ANTIPHON
THE SOPHIST
THE FRAGMENTS

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION,
TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTARY

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INTRODUCTION

I THE IDENTITY OF ANTIPHON

Among the plethora of Antiphons known from the later fifth and the fourth centuries BC, particularly at Athens, are several who have often been confused, in antiquity as well as in modern scholarship. These include Antiphon son of Sophilus, of the deme Rhamnus, the famous Athenian logographer and politician who was an originator of the oligarchic coup of 411;¹ Antiphon ὁ σοφιστής, who disputes with Socrates in Xenophon’s Memorabilia;² and Antiphon the tragic poet, who is cited several times by Aristotle. The poet Antiphon is certainly to be distinguished from Antiphon of Rhamnus. For while the latter was tried and executed at Athens in 411 on a charge of treason, a widespread ancient tradition puts the former’s death in Syracuse, at the hands of the elder Dionysius. Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1385a9–10; Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantibus 1051c–d, Quomodo adulator 68α–β; [Plut.], Vitae X or. 833b–c; Philostratus, Vitae sophistarum 499–500.³ Joel (1893–1901), 2.649 with n. 1 rejected this ancient tradition and identified all the above-mentioned Antiphons, as does the author of the pseudo-Plutarchan Vit. X or.⁴ (Philostratus

¹ PE 1304; Fraser and Matthews (1994), s.v. Ἀντίφων (57); Thucydides, 8.68.
² PE 1278; Fraser and Matthews (1994), s.v. Ἀντίφων (4); Memorabilia 1.6.1–15 = T1.
⁴ To the confusion of Antiphons [Plut.] adds the figure of Antiphon son of Lysonides [PE 1282; Fraser and Matthews (1994), s.v. Ἀντίφων (5)]. Avery (1982), 153 n. 32 and Edwards (1998) sought to defend the credibility of [Plut.]. The former argued that the confusions result from conflation of different sources, each of which offers reliable information about the particular Antiphon it deals with; the latter interpreted expressions such as λέγεται, ὃς φασὶ, δοκεῖ, and ὃς τινς as disclaimers by which [Plut.] sought to avoid responsibility for
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also confuses the poet with Antiphon of Rhamnus.) But the credibility of [Plut.] is non-existent, and the chronological grounds for distinguishing the poet Antiphon and the Rhamnusian are convincing.⁵ Chronological and other considerations also seem to rule out identification of the poet with Xenophon’s Antiphon.⁶ In the past, this identification was supported by Joël, Luria, and others; more recently, Narcy has defended it as at least possible.⁷ Narcy points out that the encounters of Antiphon and Socrates depicted by Xenophon are mentioned in Aristotle’s Ποιητικά, a work on poets (cf. T δ with commentary); he suggests this may imply that Xenophon’s Antiphon was himself a poet. But the suggestion is fanciful; and the parallels Narcy tries to draw between F 44(a)1-13-23 (from the sophist Antiphon’s Ποιητικά ἀλήθειας) and the anecdotes about the poet are unconvincing. The real problem of identity concerns not the poet Antiphon, but the relationship between Xenophon’s Antiphon “the sophist” and Antiphon of Rhamnus. Modern commentators more often than not have identified these two – the so-called unitarian position.⁸ But according to Hermogenes of Tarsus (De ideis 399.18–400.6 = T 2(a), ll. 1–10), Didymus of Alexandria and many others distinguished the Rhamnusian Antiphon

information he considered dubious. These arguments amount to special pleading.

⁶ Cf. van Spaan (1773), 827; Sauppe (1806), 513; Nestle (1942), 389–90; Schmid (1940), 99; Untersteiner (1954), 228 n. 7 = (1967), 2.45 n. 7.
⁷ Cf. Luria (1924b), 330, (1927b), 1065; Joël (n. 1 above); Narcy (1989), 225–26, 240–41. Wilamowitz (1939), 1.61 n. 1 also considered the identification possible.
from the “other” Antiphon who was author of Περὶ διήθειαις and similar philosophical works. Since Hermogenes’ “other” Antiphon is plausibly identified with the Antiphon depicted by Xenophon, there arises the possibility of distinguishing a “sophist” Antiphon from the Rhamnusian politician and logographer – the so-called separatist position.9 Morrison (1961), 54; Narcy (1989), 230, and others have objected to the use of the term “sophist” in this context (cf. below). But its use is no mere modern custom (as these commentators pretend): it goes back at least to Xenophon, and is repeated in later ancient authors.10 Three types of evidence have been brought to bear in the discussion on the identity of Antiphon: the ancient testimonia; the linguistic and stylistic characteristics of the various works current in antiquity under the name of Antiphon; and the ethical, political, and religious ideas these works have been thought to reveal. The ancient testimonia, which offer the surest support for the separatist position, will be considered first.

