

*The Cambridge Companion to*  
**THE STOICS**

---

Edited by

Brad Inwood

*University of Toronto*



**CAMBRIDGE**  
**UNIVERSITY PRESS**

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE  
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK  
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA  
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia  
Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain  
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa  
<http://www.cambridge.org>

© Cambridge University Press 2003

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception  
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,  
no reproduction of any part may take place without  
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2003

Printed in the United States of America

*Typeface* Trump Medieval 10/13 pt.    *System* L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X 2<sub>ε</sub> [TB]

*A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.*

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

The Cambridge companion to the Stoics / edited by Brad Inwood.

p. cm. – (Cambridge companions to philosophy)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-521-77005-X – ISBN 0-521-77985-5 (pbk.)

I. Stoics. I. Inwood, Brad. II. Series.

B528 .C26 2003

188 – dc21

2002031359

ISBN 0 521 77005 X hardback

ISBN 0 521 77985 5 paperback

## CONTENTS

	<i>Contributors</i>	<i>page</i> vii
	Introduction: Stoicism, An Intellectual Odyssey BRAD INWOOD	I
1	The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus DAVID SEDLEY	7
2	The School in the Roman Imperial Period CHRISTOPHER GILL	33
3	Stoic Epistemology R. J. HANKINSON	59
4	Logic SUSANNE BOBZIEN	85
5	Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology) MICHAEL J. WHITE	124
6	Stoic Theology KEIMPE ALGRA	153
7	Stoic Determinism DOROTHEA FREDE	179
8	Stoic Metaphysics JACQUES BRUNSCHWIG	206
9	Stoic Ethics MALCOLM SCHOFIELD	233

10	Stoic Moral Psychology TAD BRENNAN	257
11	Stoicism and Medicine R. J. HANKINSON	295
12	The Stoic Contribution to Traditional Grammar DAVID BLANK AND CATHERINE ATHERTON	310
13	The Stoics and the Astronomical Sciences ALEXANDER JONES	328
14	Stoic Naturalism and Its Critics T. H. IRWIN	345
15	Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition: Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler A. A. LONG	365
	<i>Bibliography</i>	393
	<i>List of Primary Works</i>	417
	<i>General Index</i>	423
	<i>Passages Index</i>	433

# 1 The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus

## I. PHASES

The history of the Stoic school is conventionally divided into three phases:

- Early Stoicism: from Zeno's foundation of the school, c. 300, to the late second century B.C.: the period which includes the headship of the greatest Stoic of them all, Chrysippus
- Middle Stoicism: the era of Panaetius and Posidonius
- Roman Stoicism: the Roman Imperial period, dominated by Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius

Although the Stoic tradition's continuity is at least as important as any resolution into distinct phases, the traditional divisions do reflect key changes which no school history can afford to ignore. The following account will, in fact, assume a rough division into five phases, despite acknowledgment of extensive overlaps between them:

1. the first generation
2. the era of the early Athenian scholars
3. the Platonising phase ('Middle Stoicism')
4. the first century B.C. decentralisation
5. the Imperial phase

The primary ground for separating these is that each represents, to some extent, a different perspective on what it is to be a Stoic – that is, on what allegiances and commitments are entailed by the chosen label.



philosophical tradition inaugurated by Socrates held a special appeal was likely to be drawn to the streets and other public places of the city in which Socrates had so visibly lived his life of inquiry and self-scrutiny. (In this regard, philosophy stood apart from the sciences and literature, for both of which the patronage of the Ptolemaic dynasty in Alexandria offered a powerful rival attraction.) So deep was the bond between philosophy and Athens that when in the first century B.C. it was broken, as we shall see in Section 8, the entire nature of the philosophical enterprise was transformed.

