THE AMBITIONS OF CURIOSITY

Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China

G. E. R. LLOYD
## Contents

**List of figures and table**  
**Preface**  
**Notes on editions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Histories, annals, myths</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The modalities of prediction</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The numbers of things</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Applications and applicabilities</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The language of learning</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Individuals and institutions</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Glossary of Chinese and Greek terms**  
**Bibliography**  
**Index**
Figures and table

FIGURES

1 Divination from the turtle shell. Source: Djamouri 1999. page 29
2 Cosmic board from the Nan Qishu. Source: Ho Peng
   Yoke forthcoming. 31
3 Tetraktys. 48
4 Five-phase transformations. 50
5 Gnomon shadow differences to get the height of the sun. 53
6 Estimating the sun’s dimension. 54
7 Eratosthenes’ calculation of the circumference of the earth. 55
8 Archimedean screw from Sotiel. Source: History of
   Technology, vol. 11, ed. C. Singer, E. J. Holmyard,
   A. R. Hall and T. H. Williams (Oxford, 1956). 71
9 Chinese chariot. Source: Needham 1965. 73
10 Vitruvius’ ballista. Source: Marsden 1969. 75
11 Gastraphetes. Source: Landels 1978. 76
12 Dionysius’ repeater. Source: Marsden 1971. 77
13 Chinese cross-bow arming. Source: Needham
   and Yates 1994. 78
14 Hero’s twin-screw press. Source: Drachmann 1963. 82
15 Vitruvius’ water-mill. Source: Moritz 1958. 83
16 Gallic corn-harvester. Source: History of Technology, vol. 11,
   ed. C. Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall and T. J. Williams
   (Oxford, 1956). 83
17 Chinese wheel-barrow types. Source: Needham 1965. 84
18 Crane with compound pulley worked by a treadmill.
   Source: History of Technology, vol. 11, ed. C. Singer,
   E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall and T. J. Williams
   (Oxford, 1956). 87
19 Eupalinus’ tunnel. Source: Kienast 1995. 89
List of figures and table

20 Hero’s triangulation technique for tunnelling. Source: H. Schoene, Hero, vol. iii.
23 Hero’s ball rotated by steam. Source: W. Schmidt, Hero, (Leipzig), vol. i.
30 Diktamos. Source: Vienna Dioscorides, Nationalbibliothek, Cod Med gr 1, f 99r.

TABLE

1 Chinese harmonics: the generation of the chromatic scale. Source: adapted from J. S. Major, Heaven and Earth in Early Han Thought (Albany, 1993).
Aristotle said that all humans naturally desire knowledge. But not all humans seem to register any particularly urgent need to expand knowledge or to test it, being often quite content, rather, with what passes as received wisdom or with what they are told to believe. Certainly not all have the same explicit or implicit ideas about what counts as knowledge and why, by what criteria, nor as to how to set about increasing it, if indeed they have the ambition to do so.

My target, in this book, is, precisely, what happened when individuals or groups came to have some such ambition, what factors then stimulated or inhibited systematic inquiry. That is to formulate the question in very general terms, but there are, I believe, advantages in focussing on systematic inquiry as such, whatever the fields inquired into and with whatever success. We might be tempted to think of the fields in question as history, or natural philosophy, or medical research, or astronomy or astrology or technology or pure or applied mathematics. But the premature use of those categories of ours is liable to prejudice our inquiry. The original investigators did not have those categories when they started out, nor even, often, when they finished. Instead of judging their inquiries from the point of view of where we might think they should be headed – ‘science’, for instance, in a word – we should assess them in the light of their original aims, ambitions, needs, in the contexts of the problems as they saw them.

The undertaking of systematic inquiry reflects one or more very basic human desires (Aristotle was right, for sure, thus far), to understand, to foresee, to explain, to control, the world, or other people. It also

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2 I attempt no definition of what I mean by ‘systematic’, but what I have in mind will become clear as we proceed.

3 This list is, of course, far from exhaustive: anthropology, psychology, geography are among other modern categories that have investigable equivalents in ancient societies.
requires a particular aim or concern with particular questions. But what do those concerns relate to? Whose interests are served? Who is charged with the investigating, and under what conditions, with what degrees of freedom or constraint? Who sets the agenda, and with what expectations concerning its implementation?

To answer those questions takes one to central issues to do with the values and belief systems of the societies or groups concerned. If inquiry is a response to a particular set of concerns, how far does it serve merely to confirm the positions of those who set the agenda? Under what conditions, and within what limits, can it lead to assumptions being revised? Inquiry may indeed be undertaken in order to legitimize the status quo. But the sponsorship of inquiry carries with it an element of risk, at least of unpredictability, insofar as its findings are not known in advance of the inquiry itself being conducted. One of the recurrent themes of these studies will be the unexpected nature of the results of investigations.

A second recurrent theme relates to the tension between what we may take as universal human cognitive ambitions (to understand, explain and so on) and their society-specific manifestations. The focus of my inquiry is on ancient civilisations, for that is where we can best study the inauguration of systematic inquiries. Although it is clearly beyond any single individual’s competence to deal with the entire gamut of ancient societies – and for my part I shall concentrate here on Greece and China and to a lesser extent Mesopotamia – I would still insist on the need for a comparative approach, and that for two related reasons. First we need to be careful not to assume that the experience of any one ancient society provides the pattern for them all, let alone that there was any inevitability about the way in which the developments must have occurred. Secondly in order, precisely, to identify which features are general, which society-specific.

Among the questions I shall raise are: what techniques of prediction were developed, with what aims in view and with what results? How and in what respects were numbers seen as the key to understanding phenomena and systems accordingly elaborated in order to explore such a possibility? How far was systematic inquiry directed to the development of devices of practical utility, and stimulated by a sense of their desirability? To what extent did inquiry depend on developments in language – on the construction of a technical vocabulary – and lead in its turn to self-conscious reflections on language use? My final chapter will take stock of the different types of institutional framework within which systematic inquiry could and did develop, and the effects of those institutions on the investigators concerned and on the nature of the work they did.
Histories, annals, myths

But to start our inquiry into inquiry, where better to begin than with history itself, both in the modern sense of historiography, and in the earlier, more general one, of research, still traceable in our term ‘natural history’? Evidently in relation to ancient civilisations we cannot assume there will be a category that corresponds to historiography as such. In practice, as we shall see, the relationship between what we might call historical writings and other disciplines, in Greece and China, exhibits certain differences that have an important bearing on what those writings were for.

