ECUMENISM, CHRISTIAN ORIGINS AND THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNION

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The theme of this book is the life of God. It is about the shared life that God engenders and the God whose very being is a sharing. Christians are used to speaking of the life that God engenders within the Church as ‘communion’, of the Christian life as a participation in the life of God, and of the life that is God as love. There is one Greek word that can be used for all three: koinonia, of which the Latin translation is communio. This book is an exploration of koinonia/communio as the terms have been used in current ecumenical discussion and in the formation of the Christian tradition. There has in recent years been a ground-swell of interest in ‘community’ and in society as a ‘community of communities’. An exploration of what it means for the Church to be that unique human community which is explicitly constituted by its communion in God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is potentially a resource for the renewal of secular social thought, and the insights of secular social thought of the greatest value in renewing our understanding of the common life of the Christian Church.

In much ecumenical literature, the Latinate communion or communio is used interchangeably with the Greek koinonia. These two words do, however, have differing resonances because of their differing provenance: the very different history and understanding of the churches and societies in East and West. One of the central points at issue in this book will be the losses and gains in translating Christianity, which first took institutional form in the Greek-speaking Hellenistic world, into

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1 See, for example, Communio/Koinonia, A Study by the Institute for Ecumenical Research (Strasburg, 1990).
the institutional forms and language of the Latin-speaking West. It will be important to explore in depth the conceptuality associated with the Greek term *koinonia*, a term which is prominent in both Plato and Aristotle. It will also be necessary to explore Jewish conceptuality that fed into the use of *koinonia* and associated terms in the New Testament. The thread of the specific use of the word *koinonia* leads on to Ignatius of Antioch, Justin Martyr, and particularly to the Cappadocians. The thread of *communio* leads by various routes to Augustine and to Jerome’s translation of the Bible into Latin, the Vulgate. In the chapters that follow it will be possible only to take soundings, to suggest a range of uses and some of the questions they raise for contemporary theology and ecumenical discussion. The wider aim, though, will be to demonstrate *communion* as the central reality of the Christian life, indeed of all life.

This approach raises a serious methodological issue, of which I have been acutely aware in writing this book. The first research was a word-study, using articles in Kittel’s *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, the *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, and other standard sources. The exposition that follows is marked by this approach, which has its uses and its dangers. One major use is the careful tracing of linguistic links that have been lost in translation. It is simply not possible from any of the standard English translations of the Bible to discern where words of the root ‘*koin-***’ are used and so to pick up some of the allusive links offered to the Greek reader of the New Testament. Nor is it possible to pick up, behind identically translated words or words with associated English roots, differences in the original Greek vocabulary, which may have suggested shades of meaning that have been lost in translation.

The dangers of word-studies are as great as the benefits. We
may think that because we have studied a word or group of
cognate words, we have understood a concept, when we ought
to take into consideration the broader linguistic context, the
phrases or sentences in which words are used; the semantic
field, the broader conceptuality, to which words contribute; and
the actual social context in which they are used.\(^3\) For this study,
it was necessary to decide how the focus could extend to
‘communion’ as a semantic field and a theological reality. The
intention is to use linguistic study as a way into the latter. Hans-
Georg Gadamer, to whose thought I am greatly indebted, once
remarked, ‘The history of concepts seems to me a precondition
for responsible critical philosophising in our time, and it is only
along the route of the history of words that the history of
concepts can move forward.’\(^4\) This book is intended to be an
exercise in ‘critical theologising’ along the lines sketched by
Gadamer.

The need for such a study is generated by the widespread use
of *koinonia* and *communion* in recent ecumenical discussion, often
without sufficient regard for the history of these concepts and
these words in the communities from which, over a thousand
years, Christianity was formed. It is striking how often these
words are used in their Greek or Latin form: there is no English
word that translates them adequately. In a whole range of
ecumenical documents it is the theology and the ecclesiology of
‘*koinonia/communio*’ which is offered as a way forward. This book
is written in the conviction that there is indeed a way forward in
this ecclesiology and that we can tread it confidently. It is a way,
as far as this study is concerned, that has led by a narrow and
specific linguistic path through broader semantic fields, which
reflect experience of community as a fundamental Christian,
Jewish, and human reality. Though we may deal with a word,
and with words, these words are the precipitate of life in

\(^3\) These points are trenchantly made by James Barr in his critique of Kittel’s *TWNT.*
pp. 210, 231–4, 281.