### 3. ZENO

The early career of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, eloquently conjures up the nature of the Hellenistic philosophical enterprise. He was born in (probably) 334 B.C. at Citium, a largely Hellenized city which did, however, retain a sufficient Phoenician component in its culture to earn Zeno the nickname 'the Phoenician'. Nothing can be safely inferred from this latter fact about Zeno's intellectual, ethnic, or cultural background, but what is clear is that, at least from his early twenties, he was passionately addicted to the philosophical traditions of Athens, encouraged, it was said, by books about Socrates that his father, a merchant, brought back from his travels. He migrated there at the age of twenty-two, and the next decade or so was one of study, entirely with philosophers who could be represented as the authentic living voices of Socrates' philosophy. If Stoicism emerged as, above all, a Socratic philosophy, this formative period in Zeno's life explains why.

His first studies are said to have been with the Cynic Crates, and Cynic ethics remained a dominant influence on Stoic thought. Crates and his philosopher wife, Hipparchia, were celebrated for their scandalous flouting of social norms. Zeno endorsed the implicitly Socratic motivation of this stand – the moral indifference of such conventional values as reputation and wealth. The most provocative of Zeno's own twenty-seven recorded works – reported also to be his earliest, and very possibly written at this time – was a utopian political tract, the *Republic*. In characteristically Cynic fashion, most civic institutions – temples, law courts, coinage, differential dress for the sexes, conventional education, marriage, and so forth – were to be abolished. What was presumably not yet in evidence, but was

to become the key to Zeno's mature philosophy, was his attempt to rescue an ethical role for conventional values.

Polemo, the head of the Platonic Academy, and the Megaric philosopher Stilpo, both of them known above all for their ethical stances, were among Zeno's other teachers, and both will have helped him develop his own distinctive ethical orientation. Polemo defended the position of the Platonist and Aristotelian schools that there are bodily and external goods, albeit minor ones, in addition to the all-important mental goods. Stilpo's most celebrated doctrine was the self-sufficiency of the wise, maintained on the precisely opposite ground that nothing that befalls one's body or possessions can be in the least bit good or bad. Zeno sided with Stilpo's Cynicising view on this, but also seems to have inherited from Polemo, and developed, an ethical stance which associated moral advancement with 'conformity to nature'. In this synthesis of his two teachers' contrasting positions, we can already glimpse the makings of the most distinctive Stoic thesis of all. For according to Zeno and his successors, bodily and external advantages such as health and wealth are not goods – Stilpo was right about that – but they are, on the other hand, natural objects of pursuit. We should, therefore, in normal circumstances, seek to obtain them, not caring about them as if their possession would make our lives any better, but on the ground that by preferring them we are developing our skills at 'living in agreement with nature', the natural 'end' whose attainment amounts to perfect rationality, happiness, and a good life. In this way, Stoicism could underpin a thoroughly conventional set of social and personal choices, and was thereby enabled to commend itself more widely in the Hellenistic world than its essentially convention-defying forebear Cynicism.

Zeno's rejection of Platonic metaphysics, which marks a vital break from Polemo and his school, may also have been influenced by Stilpo. Finally, Diodorus Cronus, whose classes Zeno attended alongside the future logician Philo, represented the dialectical side of the Socratic tradition, offering Zeno a training in logic as well as in the study of sophisms.

It was around the turn of the century that Zeno formed his own philosophical group, at first known as 'Zenonians' but eventually dubbed 'Stoics' after the Painted Stoa (*Stoa Poikilê*) in which they used to congregate. Zeno remained in Athens until his death in 262,

and the school he had founded was to become the dominant school of the Hellenistic Age.

Soon after the emergence of Zeno's school, the minor 'Socratic' movements headed by his teachers Stilpo (the 'Megarics') and Diodorus (the 'Dialecticians') seem to have vanished from the scene. The impression is that the Stoa, having absorbed their most important work, had now effectively supplanted them.<sup>2</sup> There is, in fact, evidence that the Stoics themselves were happy to be classed generically as 'Socratics'.<sup>3</sup> And with good reason: their ethical system, characterised by its intellectualist identification of goodness with wisdom and the consequent elimination of non-moral 'goods' as indifferent, was thoroughly Socratic in inspiration. True, the standard of perfection that they set for their idealised 'sage' was so rigorous that even Socrates himself did not quite qualify in their eyes. But there can be little doubt that, even so, the detailed portrayals of the sage's conduct which generation after generation of Stoics compiled owed much to the legend of Socrates. A prime example is the sage's all-important choice of a 'well-reasoned exit' from life, an ideal of which Socrates' own death was held up as the paradigm. Roman Stoics like the younger Cato and Seneca even modeled their own deaths on that of Socrates.