But we must first pay attention to the even greater variety of ways in which the past is represented and used as a resource for understanding the present or as a guide for future action. It may or may not be the case that the past is thought of as a seamless whole, continuous with the present. Was past time like the present, inhabited by people like us? Or rather a time of gods or heroes, or in other ways importantly different from today’s time? Does time, in any case, always run in the same direction? Many societies have contemplated reversals of time, or cycles that repeat themselves in general or even in every particular, as is reported for Eudemus in Greece, according to Simplicius (In Ph. 732.26). In India the sense of the immensity of the Kalpa cycle serves to underline the illusory nature of the present. In many societies the calendar is divided into stretches of sacred and profane time that are experienced as qualitatively different.

Whatever the perception of the flow of time may be, what the past is used for, and the ways in which it is recorded and accessed, may differ profoundly. Whatever myths may say about distant times, they are likely to have messages also for present conduct, laying down rules, explicitly or implicitly, about how things are and must be, and about the dire consequences of deviant behaviour. Those rules themselves, and the myths that convey them, may not be thought to have origins: or they may be thought to have come into being with the present dispensation, the way the world is now. But that does not diminish, but enhances, their authority, their power to express values, constrain, justify, legitimate.

Of course the relationship between myth and ritual, the role of myth as

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4 See Thapar 1996.
5 Leach 1961 provides a good summary of this theme, elaborated earlier by Durkheim among others. The theme of the contrast between the ‘time of the gods’ and the ‘time of humans’ in Greek thought was the subject of a classic study by Vidal-Naquet, 1986 ch. 2 (the original French publication dates from 1960).
6 Jewish accounts of the past, so it has been argued, provide a striking example of the use of such material to legitimate, in this case, the status of the Jews as the elect of god. See, for example, Murray 2000, and cf. Cartledge 1995 on the Greeks.
The Ambitions of Curiosity

charter, the very question of how the category of myth is to be defined and whether there is a valid category to be used as a tool of analysis, are all hotly debated issues in modern scholarship. But it is enough, for my purposes, that sacred tales about the past often act as guides and constraints for present behaviour and understanding. The potential for change, once the past is scrutinised and researched, is obvious, although that scrutiny may merely serve to confirm what had been believed all along.

How those stories are transmitted raises, to be sure, a further fundamental issue. Once committed to a form of writing, their status changes, though that may be in a variety of far from straightforward ways. We do not need to agree with all of Goody’s theses from his seminal work on literacy and orality to appreciate the force of some of the basic points that have emerged. First it is clear that the contrast between literacy and orality is far from being an all-or-nothing affair. Some forms of graphic representation are found in societies that have no standard script. Degrees of fluency in reading and writing exhibit, importantly, wide fluctuations.

Secondly, each oral performance of a myth is a retelling, a recreation, and that is significant for what counts as the same myth. The Myth of the Bagre, which Goody transcribed among the LoDagaa, is, according to the LoDagaa themselves, always the same: it never varies. Yet it does. Some of his later transcriptions even contain references to Goody himself, sitting in the background with his tape-recorder.

Nor, thirdly, should we assume that once a written version of a myth exists, that will spell the immediate demise of any version that does not conform to it. The Japanese Heike Monogatari shows that that does not always happen, for even after it was written down, two traditions, one to be read, one for oral performance, coexisted for more than 150 years.

That takes me to a fourth, fundamental, point, the question of the nature of the criticisms to which an account, once written, is subject. Clearly if the written version is deemed to be the canonical one, that lowers the possibility of checking an oral performance that relies purely on memory. But, as Goody recognises, other modes of criticism, including of the substance of an oral performance, are well attested in oral cultures. Moreover while the existence of written versions opens up one avenue

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9 See Butler 1986.
10 See, for example, Phillips 1981 on Sijobang.
for criticism, it may close others off. Jonathan Parry has urged this point against Goody in relation to the status achieved by sacred texts in certain societies.\textsuperscript{11} Holy scripture may invite ruminative reflection, meditation, learned commentary, yet be anything but open to sceptical, critical evaluation.

The main topic for our analysis may now be broached. Both China and Greece produced in some abundance, from around the fifth century BCE onwards, what we may provisionally call historical records, accounts that set out and comment on past events. The questions for us are: how was such writing used? On what basis were these accounts compiled? Who did the compiling? By what criteria was their work assessed? My aim is to investigate how the past came to be perceived as an important area of research and how that related to other inquiries.

We may begin with China. While much remains disputed about the earliest beginnings, a clear sequence of development can be traced, through extant texts of the Warring States period (i.e. before the unification in 221), culminating in the work most would identify as the first sustained Chinese general history, namely the 	extit{Shiji}. This was started by Sima Tan in the second century BCE and largely brought to completion by 90 BCE by his son, Sima Qian, about whom more in due course. But the 	extit{Shiji} drew on, even if it went beyond, earlier models, notably the tradition of the writing of annals, best exemplified, in early extant texts, by the 	extit{Chunqiu}, the \textit{Spring and Autumn Annals}, together with the commentaries on them, such as the \textit{Zuozhuan}. The \textit{Spring and Autumn Annals} covers the reigns of the twelve Dukes of the state of Lu, from 722 to 491 BCE, and was often ascribed to Confucius himself (traditionally dated to 551–479), indeed was so already by Mencius in the fourth century.\textsuperscript{12} But we have to be careful, since it is entirely uncertain what text Mencius read. As for the \textit{Zuozhuan}, whether its original form was as a commentary is unclear, as also is its date: the compilation as we now have it is more likely to date to the very end of the fourth century BCE rather than to any earlier period.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Parry 1985. The point that literacy may not liberate, but foreclose liberation, was already made by Lévi-Strauss (1973, p. 299: ‘the primary function of written communication is to facilitate slavery’).

