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I.

On philosophy as a system.

If philosophy is the system of rational cognition through concepts, it is thereby already sufficiently distinguished from a critique of pure reason, which, although it contains a philosophical investigation of the possibility of such cognition, does not belong to such a system as a part, but rather outlines and examines the very idea of it in the first place.

The division of the system can at first only be that into its formal and material parts, of which the first (the logic) concerns merely the form of thinking in a system of rules, while the second (the real part) systematically takes under consideration the objects which are thought about, insofar as a rational cognition of them from concepts is possible.

Now this real system of philosophy itself, given the original distinction of its objects and the essential difference, resting on them, of the principles of a science that contains them, cannot be divided except into theoretical and practical philosophy; thus, the one part must be the philosophy of nature, the other that of morals, the first of which is also empirical, the second of which, however (since freedom absolutely cannot be an object of experience), can never contain anything other than pure principles a priori.

However, there is a great misunderstanding, which is even quite disadvantageous to the way in which the science is handled, about what should be held to be practical in a sense in which it deserves to be taken up into a practical philosophy. Statesmanship and political economy, rules of good housekeeping as well as those of etiquette, precepts for good health and diet, of the soul as well as of the body (indeed why not all trades and arts?), have been believed to be able to be counted as practical philosophy, because they all contain a great many practical propositions. But while practical propositions certainly differ from theoretical ones, which contain the possibility of things and

\[\text{Vernunftverkennnis}\]

\[\text{real}\]

\[\text{Sitten}\]

\[\text{Bedeutung}\]
their determination, in the way in which they are presented, they do not on that account differ in their content, except only those which consider freedom under laws. All the rest are nothing more than the theory of that which belongs to the nature of things, only applied to the way in which they can be generated by us in accordance with a principle, i.e., their possibility is represented through a voluntary action (which belongs among natural causes as well). Thus the solution to the problem in mechanics of finding the respective lengths of the arms of a lever by means of which a given force will be in equilibrium with a given weight, is of course expressed as a practical formula, but it contains nothing other than the theoretical proposition that the length of the arms is in inverse proportion to the force and the weight if these are in equilibrium; only this relation, as far as its origin is concerned, is represented as possible through a cause whose determining ground is the representation of that relation (our choice). It is exactly the same with all practical propositions that concern merely the production of objects. If precepts for the promotion of one’s happiness are given, and, e.g., the issue is only what one has to do in one’s own case in order to be susceptible to happiness, then all that is represented are the inner conditions of the possibility of such happiness – in contentment, in moderation of the inclinations so they will not become passions, etc. – as belonging to the nature of the subject, and at the same time the manner of generating this equilibrium as a causality possible through ourselves alone, hence all of this is represented as an immediate consequence from the theory of the object in relation to the theory of our own nature (ourselves as cause): hence the practical precept here differs from a theoretical one in its form, but not in its content, and thus a special kind of philosophy is not required for insight into the connection of grounds with their consequences. – In a word: all practical propositions that\textsuperscript{4} derive that which nature can contain from the faculty of choice as a cause collectively belong to theoretical philosophy, as cognition of nature; only those propositions which give the law to freedom are specifically distinguished from the former in virtue of their content.\textsuperscript{1} One can say of the former that they constitute the practical part of a philosophy of nature, but the latter alone ground\textsuperscript{2} a special practical philosophy.

\textsuperscript{*} willkürlich
\textsuperscript{4} Here Kant crossed out the words: “are also possible through empirical determining grounds (e.g., those of the theory of happiness).”
\textsuperscript{1} Here Kant crossed out the words: “and are determining grounds only in so far as they are a priori grounds.”
\textsuperscript{2} Here Kant crossed out “belong to.”
Remark

It is very important to determine the parts of philosophy precisely and to that end not to include among the members of the division of philosophy, as a system, that which is merely a consequence or an application of it to given cases, requiring no special principles.

Practical propositions are distinguished from theoretical ones either in regard to principles or to consequences. In the latter case they do not constitute a special part of the science, but belong to the theoretical part, as a special kind of its consequences. Now the possibility of things in accordance with natural laws is essentially distinct in its principles from that in accordance with laws of freedom. This distinction, however, does not consist in the fact that in the latter case the cause is placed in a will, but in the former case outside of the will, in the things themselves. For even if the will follows no other principles than those by means of which the understanding has insight into the possibility of the object in accordance with them, as mere laws of nature, then the proposition which contains the possibility of the object through the causality of the faculty of choice may still be called a practical proposition, yet it is not at all distinct in principle from the theoretical propositions concerning the nature of things, but must rather derive its own content from the latter in order to exhibit the representation of an object in reality.