The earliest and best evidence for the existence of a sophist Antiphon distinct from Antiphon of Rhamnus is provided by Xenophon’s account of a series of conversations between Socrates and Antiphon ὁ σοφιστής (cf. T1).11 Antiphon’s purpose in all three conversations is to discredit Socrates as a teacher, in order to win over some of his followers (cf. commentary on T1). Two interrelated characteristics of the Antiphon in the Memorabilia are cru-

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10 Cf. below, and commentary on T1, I. 1; T3, II. 1–2.
11 On the importance of Xenophon’s evidence cf. Seeberger (1924), 15; Schmid (1940), 100. Schmid contended that Xenophon’s Antiphon could not be the Rhamnusian because all datable conversations in the Memorabilia fall in the last decade of the fifth century (after his execution). But the contention is untenable; cf. Avery (1982), 151 n. 26, with references.
cial to the question of his identity. The first is his status as a professional, paid educator and rival of Socrates (something which is implied by the entire episode). This characteristic almost certainly distinguishes Xenophon’s man from Antiphon of Rhamnus. For despite many claims to the contrary, there is no conclusive evidence that Antiphon of Rhamnus was a professional teacher of the kind implied by Xenophon’s portrait of Antiphon. The later ancient tradition that made Thucydides the pupil of Antiphon of Rhamnus rests on mere inference and can be dismissed (cf. commentary on Tz(a), ll. 15–17, with references). Nor does Socrates’ joke at Menexenus 236a (άλλα καὶ ὅστις ἔμοι κάκιον ἑπαίδευθη, μουσικήν μὲν ὑπὸ Λάμπτρούντας, ῥητορικήν δὲ ὑπὸ Ἀντιφώντος τοῦ Ραμνουσίου, ὅμως κἂν ὄντος οἶδα τ’ εἶη Ἀθηναίος γε ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἑπαίδευσαν ἐνδοκιμέν) prove that the Rhamnusian taught rhetoric. Most likely Antiphon owes his mention here to his reputation as one of the outstanding practitioners of oratory in the late fifth century. His identification as a teacher (ἐπαίδευθη) is probably no more than an accommodation to the context, in which he and Lamprus are ironically juxtaposed with Aspasia and Connus, the supposed teachers of Socrates.13 Plutarch, De gloria Atheniensium 350c speaks of the Rhamnusian as the head of a school: τοὺς ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τὰ μειράκια προδιδάσκοντας τοὺς Ἰσοκράτεις καὶ Ἀντιφώντας καὶ Ἰσαίους. But such evidence (despite Morrison [1961], 49 n. 3, [1972], 123–24) is late and unreliable. In this context it is worth recalling that at the Rhamnusian’s trial on the charge of treason, the prosecution evidently mentioned his activity as a paid logographer: ἄλλα μὲν δὴ λέγουσιν οἱ κατήγοροι ὡς συνεγράφον τε δίκαιος ἄλλοις καὶ ὡς [ográfos Cρόνερτ: τὸ ἐ ed. pr.]

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ἐκέρδαινον ὀπὸ τοῦτοι (De rerum mutatione fr. 1a, II.14–22; cf. Thucydidès, 8.68). Yet while the prosecution called attention to Antiphon’s practice of writing speeches for pay, there is nothing here about teaching oratory for pay. Xenophon’s Antiphon, by contrast, is a paid, professional educator (cf. below). Many critics point to the Tetralogies as evidence that Antiphon of Rhamnus did in fact teach rhetoric. But there are serious grounds for doubting that the Tetralogies were written, or could appropriately serve, as models for the use of students (as is usually supposed). Other motives for their composition and “publication” are readily conceivable, and they do not by themselves prove that their author was a professional teacher of rhetoric (cf. Dover [1950], 59). In sum, the case for regarding Antiphon of Rhamnus as a professional teacher is very weak (cf. Andrewes in Gomme et al. [1981], 173–74). Gagarin (1990), 30 contended that Antiphon of Rhamnus’ intellectual interests and wide influence entitle him to “be considered a teacher in some sense,” but this is irrelevant to the question at hand. For Xenophon depicts a sophist and professional rival of Socrates who is a teacher in much more than the vague sense indicated.

