CATHOLICISM CONTENDING WITH MODERNITY

Roman Catholic Modernism and Anti-Modernism in Historical Context

EDITED BY DARRELL JODOCK
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CHAPTER I

Vatican foreign policy and the origins of Modernism

Gary Lease

Consalvi, Antonelli, Rampolla: one could write a fascinating and rich history of nineteenth-century Europe through the eyes, and above all the work, of the Vatican’s secretaries of state. These ministers helped form foreign policy throughout Europe’s various governments, made decisions based on information and the artful gauging of the future’s likely course, and worked together with the foreign ministers of secular states to forge a common political course, where possible, to ensure not only peace but above all survival and political stability.

The twentieth century, however, standing in the shadow of 1870 and the demise of the Church State as a meaningful political base for the Vatican’s policies, has not been so productive. A history of the Roman Catholic Church in this century, making use of its secretaries of state as a point of departure, would be a thin story indeed. Merry del Val, Gasparri, Pacelli, Casaroli: compared to their counterparts in the preceding century, the achievements are few, if any, the embarrassments many, and the lack of an effective, respected policy, or set of policies, noteworthy. Rather than cooperatively forming the basic guidelines for actual political decisions, and thus events, in Europe and elsewhere, these now almost faceless ministers found themselves trapped by the lack of any stable political power base: the disappearance of the Church State in 1870 led to the bloodletting of the “war” with Bismarck, the draining struggle with France, and the internecine battle over Modernism; in turn, these moments led to this century’s straitjacket of the Lateran Treaties and surrender of the German concordat. As Rilke noted in this century’s first decade, who speaks these days of victory? Survival is everything.1

1 “Wer spricht von Siegen? Überstehn ist alles.” From Rainer Maria Rilke, “Requiem für
That may be an adequate, even comforting existential stance but it certainly does not meet the needs of modern states and their societies. Foreign relations are not only the products of themes that concern their partners, but also produce their own themes. These concerns, in turn, "form patterns of activity that reflect enduring interests and actions on the part of government, that is, policy." Applied to the Roman Church, this analytic principle reveals that the Napoleonic upheaval at the beginning of the nineteenth century created a policy vacuum for the Roman Church which it sought unsuccessfully to fill throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The church's leaders, the popes and their secretaries of state, attempted to freeze their policy in relational forms that were no longer possible. As that struggle became more and more impossible, there occurred a retreat from all effective foreign policy and a concentration upon the inner forum: the minds, hearts, wills and consciences of the institution's members. A review of the Vatican's foreign ministers and their policies during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries will reveal that the anti-Modernist spasm at the turn of the century represents the final stage of a failed foreign policy program of almost a century's duration.

A quick glance at the bibliographic resources available for such an investigation reveals how the Vatican's foreign policy during the past two centuries has to a large extent been ignored. Recent and noted historical handbooks on the one hand, and respected historical analyses on the other, make precious little mention of studies associated with the Church State's foreign policy. There are, of course, some studies, but to no one's amazement, they deal mainly with World War II, the Jewish Holocaust, and post-World War II

Wolf Graf von Kalckreuth, "Gesammelte Gedichte" (Frankfurt: Insel-Verlag, 1962), p. 420. Though Rilke penned these lines in the night of 4 and 5 November 1908, it is certain that he did not have in mind the fate of the Roman Catholic Church, locked in its anti-Modernism.


That is, since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

For the former, see the respected Guide to Historical Literature now in a new third edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Apart from chiefly medieval studies, its two very full volumes contain practically nothing related to the Vatican's foreign adventures; what mention there is remains relegated to themes and categories dominated by the world's states themselves. For the latter, let me cite Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). Surprisingly, in such a broad-ranging study of European foreign policy development, not a single pope or secretary of state is mentioned, nor is the role of the Vatican in the nineteenth century's foreign relations ever raised.
The nineteenth century and its turbulent foreign policy entanglements are all too often reduced to mentioning the *Kulturkampf* (‘‘who won?’’ is the question that is always answered, though seldom analyzed) and the formation of the new Italian national state with the consequent elimination of a Church State centered in Rome (‘‘was that good or bad?’’ is usually the query put to the reader here).