Practical propositions, therefore, the content of which concerns merely the possibility of a represented object (through voluntary action), are only applications of a complete theoretical cognition and cannot constitute a special part of a science. A practical geometry, as a separate science, is an absurdity, although ever so many practical propositions are contained in this pure science, most of which, as problems, require a special instruction for their solution. The problem of constructing a square with a given line and a given right angle is a practical proposition, but a pure consequence of the theory. And the art of surveying (agrimensoria) cannot in any way presume to the name of a practical geometry and be called a special part of geometry in general, but rather belongs among the scholia of the latter, namely the use of this science for business.*

* This pure and for that very reason sublime science seems to forgo some of its dignity if it concedes that, as elementary geometry, it needs tools, even if only two, for the construction of its concepts, namely the compass and the ruler, which construction alone it calls geometrical, while those of higher geometry on the contrary it calls mechanical, since for the construction of the concepts of the latter more complex machines are required. But what is
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Even in a science of nature, insofar as it rests on empirical principles, namely in physics proper, the practical procedures for discovering hidden laws of nature, under the name of experimental physics, can in no way justify the designation of a practical physics (which is likewise an absurdity) as a part of natural philosophy. For the principles in accordance with which we set up experiments must themselves always be derived from the knowledge of nature, hence from theory. The same is true of practical precepts, which concern the voluntary production of a certain state of mind in us (e.g., that of the stimulation or restraint of the imagination, the gratification or weakening of the inclinations). There is no practical psychology as a special part of the philosophy of human nature. For the principles of the possibility of its state by means of art must be borrowed from those of the possibility of our determinations from the constitution of our nature and, although the former consist of practical propositions, still they do not constitute a practical part of empirical psychology, because they do not have any special principles, but merely belong among its scholia.

In general, practical propositions (whether they are pure à priori or empirical), if they immediately assert the possibility of an object through our faculty of choice, always belong to the knowledge of nature and to the theoretical part of philosophy. Only those which directly exhibit the determination of an action as necessary merely through the representation of its form (in accordance with laws in general), without regard to the means of the object that is thereby to be realized, can and must have their own special principles (in the idea of freedom); and, although they ground the concept of an object of the will (the highest good) on these very principles, still this belongs only indirectly, as a consequence, to the practical precept (which is henceforth called moral). Further, there can be no insight into its possibility through the knowledge of nature (theory). Thus only those propositions alone belong to a special part of a system of rational cognitions, under the name of practical philosophy.

All other propositions of practice, whatever science they might be attached to, can, if one is perhaps worried about ambiguity, be called

meant by the former is not the actual tools (cirrus et regula), which can never give those shapes with mathematical precision, rather they are to signify only the simplest kinds of exhibition of the imagination à priori, which cannot be matched by any instrument.

* Bewegung
* Crossed out: “a determinate.”
* Cassirer suggests “matter” (Materie).
technical rather than practical propositions. For they belong to the art of bringing about that which one wishes should exist, which in the case of a complete theory is always a mere consequence and not a self-subsistent part of any kind of instruction. In this way, all precepts of skill belong to technique and hence to the theoretical knowledge of nature as its consequences. However, we shall in the future also use the expression “technique” where objects of nature are sometimes merely judged as if their possibility were grounded in art, in which cases the judgments are neither theoretical nor practical (in the sense just adduced), since they do not determine anything about the constitution of the object nor the way in which to produce it; rather through them nature itself is judged, but merely in accordance with the analogy with an art, and indeed in subjective relation to our cognitive faculty, not in objective relation to the objects. Now here we will not indeed call the judgments themselves technical, but rather the power of judgment, on whose laws they are grounded, and in accordance with it we will also call nature technical; further, this technique, since it contains no objectively determining propositions, does not constitute any part of doctrinal philosophy, but only a part of the critique of our faculty of cognition.

* This is the place to correct an error which I committed in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. For after I had said that imperatives of skill command only conditionally, under the condition of merely possible, i.e., problematic ends, I called such practical precepts problematic imperatives, an expression in which a contradiction certainly lurks. I should have called them technical imperatives, i.e., imperatives of art. The pragmatic imperatives, or rules of prudence, which command under the condition of an actual and thus even subjectively necessary end, also stand under the technical imperatives (for what is prudence other than the skill of being able to use for one’s intentions free human beings and among these even the natural dispositions and inclinations in oneself?). Only the fact that the end which we ascribe to ourselves and to others, namely that of our own happiness, does not belong among the merely arbitrary ends justifies a special designation for these technical imperatives; for the problem does not merely, as in the case of technical imperatives, require the manner of the execution of an end, but also the determination of that which constitutes this end itself (happiness), which in the case of technical imperatives in general must be presupposed as known.
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II.

On the system of the higher cognitive faculties, which grounds philosophy.

If the issue is not the division of a philosophy, but of our faculty of a priori cognition through concepts (of our higher faculty of cognition), i.e., of a critique of pure reason, but considered only with regard to its faculty for thinking (where the pure kind of intuition is not taken into account), then the systematic representation of the faculty for thinking is tripartite: namely, first, the faculty for the cognition of the general (of rules), the understanding; second, the faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general, the power of judgment; and third, the faculty for the determination of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles), i.e., reason.