\textsuperscript{12} Mencius \textsc{viii} 9.

\textsuperscript{13} The date of the \textit{Zuozhuan} is disputed. See, for example, Egan 1977, A. Cheng 1993, Brooks 1994 and Sivin 1995\textsc{b} iv 3. The value of this text as a historical source for the period it covers between the late eighth and the mid-fourth centuries BCE is also a matter of controversy. Brooks and Brooks 1998, p. 8, take a highly sceptical line. Pines 1995 is more optimistic about it containing reliable reports of the events it records. See Lloyd and Sivin 2002, p. 305.
Both these texts purport to contain the records of events. In the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, these are set out season by season (hence the name), though this is done in the barest outline, with no connecting narrative. Births, marriages, deaths, the accession of rulers, victories, defeats, droughts, famines, floods, eclipses, are duly noted, but while the fortunes of Kings and states are recorded, this is without explicit interpretative comment. The *Annals* are a celebration of past deeds, rescuing them from oblivion: but they also contain lessons for the present, even if we are left largely to make our own connections and to infer the reasons for prosperity or decline.

In the *Zuozhuan*, by contrast, events are woven into a continuous, vivid narrative, with graphic portrayals of the characters of the chief persons involved – loyal or untrustworthy, upright or corrupt, cautious or foolhardy – interspersed with pithy judgements, some ascribed to Confucius by name, others just to an unnamed ‘gentleman’ (*junzi*). The story is punctuated by the praise or blame of the main agents.

Yet when the *Zuozhuan* sets down what purport to be the conversations of those agents going back more than 240 years, strict historicity has pretty clearly been subordinated to the dramatic needs of the narrative. It is true that the role of scribes or historians (*dashi*), as represented in the text, includes the duty to record events as they happened, however unpopular that might make them in the eyes of those in power. Thus in the account of the assassination of Duke Zhuang of Qi by his chief minister, Cui Shu, we are told that first one historian and then two of his brothers recorded that ‘Cui Shu killed his ruler’, only for all three to be put to death one after another. Another brother eventually got the entry into the record (and indeed the remark about the killing corresponds to one we find in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*) and we are even told that there was someone else ready to come and make sure the entry was made. Clearly we are meant to be impressed by this example of the dedication of historians to the truth, even when this offended ministers. At the same time the falsification of records, precisely to suit those in positions of power, no doubt happened often enough.

Moreover we cannot rule out the possibility that this very story owes its origin to the authors of the *Zuozhuan* inventing a suitably edifying

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14 On the original role of the *shi* as chief ritualist in the period prior to the Warring States, see Cook 1995.
16 Huang Yi-long 2001, gives a detailed analysis both of cases where astronomical events are not recorded (because not politically or at least not symbolically acceptable) and – conversely – of others where phenomena are invented for the sake of the omens they convey.
 Histories, annals, myths

framework for that entry in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. However, once the veracity of a record becomes a question, we can see that an important step has been taken—away from an account of the past (whether oral or written) that merely serves the purposes of celebration or legitimation (let alone of entertainment), towards one that may indeed continue to serve those purposes but recognises some obligation to accuracy and indeed derives its power from its ability to offer some justification for the claim to deliver that.

Sima Qian’s project undoubtedly represents a far more sustained and self-critical attempt at an accurate universal history, although the points should not be exaggerated. On the one hand, a critical attitude towards his sources, and to what others believed, is evident in many passages. He corrects other accounts on matters of fact, such as chronology or geography (e.g. on the Kunlun mountains and the source of the Yellow River, e.g. *Shiji* 123: 3179.5ff). He explicitly disclaims knowledge of very early periods—of the times of Shennong (the supposed founder of agriculture) and before—and he acknowledges that he has to leave gaps in his chronological tables. On the positive side, he claims to have access to archives from the imperial palace, he frequently refers to his own extensive travels, and he cites inscriptions, edicts and memorials apparently verbatim, even though he also remarks that, with the Qin especially, much had been destroyed—and not just in the notorious episode of the burning of the books, ordered by Li Si, in 213 BCE.

On the other hand, he starts his account with at least a token reference to the Yellow Emperor (supposed to have lived long before dynastic times) and like the *Zuo zhuan*, the *Shiji* includes many quite imaginary conversations from early times. Sima Qian repeats such legends as that of Jian Di, the mother of Xie, the founder of the Yin, who became pregnant on swallowing an egg laid by a black bird. Again the Zhou dynasty is traced back to Jiang Yuan, who became pregnant after she had walked in the footsteps of a giant.

Yet in that case, in the sequel, some undercutting occurs. The child Jiang Yuan bore was Hou Ji, Lord of the Millet, who in other early

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17 *Shiji* 129: 3253.5. He also expresses some doubts about stories about ghosts and spirits, though his denial of these is not unequivocal.
18 For example, *Shiji* 130: 3296.1f. *Shiji* 121: 3115.5 claims that Confucius already used earlier records to create the *Spring and Autumn Annals*.
19 There are two main, but by no means identical, accounts of this in *Shiji* 6: 253.6ff and 87: 2546.11ff, cf. also 15.6ff. This became a favourite theme with those who set out to blacken the reputation of the Qin and we may suspect some exaggeration in the accounts of how far Li Si's proposals were implemented.
20 *Shiji* 3: 91.1ff, 4: 111.1ff.
Chinese texts is treated as a divine figure in charge of grain with a number of not merely human exploits to his name. In Sima Qian's version, he was appointed by Emperor Shun to take charge of agriculture to save people from starvation, but his successes there are put down to his hard work and skill, rather than to any miraculous powers he might have. This gives a more naturalistic twist to the story, though Sima Qian does not go as far as some Greek writers might have done, in such circumstances, by explicitly dismissing traditional tales as absurd. In particular, he does not bring to that task a concept that corresponds to *muthos* in the pejorative sense of fiction (not its only sense, as we shall see in a moment). Indeed he does not have a category that approximates to that at all, not even the term that was introduced into Chinese, but only much later, to cover some senses of 'myth', namely *shenhua*, literally spirit talk.