The second feature of Xenophon’s Antiphon serving to distinguish him from the Rhamnusian is the epithet τῶν σοφιστῶν which Xenophon attaches to him (cf. van Spaan [1773], 825; Gernet [1923], 175 with n. 2). It is often argued to the contrary that this epithet could not serve to differentiate Xenophon’s man from the Rhamnusian, who as a teacher and practitioner of rhetoric would quite naturally be designated a sophist. As was argued above, however, the evidence that Antiphon of Rhamnus taught rhetoric is

14 Cf. Bignone (1938), 166 n. 1; Nestle (1942), 391 with n. 89; Morrison (1961), 49 n. 3; Avery (1982), 156 with n. 39; Gagarin (1990), 30 n. 13.

15 Cf. Gomperz (1912), 58; Croiset (1917), 15–16; Bignone (1938), 162; von der Mühll (1948), 1; Morrison (1961), 51 with n. 3; Guthrie (1971a), 286; Avery (1982), 151 n. 26; Gagarin (1990), 31–33.
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far from compelling. The epithet σοφιστής could certainly be applied to a logographer like Antiphon, particularly in a hostile context. Cf. Aeschines, or. 1.175; Demosthenes, or. 59.21; von der Muhll (1948), 1 n. 3; Gagarin (1990), 31–32. But the real issue is not whether Xenophon could have referred to the Rhamnusian as a sophist, but whether he would have done so, and why. As Gagarin (1990) has shown, Antiphon of Rhamnus is usually identified in ancient texts by name alone, or by name and demotic, or by name together with the epithet ὑπάρχος, which in this context means “politician” (cf. Dodds [1959], 194). If Xenophon’s epithet τὸν σοφιστήν referred to the Rhamnusian, it would represent an unusual designation requiring some sort of explanation. Croiset (1917), 15 and Gagarin (1990), 32–33 attempted to provide one by suggesting that Xenophon added the epithet to avoid confusion and to distinguish his man from others of the same name. Croiset thought of possible confusion with the poet Antiphon; Gagarin, with the Antiphon killed by the Thirty (cf. Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.40). But it is difficult to see why Xenophon would have felt the need to distinguish his Antiphon from either of these men, neither of whom could easily be confused with a professional teacher and rival and contemporary of Socrates (cf. Avery [1982], 151 n. 26). More important, these suggestions fail to account for the specific designation “sophist,” in particular its pejorative tone and note of hostility. (Gagarin [1990], 33 acknowledged the tone but did not try to explain it.) There is an element of truth in Gigon’s contention that τὸν σοφιστήν serves to identify Antiphon “von vornherein” as an opponent of Socrates (cf. Gigon [1953], 152; Avery [1982], 151 n. 26). Yet this too fails to come to grips with the fundamental issues. Those who would identify the Antiphon in the Memorabilia with Antiphon of Rhamnus do not even attempt to explain Xenophon’s choice of the Rhamnusian (of all people) to exemplify Socrates’ sophist rivals or his adoption
of such a hostile attitude toward a man with whose politics (at least) he might be thought to have sympathized. Once it is granted that Xenophon’s Antiphon is a professional educator distinct from the Rhamnusian, then the epithet “sophist” (with its pejorative overtones) and the professional rivalry with Socrates fall into place. Gagarin (1990), 31–32 objected that Xenophon could not have distinguished a “sophist” Antiphon from Antiphon of Rhamnus unless such a figure had been well known; and even then would have added a demotic, patronymic, or ethnic designation (rather than τὸν σοφιστήν) in order to do so. Now, the fact that other references to a “sophist” Antiphon are much later than Xenophon does not by itself prove (pace Gagarin) that such a figure was unknown in the fourth century. On the contrary, Xenophon’s use of the tag τὸν σοφιστήν seems to presuppose some familiarity with the identity of the man so (briefly) designated. The suggestion that Xenophon would have used an ethnic, demotic, or patronymic ignores the fact that he seldom employs additional means of identification beyond the bare name, and in particular eschews demotics in the identification of Athenians. As Whitehead (1988), 146 concluded: “Xenophon took no systematic care, either with Athenians or in general, to distinguish between homonyms in his narrative by providing them with patronymics or other marks of additional identification.” Xenophon sometimes employs patronymics in connection with non-Athenian sophists (cf. Memorabilia 4.4–5, Symposium 4.62, Anabasis 2.6.17; but contrast Symposium 1.5, Memorabilia 3.1.1). His failure to

16 On Xenophon’s Antiphon as a “type” of the sophist hostile to Socrates cf. Wilamowitz (1931–32), 2.217 n. 1; Gigon (1953), 152, 165.
17 Cf. Whitehead (1988), 145–47. But examples such as Callistratus ὁ δημιουργός (Hellenica 6.2.39, 6.3.3) and Nicostratus ὁ καλὸς ἐπικαλούμενος (Hellenica 2.4.6) show that the conditions Gagarin (1990), 32 laid down for the use of supplementary designations in Xenophon are too rigid. Cf. Whitehead (1988), 146.
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do so in Antiphon’s case may well indicate that the latter was in fact an Athenian (cf. below).