The critique of pure theoretical reason, which was dedicated to the sources of all cognition a priori (hence also to that in it which belongs to intuition), yielded the laws of nature, the critique of practical reason the law of freedom, and so the a priori principles for the whole of philosophy already seem to have been completely treated.

But now if the understanding yields a priori laws of nature, reason, on the contrary, laws of freedom, then by analogy one would still expect that the power of judgment, which mediates the connection between the two faculties, would, just like those, add its own special principles a priori and perhaps ground a special part of philosophy, even though philosophy as a system can have only two parts.

Yet the power of judgment is such a special faculty of cognition, not at all self-sufficient, that it provides neither concepts, like the understanding, nor ideas, like reason, of any object at all, since it is a faculty merely for subsuming under concepts given from elsewhere. Thus if there is to be a concept or a rule which arises originally from the power of judgment, it would have to be a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment, and thus a concept of a property of nature such that one cannot form any concept of it except that its arrangement conforms to our faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones even though these are not given; in other words, it would have to be the concept of a purposiveness of nature in behalf of our faculty for cognizing it, insofar as for this it is required that we be able to judge the particular as

\[ des \text{ Allgemeinen. The term allgemein can be translated as either "general" or "universal"; we will generally use the former where there is a contrast with "particular," and the latter when a claim to the assent of all is contrasted to an idiosyncratic or private judgment.} \]
\[ burchten \]
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contained under the general and subsume it under the concept of a nature.

Now such a concept is that of an experience as a system in accordance with empirical laws. For although experience constitutes a system in accordance with transcendental laws, which contain the condition of the possibility of experience in general, there is still possible such an infinite multiplicity of empirical laws and such a great heterogeneity of forms of nature, which would belong to particular experience, that the concept of a system in accordance with these (empirical) laws must be entirely alien to the understanding, and neither the possibility, let alone the necessity, of such a whole can be conceived. Nevertheless particular experience, thoroughly interconnected in accordance with constant principles, also requires this systematic interconnection of empirical laws, whereby it becomes possible for the power of judgment to subsume the particular under the general, however empirical it may be, and so on, right up to the highest empirical laws and the forms of nature corresponding to them, and thus to regard the aggregate of particular experiences as a system of them; for without this presupposition no thoroughly lawlike interconnection, i.e., empirical unity of these experiences can obtain.

* The possibility of an experience in general is the possibility of empirical cognitions as synthetic judgments. It therefore cannot be drawn analytically from mere comparison of perceptions (as is commonly believed), for the combination of two different perceptions in the concept of an object (for the cognition of it) is a synthesis, which does not make an empirical cognition, i.e., experience, possible otherwise than in accordance with principles of the synthetic unity of the appearances, i.e., in accordance with principles through which they are brought under the categories. Now these empirical cognitions constitute, in accordance with what they necessarily have in common (namely those transcendental laws of nature), an analytic unity of all experience, but not that synthetic unity of experience as a system in which the empirical laws, even with regard to what is different in them (and where their multiplicity can go on to infinitude), are bound together under a principle. What the category is with regard to each particular experience, that is what the purposiveness or fitness of nature to our power of judgment is (even with regard to its particular laws), in accordance with which it is represented not merely as mechanical but also as technical; a concept which certainly does not determine the synthetic unity objectively, as does the category, but which still yields subjective principles that serve as a guideline for the investigation of nature.

* Here Kant crossed out “so” and “consequently,” having originally written “and so subsume, consequently.”
* Here Kant crossed out “yet higher, likewise to”.
* This footnote appears to be an addition to the fair copy.
This lawfulness, in itself (in accordance with all concepts of the understanding) contingent, which the power of judgment presumes of nature and presupposes in it (only for its own advantage), is a formal purposiveness of nature, which we simply assume in it, but through which neither a theoretical cognition of nature nor a practical principle of freedom is grounded, although a principle for the judging and investigation of nature is given, in order to seek for particular experiences the general rules in accordance with which we have to arrange them in order to bring out that systematic connection which is necessary for an interconnected experience and which we have to assume a priori.

The concept which originally arises from the power of judgment and is proper to it is thus that of nature as art, in other words that of the technique of nature with regard to its particular laws, which concept does not ground any theory and does not, any more than logic, contain cognition of objects and their constitution, but only gives a principle for progress in accordance with laws of experience, whereby the investigation of nature becomes possible. But this does not enrich the knowledge of nature by any particular objective law, but rather only grounds a maxim for the power of judgment, by which to observe nature and to hold its forms together.