But the *Shiji* is not just history, nor its author just a historian, and both points are important. The work is organised in five main sections. First there are the 'Basic Annals', the accounts of the main dynasties from their foundation to their fall. These are followed, secondly, by chronological tables. Then comes a third section, a group of treatises, dealing with the calendar and astronomy, waterways, agriculture, music and ritual. The fourth section contains the memoirs of the 'hereditary families', but includes the biographies of Confucius and some other prominent figures. Finally a group of seventy chapters ('traditions', *zhuan*) contains biographies of statesmen, scholars and others, often paired or grouped together to illustrate particular types, and including chapters devoted to 'assassin retainers', 'money makers' and 'jesters'. This last section draws out certain general lessons from the fluctuating fortunes of historical figures otherwise anchored in the narrative account. But it is the third section, the treatises, above all, that incorporates material that goes far beyond what we normally expect in historical writing.

Yet the inclusion of that material is entirely appropriate, given first Sima Qian’s own official position and secondly the overall aim of the work, where it will be helpful to compare it with other types of writing that are in no way historiographical but that share the *Shiji*’s ambition to convey information on matters of importance for government. First, as to the office that first Sima Tan and then Sima Qian himself occupied: Sima Qian refers to his father as *taishi gong*, and he quotes his father as claiming

\[\text{For example, *Shijing Mao* 245, *Sheng min*.}\]

\[\text{See, for example, below on Hecataeus. This is not to deny that Chinese historians repeatedly criticise one another. Already Ban Gu’s evaluation of Sima Qian contains negative as well as positive points, *Hanshu* 62: 2737.4ff, 8, 2738.2ff, and hostile judgements recur in later commentators.}\]
that members of their family had been taishi for generations. On his father’s death, he became taishi ling, or taishi gong, in turn, though that did not last. He fell out with the Emperor Wu Di because he defended the conduct of Li Ling, the officer who had commanded a disastrous expedition against the Xiong Nu, the barbarians often identified with the Hun. Sima Qian was arrested and would have been executed, but for the fact that he chose the humiliation of castration instead, precisely in order to be able to complete his father’s work. Yet the story does not end there. Remarkably, according to the evidence in Ban Gu’s history of the Han, the Hanshu (written about 80 ce), Sima Qian once again held office even after his disgrace, though not as taishi, but as zhong shu ling (‘Secretariat Director’, in Hucker’s translation), in which role, indeed, according to Ban Gu again, he even won considerable honour.

But what were the duties of the taishi? (For present purposes, I shall not go into the question of the differences between this and the other two titles, taishi gong and taishi ling, also used of Sima Qian.) English translations vary confusingly between Grand Scribe, Grand Historian or Grand Historiographer, Grand Astrologer, even Astronomer Royal. When we encounter individuals with that title or, what seems the equivalent, dashi, whether in the Shiji or the Zuozhuan, we find them undertaking a variety of roles. These certainly included acting as the recorder of events (as we have seen in the story about Cui Shu’s assassination that I mentioned from the Zuozhuan). But they were also consulted on ritual matters and they carried out divinations or interpreted those conducted by others and omens and prodigies generally.

It so happens that the predominant modes of divination associated with such figures in the Zuozhuan are those based on turtle shells and milfoil, rather than on the interpretation of astronomical signs or portents. However, there is no discontinuity between the divinatory and the astro-nomical interests of the taishi, as is apparent also from what we are told of Sima Tan’s own training. That included studies in astronomy as well as

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23 Shiji 130: 3295, 2ff. Upholding the family’s reputation was evidently an important motivation for Sima Qian’s work. See Nylan 1998–9, who mounts a powerful case for the role of piety and of considerations of religious propriety in Sima Qian’s thought.


25 All three expressions are used not just of Sima Tan but also of Sima Qian, even though the gong added to taishi gong is honorific, not the title of an office.

26 See, for example, Needham 1959 xlv, cf. Watson 1961 (Grand Historian), Hulsewé 1993, Queen 1996, Hardy 1999 (Grand Astrologer), Dawson 1994 (Grand Historiographer), Nienhauser 1994a (Grand Scribe).

27 Shiji 130: 3288, rff.
in the classic divinatory text, the Yijing or Book of Changes. As a recorder of events, a taishi would certainly be concerned with the calendar (though not necessarily, to be sure, with calendar reform) and as a diviner he might well be called upon to interpret signs from heaven. When one of the later dynastic histories, the Hou Hanshu (25: 3572.1ff), comes to define the duties of the taishi ling, it specifies (1) being in charge of the calendar and ephemerides, (2) choosing auspicious dates and times for state business, sacrifices, funerals, weddings and so on, and (3) recording propitious and baneful omens as they occur.

Since a taishi would be expected to be learned in astronomy and ritual, the inclusion of treatises on those subjects in the Shiji makes good sense. But what about the essays on agriculture, or on aspects of music, such as acoustics, that go beyond ceremonial? Here we have to look further afield for precursors or models, to works such as the Lushi chunqiu, and Huainanzi, compendia that offer comprehensive advice to rulers.

The first of these, the Lushi chunqiu, was compiled under the direction of Lü Buwei (before 237 BCE), who was minister to the man who eventually became the first Qin Emperor, Qin Shi Huang Di, although Lü fell from grace before the unification of China was complete. The text he was responsible for compiling contains advice not just on how rulers, ministers and others should conduct themselves, but on music, medicine, agriculture and on the nature of the basic principles at work in the universe, in other words cosmology. Similarly from the second century BCE, the Huainanzi (put together under the auspices of Liu An, King of Huainan) set itself an ambitious programme encompassing pretty much the whole of useful knowledge.

