy of taking-things-in and setting-them-down in physical life, and by virtue of the way in which this act emerges into the community – personality is superseded again for the duration of the act.

20 In reality the two moments are never separated, and only in their coexistence do they give a single act; but acts undoubtedly exist in which one or the other aspect is dominant.

21 In the activity which forms the organs this duality is to be found in the coexistence of organizing and symbolizing, and in cognitive activity in the identity of cognition and depiction.

22 Here too, precisely because of this relative dominance [of one factor or the other], a perfect scientific depiction can only be conveyed by means of a prior abstraction.

23 In reality, too, the two characters of identity and particularity are always intimately connected. For even the greatest particularity exists on the basis of identity, either in the elements or in their combination, for without such a basis there could be no communication. And even where an act is identical in all essentials, it has its aspect of particularity, even if this exists merely as a minimum, with what is thought and what is posited in each.

24 Thus the whole of morality could be depicted under each of these separate headings, in the process of which, it is true, all the others would have to take their place in the depiction, but with what is in opposition present only in truncated form, which is precisely what forms its one-sidedness. Morality as culture, the political perspective; morality as knowledge, as theory, the perspective of antiquity; morality as genius, the artistic perspective; morality as lawfulness, the legal perspective; morality as perfection and bliss, the French perspective; as sociability and sympathy, the English perspective.

25 Now, since no term in these oppositions can be understood without the other, and yet our intuition of each one individually cannot be completed without resorting to abstraction, it is necessary to begin with a general
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overview which remains within the context of the whole, and once we have prepared the ground for a lively intuition [of our subject] we may pursue each individual aspect further.

Part I  General overview

§ 1 Our starting-point must be the organizing function since, relatively speaking, and even though a minimum of unification is already given, it represents the entry of reason into nature.

§ 2 It is true that the original organic system may everywhere appear to us a given; however, just as the individual himself comes into being by means of an ethical act, this too we can only regard in itself as the result of activity on the part of reason.

§ 3 Practice [Übung] is the particularly human factor, apparent from the very beginning, in the way the organs evolve, by means of which the organs continue to evolve even when, in physical terms, decay is already setting in again; in animals, on the other hand, perfectibility is restricted to the domain of physical growth.

§ 4 The relative opposition between human nature, given as body, and the rest of nature, given as raw material, is gradually superseded in the process of forming the organs.

§ 5 Inasmuch as neither the earth itself nor anything on it exists for itself, that process is not limited to the earth alone; on the contrary, the forces and influences of other heavenly bodies are also drawn into it.

§ 6 However, inasmuch as human nature is only a product of the earth and the earth itself a product of the cosmic system, neither the former nor the latter can become an organ.

§ 7 The limit of the organizing function is that of cognition, for the unity of the earth and of the other heavenly bodies becomes an organ through being recognized, and to the extent that it is recognized.

§ 8 Our existence is given only in the form of consciousness, and we may therefore posit cognitive activity as an original feature of it, but even that original form of consciousness can only be regarded, according to § 2, as resulting from the activity of reason.

10 Marginal addition 1827: Symbolizing function more representative of the end. If the process were complete everything would be a symbol and nothing would need to be an organ.
§ 9 In its broader sense the original human form of cognition is the definite separation of subject and object and thus of feeling and perception, in which the human being becomes I to himself and what is outside himself becomes a diversity of objects; whereas we do not attribute either true self-consciousness nor a true knowledge of objects to the animals.

§ 10 The absorption of the object in self-consciousness is the original act of freedom, perpetually renewed, while the absorption of self-consciousness in the object is that of surrender.

§ 11 The way in which objects are referred to the individual personality in the act of perception, which predominates in any sensory encounter, is only a way of directing us onward towards genuine cognition (by virtue of the original correspondence between human nature and general nature), and only in this capacity to direct us onward is it human and moral. True cognition, however, is the grasping of the individual entity in its relation to the totality, that is, in the identity of general and particular, so that when personal reason becomes one with an individual thing, we are given at the same time the identity of the whole of reason with the whole of nature.

§ 12 The continuation of the process in terms of extent is the division of the confused object and subject, inasmuch as they can come into contact with one another.