As for the Academy, Zeno'

One apparent feature of early Stoicism that has caused controversy is the surprising rarity of engagement with the philosophy of Aristotle. Even some of the most basic and widely valued tools of Aristotelian philosophy, such as the distinction between potentiality and actuality, play virtually no part in Stoic thought. Although there is little consensus about this,<sup>4</sup> the majority of scholars would probably accept that, at the very least, considerably less direct response to Aristotelianism is detectable in early Stoicism than to the various voices of the Socratic-Platonic tradition. It is not until the period of Middle Stoicism (see Section 7) that appreciation of Aristotle's importance finally becomes unmistakable. Yet Aristotle and his school were among the truly seminal thinkers of late-fourth-century Athens and, in the eyes of many, Aristotle himself remains the outstanding philosopher of the entire Western tradition. How can a system created immediately in his wake show so little consciousness of his cardinal importance? One suggested explanation is that Aristotle's school treatises, the brilliant but often very difficult texts by which we know him today, were not at this date as widely disseminated and studied as his more popularising works. But an alternative or perhaps complementary explanation lies in Zeno's positive commitment to Socratic philosophy, of which the Peripatetics did not present themselves as voices. Either way, we must avoid the unhistorical assumption that Aristotle's unique importance was as obvious to his near-contemporaries as it is to us.

Zeno's philosophy was formally tripartite, consisting of ethics, physics, and logic. His ethics has already been sketched above as a socially respectable revision of Cynic morality. His physics – stemming in large part from Plato's *Timaeus* but with an added role for fire which appears to be of Heraclitean inspiration, and which may reflect the input of his colleague Cleanthes – posits a single, divinely governed world consisting of primary 'matter' infused by an active force, 'god', both of them considered corporeal and indeed depending on that property for their interactive causal powers. As probably the one good and perfectly rational thing available to human inspection, this world is a vital object of study even for ethical

<sup>4</sup> Views range from that of Sandbach (1985) that Aristotle's school treatises were all but unknown to the early Stoics, to those of others, such as Hahn (1977), who give Aristotelian philosophy a very significant role in the formation of Stoicism.

purposes. 'Logic', finally, includes not only the formal study of argument and other modes of discourse, but also what we would broadly call 'epistemology'. Here, in a clean break with his Platonist teacher, Zeno developed a fundamentally empiricist thesis according to which certain impressions, available to everybody through their ordinary sensory equipment, are an infallible guide to external truths and, therefore, the starting point for scientific understanding of the world.

Zeno appears to have been more an inspirational than a systematic philosophical writer, and it was left to later generations to set about formalising his philosophy (see especially Section 5).

#### 4. THE FIRST-GENERATION SCHOOL

The temporary title 'Zenonians' must have reflected Zeno's intellectual dominance of the group gathered around him, more than any formal submission to his leadership on their part, or for that matter any official institutional structures (on which our sources are eloquently silent). For during Zeno's lifetime there is no sign of the phenomenon that, as we shall see, was to hold the Athenian school together after his death, namely, a formal commitment to his philosophical authority. His leading colleagues were a highly independent and heterogeneous group. It would be wrong to give the impression that *no* degree of doctrinal conformity was expected: when, for example, one of Zeno's eminent followers, Dionysius of Heracleia (later nicknamed 'Dionysius the Renegade'), was induced by an excruciating medical condition to reject the doctrine that physical pain is indifferent and so to espouse hedonism, he left the school altogether. Nevertheless, by contrast with later generations, it is the lack of conformity that stands out.