\(^4\) H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT
community and a stimulus to the deepening of communion within and between contemporary Christian communities.

Since 1965, when the Second Vatican Council concluded, there has been a striking ecumenical convergence around certain basic notions of what it is to be ‘Church’. More than that, there is widespread agreement that this understanding of what it is to be ‘Church’ is at the heart of the Christian faith. This consensus has been expressed through some of the key documents of the Second Vatican Council, through official statements and reports of various Christian traditions, through the reports of bi-lateral ecumenical discussions, and through the multi-lateral statements of the World Council of Churches. At the centre of all these documents is an understanding of the Church as communion, of this communion as a sharing or participation in the life of the Trinity, and of the vital contribution this understanding can make to the ecumenical goal of ‘visible unity in one faith and in one eucharistic fellowship expressed in worship and in the common life of Christ’. With this emerging consensus has gone a consensus about method: that we must build on the communion Christians already experience by virtue of shared participation in Christ, a shared participation that can be made explicit by ‘going behind disagreements’ or finding from the tradition reconciling language in which both parties can recognise their own faith.

Central to this understanding and this method is the theory and practice of communion – or, to use the Greek term, koinonia.

It will be clear from what follows that I warmly support the ecumenical rapprochements that have taken place in recent years and wish to promote genuine consensus amongst Christians who are working for visible unity. I am thus concerned to prevent the term koinonia being used in a slovenly and over-general fashion to paper over ecumenical cracks, and wish to sound a note of warning against this or similar terms being used

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ideologically to promote (and conceal) the very opposite of true communion. *Koinonia* is a term which, used with care, can be of immense power and suggestiveness, an invaluable ecumenical resource. Words, however, relate to human living and the use of a word like *koinonia* must be tested against the realities of human life. Though my approach will be in part through a discussion of language, tracing continuities in translation and usage, my concern remains equally and fundamentally the concrete life of communities from the past which have struggled with the problems of unity and diversity, and communities which do so today. Throughout this book I shall, I hope, be developing grounds for a critique of the way in which the language and ideology of *koinonia* is properly used to sustain the unity and to promote the reconciliation of the Christian churches.

Ecumenical theological discussion does not usually make much of the extensive use of the term *koinonia* in pre-Christian Greek literature, especially that of Plato and Aristotle, which was so influential for the early formation of Christian theology and for its development in the Middle Ages and at the Reformation. Nor does this literature usually reflect upon the actual life of communities, whether Hellenistic, Jewish, avowedly Christian, or a mixture of all three. Though much discussion of communion relates this explicitly to Trinitarian theology, it does not do so by reference to early Christian experience of *koinonia* (both the powerful experience of the Spirit and the intense struggles for unity and fidelity to tradition). Closer reflection upon actual Christian experience within actual Christian communities is vitally important if ecumenical theology is

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not to remain at a level of high abstraction remote from the concerns of believing Christians in their local churches.

Attention to such issues has led me to identify five themes, each of which is implicit in all that follows. The first is translation. Christianity is from beginning to end an exercise in translation as the Word of God is heard afresh in new ways and in new situations. In following the progress of the Gospel towards the English-speaking world, we must trace a linguistic trajectory from Hebrew and Greek to Latin to various forms of English. These linguistic shifts have been necessary to present the unchanging Word of God faithfully, in such a way that people can hear it as addressed directly to them, and to sustain Church life as a living expression of contemporary faith, not a museum piece. However, just as there are norms of fidelity in linguistic translation, so there are norms of fidelity in the development of the life of the Church. The linguistic norm is the text of Scripture itself, where (in the New Testament) the word koinonia and its cognates are to be found extensively. What one might call the ‘living norm’ is the actual life, the actual koinonia, of the apostolic communities of which the words of Scripture are the precipitate that is left to us. It is clear from the linguistic norm of Scripture that continuities can be traced from the life of the synagogue, from the household and the polis within the Hellenistic world, to this ‘living norm’ of Christian community. As for those early Christian writers known as ‘The Fathers’, they ‘made their own the categories in which the Greeks habitually interpreted their own experience’. They did so because the life of the local church, the life of the Christian household, was itself both a translation and a transformation of whatever went before. The community was newly formed about Christ, but the experience of koinonia was not new: to the Hellenistic and the Christian mind it was a condition of being human. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle and their followers, and in Jewish