Two further features of Xenophon’s portrait of the sophist Antiphon have led critics to identify him with Antiphon of Rhamnus. One is Antiphon’s evident greed or φιλαργυρία (cf. T1 with commentary). This is a characteristic for which Antiphon of Rhamnus is known to have been attacked in comedy. Cf. [Plut.] Vitae X or, 833c (= Plato, fr. 110): κεκωμωδεται δ’ εἰς φιλαργυρίαν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Πεισανδρῳ. As Philostratus and others make clear, however, Antiphon of Rhamnus’ reputation for greed arose from his practice of writing speeches for money. Cf. Philostratus, Vitae sophistarum 499 (= Plato, fr. 110): καθάπεται δὲ ἡ κωμῳδία τοῦ Ἀντιφόντος ὡς δεινοῦ τὰ δικαία καὶ λάγους κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἔμμεινοι ἀποδιδομένου πολλῶν χρημάτων αὐτοῖς μᾶλιστα τοῖς κινδυνεύοσιν; Antiphon, De rerum mutatione fr. 1a, π.14—22 (quoted above); Diodorus Siculus apud Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.16.79.3; Ammianus Marcellinus, 30.4.5. The greed which characterizes Xenophon’s Antiphon should be related instead to his status as a professional educator or sophist. The sophists’ practice of charging fees for instruction opened them generally to accusations of greed (cf. Blank [1985], 3–6 and passim; and Xenophon in particular often mentions this practice (cf. Symposium 1.5, 4.62; Anabasis 2.6.16; T1, ll. 81–83). The second feature concerns the matter of politics. In his third and final exchange with Socrates (T1, ll. 97–102), Antiphon criticizes the latter for undertaking to teach the art of politics without practicing it. This line of attack has suggested to many that Xenophon’s Antiphon must himself be a professional politician, and therefore identical with Antiphon

18 Cf. Croiset (1917), 16; Aly (1929), 110; von der Mühll (1948), 1; Morrison (1961), 57; Avery (1982), 152–55.
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of Rhamnus. 19 (Others agree with the inference that Xenophon’s Antiphon practiced politics, but deny that he ought for this reason to be identified with the Rhamnusian.) However, it does not follow from Antiphon’s criticism that he himself practiced politics. For one thing, Antiphon does not so much urge Socrates to engage in politics (as is usually supposed) as bring out an alleged contradiction between Socrates’ teaching on the one hand, and his practice on the other. Nothing is said (or implied) about Antiphon himself teaching politics, and so nothing follows about him practicing politics. Moreover, Antiphon’s criticism (as Leonardo Tarán points out to me) is a topos or commonplace, comparable to Aristotle’s remark that while the sophists profess to teach politics, it is not they but the politicians who practice it (Nicomachean Ethics 1180b35–1181a2), and to Plato’s comments on the discrepancy between Homer’s poetic representations of war and politics and his lack of practical experience in such matters (Republic 599c–600e). 20 These considerations undermine the inference that Xenophon’s Antiphon is himself a practicing politician, and therefore identical with the Rhamnusian.

The identity of Xenophon’s Antiphon was a matter for disagreement already in later antiquity. In the list of rivalries involving famous poets and philosophers cited by Diogenes Laertius from the third book of Aristotle’s Περὶ ποιητῶν (2.46 = T5), Αντίφων ὁ τετραοσκότος is said to have contended eristically (ἐχθρονείκε) with Socrates. This refers in all probability to the encounters in the Memorabilia. Whoever was responsible for the designation