We are even more stingily informed when it comes to the actual actors, the Vatican’s several secretaries of state throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One slim volume, now over thirty years old, has made the attempt to gather some data on these now almost forgotten personages, while biographies, that exegetical staple in the historian’s larder, are few and far between, and when available usually of questionable dependability.\(^6\)

Ercole Consalvi (1757–1824), the key advisor of Pius VII, left us, of course, his memoirs, and there have been several attempts to evaluate his accomplishments during and after the era of Napoleon.\(^7\) But a full-blown study that places Consalvi in the complex and complicated currents of the nineteenth century’s first two decades is


still to be written. For Tommaso Bernetti (1779–1852), secretary of state under two popes (Leo XII and Gregory XVI), there are only slim pickings, while Luigi Lambruschini (1776–1854), who served the final decade under Gregory XVI, has received but one major study. Surprisingly, we are not much better off when it comes to Giacomo Antonelli (1806–1876), the right-hand man of Pius IX. Though Europe was awash with supermarket publications following his death, it is only now that Antonelli has received anything approaching a balanced evaluation based on broad archival study. One might think that with Mariano Rampolla (1843–1913), the close partner of Leo XIII, we would find a new and flourishing field of investigation. Sadly, nothing of note has appeared since the 1920s! Much the same can be said for Raphael Merry del Val (1865–1930), the intimate advisor of Pius X. Some of his correspondences have been published but, in the main, isolated studies and hagiographical “biographies” make up the body of writing devoted to his life and work. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the fact that his cause

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8 For the former see the eulogy delivered at the first anniversary of his death: Elogio funebre del Cardinale Tommaso Bernetti, recitato il giorno anniversario della sua morte nella Metropolitana di Fermo il 17 Marzo 1853 (Loreto: Brothers Rossi, 1853); the eulogy itself covers some 26 pages, but 13 pages of notes contain the skeleton of a future biography. Lambruschini penned a well-known Polenical Treatise on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin (New York: Sadlier, 1855; original Italian edition from 1842), and published his spiritual meditations, Operette spirituali delle Cardinale L. Lambruschini (Rome: F. Bourlie, 1833). More in tune with his role as Vatican diplomat are his memoirs as papal nuncio to France: La mia nunziazione di Francia, ed. Pietro Pirri (Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1934). An early and very sketchy biography, based on his funeral eulogy, was done by Giovanni Piantoni, Biografia del Cardinale Luigi Lambruschini della Congregazione de’ Barnabiti (no date, 1892); this is a separate publication from the author’s article, “Il Cardinale Luigi Lambruschini,” in Annali delle Scienze Religiose 13 [1854], 128–153. The most recent, and most substantial treatment is from Luigi Manzini, Il Cardinale Luigi Lambruschini (Vatican City: Vatican Library, 1960), containing over 100 pages of documents and appendices.


10 The single biography of any value is G. Pietro Sinopoli di Giunta’s Il Cardinale Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro (Rome: Vatican Press, 1923). For archival source materials see also Crispolti Crispolti and Guido Aureli, La politica di Leone XIII da Luigi Galimberti a Mariano Rampolla su documenti inediti (Rome: Bontempelli e Invernizzi, 1922).

11 See, for example, Gary Lease, “Merry del Val and Tyrrell: A Modernist Struggle,” “Odd Fellows” in the Politics of Religion: Modernism, National Socialism, and German Judaism (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), pp. 55–76. Among the biographies, the best is from
for beatification was introduced in the early 1950s, though at the moment all is quiet on that front. In other words, the vital field of the Vatican's foreign relations has been left, particularly in the excited nineteenth and twentieth centuries, without the attention to its main actors that they so richly deserve.