'Philosophy, as a doctrinal system of the cognition of nature as well as freedom, does not hereby acquire a new part; for the representation of nature as art is a mere idea, which serves as a principle, merely for the subject, for our investigation of nature, so that we can where possible bring interconnection, as in a system, into the aggregate of empirical laws as such, by attributing to nature a relation to this need of ours. On the contrary, our concept of a technique of nature, as a heuristic principle in the judgment of it, will belong to the critique of our faculty of cognition, which indicates what occasion we have to

\[\text{B} \] Beurtheilung

\[\text{G} \]

\[\text{H} \]

Here Kant crossed out "for us" (uns).

Here Kant crossed out the following paragraph:

Philosophy, as a real system of cognition of nature a priori through concepts, thus does not acquire a new part; for that consideration belongs to its theoretical part. But the critique of the pure faculties of cognition does indeed acquire such a new part, and indeed one that is very necessary, by means of which, first, judgments about nature whose determining ground could easily be counted among the empirical ones are separated from these, and, second, others, which could easily be taken for real and held to be determination of the objects of nature, are distinguished from these and cognized as formal, i.e., rules for mere reflection on things in nature, not for the determination of these in accordance with objective principles.

\[\text{B} \] Beurtheilung

\[\text{G} \]

\[\text{H} \]
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make such a representation of it to ourselves, what origin this idea has, whether it is to be found in an a priori source, and also what the scope and boundary of its use are; in a word, such an inquiry will belong as a part to the system of the critique of pure reason, but not to doctrinal philosophy.

III.

On the system
of all the faculties of the human mind.

We can trace all faculties of the human mind without exception back to these three: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. To be sure, philosophers who otherwise deserve nothing but praise for the thoroughness of their way of thinking have sought to explain this distinction as merely illusory and to reduce all faculties to the mere faculty of cognition. But it can easily be demonstrated, and has already been understood for some time, that this attempt to bring unity into the multiplicity of faculties, although undertaken in a genuinely philosophical spirit, is futile. For there is always a great difference between representations belonging to cognition, insofar as they are related merely to the object and the unity of the consciousness of it, and their objective relation where, considered as at the same time the cause of the reality of this object, they are assigned to the faculty of desire, and, finally, their relation merely to the subject, where they are considered merely as grounds for preserving their own existence in it and to this extent in relation to the feeling of pleasure; the latter is absolutely not a cognition, nor does it provide one, although to be sure it may presuppose such a cognition as a determining ground.

The connection between the cognition of an object and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in its existence, or the determination of the faculty of desire to produce it, is certainly empirically knowable; but since this interconnection is not grounded in any principle a priori, to this extent the powers of the mind constitute only an aggregate and not a system. Now it is surely enough to produce a connection a priori between the feeling of pleasure and the other two faculties if we connect a cognition a priori, namely the rational concept of freedom, with the faculty of desire as its determining ground, at the same time subjectively finding in this objective determination a feeling of pleasure contained in the determination of the will. But in this way the faculty

\footnote{“finally” crossed out by Kant.}
\footnote{Crossed out by Kant: “as in fact found to be identical with the former.”}
of cognition is not combined with the faculty of desire by means of
the pleasure or displeasure, for this does not precede the latter faculty,²
but either first succeeds the determination of it, or else is perhaps
nothing other than the sensation of the determinability of the will
through reason itself, thus not a special feeling and distinctive receptiv-
ity that requires a special section under the properties of the mind.
Now since in the analysis of the faculties of the mind in general a
feeling of pleasure which is independent of the determination of the
faculty of desire, which indeed is rather able to supply a determining
ground for that faculty, is incontrovertibly given, the connection of
which with the other two faculties in a system nevertheless requires
that this feeling of pleasure, like the other two faculties, not rest on
merely empirical grounds but also on a priori principles, there is thus
required for the idea of philosophy as a system (if not a doctrine then
still) a critique of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure insofar as
it is not empirically grounded.

Now the faculty of cognition in accordance with concepts has its a
priori principles in the pure understanding (in its concept of nature),
the faculty of desire, in pure reason (in its concept of freedom), and
there remains among the properties of mind in general an intermediate
faculty or receptivity, namely the feeling of pleasure and displeasure,
just as there remains among the higher faculties of cognition an inter-
mediate one, the power of judgment. What is more natural than to
suspect that the latter will also contain a priori principles for the for-
mer²?

Without yet deciding anything about the possibility of this connec-
tion, a certain suitability of the power of judgment to serve as the
determining ground for the feeling of pleasure, or to find one in it, is
already unmistakable, insofar as, while in the division of faculties of
cognition through concepts understanding and reason relate their
representations to objects, in order to acquire concepts of them, the
power of judgment is related solely to the subject and does not produce
any concepts of objects for itself alone. Likewise, if in the general
division of the powers of the mind overall the faculty of cognition as
well as the faculty of desire contain an objective relation of represen-
tations, so by contrast the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is only
the receptivity of a determination of the subject,⁴ so that if the power
of judgment is to determine anything for itself alone, it could not be