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9 Barr (The Semantics of Biblical Language, p. 4) rightly talks of the problem ‘not only of translation but of transculturation’.
10 The Niagara Report, para. 46, speaks of the way that ‘Churches increasingly found that political or quasi-political terminology expressed their sense of their own identity.’
sources, both those which were translated into Greek and those which were not, there is a rich tradition of reflection on the experience of koinonia and on the social conditions under which humans flourish. As we consider these traditions, we shall discover they have important lessons to teach us about the functioning of human communities, including churches. It is, after all, from such sources as these that we have drawn again and again in theological reflection, and we need to investigate them afresh as resources for critical reflection on the ecumenical effort to translate the Gospel and the life of the Church for the cultures of our time.\(^\text{12}\)

The second theme is politics. I have tried to bear in mind throughout that the texts with which we have to deal are the precipitate of life in historical communities. Certainly, the texts, both scriptural and non-scriptural, are formed by and bear witness to the life of communities in many different ways, but it is important to remember that they are not theoretical treatises composed in abstraction from the abrasions and the conflicts of everyday life. Wherever there are communities of human beings, power is deployed and conflict is either contained or it tears the community apart. Issues of leadership, representation, communication, education, division of resources, justice, fidelity are integral to the life of every human community. In negotiating these issues, whether in a local church or a local community, in an ecumenical encounter or as citizens of a modern state, we engage in politics. Politics and koinonia are interwoven. One outstanding teacher of the importance of recognising the proper role of politics in every human community has been Bernard Crick, who writes with characteristic economy:

\(^{12}\) My position would differ sharply from that of Alan J. Torrance, who writes in Persons in Communion (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1996), pp. 254–5: ‘There is absolutely no conceptual or ontological connection between the Greek interpretation of participation conceived as methexis and the New Testament interpretation as koinonia.’ This claim, which he reiterates frequently, drives a wedge between the language and conceptuality of the New Testament and the Hellenistic culture to and from which it spoke. For cognates of methexis and koinonia used within the NT as synonyms, see Luke 5:7–10, 1 Cor. 10:16–17. Reumann finds in his survey of biblical texts (‘Koinonia in Scripture’ p. 43) that metechein emphasises ‘have a share in’, but concludes that ‘it is difficult to establish a clear distinction from koinonia’.
A political doctrine is . . . just an attempt to strike a particular harmony in an actual political situation, one harmony out of many possible different (temporary) resolutions of the basic problem of unity and diversity in a society with complex and entrenched rival social interests.\textsuperscript{13}

The point must be spelt out with care if it is to be applied ecclesiologically, for the issue of temporary or permanent resolution of disputes and the constraints upon diversity if unity is to be maintained must appear in a distinctive light within the Christian Church, but the ‘attempt to strike a particular harmony’ and the ‘basic problem of unity and diversity in a society with complex and entrenched rival social interests’ goes to the heart both of Church life within particular traditions and of the ecumenical enterprise.

The third theme is a development of the second: it is that of conflict. Implicit in the notion of politics is the recognition that conflict is integral to life in community. It is not the presence of conflict that is unhealthy for communal life, but the premature suppression of conflict in the interests of an inauthentic unity. Serious, impassioned conflict, where the protagonists are committed to apparently irreconcilable positions, is characteristic of humans living in community. The Church is not immune from this fundamental datum of human sociality. On the contrary, where Christians have a proper depth of conviction, it is inevitable that those convictions will clash. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was right to put this point starkly: ‘Conflict as such is not the consequence of the fall, but arises on the basis of common love for God.’\textsuperscript{14} The issue for Christians within the Church is not whether such conflict is present but how it is handled within the Body of Christ. Where Christians remain in communion, there is potentially a security to face disagreement and a resource to sustain debate in a climate of trust until there is some resolution which is


satisfactory to all. Where trust and communion have broken down, but there is the desire for reconciliation, there can only be a more cautious handling of contentious issues. Serious conflict is a much more dangerous threat to the unity of those who are not bound in communion. This is why a change in perception whereby communion is seen as taking many forms within the life of the Church, and the recognition of other Christians as truly bound in that communion, has revolutionised the basis for ecumenical discussion. Recognition of a fundamental unity in Christ, though that unity is not yet made explicit in eucharistic communion, has made it possible to handle old conflicts in a new light – even to see the protagonists of contrary views, and those views themselves, as contained within the diversity that goes to make up the variegated unity of the Church.