The Shiji itself does not, to be sure, have the pretensions to comprehensiveness that we find in such works. Yet the addition of the treatises was no

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30 A third such comprehensive treatise, the Chunqiu fahu, should also be mentioned. This was attributed to Dong Zhongshu, a famous memorialist and statesman who lived from 179 to 104 BCE. It too, however, was a compilation, and how much of the text we have was composed by Dong Zhongshu himself is controversial, see Arbuckle 1989, 1991, Queen 1996. On the one hand Sima Qian evidently knew and admired Dong Zhongshu, including a short biography of him in which he praised his honesty and learning (Shiji 121: 3285.5 and 8). More importantly, in the final chapter of the Shiji 130: 3177.1ff, when Sima Qian defends his own practice as a historian, under hostile questioning from Hu Sui, he cites with approval Dong Zhongshu’s interpretation of Confucius’ role as that of ‘giving instruction in the business of a ruler’, where the best way of doing so, as Confucius himself is cited as saying, is by ‘illustrating this through the depth and clarity of events’. This is important testimony that Sima Qian represented himself as following Confucius’ model in his own book, even though he enters a disclaimer, saying that he did not make a work as Confucius did, but merely transmitted a record of past affairs: 3299.1–3300.1.) On the other hand, neither of these chapters in the Shiji cites the Chunqiu fahu as such, which is never mentioned explicitly in the Shiji, even though the commentators take as an allusion to it a remark at 14: 310.5, that Dong Zhongshu ‘extended’ the Springs and Autumns.
Histories, annals, myths

merek learned decoration. Rather, it was accepted that even quite detailed information on such subjects as music, astronomy, ritual, formed part of the technical knowledge that the Emperor, or his officials, would need to have and indeed put to use. Their mastery of such knowledge was, as we shall see, an important element in their claims to legitimacy. This needs some explanation. It was the Emperor’s responsibility to ensure the welfare of ‘all under heaven’, in which context he was conceived as a mediator on whom good relations between heaven and earth depended. To carry out that task, he needed both correct ritual and accurate knowledge — of what was going on in the heavens, among other things, the kind of knowledge the astronomical treatises provided — and of course not just for him but also for his ministers. More on these issues later.

We come then to the key question of the modes of usefulness of the Shiji taken as a whole. What, to judge from this example, was Chinese ‘historiography’, if we can call it that, for? The answer depends on the balance between three points. First, although the Shiji was not directly commissioned by the Emperor (as the Emperor Ming was later to order Ban Gu to write the history of the later Han$^{29}$), its authors held, as taishi, an official position, and depended on imperial approval for access to palace archives, for instance.

Secondly, the Shiji was certainly not just state propaganda. There is a clear contrast between it and the inscriptions that, from Qin Shi Huang Di onwards, Chinese Emperors (like some Persian Kings) put up in prominent positions, on their progress through their lands, to glorify their achievements.$^{30}$ Moreover Sima Qian continued his work, even after his disgrace. Whether indeed he then set out to incorporate more critical comments as tacit reproof of Wu Di himself is controversial.$^{31}$ On the one hand, encoded reprimands of rulers are a well-developed Chinese skill.$^{32}$ On the other, that was always a risky business, not least for someone who had fallen out with Wu Di once before.

The third point may, then, be the fundamental one. The usefulness of the work — to anyone from Wu Di down — and its claim to fame, were not just that it provided a record to memorialise the achievements of great men. Much depended also on its conveying valid information and

$^{29}$ See Hulsewé 1961, p. 38.

$^{30}$ There are several examples in ‘Basic Annals’ 6 with regard to the first Emperor, Qin Shi Huang Di, Shiji 6: 243, 245–7, 249–50, 261–2. Cf. Herrenschmidt 1996 for a discussion of Persian inscriptions celebrating the deeds of Kings, though in some cases these were placed in inaccessible spots where mere mortal observers could hardly inspect them.


$^{32}$ See, for example, Schaberg 1997.
advice on the conduct of human affairs. The narrative is punctuated by remarks made by the taishi gong (whether this is Sima Tan or Sima Qian) that reflect on the lessons to be drawn from what happened, the morals of the stories, the misfortune that may overtake the corrupt, but also the unwary and the innocent. There is no trumpeted claim that the work is a ‘possession for always’. But ‘Basic Annals’ 6 (278.9ff) cites Jia Yi quoting a folk-saying that ‘the past remembered is a guide for the future’: one should examine the ways of ruling in ancient times, test them in one’s own generation and look for what fits. Again in 18 (878.4ff) while it is stated that the present is not necessarily like the past, the text adds: ‘if one examines the ways in which men win position and favour and the reason why they lose these and incur disgrace, one will have the key to success and failure in one’s own age’. Even though the text continues by implying that it is not necessary to consult the traditions of antiquity, they obviously provide a similar resource.

Moreover in the letter that, according to Ban Gu, *Hanshu* 62: 2735, he wrote to Ren An, Sima Qian talks about why he composed the *Shiji*. There he first compares himself with others, including Confucius and Lü Buwei, who chose ‘writing about the past while thinking about the future’ as a way out of the frustrations they felt in being thwarted in their attempts to influence affairs directly. So too, he says (2735.6ff), he gathered together old traditions and ‘investigated the principles of success and failure and of rise and decline’. If later generations, he goes on, appreciate his work, then it will have been worthwhile.

Early Chinese historiography has often been compared with Chinese divination (which I shall be discussing in my next chapter), and the similarities and differences bear remarking, not least because such a text as the *Yijing*, the *Book of Changes*, offers not just a technique for prognostications, but a whole framework for the understanding of human experience. The *Shiji* itself does not aim to prophesy the outcome of events. It does not lay down rules for prognostication, even though in the astronomical treatises it associates particular heavenly phenomena with particular types of events, such as epidemics, wars, victories or defeats. Thus it says that a conjunction of the planet of Fire (Mars) with that of the Earth (Saturn) is a deadly omen for high officials, signifying famines and military defeats: whereas if *Fu Er* (a star in Taurus) twinkles, it means that there are those who spread malicious gossip and create confusion at the Emperor’s side.33

33 *Shiji* 27: 1326.10 and 1306.1, respectively.
But if we take a broader perspective, the *Shiji* certainly conveys lessons from which the wise ruler or statesman will be able to learn, inferring the likely consequences of types of behaviour or policies, and thereby putting himself in a better position to manage the present and anticipate the future.