19 So Croiset (1917), 16; Aly (1929), 110; Morrison (1961), 58; Avery (1982), 154.
20 Cf. Tarán (1981), 4 n. 11. Nettles (1946), 47 with n. 45 argued that Memorabilia 1.6.15 is derived from Plato (cf. Apology 51cff.; Gorgias 521d) and as such reveals nothing about Antiphon.
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τερατοσκόπος seems not to have identified Xenophon’s Antiphon with the Rhamnusian, to whom he would hardly have referred with this epithet. On the other hand, the author of the pseudo-Plutarchan Vitae X or. (or his source) identified the Antiphon in the Memorabilia with Antiphon of Rhamnus. Speaking of the Rhamnusian, he remarks: διατριβήν δὲ συνέτησε καὶ Σωκράτει τῷ φιλοσόφῳ διεισέχετο τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν λόγων διαφοράν ὡς φιλοσόφου ἀλλ’ ἐλεγκτικῶς, ὡς ξενοφόν ιστόρηκεν ἐν τοῖς Ἀπομνημονεύμασιν (Vit. X or. 832c). Additional evidence of interest in the identity of Xenophon’s Antiphon is provided by Athenaeus, who mentions a monograph entitled On the Antiphon in Xenophon’s Memorabilia written by a certain Hephaestion (cf. Diphnosophilae 15 673p–f = T4, with commentary). According to Athenaeus, Hephaestion plagiarized the material for his monograph from an earlier monograph by Adrastus of Aphrodias, who had discussed both Antiphon the tragic poet and the character Plexippus from the latter’s tragedy Meleager. Hephaestion’s and Adrastus’ interest in the Xenophontic Antiphon almost certainly extended to the question of his identity vis-à-vis other personages of the same name (cf. Sauppe [1896], 509; von der Mühll [1948], 1 n. 2; commentary on T4). This inference is rejected by Avery (1982), 151 n. 24 and Gagarin (1990), 41–42, the latter of whom suggested that Adrastus discussed the moral character of the poet Antiphon and of the dramatis persona Plexippus, while Hephaestion discussed the Xenophontic Antiphon’s manner of

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21 The epithet is usually ascribed to Aristotle; but cf. commentary on T5. Gagarin (1990), 41 n. 50 rejected the inference, on the grounds that we do not know who added the epithet or why it was added. But our ignorance on these points does not really affect the issue.

22 On the unreliability of [Plut.] cf. nn. 4–5 above.

23 Similarly Photius, Bibliotheca 186a (8.42) and the anonymous Vita Antiphontis 7. According to Blass (1887–98), 1.93, these depend on [Plut.]; but others disagree (cf. commentary on T6).
arguing with Socrates. But this suggestion does not do justice to the available evidence concerning Adrastus’ work, which indicates that he offered detailed discussions of literary-historical problems of all kinds (cf. Moraux [1973–84], 2.323–30). In addition, Athenaeus specifies that Adrastus discussed the person of Antiphon the poet at considerable length (καὶ πλείστα δόσα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἀντιφώντος εἰπόντος). It is difficult to avoid the inference that Adrastus dealt with the question of the identity of the poet Antiphon vis-à-vis others of the same name, including the Antiphon in the Memorabilia; and Hephaestion will have followed suit.

Xenophon’s evidence for the existence of a sophist Antiphon distinct from Antiphon of Rhamnus is confirmed by the opinion of Didymus of Alexandria (and others) as reported by Hermogenes of Tarsus. By way of preface to his stylistic analysis of the works current under the name of Antiphon (Τ2(a), ll. 1–10), Hermogenes reports that from among the many men named Antiphon, Didymus singled out two in particular, referred to as σοφιστέσσαντες (on the meaning of this term cf. commentary on Τ2(a), l. 4). One of these two is identified as Antiphon ὁ ῥήτωρ — that is, the Rhamnusian (cf. De ideis 400.22 ὁ τοῖνυν Ἀρμονίσσιος Ἀντιφών) — author of the Τετραλογίας and similar legal speeches. From the Rhamnusian Didymus distinguished “the other” (ἐτέρος) Antiphon, author of Περὶ ἀληθείας and similar philosophical works, who is said also to have been a dream-interpreter. Hermogenes neglects to report the reasons which led Didymus (and others) to

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24 Gagarin (1990), 41 argued that the title of Hephaestion’s work does not suggest that it concerned the question of identity. But still less does it suggest the contents Gagarin proposed for it.


26 On the division of works between the two Antiphons cf. section ii below.
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these conclusions. Despite this, many commentators have inferred that Didymus based his distinction between the Rhamnusian and “the other” Antiphon on perceived stylistic differences within the corpus Antiphonteum. Hence these commentators have felt free to reject Didymus’ distinction, in the belief (correct in itself) that stylistic considerations do not suffice to establish his separatist conclusions.\(^\text{27}\) The inference regarding Didymus’ rationale rests solely on Hermogenes’ silence, however, and is quite unjustified.\(^\text{28}\) In the first place, Hermogenes himself was a critic of style, and his focus on stylistic criteria reflects his own preoccupations rather than those of Didymus (cf. Bignone [1938], 166 n. 4). This point applies equally to the argument Hermogenes offers against Didymus’ distinction as to the disparities of style he cites in favor of it. Gagarin (1990), 36 overlooked this when he noted that Hermogenes cites evidence against the distinction from Plato and others and concluded that Hermogenes “investigated carefully the matter of identity.” For the “evidence” in question reduces to a stylistic argument (cf. T2(a), ll. 14–20, with commentary). In the second place, it is possible and even likely that Hermogenes encountered Didymus’ views on the problem of Antiphon at second hand and/or in abbreviated form. Didymus’ prodigious output suffered the usual fate of scholarly literature in antiquity, and was frequently excerpted (cf. Cohn [1903], 446). This might help to explain Hermogenes’ failure to record Didymus’