The title and office of a “secretary of state” to the pope emerged much earlier, at the end of the sixteenth century; by 1605 it was an official position, though the function itself had been present for at least a century. The establishment of a complex system of nuncios, or papal representatives, at Europe’s various courts demanded someone who would read and analyze their frequent reports. This meant, of course, that the office of secretary of state took on almost immediately a grave importance. Such a person controlled the information regarding foreign relations, and many other matters also, that reached the pope. In other words, popes quickly became dependent upon the occupant of that office. Since 1644 the holder of the secretariat has always been a cardinal; a century later (1721) the secretary of state had become ex officio both the prime minister of the Papal States and the controller of foreign policy information channelled through the various nuncios. By the beginning of the nineteenth century and Consalvi’s service to Pius VII, the secretary of state was clearly an “alter ego” to the pope, with the consequence that this official was necessarily close to the pope’s point of view on all major issues, indeed enjoyed a personal relationship with the pope second to none among Vatican officials. When Modernism breaks on the scene at the end of the nineteenth century, it quickly finds its counterpart in Rome’s institutional anti-Modernism, an
appearance that owes a great deal to the foreign policy dealings of previous papal secretaries of state throughout the preceding decades. Modernism and anti-Modernism are, in other words, not without their antecedents, and many of the most important of these roots are to be found in the Church State’s foreign relations rather than exclusively in doctrinal distinctions and debates.

AN ERA OF RECOVERY (= DENIAL AND DECLINE), OR: THE AGE OF CONSALVI

As Chadwick trenchantly observes, prior to the French Revolution there were three Catholic powers in Europe (Austria, France, Spain) and but one Protestant (Britain); after the Revolution that ratio had turned completely around: Britain, Prussia, and Russia were the Protestant or non-Catholic powers, while only Austria remained Catholic. This situation was clearly the result of Napoleon’s attempt to bring all of Europe under his unified rule. While the seventeenth-century wars of religion had left a rough balance in Europe, Napoleon’s wars overthrew this, leaving Europe with a Protestant political ascendancy over Catholics, and the popes with far less weight in the political arena than, say, Berlin or Moscow.\(^\text{14}\)

The suppression of revolution in Italy and the Papal States after the Congress of Vienna was designed to restore imperial power to Austria, Prussia, and Russia – it did not have as its goal the restoration of religion. In contrast, Catholics and, above all, their popes wanted to reconstruct a more Christian society; this inevitably meant a shift to the political right and cooperation with the anti-democratic and against the constitutional movements opposed by the three empires. The only reason Metternich supported the restoration of the Roman Church and its Papal State was because he saw it as a “glue,” if you will, to hold together a political order; for him “Catholic religion was the surest defence of a State against anarchy.”\(^\text{15}\)

Thus the goal of the post-1815 Roman Church was to salvage what rights and independence it could in the face of an expansion of state power and influence. To this end, Consalvi was convinced that only when the papacy had firm control of its traditional territories would it be able to guarantee its independence from the other


\(^{15}\) Ibid., pp. 537, 610.
European powers, and thus ensure the essential condition of its ecclesiastical effectiveness. His goal was to have the papacy accepted once again by the European powers as an equal; all his efforts to weave a web of concordats were expended to this end. The ironic conclusion, however, is that most of these attempted relationships by treaty ended in failure and in an increase in state control. All along the line Consalvi had to concede key points if he was to gain the aid needed to rebuild a devastated church: it was a steep price to pay (episcopal appointments, lost lands, etc.). In South America, revolutions moved from one country to another while he lacked any ability to stem the tide; in Spain the Inquisition was reinstituted and Ferdinand VII chased from the throne by a coup (1820), only to be restored three years later by force, leading eventually to civil war in 1833. Where the church wished to survive, religion became identified with the politically conservative goals of the imperial states.

The French Revolution had demonstrated just how fragile faith is, just how uncertain the social structure of the church is, and just how much religion is, in the end, conformity. This experience, the key marker of the Roman Church’s entry into the modern age, was already the hallmark of its foreign policies prior to the mid-nineteenth century. “Consalvi failed,” judges Chadwick, “because the problems were insoluble, not because he lacked wisdom.” With the restoration of the Papal States there was now a single government that one might blame, rather than foreign buffers onto which one could shunt disgruntlement. In his flexibility and desire to see the Papal States once again in place, Consalvi ended up baptizing the Napoleonic system, giving up the pre-revolutionary rights of the cardinals and Roman nobility. The result was a harbinger of things to come. Though the Congress of Vienna (1815) had restored the Papal States in order to limit Austrian power, all that was achieved was chaos. The popes were unable to rule the territories effectively but felt called to do so anyway. This was a sure recipe for disaster. It marked the Roman Church’s entry into the nineteenth century, while at the same time it affected the papacy’s attitude toward the democratic and constitutional character of the emerging modern