From the point of view of officialdom, evidently, there was a double-bind – as the later dynastic histories were eventually abundantly to show. On the one hand, merely hagiographic historiography would give the ruler a warm glow, and was often promoted for propaganda purposes: yet the downside was that it offered little or nothing of value as advice. It just told the ruler what he wanted to hear, and though there are plenty of rulers who have wanted just that, some saw it as vacuous: and indeed the idea that advisers should stand up to their lords and where necessary admonish them, however unpopular it made them, is a well-developed theme in the stories surrounding Chinese philosophers from Mencius, if not Confucius himself, onwards.

Yet on the other hand, if the historian was allowed his head, then the more careful his research and the more independent his opinions, the greater the potential for subversion, the possible damage from the revelation of mistakes in policy or flaws in judgement. Conversely, from the side of the historian, the goal was to record, to evaluate and explain, to diagnose the reasons for success or failure. But the dire consequences of possible official disapproval always loomed.\(^{34}\) The ongoing modern debates on Sima Qian's own position and attitudes towards Wu Di show how well he covered his tracks, leaving us his readers with exceptional hermeneutic space within which to evaluate his evaluations.

Greek *historia*, as is well known, covers far more than the writing of history, just as we found to be the case, though in a different way, with Chinese 'historiography' – so here too historiography had complex origins and certainly inherited no automatic god-given intellectual niche. First *historia* can be used either of a form of knowledge or of investigative research, and secondly, when it has the latter sense, it can be used of any inquiry – or of the knowledge or information it results in – with or without a specification with a *peri* clause, 'concerning', animals or plants, for instance, or nature as a whole. But those who practised one branch of inquiry did not necessarily engage in others – a point that we shall

\(^{34}\) As Ban Gu's own fate testifies. He was denounced and imprisoned for 'refashioning' the history of the state, though he was later released and ordered by the Emperor Ming to turn to the history of the founding of the later Han. He was executed in 92 CE, effectively for siding with the wrong faction in the early years of the young Emperor He Di.
see is relevant to the ambitions of those who deal with subjects that are
closer to historiography in our sense.

Two fundamental institutional points and one ideological one must
be made at the outset. It is not as if any of the practices of *historie* in the
classical period brought with it an official post, the equivalent to that of a
*taishi*. Doctors, to be sure, were sometimes retained, for limited periods,
as public physicians, but that was to serve as doctors, not to do research
or practise *historie* in the sense of inquiry (though they might also do
that).35

The second, related, institutional point concerns the audience Greek
practitioners of *historie* were out to impress. Even though they sometimes
worked at the courts of tyrants, Greek investigators made their reputa-
tions more by impressing their own peer group, or even the citizen-
body as a whole, than by courting rulers (pale shadows, in any event, of
Emperors responsible for the welfare of ‘all under heaven’).

It is true that certain changes occur in the Hellenistic period that
affect the situation with regard to both those points. Alexander had
historians (in our sense) in his entourage, and the execution of one of
these, Callisthenes, serves to remind us that Greek historians could be
just as much at risk as their Chinese counterparts – a point valid also for
Rome. Again, as I shall be considering in the final chapter, the institutions
set up by the Ptolemies at Alexandria, and imitated elsewhere, offered
limited support for *historie* of various kinds.

Then the third, ideological, point concerns Greek attitudes towards
the distant past. The Greeks of the classical period did not think of their
own civilisation as having been instituted by Sage Kings many centuries
ago. They had their heroes – Heracles, Theseus – and the period of the
Trojan Wars was emblematic. But there was no equivalent to the notion
of a mandate from heaven, passing down from one dynasty to another,
over vast spans of time. When the Greeks encountered Egypt, some
reacted to the evidence of past continuous culture there by registering
their own, Greek, ‘youth’.36

True, they had their stories of the founding of cities, the subject of
local chronicles. But the earliest Greek historiography has no long-
standing tradition of Annals to serve as models to imitate or to surpass.
Local histories, the work of Ion of Chios, Charon of Lampasacus and the

35 *Historie* becomes an important methodological principle in the Empiricist school of Hellenistic
medicine where it covers especially investigations into the textual records of earlier writers, that
is, as we say, into the medical literature: see, for example, Frede 1987, ch. 13, Staden 2001,
Sigurdarson 2002.
36 Plato, *Timaeus* 22b.
Atthidographers starting with Hellanicus, develop *along with*, and more or less at the same time as, the work of Hecataeus and Herodotus. If Herodotus had a model, some think that was epic, though the way the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* deal with wars, and foreign peoples, was very different from his.

Further back, when the Greeks picture a Golden Age, that is marked by discontinuities with the present. In Hesiod’s myth of the metals, in the *Works and Days*, the ages are separate *gene*, the heroes, for example, the result of a distinct act of creation by Zeus, before he brought today’s race of iron into being. In the Age of Cronos, time is qualitatively different, flowing in reverse, so that old age precedes youth, the stuff, of course, of myth.

How far, indeed, we must now ask, was the key question, for early Greek historiography, indeed for *historie* as a whole, that of distancing itself from, precisely, myth? The scope for confusion, given the stretch not just of our own term myth, but that of the far from equivalent Greek *muthos*, is considerable. As Calame has recently insisted (1996, 1999), the early Greek historians, Hecataeus, Herodotus, Thucydides, were – none of them – intent on systematically rejecting myth in anything like the modern anthropologists’ sense of sacred tales (whether one thinks of the ‘Geste d’Asdiwal’ or of Hesiod’s myth of the metals). Conversely, when Thucydides rejects other accounts of the ‘archaeology’ – of early Greek history – he criticises not just the poets, but also the *logographoi*, writers of *logoi*, where that term is not the antonym of *muthos* in the sense of fiction, but rather the synonym of *muthos* in the sense of story. Elsewhere too Thucydides has *logopoiein* in the sense of rumour-monger, while Herodotus uses *logopoios* to describe the kind of writer Hecataeus is.