§ 13 Now, since many objects can become subjects as a result of the organizing function, a subject must for its part also be able to become an object.

§ 14 The limit of cognition lies only in those most immediate organs, psychic as well as physical, which are nothing other than organizing activity itself and which in themselves, therefore, do not come to consciousness.

§ 15 Given that the two functions form a complete circle, and each is limited by the other, we see how necessary it is for the two to be identical in every act.

§ 16 In terms of its existence in the form of personality, the identity of reason is represented by the community of persons.

§ 17 In terms of the totality of persons, the way in which peculiarity adheres to reason, existing in nature in the form of particularity, is represented by the impossibility of transference from one to the other.

§ 18 The character of identity adheres most closely to the organizing function in its external operations, in the formation of external natural

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11 Marginal note: § 14 ought to be phrased more by analogy with 6.
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objects for the purposes of reason according to a schematism. For, by virtue of its nature, whatever is formed in this way is available to everyone who can deal with this schematism.19

§ 19 To the extent that they are also formed according to a general schematism, the immediate organs also yield results which are available to all those who know how to use them.

§ 20 The impossibility of transference is indicated physically on the organs themselves, given that they are integrating components of existence, by the fact that they cannot leave the domain of the person without being lost.

§ 21 Thus the character of identity is manifested in the organizing process through a general schematism, and whatever bears the marks of this forms a sphere of common usage (= commerce) in which individual entities determine their claims for themselves, according to ability and need.

§ 22 Since those objects which have been formed according to § 18 have also already been formed by the organs as integrating components of the person (§ 20), they too must bear traces of particularity.

§ 23 The more this character comes to the fore in those things which have been formed, the more they will resemble the immediate organs (§ 20).

§ 24 The character of particularity manifests itself in what has been organized through the relationship to the unity of all the organs in the person, and whichever are the dominant traces from among the elements of understanding and will, sense and limbs will form for each one the sphere of his proper characteristics.

§ 25 The character of identity in the cognitive function manifests itself in the requirement which accompanies its acts, namely that any individual

19 Marginal addition 1827, against § 15–§ 18:
Demonstration of what is identical and what is particular.

General.
As the process is carried out it will lack unity unless something of each point participates in every part of the process, and vice versa.
The impossibility of transference forms the limit of community. Where one is, the other is not; but this must be superseded in order for the process to be complete everywhere. It is thus a condition of morality that, taken from another viewpoint, the one could at the same time be the other, and this must be realized in the pre-formation of nature, as a basis [for the rest].

With particular reference to the organizing principle.
The process of forming and educating is only a moral one to the extent that it has a schematism of this kind, with a basis in the natural forms. All formative activity is only moral to the extent that the tendency to such schematism is present.

1) Marginal addition 1827: As integrating components of existence, those natural objects which have been formed acquire the same character.

14 Marginal note 1827: In the symbolizing sphere a) Identity.
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could only carry out that act in precisely that way and could only achieve precisely that result, and thus under the same conditions would be obliged to come up with an action which is identical in every respect to that of the other person.

§ 26 This character is to be found first and foremost in all acts where reason manifests itself as a system of ideas or as a combinatory capacity within a schema of oscillation between the general and the particular.

§ 26 [N.B. Schleiermacher erroneously writes § 26 twice.] It is also to be found in the domain of the empirical, although here it is assumed that at the same time there is an identical formation of the organs as in § 10.

§ 27 The totality of the existence of reason in nature thus characterized forms the sphere of objective cognition or knowledge.

§ 28 Every act of cognition, even if it is objective, is bound up in reality with a self-consciousness that has been stirred into activity, so that without this we regard such an act as a mechanical imitation rather than something generated from the very beginning.

§ 29 Self-consciousness that has been stirred into activity is always the expression of the characteristic way in which all the functions of reason and nature are at one in any particular existence, and is thus a kind of cognition which is special to each individual and non-transferable, from which each person excludes all the others.

§ 30 The totality of the existence of reason in nature thus characterized forms the sphere of subjective cognition, of moods and emotions.