This difference should not cause surprise, since it reflects the broad pattern of philosophical allegiance in the ancient world. The evolution of a formal school around a leader was likely to be, as in Zeno's own case, a gradual process, during which emerging differences of opinion would continue to flourish. It was, typically, only after the founder's death that his thought and writings were canonised, so that school membership would come to entail some kind of implicit commitment to upholding them. Plato's school, the Academy, is an excellent illustration of this pattern. In Plato's own lifetime,

it could house fundamental philosophical disagreements between Plato and his leading associates (including Aristotle). After his death, a commitment to upholding Plato's philosophy and to respecting the authority of his text becomes evident among his successors over many centuries, despite their widely divergent positions on what his philosophy amounted to (as we have seen, the New Academy regarded its essence as critical rather than doctrinal). A similar distinction between the first and subsequent generations can be detected even in the reputedly authoritarian Epicurean school.<sup>5</sup>

Among the first-generation Stoics, Zeno's most notable colleague was Aristo of Chios, who, if he ever tolerated the label 'Zenonian', did so in virtue of being a member of Zeno's circle, certainly not a devoted follower on doctrinal matters. He explicitly rejected the two nonethical parts of philosophy – physics and logic – endorsed by Zeno, and in ethical theory he stayed much closer to the recent Socratic-Cynic tradition than Zeno himself did, rejecting the latter's keynote doctrine that bodily and external advantages, although morally 'indifferent', can be ranked in terms of their natural preferability or lack of it. According to Aristo, the term 'indifferent' must be taken at face value: since health or wealth, if badly used, does more harm than illness or poverty, there is *nothing* intrinsically preferable about either, and typically Zenonian rules such as 'Other things being equal, try to stay healthy' damagingly obscure that indifference.

It was probably only after Zeno's death (262), with the consequent canonisation of his thought, that Aristo's independence began to look like heresy. It may well have been at this stage that he went so far as to set up his own school,<sup>6</sup> said to have been in the Cynosarges gymnasium outside the city walls of Athens. The later Stoic tradition chose to revere Zeno but not Aristo and, because history is written by the winners, Aristo has come to be seen with hindsight as a marginal and heretical figure. This was certainly not so in his own day, when his impact at Athens was enormous. For example, Arcesilaus, who led the Academy into its sceptical phase, appears to have engaged in debate with Aristo at least as much as with Zeno. Aristo's own pupils included a leading Stoic, Apollonides, and the celebrated scientist, Eratosthenes.

<sup>5</sup> On this and other aspects of school allegiance, cf. Sedley (1989).

<sup>6</sup> DL VII 161.

There are signs of philosophical independence also in other figures of the first-generation school. Herillus of Carthage, who had unorthodox views on the moral 'end', is specifically reported to have included critiques of Zeno in his writings.<sup>7</sup> And Persaeus, himself a native of Citium and undoubtedly a close associate of his fellow citizen Zeno, nevertheless wrote dialogues in which he portrayed himself arguing against him (Athenaeus 162d). The one first-generation Stoic who clearly appears in the sources as committed to endorsing Zeno's pronouncements is Cleanthes; and, for all we know, the evidence for this may entirely represent the period after Zeno's death in 262, when Cleanthes himself took over the headship of the school. It is to that second phase that we now turn.

##### 5. THE POST-ZENONIAN SCHOOL

Given what we will see (Section 6) to have been the apparent lack of an elaborate institutional framework, it was perhaps inevitable that the school's sense of identity should come from a continuing focus on its founding figure, Zeno. Without his personal engagement in its debates, teaching, and other activities, it may have been equally inevitable that his defining role should be prolonged by a new concern with scrutinizing his writings and defending and elaborating his doctrines. At any rate, doctrinal debates between leading Stoics quickly came to take the form of disputes about the correct interpretation of Zeno's own words. Numerous disputes of this type are evident between Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the latter of whom went so far as to teach outside the Stoa before eventually returning to succeed Cleanthes as school head on his death in 230. A typical case concerns the nature of *phantasiai* (i.e., 'impressions', 'presentations', or 'appearings').<sup>8</sup> Cleanthes took these to be pictorial likenesses of their objects, imprinted on the soul, itself a corporeal part of the living being. Chrysippus, insisting on the impossibility of the soul simultaneously retaining a plurality of these imprints, argued that they were modifications of the soul but not literal imprints. What is significant in the present context is less the details of the debate than its form. For Zeno, following a tradition inaugurated by the famous

<sup>7</sup> DL VII 165.