\(^{27}\) Cf. Drerup (1901), 301–6 (but contrast the doubts expressed at 306); Croiset (1917), 17; Altwegg (1908), 8; Joel (1893–1901), 2.639, 642, (1921), 663 n. 3; Aly (1929), 114, 168–69; Nestle (1942), 372; Hommel (1941), 2; Morrison (1961), 55; Decleva Caizzi (1984), 97–98; Gagarin (1990), 36–37, 43.

\(^{28}\) Narce (1989), 228 seems to regard it as a matter of significance that Hermogenes’ information on the “other” Antiphon “est depourvue d’éléments biographiques.” But he failed to point out that the same holds for Hermogenes’ information on Antiphon of Rhamnus.
rationale for the distinction. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Hermogenes does at least allude to evidence (other than that of style) in support of the distinction, in his remark on ἱστορία: πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἱστορίας φαίνεται κτλ. (T2(a), 1. 3). What exactly Hermogenes means by ἱστορία is uncertain (cf. commentary ad loc.). But on any interpretation, his remark seems to allude to some sort of factual information supporting Didymus’ distinction. And it is entirely reasonable to assume that Didymus himself was acquainted with such information (cf. Bignone [1938], 166 n. 4). In sum, it is quite unjustified to infer that Didymus based his distinction on stylistic considerations alone, and to reject the distinction for this reason. Exploiting the ambiguity of Hermogenes’ term εἴδος, which can mean “genre” as well as “style,” Cassin [1985], 67–71 tried to move the discussion from the question of literary style to the notion of what she called “compétence.” Cassin suggested that Didymus and his modern followers have distinguished the Antiphons out of a conviction that rhetorical works should belong to an “orator,” and philosophical works to a “sophist” (cf. Decleva Caizzi [1984], 97). But there is simply no evidence that such a consideration influenced Didymus, Hermogenes, or any other ancient author concerned with the problem of Antiphon. Some modern commentators have objected that Didymus’ distinction represents merely an isolated or even unique view in antiquity. But this ignores Hermogenes’ explicit information to the contrary, that “many others” (ἄλλοι τὲ φασίν οὐκ ἐλίγοι, T2(a), 1. 2) shared Didymus’ opinion. Our ignorance of the identity of these others does not diminish the value of Hermogenes’ information.

In contrast to the authors discussed above, the vast majority of ancient and medieval writers who refer to

29 Cf. Alb (1929), 114; Hommel (1941), 1–2; Gagarin (1990), 43–44 and passim.
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“Antiphon” show no awareness of the problem of identity and do not attempt to distinguish a sophist from Antiphon of Rhamnus. In the works of Aristotle, for example, the name Antiphon appears eleven times. In *Physics* 185a17 (= F13(a)), 193a9–28 (= F15(b)), and *Sophistici elenchi* 172a7 (= F19(b)), Aristotle refers to the (sophist) Antiphon three times by bare name, without a distinguishing epithet. Antiphon of Rhamnus is likewise referred to three times by bare name (Ἀθηναίων πολίτεια 32.2; *Ethica Eudemia* 1232b6–9; fr. 624). Antiphon the tragic poet is referred to twice with the epithet “poet” (*Rhetoric* 1385a10; *Mechanics* 847a20), but three times without it (*Ethica Eudemia* 1239a37; *Rhetoric* 1379b15, 1399b27). Such lack of concern to identify the particular Antiphon in question has led some commentators to infer that Aristotle (and his imitators) did not distinguish the author of the philosophical works from Antiphon of Rhamnus. But the inference does not follow. It is necessary to keep in mind the peculiar nature of the *corpus Aristotelicum* and the specialized and knowledgeable audience to which works such as the *Physics* and *Sophistici elenchi* were addressed. If Aristotle could take for granted his audience’s familiarity with such things as the details of the sophist Antiphon’s quadrature attempt, it should cause no surprise if he neglects to supply more elementary information such as the identity of Antiphon in question. Furthermore, in most cases the context would suffice to make clear which Antiphon he had in mind. In the *Rhetoric*, for example, Aristotle twice omits a distinguishing epithet when citing the poet Antiphon in connection with the drama *Meleager* (*Rhetoric* 1379b15, 1399b27). Yet when the same man is cited in the same work for an anecdote in connection with his death at the hands of the tyrant Dio-

nysius, Aristotle adds the tag “poet,” presumably because he did not think it immediately obvious from the context which Antiphon was meant (Rhetoric 1383a10). These considerations go far to account for Aristotle’s apparent non-chalance in citing “Antiphon.”