A fourth theme is dialogue. This will be addressed explicitly in the chapter on Plato, but it is implicit in both the discussion of ecumenism and the use that I have made of my sources. Plato above all teaches us that to read is to enter into dialogue with the text, that reading is a participatory activity. It is an emphasis reinforced by hermeneutic practitioners of the stature of H.-G. Gadamer and George

15 For a powerful description of such decision-making among the Thembu people of South Africa, see N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus, 1995), pp. 24–5: ‘The meetings would continue until some kind of consensus was reached. They ended in unanimity or not at all.’

Steiner. I would go beyond Gadamer (on theological grounds) to say that the construing of a text brings about a dialogue between the reader and the writer, in which there is a kind of meeting, a communion. The text of this book for me represents a kind of communion with Plato and Aristotle, the biblical writers, the Cappadocians and Augustine, though their words and thought as interpreted here may be as historically in-authentic as, in all probability, are the words of the participants at Plato’s banquet. The dialogues we sustain with and through classic texts take their place among the many conversations that we sustain with other people and other sources. To exist in such a network of communication is in one mode to exist in communion, or in community. This dialogue, or these dialogues, with classic texts, principally but not exclusively the Scriptures, is one means by which the life of the Church continues as a life in dialogue. To identify my methodological indebtedness a little further: the discussion at Plato’s banquet moves from individual statement towards an exposition of the way of love in communion with God and so, I hope, does this book.

A fifth theme is symbols. This is particularly important in a study of koinonia because of the tendency to think that communion or communication takes place at a level above or behind the physical (at the ‘spiritual’ level). Koinonia as ‘mutual sharing’ or as ‘fellowship’ is often spoken of in this way. The position taken here is that there can be no koinonia without shared participation in symbols and that such participation is a corrective to any ‘spiritualising’ which overlooks or excludes the place of the physical in communion. For Plato, objects in the world are thus bound to one another in a new community (Gemeinsamkeit). To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion (Gemeinsam) in which we do not remain what we were (p. 379; WM, p. 384). See also ‘Conversation and the Way we come to Shared Understanding’ in Plato’s Dialectical Ethics (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 17–65.


18 I have dealt with this briefly in Liturgy and Symbolism (Bramcote: Grove Books, 1978).
carry a ‘surplus of meaning’ which is attributable to their participation in a higher world of fuller reality. They are symbolic. Beginning with the critique of Aristotle, the ‘higher world’ may for many people have evaporated, or may now be differently understood, but the symbolic intensity of objects, their ‘surplus of meaning’ within an ecology of koinonia, remains.

To be human is to inhabit a world of symbols in which language is only one (secondary) mode of symbolic communication. More, perhaps, than the giving and receiving of a word, more than ‘something understood’, the physical giving – and receiving – of a gift is a paradigm of koinonia.19 How is it that we know in particular circumstances what is the appropriate gift – one that can be received? Such knowledge is often made explicit in religious or social codes. The giving, and receiving by God or the gods, of appropriate sacrificial offerings is at the heart of what we would think of as ‘religion’ (that is the ‘cult’) within the Graeco-Roman world, and within the world of the Hebrew Scriptures.20 Sacrifice as that which effects koinonia with the deity, the benefit of which may be appeasement, or reconciliation, empowerment, or blessing, is widely recognised throughout the ancient and modern world. Within Judaism, the symbolism of sacrifice was articulated by an elaborate code, in which the various dimensions of koinonia effected by the sacrifice, whether between the sacrificer and God, or between the sacrificer and others who participated in the sacrifice, were spelt out. In tension with this, however, was the prophetic appeal to the covenantal koinonia, sealed in the past with


20 Of many studies, one anthropologically informed recent treatment (with good bibliography) is L. B. Zaidman and P. S. Pantel, Religion in the Ancient Greek City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 28–39: ‘Bloody animal sacrifice of alimentary type . . . simultaneously gave expression to the bonds that tied citizens one to another and served as a privileged means of communication with the divine world’ (p. 29). Anthropological and biblical material is brought together in M. F. C. Bourdillon and Meyer Fortes eds., Sacrifice (London: Academic Press, 1980). The discussion in S. W. Sykes ed., Sacrifice and Redemption (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) has a more theological focus.
sacrifice but thereafter operative in the ethical demands made upon a people in relationship with their God.