Yet however the point is expressed, the recurrent motif round which the self-image of early Greek historical writers was often articulated, relates to securing the truth. Hecataeus ridiculed the ‘many tales’ (*logoi*, indeed) of the Greeks as ‘absurd’: his own accounts, by contrast, so he claimed, are true (*alethes*, Fr 1). Herodotus, who is constantly evaluating the conflicting accounts of events he gathers from different informants, also uses the category of the absurd in dismissing the ideas of those who had given speculative accounts of world geography (iv 36, cf. 42) – where he may well have Hecataeus among others in mind.

The sequence continues in the next generation, with Thucydides. True, he does not name Herodotus: but he distances himself from those

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38 Lévi-Strauss 1967.
39 See Herodotus ii 143, v 36, 125, Thucydides vi 38.
whose accounts are ‘more suited to entertain the listener than to the truth’ (121). Their stories are beyond verification or scrutiny (anexelegktos), having ‘won their way to the mythical’ (mathodes), where, in a collocation associated with unverifiability, that term clearly acquires pejorative undertones.

Such a motif is the counterpart, in historiography, of the common moves made in early Greek philosophy and medicine to downgrade other people’s views as mere opinion, as speculation, even as rank superstition (deisidaimonie), and it corresponds to similar competitive pressures. Yet that way of putting it – using our categories, of historiography and philosophy at least – hardly does justice to the fluidity of the boundaries across which and within which polemic was conducted.

Herodotus, for instance, shares aetiological interests – on such topics as the causes of the Nile’s flooding – with those we think of as Presocratic philosophers.40 The Hippocratic treatise On Airs Waters Places, in its account of the Scythians, for example, shares some of Herodotus’ ethnographic interests. The causes of the impotence of the Anarieis are discussed by both writers. Where the Hippocratic writer dismisses the idea that this has anything to do with the gods, Herodotus reports one story to that effect without rejecting it.41 But another Hippocratic writer attacks a large part of the aetiological tradition itself. On Ancient Medicine criticises those who speculated about ‘things in heaven and things under the earth’, where his point, like Thucydides’, is that such talk is beyond verification. A correct understanding of the physical constitution of humans is a historie that should be based, he claims, on medicine, a matter not of speculation, but of experience.42 But as we see both from the disagreements between Herodotus and the author of On Airs Waters Places, and the criticisms of other ways of proceeding on the question of the human body in On Ancient Medicine, quite what counted as a genuine historie was far from agreed even by those who did agree that some such should be practised.

It is not the case, indeed, that all early Greek writers approved of historie, however they defined it. Heraclitus, who dismissed most of what most people believe as deluded, speaks with contempt of those who turned themselves into polymaths, naming Pythagoras as one who had done so

40 See especially R. Thomas 2000. Similarly there are extensive geographical and ethnographic interests in such later historians as Diodorus, while in Strabo, conversely, historical material (in our sense) is incorporated into an otherwise largely geographical account.
42 On Ancient Medicine ch. 20, CMG i 2, 51.6ff, 51.17, cf. also ch. 1, 36.9ff, ch. 2, 37.1ff.
Histories, annals, myths

through historie. ‘Pythagoras son of Mnesarchus practised inquiry (historie) most of all men’: but ‘much learning does not teach sense: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus’.\(^4\) Claiming to practise ‘inquiry’ cut no ice with Heraclitus. Notoriously, Aristotle, who engages in historia on his own account, with regard to animals, the soul, nature in general, also uses that term in relation to the narrative account of events, in the Poetics (1451b2–4), where he compares the ‘historian’ unfavourably with the poet on the grounds that the former deals with particulars and with what actually happened, the latter with the general and with what is likely to occur. In that passage, he says that even if Herodotus’ text were versified, it would still be (a kind of) ‘history’. But elsewhere, in GA 756b6ff, when discussing what Herodotus has to say about the fertilisation of fish in his Egyptian account, he downgrades him as a mere ‘mythologist’.\(^4\)

It was, to be sure, perfectly possible, as that text in the Poetics shows, to distinguish historiography from other types of historia, zoology, psychology, geography or whatever, viz. by their subject-matter. What they have in common is a search, indeed a research, for truth. That was the claim. But the challenging of boundaries, of methodologies, of results, all indicate the competitive pressures that existed. No early Greek historian had any prospect of employment. To make their way, they needed considerable skills of self-advertisement. Herodotus, we are told, read out parts of his work at Athens, if not also elsewhere.\(^4\) But Thucydides says his work does not pander to the audience. His tactic to defeat the competition is to claim that his own work is no mere piece produced for a competition (agonisma, 1 22).

There is, of course, more to the ambitions of early Greek historians than self-publicity. Herodotus’ stated aims are both to commemorate the great achievements of the Greeks and the barbarians and to show how conflict arose between them. Thucydides disclaims knowledge of the distant past, but claims that his subject is the greatest war there has ever been. As for the usefulness of his work, the programmatic 1 21–2 famously proclaims it as a ‘possession for always’. It sets before the reader not just what happened, but what may be expected to happen again in

\(^4\) Heraclitus Fr 40, cf. Fr 35 and 129.

\(^4\) Aristotle denies that female fish could ever be fertilised by swallowing the milt of the male – citing his knowledge of the internal layout of the organs of reproduction. He did not need dissection to establish this point, for he could have learnt the essential facts from a fishmonger. Yet elsewhere dissection, explicitly defended in On the Parts of Animals 1 ch. 3, 645a26ff, for instance, was one of his most effective research methods in his inquiry into animals.