² Crossed out by Kant: “As inner perceptions exhibit in so many cases.”
³ Crossed out: “in inner observation.”
⁴ Question mark added.
⁵ Kant substituted “of the subject” for the phrase “of the state of mind” (Gmuthszu-
dande) in the fair copy, and then added the remainder of the sentence.
anything other than the feeling of pleasure, and, conversely, if the latter is to have an a priori principle at all, it will be found only in the power of judgment.⁵

IV. On experience as a system for the power of judgment.

We have seen in the critique of pure reason that the whole of nature as the totality of all objects of experience constitutes a system in accordance with transcendental laws, namely those that the understanding itself gives a priori (for appearances, namely, insofar as they, combined in one consciousness, are to constitute experience). For that very reason, experience, in accordance with general as well as particular laws, insofar as it is considered objectively to be possible in general, must also constitute (in the idea) a system of possible empirical cognitions. For that is required by the unity of nature, in accordance with a principle of the thoroughgoing connection of everything contained in this totality of all appearances. To this extent experience in general in accordance with transcendental laws of the understanding is to be regarded as a system and not as a mere aggregate.

But it does not follow from this that nature even in accordance with empirical laws is a system that can be grasped by the human faculty of cognition, and that the thoroughgoing systematic interconnection of its appearances in one experience, hence the latter itself as a system, is possible for human beings. For the multiplicity and diversity of empirical laws could be so great that it might be possible for us to connect perceptions to some extent in accordance with particular laws discovered on various occasions into one experience, but never to bring these empirical laws themselves to the unity of kinship under a common principle, if, namely, as is quite possible in itself (at least as far as the understanding can make out a priori), the multiplicity and diversity of these laws, along with the natural forms corresponding to them, being infinitely great, were to present to us a raw chaotic aggregate and not the least trace of a system, even though we must presuppose such a system in accordance with transcendental laws.

For unity of nature in time and space and unity of the experience possible for us are identical, since the former is a totality of mere appearances (kinds of representations), which can have its objective

⁵ Presumably this means the book, the Critique of Pure Reason, but the words are not underlined in the fair copy.
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reality only in experience, which, as itself a system in accordance with empirical laws, must be possible if one is to think of the former as a system (as must indeed be done). Thus it is a subjectively\* necessary transcendental presupposition that such a disturbingly unbounded diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of natural forms does not pertain to nature, rather that nature itself, through the affinity of particular laws under more general ones, qualifies for an experience, as an empirical system.

Now this presupposition is the transcendental principle of the power of judgment. For this is not merely a faculty for subsuming the particular under the general (whose concept is given), but is also, conversely, one for finding the general for the particular. The understanding, however, abstracts in its transcendental legislation for nature from all multiplicity of possible empirical laws; in that legislation, it takes into consideration only the conditions of the possibility of an experience in general as far as its form is concerned. In it, therefore, that principle of the affinity of particular laws of nature is not to be found. Yet the power of judgment, which is obliged to bring particular laws, even with regard to what differentiates them under the same general laws of nature, under higher, though still empirical laws, must ground its procedure on such a principle. For by groping about among forms of nature whose agreement with each other under common empirical but higher laws appeared entirely contingent to the power of judgment, it would be even more contingent if particular perceptions were luckily to be qualified for an empirical law; it would be all the more contingent if multiple empirical laws were to fit into a systematic unity of the cognition of nature in a possible experience in their entire interconnection without presupposing such a form in nature through an a prior\(i\) principle.

All of the stock formulae: nature takes the shortest route – she does nothing in vain – she makes no leaps in the manifold of forms (continuum formarum) – she is rich in species but sparing with genera, etc.\* – are nothing other than this very same transcendental expression of the power of judgment in establishing a principle for experience as a system and hence for its own needs. Neither understanding nor reason can ground such a law of nature a prior\(i\). For while it may readily be understood that nature should be directed by our understanding in its merely formal laws (by means of which it is an object of experience in general), with regard to particular laws, in their multiplicity and diversity, it is free from all the restrictions of our law-giving faculty of cognition, and it is a mere presupposition of the power of

\* The word “subjectively” was added to the fair copy.
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judgment, in behalf of its own use, always to ascend from empirical, particular laws to more general, but at the same time still empirical ones, for the sake of the unification of empirical laws, which grounds that principle. And one can by no means charge such a principle to the account of experience, because only under the presupposition of it is it possible to organize experiences in a systematic way.

V.

On the reflecting power of judgment.

The power of judgment can be regarded either as a mere faculty for reflecting on a given representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made possible, or as a faculty for determining an underlying concept through a given empirical representation. In the first case it is the reflecting, in the second case the determining power of judgment. To reflect (to consider), however, is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one's faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible. The reflecting power of judgment is that which is also called the faculty of judging (facultas diiudicandi).

Reflecting (which goes on even in animals, although only instinctively, namely not in relation to a concept which is thereby to be attained but rather in relation to some inclination which is thereby to be determined) in our case requires a principle just as much as does determining, in which the underlying concept of the object prescribes the rule to the power of judgment and thus plays the role of the principle.