<sup>8</sup> S. E. *M* VII 227–41. Cf. Ch. 3, Hankinson, this volume.

image of the mind as a wax tablet in Plato's *Theaetetus*,<sup>9</sup> had defined impressions as mental 'imprints', and the respective positions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus were presented and developed as rival interpretations of Zeno's own words. Although there is no reason to doubt that their competing arguments were in fact focused on the philosophical merits of their respective cases, the formally exegetical character of the exchange speaks eloquently of the authority that Zeno, once dead, came to exert in the school. Various other debates seem likely to have taken on the same formal framework. Consider, for instance, the controversy between (once again) Cleanthes and Chrysippus about whether Zeno's definitions of each virtue as wisdom regarding a certain area of conduct made all the virtues identical with one and the same state of mind, wisdom – as Cleanthes held – or left each – in line with Chrysippus' doctrine – as a distinct branch of wisdom.<sup>10</sup> Even the most high-profile and enduring of all Stoic debates – regarding the correct formulation of the moral 'end' (*telos*) – seems to have started from Zeno's laconic wording of it as 'living in agreement' (although he may himself have subsequently started the process of exegesis by adding 'with nature'), bequeathing to his successors the unending task of spelling out its precise implications.<sup>11</sup> Even where intraschool disputes were not a factor and the criticisms came from outside, Zeno's formal assertions and arguments had to be defended and vindicated. Thus, a number of his extraordinarily daring syllogisms were defended against his critics. Many of these were defences of theistic conclusions that no Stoic would hesitate to endorse;<sup>12</sup> but one – his syllogistic defence of the thesis that the rational mind is in the chest, not the head – had a conclusion which itself became increasingly untenable in the light of Hellenistic anatomical research – despite which Chrysippus and other leading Stoics resolutely kept up their championship of it.<sup>13</sup>

In all this, the actual source of authority was Zeno's writings, now recast in the role of the school's gospels. Although the works that were preserved under his name undoubtedly conveyed some

<sup>9</sup> Plato, *Tht.* 191–5.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch, *Virt. mor.* 441a–c, *St. rep.* 1034c–e.

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., Stobaeus *Ecl.* II 75–76.

<sup>12</sup> For these syllogisms, and later Stoic defences of them, see Schofield (1983).

<sup>13</sup> For Zeno's syllogism and the defensive reformulations of it by Chrysippus and Diogenes, see Galen, *PHP* II 5. See also on Posidonius, n. 16.

of the intellectual charisma which had won Zeno the leadership of his movement, it is equally apparent that they were far from systematic, leaving all the more room for exegetical debate. As for his first treatise, the *Republic*, with its endorsement of outrageously unconventional social practices, it became a celebrated source of embarrassment to later Stoics, some of whom resorted to bowdlerisation,<sup>14</sup> while others dismissed it as a folly of Zeno's youth – belonging, by good fortune, to his pre-Stoic phase. Others, however (almost certainly including Chrysippus) had the courage to defend its contentions against the critics.<sup>15</sup>

Chrysippus himself (school head c. 230–206) is universally recognized as the most important thinker in the history of the school; to a considerable extent, the Stoicism expounded in this volume is the Stoicism of Chrysippus. His preeminence should not be mistaken, as it often is, for a newly arrived 'Chrysippean orthodoxy', as if his authority now somehow supplanted Zeno's. Subsequent members of the Athenian school showed a healthy readiness to express disagreement with Chrysippus, whereas Zeno to all appearances continued to be above criticism.<sup>16</sup> His acknowledged importance is attributable rather to his encyclopedic elaboration and systematisation of Stoic thought, in a series of treatises running to an astonishing 705 volumes or more. Above all, the school's logic – today widely considered the jewel in the Stoic crown – is agreed to owe its development overwhelmingly to Chrysippus. His 'authority', such as it was, consisted in the uniquely high respect which his work had earned among his fellow Stoics, and did not depend on his formal standing in the school's history or institutional structure.