18 Chadwick, Popes and Revolution, p. 554; see also pp. 539–566.
world. Long before the Modernist crisis, the pope was seen as a “supreme spiritual court,” but certainly not a political one; in other words, the decline of political and state power on the part of the pope was compensated by “feeling” rather than by law and a political role. 19

With Austria in complete control of the Italian peninsula, Metternich and the Austrian armies became a prop to the Papal States. France was on the outside, looking in, and the Russian move to gain influence in Rome was effectively blocked. 20 Shortly after Gregory XVI’s election in 1831, a revolt broke out in the Papal States. The pope’s new secretary of state, Bernetti, was opposed to Austrian support, but the pope had little choice. Once again, France was trumped by Austria, though it did not cease to work for entry into the Italian political scene. A multi-state conference, called in the late spring of that year to consider the “Roman Question,” failed because Bernetti allowed it to. His policy was to play Austria off against France, hoping that the resulting turmoil would allow the papacy to control the Church State. Even though the Austrians withdrew some of their troops at the pope’s request, Gregory soon replaced Bernetti with Lambruschini, who lavishly made use of Austrian support in maintaining internal control of the Papal State. 21

By the election of Pius IX in 1846, however, Austrian power in Italy was beginning to break down. With revolt breaking out in Naples (January 1848), it was time for the Austrians to cut their losses: while Austria now no longer tried to keep France out of Italy, France was no longer trying to throw them out. The result was that the Vienna solution of 1815 had finally ceased to function; the Holy Alliance (Austria, Prussia, Russia) was unable to guarantee any longer Metternich’s grand goal of overall supremacy in Italy. Nationalism, liberalism, and economic change were all working to undermine the previous order. Papal strivings were now directed toward the dubious aim of recovering this lost structure of apparent stability; in the best of scenarios the Papal States would be at the center of such a “new” or recovered Italian order, at the worst at

19 Ibid., p. 570.
21 Ibid., pp. 692–695.
least a viable one.\textsuperscript{22} A new chapter in Vatican foreign relations had begun.

\begin{center}
\textsc{An era of doubt (= dependency), or: The Age of Antonelli}
\end{center}

Despite the restoration of a Church State by Consalvi and Metternich in 1815, Napoleon's imposed example of Italian unity continued to entice Italian political hopes. In 1831–32 the Papal States were rocked by revolts; dissatisfaction with the practice of jurisprudence and the overall administration of the Church State had led to rebellion in the northern sectors, and only the presence of Austrian troops helped to put it down. The presence of foreign powers over many years, however, simply increased the disquiet. By refusing to join the Piedmontese uprising against the Austrians in April 1848, Pius IX undermined the good will that his steps toward a democratic constitutional state had created; on 15 November 1848 the papal prime minister Rossi was assassinated in parliament. Revolution had finally overtaken Rome itself.

The last cardinal to be created without sacerdotal orders – he received the diaconate in 1841 but never sought priestly ordination – Antonelli helped plan the flight of the pope from Rome, and five days later was named secretary of state, an office he held for the next 28 years. Working tirelessly for the pope's return to Rome, he was able to persuade Austria, France, and Naples to retake Rome (May 1849), and in April 1850 Antonelli accompanied Pius IX on his return to Rome. Though he won the pope's trust and confidence, Antonelli found opposition not only among the liberal factions of the Church State and college of cardinals, but also among the anti-progressives led by the former secretary of state for Gregory XVI, Lambruschini. The reasons were not hard to find: Antonelli was a political realist, not an ideologue; he was bound to encourage enemies from all directions on the ideological compass. Nevertheless he was able to remove the entire Church State deficit within nine years, and along the way found avenues for supporting industry, trade, and business. The result was that by the end of the 1850s the average citizen in the Papal State paid less than half the taxes of the average French citizen!