This tension within Judaism is reproduced within Christianity. There is in Christian tradition a move towards concretion, towards the development of a rich, sacramental economy of water and bread and wine, of the bishop, the liturgy, the community gathered in one place (epi to auto). There is also within the tradition a deep prophetic alarm at any suggestion of religious mechanisms which detract from or short-circuit the ethical, the intellectual, the life of the Spirit. The development by which the Christian community is called (as by Pachomius) the Koinonia, or the eucharist becomes known as the communion, represents a major shift towards the concrete, with significant implications for ecumenism today. For those who accept that such a development was not misplaced, and that sharing in the one eucharist with the one bishop in some sense ‘makes the Church’, so that it is right to speak of a visible Christian community as a ‘Sharing’ (as in ‘The Anglican Communion’) it is clearly inadequate to engage in an ecumenism of ‘reconciled diversity’. Since the one koinonia of the Spirit is broken into ecclesial fragments that do not fully recognise one another, what is required for the reconciliation of the Church in its wholeness is a convergence or reconvergence of communities, in all their diversity and particularity, on the eucharist as the central symbolic act of the Church (which does not at all exclude a correlative convergence in the interpretation of Scripture). In the ecumenical movement today, we continue to seek ways of realigning our ecclesiastical and liturgical symbols by means of translation, politics, conflict, and dialogue. In one sense, the enterprise takes place within the shared life of the Church, in koinonia. In another, the goal remains ‘visible koinonia’: shared participation in the visible symbol of the eucharist. If Mary Douglas is right in saying that ‘the perception of symbols in general, as well as their interpretation, is socially determined’, the

22 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 27–8, my emphasis.
way forward can only be by means of convergent and inclusive social praxis. Not to ask what praxis will draw together the communities in which the traditions that sustain those variant interpretations are carried, is to misunderstand the complex and concrete functioning of symbolism.

Each of these five themes—translation, politics, conflict, dialogue, and symbols—is related to human life in actual, human communities, and therefore to the practice of koinonia. Though much of the discussion in this book will be about language, there will be hints that my concern is equally to reflect upon the actuality of koinonia as lived, human experience in living, human communities. So strong has been the renewal of interest in community in recent years that the theme has at times been all but done to death. Nevertheless, the search for authentic expressions of community continues. Alasdair MacIntyre’s conclusion to After Virtue has been particularly influential:

What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.23

MacIntyre acknowledges his debt to Christianity: ‘We are waiting not for a Godot, but for another—doubtless very different—St Benedict.’ His conclusion is echoed by other recent writers of moral or social philosophy. Richard Bernstein concludes his study of Arendt, Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty by saying:

What we desperately need today is...to seize upon those experiences and struggles in which there are still the glimmerings of solidarity and the promise of dialogical communities in which there can be genuine mutual participation and where reciprocal wooing and persuasion can prevail.24

Bernstein concludes his study with an impassioned plea for

23 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (second edition, London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 263. For MacIntyre, tradition plays a vital role in the life of healthy communities (a point of convergence with Gadamer), as does conflict (a point of convergence with a significant theme in this book). As he puts it, ‘Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict’ (p. 222).

dedication to ‘the practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition that is founded in dialogical communities’.  

‘Dialogical communities’ of various sorts – the Athens of Plato and Aristotle, the synagogue in Hellenistic Judaism, the Essene community, the earliest Christian churches and monastic communities, the churches of today engaged in ecumenical discussion – are presupposed throughout the chapters that are to follow. I have already hinted at the pervasive influence of Hans-Georg Gadamer, with his exploration of the dialogical reading of texts leading to a ‘fusion of horizons’. Gadamer’s hermeneutical account of the emergence of meaning and the communication of truth within a tradition presupposes the existence of communities in which the responsible interpretation of texts and the appropriation of tradition takes place. His focus, however, is on the text, on truth known in literary and artistic interpretation. He has, accordingly, been criticised for lack of critical reflection on the composition of the communities in which he finds truth-ful interpretation. Gadamer, it is argued, offers no account of the realities of conflict, power, the ideological use of tradition, the politics of interpretation, and fails to address the issue of the universal validity of truth disclosed in the interpretation of particular texts within particular communities. Despite his regard for Gadamer’s ‘magnificent actualisation of the humanist tradition, which is oriented to the formation of the free spirit’, Jürgen Habermas finds a weakness at this point.