In the sixty or so years following Chrysippus' death, there were just two scholarchs: Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes of Babylon. Not surprisingly after the Chrysippean overhaul, their own respective imprints on the Stoic system can seem relatively minor ones. Minimal information survives on Zeno, and Diogenes earns his appearance

<sup>14</sup> Cf. n. 57.

<sup>15</sup> The main evidence is discussed by Schofield (1991).

<sup>16</sup> A nice example is the way in which Posidonius, who openly challenged Chrysippus' version of Stoic monistic psychology (see Section 7) in favour of Plato's tripartition of the soul, nevertheless departed from Plato in locating all three soul parts in the chest (Galen, *PHP* VI 2.5 = F146 EK), in deference, undoubtedly, to Zeno's express argument for placing the rational mind here (see n. 13). For further critiques of Chrysippus by Posidonius, cf. T83, F34, 159, 164–6 EK.

in the school's history largely for his skillful handbook-style definitions of dialectical and ethical terms, and for his formal defences of Zeno of Citium's controversial syllogisms. The main area in which Diogenes can be seen to go beyond mere consolidation of the school's achievements – and this may well be a sign of the intellectual fashions of the day – is aesthetics: Philodemus preserves evidence of major contributions by Diogenes to musical and rhetorical theory.

## 6. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

Even less is known about the institutional character of the Stoa than about that of other Athenian schools. We have no evidence that Zeno bequeathed to his successor any kind of school property, financial structure, or organisational hierarchy. What is well attested, however, is that – as in other philosophical schools – there was a formal head (the 'scholarch'). Whether he was nominated by his predecessor or elected after his death is unknown but, once appointed, he certainly held the office for life.

Although the school's institutional structure remains obscure, the question of finance clearly bulked large. Not all school adherents were wealthy; Cleanthes in particular was reputedly impecunious and is reported to have charged fees.<sup>17</sup> His successor Chrysippus wrote in support of the practice, which he himself plainly adopted,<sup>18</sup> as did at least one of his own successors, Diogenes of Babylon.<sup>19</sup> In his work *On livelihoods*, Chrysippus enlarged the question, asking in how many ways a philosopher might appropriately earn a living. The only three acceptable means, he concluded, were serving a king (if one could not oneself be a king), reliance on friends, and teaching. There is no evidence that Chrysippus adopted the first of these practices, and Zeno was said to have explicitly declined invitations to the Macedonian court.<sup>20</sup> Other leading Stoics did adopt it, however: Persaeus took up the invitation to Macedon in Zeno's stead, and Sphaerus, a younger contemporary, had strong links with both the Alexandrian and Spartan courts.

<sup>17</sup> Philodemus, *Ind. St.* 19 with Dorandi (1994) *ad loc.*

<sup>18</sup> Plut. *St. rep.* 1043b–1044a.

<sup>19</sup> Cic. *Acad.* II 98.

<sup>20</sup> DL VII 6.

Quite apart from financial considerations, some of these dynastic links were undoubtedly of considerable political significance for the long-term fortunes of the Stoa.<sup>21</sup> In Athens itself, too, the school's public standing seems to have been high. After the brief period in 307 during which the philosophers were exiled from the city (ironically, a symptom of their growing political importance), all the signs are that they enjoyed considerable public esteem. Although, other than Epicurus, virtually all the Hellenistic philosophers of whom we hear were non-Athenians, it seems clear that many were granted Athenian citizenship.<sup>22</sup> In addition to citizenship, other recognitions of eminence were conferred on philosophers. Zeno of Citium, for instance, although he is said to have refused the offer of citizenship out of respect for his native city, was formally honoured by the Athenians in a decree at the time of his death:<sup>23</sup>

Because Zeno of Citium spent many years philosophising in the city, and furthermore lived the life of a good man, and exhorted those young men who came to join him to virtue and self-discipline and encouraged them towards what is best, setting up as a model his own life, which was one in accordance with all the teachings on which he discoursed, the people decided – may it turn out well – to praise Zeno of Citium the son of Mnaseas and to crown him with a golden crown, as the law prescribes, for his virtue and self-discipline, and also to build him a tomb in the Kerameikos at public expense.