§ 31 What has been formed according to the general schematism, as in § 18, can only support the activity of reason as an organ [of reason] to the extent that it is connected with an individual personality; thus it only becomes an organ to the extent that we posit the existence of a personality, and in doing so all other personalities are excluded to exactly the same extent; this isolation must be superseded.

§ 32 It is superseded by the reverse of this process, to the extent that matters are taken out of the sphere of personality and placed in the sphere of community.

15 Marginal note 1827: b) Particularity.
16 Here the following words were crossed out: or of feeling.
17 Marginal addition 1827: Organization; unification of what is personal and what is held in common
1  Formal a) quantitatively.
Introduction and doctrine of goods

§ 33 Both are essentially identical, in that every individual is himself an organ of reason in general in his own existence, but in each individual act one factor will predominate over the others just as it does in every relative opposition.

§ 34 For the person engaged in such appropriation himself, this will be superseded by the accompanying consciousness that he is always in a process of working for the community; but it is only resolved for the totality if such appropriation is essentially conditional upon such work.\textsuperscript{18}

The positing of personality in these terms is [what we term] right.

§ 35\textsuperscript{19} Since what has penetrated the sphere of the particular and formed it (23, 24) acquires the character of non-transferability belonging to the original organs, nature which has been formed in this way is completely cut off from unity with all reason except for what is posited within that particularity, a limitation which must be completely superseded.

§ 36 This can only happen by surrendering it to reason in general as an object for the cognitive function, since only when it is mediated through what has been formed in this way can reason, modified by particularity – i.e. the special way in which all the functions of reason are at one in the individual – be recognized.

§ 37 For the individual engaged in formative activity, this superseding is brought about through the endeavor which accompanies the act of formation to give what has been formed symbolic value, i.e. to make it a recognizable sign of the formative power of reason. For the totality, however, it is only brought about by the fact that the forming of spheres belonging to particularity is conditional upon the formation of a cognitive community for those same spheres.

§ 38 The whole process of formation is simply an integrating component of the moral in the identity of these two moments.

§ 39 In instances of isolated appropriation the purely human character gets lost and takes on the form of violence, i.e. non-recognition of personalities outside the self.

§ 40 In instances of isolated surrender it is dissipated in the form of flabbiness, i.e. the failure to posit one’s own personality.\textsuperscript{20}

§ 41 Both involve a contradiction, however.

\textsuperscript{18} Marginal addition 1827: Could one not just as well say: for feeling and for cognition?

\textsuperscript{19} Marginal addition 1827: See marginalia to § 17. From 31 onward: Ways in which each character is conditional upon the other b) qualitatively.

\textsuperscript{20} Marginal note: N.B. 39 and 40 would be better placed later, with 79.
§ 42 The way in which identical appropriation is conditional upon the surrender of self to the community creates the state of right. The way in which particular appropriation is conditional upon surrendering oneself to intuition creates that of sociability.

§ 43 To the extent that a piece of knowledge is first generated in a personal consciousness, the rest of reason is excluded, and so there must be a means whereby it can get out of personality into the community.

§ 44 Objective knowledge becomes external through speech.

§ 45 For the individual engaged in cognitive activity himself the identity of the two is there from the beginning, since a moment of cognition only arises as a form of internal speaking, which is always already differentiated from external speech.

§ 46 Since, however, a moment of cognition can only be fixed by bringing it into connection with all the others, and this can only take place by leading it through the lively domain of speech, this identity is also present for the totality.

§ 47 The identical nature of positing and superseding personality is to be found in the essentially identical nature of generating and communicating cognition.

§ 48 This domain thus encompasses not only the more rigorous domain of science but also every instance of empirical communication in everyday life.

§ 49 Self-consciousness which is sealed up inside personality is not an ethical act, because here reason stands under the power of nature; it can only become an ethical act by means of a reaction which supersedes that self-consciousness.

§ 50 It must become external in the form of cognition, in the same way as something objective does; as something particular, however, it can only enter a community of objective cognition.

§ 51 The way in which self-consciousness becomes external to further the cognition of others is through depiction, and the morality of self-consciousness rests on the identical nature of the state of excitation and its depiction.

§ 52 This domain encompasses not only the rigorous domain of art, where everything objective is, after all, only the depiction of what is subjective,