The principle of reflection on given objects of nature is that for all things in nature empirically determinate concepts can be found,* On first glance, this principle does not look at all like a synthetic and transcendental proposition, but seems rather to be tautological and to belong to mere logic. For the latter teaches how one can compare a given representation with others, and, by extracting what it has in common with others, as a characteristic for general use, form a concept. But about whether for each object nature has many others to put forth as objects of comparison, which have much in common with the first in their form, it teaches us nothing; rather, this condition of the possibility of the application of logic to nature is a principle of the representation of nature as a system for our power of judgment, in which the manifold, divided into genera and species, makes it

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* The next two clauses were added to the fair copy.
* Reflectire (überlegen)
* Beurtheilungsvermögen
which is to say the same as that in all of its products one can always presuppose a form that is possible for general laws cognizable by us. For if we could not presuppose this and did not ground our treatment of empirical representations on this principle, then all reflection would become arbitrary and blind, and hence would be undertaken without any well-grounded expectation of its agreement with nature.

With regard to the general concepts of nature, under which a concept of experience (without specific empirical determination) is first possible at all, reflection already has its directions in the concept of a nature in general, i.e., in the understanding, and the power of judgment requires no special principle of reflection, but rather schematizes this a priori and applies these schemata to every empirical synthesis, without which no judgment of experience could be possible at all. The power of judgment in its reflection is here also determining and its transcendental schematism serves it at the same time as a rule under which given empirical intuitions are subsumed.

But for those concepts which must first of all be found for given empirical intuitions, and which presuppose a particular law of nature, in accordance with which alone particular experience is possible, the power of judgment requires a special and at the same time transcendental principle for its reflection, and one cannot refer it in turn to already known empirical concepts and transform reflection into a mere comparison with empirical forms for which one already has concepts.

do bring all the natural forms that are forthcoming to concepts (of greater or lesser generality) through comparison. Now of course pure understanding already teaches (but also through synthetic principles) how to think of all things in nature as contained in a transcendental system in accordance with a priori concepts (the categories); only the (reflecting) power of judgment, which also seeks concepts for empirical representations, as such, must further assume for this purpose that nature in its boundless multiplicity has hit upon a division of itself into genera and species that makes it possible for our power of judgment to find consensus in the comparison of natural forms and to arrive at empirical concepts, and their interconnection with each other, through ascent to more general but still empirical concepts; i.e., the power of judgment presupposes a system of nature which is also in accordance with empirical laws and does so a priori, consequently by means of a transcendental principle.

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4 This phrase replaces “perception of an object” in the fair copy.
5 Kant replaces “representations” in the fair copy with “intuitions.”
6 Und in the fair copy crossed out by Kant.
7 Kant replaces empirische Vordellungen ("empirical representations") in the fair copy with alle vorkommende Naturformen.
First Introduction

“For it is open to question how one could hope to arrive at empirical concepts of that which is common to the different natural forms through the comparison of perceptions, if, on account of the great diversity of its empirical laws, nature (as it is quite possible to think) has imposed on these natural forms such a great diversity that all or at least most comparison would be useless for producing consensus and a hierarchical order of species and genera under it. All comparison of empirical representations in order to cognize empirical laws in natural things and specific forms matching these, which however through their comparison with others are also generically corresponding forms, presuppose that even with regard to its empirical laws nature has observed a certain economy suitable to our power of judgment and a uniformity that we can grasp, and this presupposition, as an a priori principle of the power of judgment, must precede all comparison.

The reflecting power of judgment thus proceeds with given appearances, in order to bring them under empirical concepts of determinate natural things, not schematically, but technically, not as it were merely mechanically, like an instrument, but artistically, in accordance with the general but at the same time indeterminate principle of a purposive arrangement of nature in a system, as it were for the benefit of our power of judgment, in the suitability of its particular laws (about which understanding has nothing to say) for the possibility of experience as a system, without which presupposition we could not hope to find our way in a labyrinth of the multiplicity of possible empirical particular laws. Thus the power of judgment itself makes the technique of nature into the principle of its reflection a priori, without however being able to explain this or determine it more precisely or having for this end an objective determining ground for the general concepts of nature (from a cognition of things in themselves), but only in order to be able to reflect in accordance with its own subjective law, in accordance with its need, but at the same time in accord with laws of nature in general.

The principle of the reflecting power of judgment, through which nature is thought of as a system in accordance with empirical laws, is however merely a principle for the logical use of the power of

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*a* The remainder of this paragraph is Kant’s replacement for the following in the fair copy: “For it is also rightly open to question about these [empirical forms] how and through what reflection we have arrived at them as lawful natural forms. Laws cannot be perceived, but rather presuppose principles in accordance with which perceptions must be able to be compared, which, if under them alone experience is possible, are transcendental principles.”

*b* Kant added the phrase an sich selbst to the fair copy.