(The decree then continues with details of the commissioners appointed to oversee the work.)

It is from the mid second century onward that the philosophers' civic standing seems to have been at its most remarkable. In 155, the current heads of the Stoa (i.e., Diogenes of Babylon), the Academy, and the Peripatos were chosen as ambassadors to represent Athens in negotiations at Rome, pleading for remission of a fine imposed on

<sup>21</sup> This aspect is explored by Erskine (1990).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Philodemus, *Hist. Acad.* XXXII 6–8 Dorandi (1991), where the Academic Charmadas, returning to Athens from Asia, 'easily obtained citizenship, and opened a school in the Ptolemaeum . . .' For the epigraphic evidence on this honorific practice, see Osborne (1981–3).

<sup>23</sup> DL VII 10–11. The decree was, rather pointedly, exhibited in both the Academy and the Lyceum.

the city for the sack of Oropus.<sup>24</sup> The occasion was of especial historical importance because of the packed lectures that the philosophers gave while in Rome, causing shock waves among the Roman establishment, but doing more than any other single event to ignite at Rome a fascination with philosophy which was to remain undiminished for the remainder of antiquity and to have special importance for the future fortunes of Stoicism.

## 7. THE INTEGRATION OF PLATONISM

From the mid second century B.C. onward, a new trend in the Stoic school's orientation becomes visible: a revised recognition of its Platonic heritage. Some have traced this trend back to Diogenes of Babylon (see Section 5), but the best evidence points to his successor Antipater of Tarsus (school head in the 150s and 140s B.C.) as its true instigator. Antipater, notable among other things for his innovative work in logic, wrote a treatise entitled *On Plato's doctrine that only what is virtuous is good* (SVF 3 [Antipater] 56), in which (we are told) he argued that a wide range of Stoic doctrines in fact constituted common ground with Plato. We do not know his motivation, but a plausible conjecture links the treatise to his well-attested engagement with his contemporary critic, Carneades, the greatest head of the sceptical Academy, with whom he fought a running battle over the coherence of the Stoic ethical 'end'. There were obvious tactical gains to be made by showing that Stoic ethical and other doctrines, under fire from the Academy, were in fact identical to the doctrines of the Academy's own founder.

Be that as it may, the new interest in exploring common ground with Plato<sup>25</sup> gathered pace in the late first century B.C. with Antipater's successor Panaetius (scholarch 129–110), and Panaetius' own eminent pupil Posidonius (lived c. 135–51 B.C.). By this stage, the motivation was certainly much more than polemical. Plato's *Timaeus* in particular had exerted a seminal influence on early Stoic

<sup>24</sup> The absence of an Epicurean representative among them attests the apolitical stance adopted and promoted by this school.

<sup>25</sup> One area where Antipater seems likely to have been doing just this is metaphysics: he is the first Stoic recorded (Simplicius, *In Ar. Cat.* 209.11ff., 217.9ff.) as writing about *hekta*, 'properties', a theme which here and elsewhere involves comparison between Platonic Forms and the entities equivalent to them in Stoicism.

cosmology, and Posidonius evidently made the *Timaeus* a special object of his own study and veneration. Most famously, in developing his disagreement with Chrysippus' analysis of moral failings ('passions'), he adopted a version of the tripartite psychology that Plato had developed in that dialogue, among others. In doing so, however, he was not seeking to set up Plato as the new patron saint of Stoicism. Nor, for that matter, was he merely using Plato's dialogues, in the way that previous Stoics had undoubtedly done, maintaining their distance from Plato's own thought<sup>26</sup> while plundering him as a historical source for the life and philosophy of Socrates, a uniquely revered figure in the school; for Socrates is not the principal speaker of the *Timaeus*. Rather, Posidonius was apparently relying on the traditional (and probably correct) identification of Plato's spokesman Timaeus as a Pythagorean, thereby using the dialogue as a step toward fathering his school's philosophy on that most august of all the early sages, Pythagoras.<sup>27</sup> So much for his formal stance; none of this is to deny that the close study of Plato (as well as of Aristotle) had a profound impact on Posidonius' style of philosophical thinking.