Habermas’ own consistent concern, as expressed in his earlier work, is for human emancipation from ‘systematically distorted communication’, for ‘communication free from domination’. The utopian caste of his thought is evident when he writes:

25 Ibid. p. 231.
28 See the excellent analysis by Alan How in The Habermas–Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), which defends Gadamer against the criticisms of Habermas.
29 J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (second edition, London: Heinemann,
Only in an emancipated society, whose members’ autonomy and responsibility have been realised, would communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally practised dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived.\textsuperscript{30}

The realisation of such communication is, for him, an ethical possibility implicitly present in all linguistic utterance. ‘Our first sentence’, he writes, ‘expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus.’\textsuperscript{31} Habermas asserts the universal possibility of such consensus (though it is not clear that he ever points to the realisation of such consensus in actual human communities).\textsuperscript{32} The value of his work lies in his identification and exploration of transcendental conditions for non-exploitative human community (for true koinonia), and his finding within every act of human speech the possibility of an intention towards that ‘undistorted communication’ which would be the hallmark of such a community. Duncan Forrester writes appreciatively: ‘His “discourse ethics” points in the direction of participation, equality and community. And he proposes a thoroughgoing hermeneutic of suspicion of social structures.’\textsuperscript{33}

Habermas has developed his theory of communicative action in an extended critique of modernity.\textsuperscript{34} His discussion of reason and the ‘rationalisation’ of society follows Weber’s discussion of the growing application of instrumental reason throughout society, for example in the growth of bureaucracy and the

\textsuperscript{30} Habermas, \textit{Knowledge and Human Interests}, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{33} Duncan B. Forrester, \textit{Christian Justice and Public Policy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 174. Forrester also notes that Habermas believes theology to have become irrelevant, and (\textit{tu quoque!}) criticises Habermas for the way that his theorising ‘has become increasingly remote from any identifiable field of practice’ (p. 182).

spread of what we now call consumerism. The growth of individualism, together with the split between ‘facts’ and ‘values’, has been a disaster for our understanding of what it is to be human. Habermas identifies a widespread split in capitalist society between ‘institutions effective for social integration’ and ‘systemic mechanisms’ such as those of money, power, and the market.35 ‘Without the brackets of a lifeworld centred on communicative action’, he writes, ‘culture, society, and personality fall apart.’36 His critique is intended to illuminate the rational conditions for their being reunited. Though his work is a profoundly critical analysis of the failures of modernity, it is also a vigorous attempt to further the Enlightenment project of universal emancipation in the face of the pessimism of post-modernism, where there can be no rational arbitration between competing concepts of ‘culture, society and personality’. Habermas’ critique of modernity and his commitment to universal human emancipation in mutual understanding (‘communicative action’) itself provides a basis on which the discussion in this book can engage with the concerns of contemporary thought. The reflection on Christian understandings of koinonia offered here is intended to be more than an intensification of understanding within Christian tradition. It is intended to contribute to and draw from wider discussion of the conditions for authentic human community.

Nevertheless, the focus in the chapters that follow will not (with Habermas) so much be on conditions for the realisation of true humanity or authentic hope, as on the life of particular communities which have claimed in some way to realise emancipatory koinonia. Habermas’ emphasis upon the human need not just for communicative speech, but for communicative action, opens a perspective on life in community which goes beyond that of Gadamer, with his commitment to disclosure of truth in the responsible reading of texts within a humanistic tradition. Together, however, they remind those involved in Christian

35 Lifeworld and System, p. 163.
36 Ibid., p. 225. Habermas discusses at length the concept of the ‘lifeworld’, engaging particularly with the work of Alfred Schutz. He describes the ‘lifeworld’ as ‘the horizon within which communicative actions are “always already” moving’ (p. 119).
ecumenism, which is so often a matter of the reappropriation of classic texts within a convergence of tradition, that ecumenism (including the responsible interpretation and re-interpretation of texts) is first and foremost a praxis. What they illuminate are the conditions for an authentic ecumenism that is not inturned upon the needs of the Christian community, but which finds its integrity in dialogue with the world. Where specifically Christian understanding of koinonia goes beyond what either of them can offer as philosophers is in the claim to something radically new. The Christian claim is that there is about the koinonia of the Spirit (2 Cor. 13:14) an element of radical novelty, the need for which is apparent to human reason, but the realisation of which is a matter of gift and the incarnation of the Gospel in the Body of Christ. The Christian practice of koinonia is seen as a practical participation in the love of God, which can be entered upon only with repentance and is normally sustained within or by reference to confessional Christian communities. Only by the activity of the Spirit can we live, in its fullest sense, ‘the common life’.

37 That is to say, an exercise of practical rather than theoretical reason, in Aristotle’s terms an exercise of phronesis rather than nous.