Later authors who quote from or refer to the sophist Antiphon without distinguishing him from the Rhamnusian include the doxographer Aëtius (F9, F26–28, F32); Galen (F1–2, F29–29A); Christian authors such as Clement of Alexandria (F66) and Origen (F12); Athenaeus (T4, F73); Philostratus (T2(b)); the anthologist Stobaeus (F49–51, F53–54, F57–62), and lexicographers from Aelius Dionysius and Pollux to Photius and the Suda. Among all these, Gagarin (1990), 39–40 attached special significance to the case of Valerius Harpocation, who preserves a large number of fragments from the sophist Antiphon in his Lexicon of Attic orators. Harpocation quotes by title from the sophist Antiphon’s Περὶ ἀληθείας, Περὶ ὀμοιοίας, and Παρατικός, as well as from numerous speeches of Antiphon of Rhamnus. Yet he never indicates any awareness that these various works might belong to different authors. Gagarin inferred that Harpocation must have known, and rejected, Didymus’ rationale for distinguishing the Antiphons. Not only this, Harpocation (in Gagarin’s words) must have been unaware of “any significant scholarly opinion favoring a separatist view.” Such inferences, however, go far beyond the evidence. Harpocation cites sev-

31 Compare how Aristotle refers to “Plato,” without a distinguishing epithet, in Topics 140a3–5 in connection with the rare words δρυσκίας (of the eye), σπυριδικός (of a kind of spider), and ὀστέογιες (of marrow). Both the general context and the frequent use of Platonic material in this work might lead the unwary to suppose that the philosopher is meant (as some modern commentators have in fact done). Yet the reference is certainly to Plato the comic poet, whom Aristotle refers to again without a distinguishing epithet in Rhetoric 1376a10. Cf. Cherniss (1944), 25 n. 18.
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eral of Didymus’ commentaries on the Attic orators, and utilized some of his lexicographical works. But it is not known where Didymus expressed his views on Antiphon, and uncertain whether Harpocation even knew of them.32 On two occasions, Harpocation questions the authenticity of speeches ascribed to “Antiphon” (s.v. δημοσεύμενος, δ 32, on the Πρὸς Φιλιππόν ἀπολογία; s.vv. ἡμπορικὴ γραφή, p 3, on the Κατὰ πρωτόνως). Again, however, it is not known what source or sources Harpocation depended on for information about issues of ascription in the corpus Antiphontaeum. None of Harpocation’s thirty-nine citations of Didymus concerns a problem of ascription. The only authorities he cites by name on questions of ascription are Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Callimachus, on the authenticity of the speech Πρὸς Κριτίαν περὶ τοῦ ἐνεπισκήματος attributed to Demosthenes (s.vv. ἐνεπίσκημα καὶ ἐνεπισκήψασθαι, ε 51). There is reason to believe that Harpocation utilized Dionysius’ views on the ascription of speeches in the Lysianic corpus as well (cf. Dover [1968b], 15–19).33 But there is no evidence that Dionysius concerned himself with problems of ascription in the corpus Antiphontaeum. The outstanding ancient authority in this area was Caecilius of Calacte, but Harpocation cites him only once, and not on a problem of ascription (s.v. ἔξουλης, ε 72).34 Despite this, both Blass (1887–98), 1.102–3 and Aly (1929), 113 assumed that Harpocation reflects the views of Caecilius on questions of ascription in the corpus Antiphontaeum. This is possible, of course, but is unsupported by evidence. (Aly further assumed, without any justification whatsoever, that all information on Anti-

32 On Harpocation’s use of Didymus cf. Cohn (1903), 458–59 and commentary on T2(a), ll. 2–3.
34 Cf. [Plut.], Vitae X or. 833c = Caecilius, fr. 100; Blass (1887–98), 1.102–7; Brzoska (1897), 1181–82.
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phon in the later lexicographical tradition goes back to Caecilius.30 Papyrus discoveries which have made it possible to compare Harpocratio's work with the sources available to him suggest that he offers but a small selection from the learning at his disposal (cf. Schultz [1912], 2413–14, with references). Moreover, the Lexicon as extant is abridged (cf. Dindorf [1853], xxii–xxiii; Keaney [1991], xxv). In the circumstances, it is hazardous to draw inferences from silence regarding Harpocratio's possible knowledge or opinion of Didymus' distinction.