*c* Kant added the phrase nach ihrem Bedürfnis to the fair copy.
 judgment, a transcendental principle, to be sure, in terms of its origin, but only for the sake of regarding nature \textit{a priori} as qualified for a \textbf{logical system} of its multiplicity under empirical laws.\footnote{Kant added the phrase \textit{seinen Ursprung nach} to the fair copy.}

The logical form of a system consists merely in the division of given general concepts (of the sort which that of a nature in general is here), by means of which one thinks the particular (here the empirical) with its variety as contained under the general, in accordance with a certain principle. To this there belongs, if one proceeds empirically and ascends from the particular to the general, a \textbf{classification} of the manifold, i.e., a comparison with each other of several classes, each of which stands under a determinate concept, and, if they are complete with regard to the common characteristic, their subsumption\footnote{Kant added the words \textit{ihrer Subsumtion} to the fair copy.} under higher classes (genera), until one reaches the concept that contains the principle of the entire classification (and which constitutes the highest genus). If, on the contrary, one begins with the general concept, in order to descend to the particular through a complete division, then the action is called the \textbf{specification} of the manifold under a given concept, since the progression is from the highest genus to lower (subgenera or species) and from species to subspecies. This would be expressed more correctly if, instead of saying (as in common usage) that one must specify the particular which stands under a general concept, it were instead said that one \textbf{specifies the general concept} by adducing the manifold under it. For the genus is (considered logically) as it were the matter, or the raw substratum, which nature works up into particular species and subspecies through various determinations, and thus it can be said, in analogy with the use of this word by jurists, when they speak of the specification of certain raw materials, that \textbf{nature specifies itself} in accordance with a certain principle (or the idea of a system).\footnote{Kant added this footnote to the fair copy.}

Now it is clear that the reflecting power of judgment, given its
nature, could not undertake to classify the whole of nature according to its empirical differences if it did not presuppose that nature itself specifies its transcendental laws in accordance with some sort of principle. Now this principle can be none other than that of the suitability for the capacity of the power of judgment itself for finding in the immeasurable multiplicity of things in accordance with possible empirical laws sufficient kinship among them to enable them to be brought under empirical concepts (classes) and these in turn under more general laws (higher genera) and thus for an empirical system of nature to be reached. – Now since such a classification is not a common experiential cognition, but an artistic one, nature, to the extent that it is thought of as specifying itself in accordance with such a principle, is also regarded as art, and the power of judgment thus necessarily carries with it a priori a principle of the technique of nature, which is distinct from the nomothetic of nature in accordance with transcendental laws of understanding in that the latter can make its principle valid as a law but the former only as a necessary presupposition.

The special principle of the power of judgment is thus: Nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance with the form of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment.

Now here arises the concept of a purposiveness of nature, indeed as a special concept of the reflecting power of judgment, not of reason; for the end is not posited in the object at all, but strictly in the subject and indeed in its mere capacity for reflecting. – For we call purposive that the existence of which seems to presuppose a representation of that same thing; natural laws, however, which are so constituted and related to each other as if they had been designed by the power of judgment for its own need, have a similarity with the possibility of things that presuppose a representation of themselves as their ground. Thus through its principle the power of judgment thinks of a purposiveness of nature in the specification of its forms through empirical laws.

However, these forms themselves are not thereby thought of as purposive, but only their relation to one another and their fitness, even in their great multiplicity, for a logical system of empirical concepts. – Now if nature showed us nothing more than this logical purposiveness, we would indeed already have cause to admire it for this, since we cannot suggest any ground for this in accordance with the general laws of the understanding; only hardly anyone other than a transcendental

\(^*\) Vermögen

\(^*\) Kant crossed out durch die (through the) and replaced it with zu (into).

\(^*\) Vermögen
philosopher would be capable of this admiration, and even he would not be able to name any determinate case where this purposiveness proved itself in concreto, but would have to think of it only in general.

VI.
On the purposiveness of the forms of nature as so many particular systems.

That nature in its empirical laws should specify itself as is requisite for a possible experience, as a system of empirical cognition – this form of nature contains a logical purposiveness, namely of its conformity to the subjective conditions of the power of judgment with regard to the possible interconnection of empirical concepts in the whole of an experience. Now this, however, yields no inference to its usefulness for a real purposiveness in its products, i.e., for producing individual things in the form of systems: for the latter could always, as far as intuition is concerned, be mere aggregates and nevertheless be possible in accordance with empirical laws interconnected with others in a system of logical division, without a concept specially instituted as the condition for their particular possibility having to be assumed, hence without a purposiveness of nature as its ground. In this way we see soils, stones, minerals, etc., without any purposive form, as mere aggregates, but nevertheless as so related in the inner character and grounds for the cognition of their possibility that they are suitable for the classification of things in a system of nature under empirical laws yet do not display the form of a system in themselves.