In adopting this Pythagoreanising mode, Posidonius was rewriting Stoicism's ancestry in a way which goes beyond anything we can plausibly attribute to Panaetius. The latter was already, like his pupil after him, an avid reader of Plato and his philosophical successors, but the evidence repeatedly suggests that the ultimate authority figure lying behind those thinkers was for him still Socrates. In addition to writing a treatise on Socrates, he is said to have branded Plato's *Phaedo* inauthentic because of its (un-Stoic) insistence on the soul's immortality, an indication that he regarded Plato's genuine Socratic dialogues as philosophically authoritative. Even what is often seen as his most striking philosophical innovation, the bipartition of the soul into rational and desiderative components,<sup>28</sup> could easily have been defended as authentically Socratic on the evidence of Plato's

<sup>26</sup> Examples of anti-Platonic works by early Stoics include Persaeus, *Against Plato's Laws* (DL VII 36) and Chrysippus, *On justice against Plato* (SVF 3.157, 288, 313, 455).

<sup>27</sup> Galen, *PHP* V 6.43. Pythagoras should not be thought of as supplanting Zeno's authority (cf. n. 16), but as underwriting it. Posidonius might have pointed to Zeno's own work, *Pythagorika*, about which we know nothing beyond its title (DL VII 4). On the growing importance attached, from around this time, to establishing an *ancient* pedigree, see Boys-Stones (2001).

<sup>28</sup> Panaetius 121–7 Alesse.

*Gorgias*.<sup>29</sup> It was Posidonius' tripartition of the soul that first clearly went beyond what the Stoics recognized as 'Socratic' and invoked an earlier, allegedly 'Pythagorean', tradition.<sup>30</sup>

Leaving aside this last development, most other features of Panaetius' and Posidonius' work show an impressive harmony of approach. Both, for example, are said to have made regular use of early Peripatetic as well as Platonist writings.<sup>31</sup> One way in which their Aristotelianism manifested itself was in an encyclopedic polymathy which had not been at all characteristic of their Stoic forerunners. Beyond the usual philosophical curriculum, both wrote widely on historical, geographical, and mathematical questions, among many others. Posidonius' history alone – it was a continuation of Polybius' – ran to fifty-two volumes. Both, but especially Posidonius, traveled widely in the Mediterranean region, and both became intimates of prominent Roman statesmen (Scipio the Younger in Panaetius' case, Pompey and Cicero in Posidonius').

There are a number of aspects in which this reorientated Stoicism points forward to the school's future character, as will become increasingly evident in the following discussion. It is also of vital relevance to the history of Stoicism to mention the impact of this new approach on the Academy. For what Panaetius and Posidonius had brought about was a pooling of philosophical resources among what could be seen as three branches of the Platonist tradition: early Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. This 'syncretism', as it has come to be known, had a visible impact on a younger contemporary of Panaetius, Antiochus of Ascalon.<sup>32</sup> Antiochus was a member of the Academy – at this date still formally a sceptical school but increasingly interested in the development of positive doctrine. From his side of the divide, he came to share the Middle Stoa's recognition of a common heritage, differing only in that he reclaimed it – or at any rate all that was best in it, which for him excluded some central

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 493a–d. Importantly, it could also be presented as the correct interpretation of Zeno of Citium, as indeed it was by Posidonius (Galen, *PHP* V 6.34–7 = F166 EK).

<sup>30</sup> In addition to these remarks on Posidonius and the *Timaeus*, note that Chrysippus already regarded tripartition as Plato's own contribution rather than Socrates' (Galen, *PHP* IV 1.6), and that at least one tradition (cf. Cic. *Tusc.* IV 10, DL VII 30) located the antecedents of Platonic tripartition in Pythagoras.

<sup>31</sup> For Panaetius, see Philodemus, *Ind. St.* 51, Cicero *Fin.* IV 79. For Posidonius, Strabo II 3.8 = Posidonius T85 EK.

<sup>32</sup> On Antiochus, see Barnes (1989) and Görler (1994).