From the way in which Harpocratio and other late ancient authors cite the sophist Antiphon's Περὶ ἀληθείας, Περὶ ὁμοφύσεως, and Πολιτικός, it can safely be inferred that these works were regularly included in copies of the corpus Antiphontaeum circulating in later antiquity.36 When and how they came to be incorporated in it is not known; it is possible that Callimachus catalogued them among the works of the Rhamnusian in his πίναξ of orators.37 After Callimachus, Caecilius of Calacte exercised great influence on the shape of the corpus Antiphontaeum (cf. above). Aly (1929), 113 supposed that Caecilius identified the sophist Antiphon and the Rhamnusian; Blass (1887–98), 1.102–3 thought that he did not, and assumed that the sophist’s works were among the twenty-five speeches designated by Caecilius as inauthentic. The difficulty then is to explain why Harpocratio and other authorities appear to ignore Caecilius’ conclusions. Blass suggested that because the sophist’s works stemmed from an Antiphon (though not from the Rhamnusian), their authenticity is not questioned in Harpocratio and others. But the suggestion is less than

30 Harpocratio (for one) seems not to have used Caecilius’ lexicographical work on the orators, at least directly. Cf. Brzoska (1897), 1186.

36 But Antiphon the sophist’s dream-book probably was not (cf. below).

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completely convincing. In any case, the views of Didymus (and others) on the problem of the Antiphons had no discernible effect on the form of the corpus Antiphoniceum, which continued to include Περὶ ἀληθείας, Περὶ ὁμονοίας, and Πολιτικός. The bare fact of their inclusion, however, no more proves their author identical to Antiphon of Rhhamnus than the inclusion of speeches by Apollodorus son of Pasion in the Demosthenic corpus proves that Apollodorus was the same person as Demosthenes.38 But it does help to explain why Galen, Harpocratio, and other ancient authorities could cite these works (without apparent scruple) as belonging to “Antiphon” or even “Antiphon of Rhhamnus.” The corpus Platoniceum provides an instructive parallel. Late writers clearly felt free to cite as Plato’s even works they knew or suspected to be spurious, on the principle that anything included in available editions of Plato could be cited as Plato’s (cf. Tarán [1975], 7 with n. 23). It is at least conceivable that some of the authors who cite the works of the sophist Antiphon as if they belonged to the Rhhamnusian may similarly have known or suspected otherwise. Other late writers – including Philostratus and the author of the pseudo-Plutarchan Vitae X or. – certainly did not. But the essential point is that the form of the corpus Antiphoniceum undoubtedly contributed to the widespread confusion of the sophist Antiphon with Antiphon of Rhhamnus in later antiquity. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that ancient authorities from Thucydides (8.68) and Lysias (or. 12.67) on who refer to the Rhhamnusian Antiphon without distinguishing him from the sophist represent a different case. Antiphon of Rhhamnus was a famous politician and orator familiar to anyone acquainted with

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the history of rhetoric or of fifth-century Athens. Later writers referring to him would scarcely have felt it necessary to distinguish him from the much less familiar sophist (even if they were aware of the distinction). Modern commentators who have analyzed the ancient tradition on “Antiphon” have unjustifiably ignored this consideration.39

The ancient testimonia, then, offer probable (though not certain) evidence for the existence in the late fifth century of a sophist Antiphon distinct from Antiphon of Rhamnus. Some supporters of the separatist position have attempted to reinforce this conclusion with arguments drawn from an analysis of language and style.40 Luria (1926c), for example, argued that the distinction is proved by simple orthography, since the sophist Antiphon consistently used spellings in –ττ– and –ξυν–, the Rhamnusian in –σσ– and –συν–. But Luria’s own collection of the evidence shows that neither author is consistent on these points (cf. Rosenkranz [1930], 144–45, 170, 173; Bignone [1938], 215 n. 1). Bignone (1938), 175–215 offered a detailed stylistic comparison between the works of the sophist Antiphon and the extant speeches of the Rhamnusian. This analysis, while subtle and not without interest, falls far short of demonstrating his separatist conclusions, and is open to the fundamental objection of failing to take account of the generic distinction between dicanic oratory and philosophical treatises.41 The fragmentary character of the sophist’s writings, and the difficulty of dating them, further exacerbate the uncertainties attaching to stylistic analysis in this case (cf. Dover [1950], 60). Linguistic and stylistic differences between the fragments of the sophist Antiphon and the speeches of the Rhamnusian undoubtedly exist. For exam-

40 Cf. Bignone (1938), 175–215; Luria (1926c); Gomperz (1912), 59.
41 Cf. Aly (1929); Hommel (1941); Morrison (1961), 55–56.