Hence I understand by an absolute purposiveness of natural forms such an external shape as well as inner structure that are so constituted that their possibility must be grounded in an idea of them in our power of judgment. For purposiveness is a lawfulness of the contingent as such. With regard to its products as aggregates, nature proceeds mechanically, as mere nature; but with regard to its products as systems, e.g., crystal formations, various shapes of flowers, or the inner structure of plants and animals, it proceeds technically, i.e., as at the same time an art. The distinction between these two ways of judging

* The words from the last semicolon to here replace the single word “we” (wir) in the original fair copy.

** In the fair copy, this sentence originally read: “For purposiveness is a lawfulness which is at the same time contingent with respect to general laws of nature that are necessary for experience.”

\[ \text{baurtheilen} \]
natural beings is made merely by the **reflecting** power of judgment, which perfectly well can and perhaps even must allow to happen what the **determining** power of judgment (under principles of reason) would not concede with regard to the possibility of the objects themselves, and which would perhaps even like to know everything to be traced back to a mechanical sort of explanation; for it is entirely consistent that the **explanation** of an appearance, which is an affair of reason in accordance with objective principles of reason, be **mechanical**, while the rule for the **judging** of the same object, in accordance with subjective principles of reflection on it, should be **technical**.

Now although the principle of the power of judgment concerning the purposiveness of nature in the specifications of its general laws by no means extends so far as to imply the generation of **natural forms that are purposive in themselves** (because even without them the system of nature in accordance with empirical laws, which is all that the power of judgment has a basis for postulating, is possible), and this must therefore be given solely through experience, nevertheless, because we already have a ground for ascribing to nature in its particular laws a principle of purposiveness, it is always **possible** and permissible, if experience shows us purposive forms in its products, for us to ascribe this to the same ground as that on which the first may rest.

Although even\(^1\) this ground itself may lie in the supersensible and beyond the sphere of the insights into nature that are possible for us, we have still already won something by having ready in the power of judgment a transcendental principle of the purposiveness of nature for the purposiveness of the natural forms that may be found in experience, which, even though it is not sufficient to explain the possibility of such forms, nevertheless makes it permissible for us to apply such a special concept as that of purposiveness to nature and its lawfulness, although it cannot of course be an objective concept of nature, but is rather derived merely from the subjective relation of nature to a faculty of the mind.

### VII.

**On the technique of the power of judgment**
as the ground of the idea of a technique of nature.

As was shown above, the power of judgment first makes it possible, indeed necessary, to conceive in nature, over and above its mechanical necessity, a purposiveness without the presupposition of which system-

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\(^1\) *Bearbeitung*

\(^2\) *Kant added such to the fair copy.*
atic unity in the thoroughgoing classification of particular forms in accordance with empirical laws would not be possible. It has just been shown that since this principle of purposiveness is only a subjective principle of the division and specification of nature, it does not determine anything with regard to the forms of the products of nature. In this way, this purposiveness would merely remain in concepts and supply a maxim of the unity of nature in its empirical laws for the logical use of the power of judgment in experience, in behalf of the use of reason about its objects, but by this particular kind of systematic unity, namely that in accordance with the representation of a purpose, no objects in nature, as products corresponding to it in their form, would be given. – Now I would call the causality of nature with regard to the form of its products as ends the technique of nature. It is opposed to the mechanics of nature, which consists in its causality through the combination of the manifold without a concept lying at the ground of its manner of unification, roughly as we would call certain tools, e.g., a lever or an inclined plane, which have their effect in an end without a concept having to be their ground, machines but not works of art; for they can certainly be used for ends, but are not possible solely in relation to them.

Now the first question here is: How can the technique of nature in its products be perceived? The concept of purposiveness is not a constitutive concept of experience at all, not a determination of an appearance belonging to an empirical concept of the object; for it is not a category. In our power of judgment we perceive purposiveness insofar as it merely reflects upon a given object, whether in order to bring the empirical intuition of that object under some concept (it is indeterminate which), or in order to bring the laws which the concept of experience itself contains under common principles. Thus the power of judgment is properly technical; nature is represented technically only insofar as it conforms to that procedure of the power of judgment and makes it necessary. We will shortly indicate the way in which the concept of the reflecting power of judgment, which makes possible the inner perception of a purposiveness of representations,

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{a} Kant crossed out \textit{Verknüpfung} (connection) and replaced it with “classification.”}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{b} Kant substituted \textit{Formen nach empirischen Gesetzen} for \textit{Erfahrung und ihren Gesetzen} (experience and its laws).}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{c} Kant added “systematic” to the fair copy.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{d} Kant added the remainder of this sentence to the fair copy.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{e} Kant added the last clause to the fair copy.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{f} Written in the margin next to this sentence, in a hand that does not appear to be either Kant’s or Kiesewetter’s: “We put, it is said, final causes into things, and do not as it were draw them out of their perception.”}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{g} Kant substituted \textit{möglich macht} for “permits” (verstattet) in the fair copy.}\]