\(^4\) See Marcellinus’ Life of Thucydides in Jones and Powell 1960 i 54.
all probability – thereby neatly contradicting Aristotle _avant la lettre_. Just as the plague at Athens is described so that it may be recognised should it reappear (π 48), so similarly, in the moral and political domain, the calamities that befell the Greeks as a result of _stasis_, strife, are those that will always recur ‘as long as human nature is the same’ (τιν 82). Political maladies, we may understand, follow as regular courses as physical ones – turning the historian into the diagnostician, if not the therapist, of political ills. Of course ‘Thucydides’ lessons are general, not specific; nor does he exactly propound causal theories for political change. But the reader is meant to learn, at least in general terms, about the sources of calamities, the strains of war, and the moral degradation that may follow from internal strife.

The possible roles of historiography stretch from celebrating, commemorating, legitimating, to explaining, instructing, moralising, criticising, admonishing. But the first three are appreciably easier than the last five, in that the latter inevitably set up a tension between the historian and his audience. On what basis, with what justification, does a historian criticise? How can he expect his audience (whoever that is) to react when he admonishes them? That is where not just skill in presentation, but also the quality of research come in, to support the claim to speak the truth: the writing of history that explicitly claims to be true raises, precisely, the question of justification and evidence. I have seen, I have heard, I have investigated, I can quote the _ipsissima verba_. I can tell how it really was – an extraordinary claim, in all conscience, when we reflect how absurd it would be to try to tell it _all_. _Histoire totale_ is as chimerical as _histoire événementielle_ is inconsequential.

Herodotus and Thucydides share with Sima Qian not just a commemorative, but also didactic and advisory ambitions. The beginnings of historiography in both cultures are political. But the ways they negotiate those functions vary, reflecting differences both in their own positions and in the political realities they faced. Both ancient Greece and ancient China (among other societies) came to use the active study of the past as a resource for understanding the present and anticipating the future, providing a powerful if certainly not unambiguous weapon in the evaluation of the current _status quo_ or the recent conduct of affairs, potentially justificatory, but potentially also critical, even subversive. However, the routes Greece and China took to develop those potentials were different,

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46 Hartog 1988 provides a classic discussion of these themes in Herodotus.
Histories, annals, myths

and so too were their end-results. Call the one the official, the other the unofficial, route. Let me summarise the main points to have emerged from this first inquiry into the development of inquiries, in terms of their self-definition, manner of research, modes of criticism and audience.

First self-definition, and in both cases the relation of historical to other writings is complex. In the Chinese case this is because the earliest dynastic histories include, for example, astronomy, not as a mere appendage, but as contributing to their advisory role. Knowledge on such matters formed a significant component not just in the ruler’s self-presentation, but in his claims to legitimacy. In the Greek case, historie was anything but the monopoly of what we call history, so it needed to carve out its domain by reference to its subject-matter – which it did with mixed success.

Historiography, in China, was an affair of state, and this even before there was an official Bureau of History to oversee the writing of official dynastic histories. Sima Qian, like Sima Tan, held office as taishi ling, with duties that comprised far more than just those of a scribe recording events. The support he could count on included access to state archives of a far more impressive kind than were cited by Herodotus or Thucydides – indeed than any that existed in any classical Greek city-state. So while research in all three cases involved personal inquiry, on the ground, the potential archival back-up was far greater on the Chinese side.

Then as to criticism and audience, one might suppose that the price the Chinese historians had to pay, given their official role, was exorbitantly high. Of course the Emperor and his ministers were not the sole targets of the Shi ji. When Sima Qian was disgraced, he did not just give up, but continued his father’s work, first out of piety to him, of course, but then also in the conviction of its usefulness. Yet he could not afford to offend Wu Di again. The critical comments the text ascribes to the taishi gong show an independence of judgement that belies the potential perils of their authors’ situation. While that is testimony to Sima Qian’s toughmindedness and courage, I argued that from the perspective of officialdom, the historian’s independence corresponded, at least up to a point, with their interests too. There was not much to be learnt merely from flatterers, though woe betide those who took too critical a line. Besides, the celebration of glorious past deeds was not much of a celebration if it was compiled by hacks who did not even appear to be independent.

The early Greek historians had neither the advantages nor the drawbacks of an Emperor in the wings, none of the support an official position could offer, but none of the constraints either. (Later historians
of the Greco-Roman world are, to be sure, another matter; but I am concentrating here on the early development of inquiry.) Not in anyone’s employ, they could, in principle, criticise anyone they liked and as openly as they liked. Yet they too faced the problem of impressing and persuading an audience. Their chief constraint was the need to succeed in the fiercely competitive environment of those claiming special knowledge, whatever branch of historia they cultivated. The rejection of others’ efforts – including via the use of the category of myth in a pejorative acceptance – was a common, if not quite obligatory, preliminary to your own bid for attention. But evidently your own performance was no more immune to attack, from rivals or from colleagues, in your own generation or the next, than those you yourself undermined.

The early Greek historians too wrote, in a sense, for the benefit of those in whose hands lay political power, not, in their case (mostly), Kings, let alone Emperors, so much as the citizens of the classical Greek city-states. True, Thucydides, exiled from Athens for his poor performance as commander in the Thracian campaign (v 26), was thereafter unable himself to participate directly in Athenian politics at all. But he reaches out, with his ‘possession for always’, beyond his contemporaries, to future generations of those whom he no doubt envisaged as participants in the political processes with which he was familiar. There is an irony here, in that he wants his work to be useful, including to his fellow-citizens; yet within the narrative he repeatedly and very vividly illustrates just how difficult it was to persuade the Athenians of where their true interests lay – let alone to get them to learn the lessons of the past.

I shall have more to say, in later chapters, on these and other aspects of the situation in which Chinese and Greek investigators worked – on the different problems they faced in getting their ideas accepted and implemented. We have already seen how historiography was perceived to be relevant to the future, as a source of ideas about what is likely to happen. The topic of chapter 2 will be the wider issues raised by the different manifestations of the ambition to predict.