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 803.
However, Antonelli was swimming against the tide. His most formidable opponent was Cavour, president of the Kingdom of Piedmont (1852) and indefatigable proponent of a united Italy without a separate Church State. In 1859 Piedmont and France joined in a war designed to drive the Austrians out of Italy; the consequence was that Austria’s influence on the peninsula came to an end. An unexpected result was that the areas left vacant by the Austrian withdrawal were turned into revolutionary hotbeds (e.g. Bologna, Umbria, the Marches). The Romagna was lost to Piedmont, as Napoleon III expressed a desire to withdraw French troops from Rome; Cavour’s plan to found an Italian federation with France’s aid was moving closer to realization. In response, Pius IX, against the advice of Antonelli, called for a volunteer army to be formed from Catholics all over Europe. A year later Cavour attacked and overran this Vatican force as 15,000 French troops sat idly by. Antonelli’s only hope was to play Turin (Piedmont) off against Paris (France), while in the process gaining support from Spain and Austria. This was clearly a strategy doomed to failure, and Antonelli knew it.

After the declaration of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854, Antonelli had hoped for restraint in injecting religious belief and practice into foreign policy. But Pius disappointed him. Just as public, certainly more scandalous, and more of a problem for the Vatican’s foreign relations, was the case of Edgar Mortara, similar in the scope of its European uproar to the Dreyfus Affair some decades later. Pius had, of course, kept Rome’s Jewish community restricted to its traditional ghetto, but his treatment of the respected, and well-off Jewish family of Mortara from Bologna overstepped all bounds. Young Edgar Mortara, born in 1851, had been babysat from birth by a teenage Christian girl from Bologna. During his first year he had become quite sick; worried that he might die still an infidel Jew, the young nurse, Anna Morisi, baptized him while the parents were absent. The boy survived the illness and several years elapsed. In 1858, however, Edgar’s younger brother also became ill and then died before Anna could baptize him, as she had Edgar. The ensuing guilt made her worry about Edgar’s fate: unlike his younger brother he had been delivered from the danger of dying without salvation, yet he did not even know it! Conversations with neighbors made

their way to the local priest; from there it was a hop and a skip to the archbishop of Bologna. Despite careful investigation and several court actions, it is still unclear who said what to whom; but on 24 June 1858 the police, under order of the Inquisition, came to the Mortara household, took young Edgar, and disappeared with him. By the next morning he was on his way to Rome.24

The European and North American publics were outraged. Appeals were made from throughout the two continents to the Vatican, but Pius IX made it clear that this was a spiritual case outside his temporal jurisdiction. He was bound, he maintained, by an earlier ruling from Benedict XIV (1740–1758) according to which Jewish children, even if illicitly baptized, are to be separated from their families and educated as Christians.25 In any case, conflicting reports very soon circulated: one had him crying for his parents and family, begging for a mezuzzah, while others had him adopting his new faith with warmth, adapting easily to his new residence in the Roman Home for Catechumens. While declining to take any action to release the child to his parents, Pius did make young Edgar his personal ward.26

Finally, in 1861, the Mortara family did bring the Italian government to demand that at least the nurse be prosecuted for kidnapping. Pius IX replied that this was impossible since the young woman in question had already entered a nunnery. Indeed during the traditional New Year’s audience granted by the pope to the Jewish


25 In his rule “On Baptism of Hebrews, Children and Adults” from 1747, Benedict XIV (Lambertini), a famous canon lawyer, based his opinion on the well-known canon 60 from the Council of Toledo held in 633. It is worth noting that throughout the nineteenth century the old *Corpus Iuris Canonici* remained in force; thus “Sicut Iudeis” (*Decretals*, bk. 5, tit. 6) specifically prohibited the forced baptism of Jews. Lambertini certainly recognized this, as did also Pius IX; the rub was, of course, the status of a forced baptism (and thus illicit) after it had occurred. And here the situation was clear to Pius: illicit or not, it was still valid.

26 For the first see the report in the *New York Times* (27 November 1858), 2, repeating a story from the Genoese *Corriere Mercantile*. The opposite view can be found in the *New York Tablet* (20 November 1858), 3, carrying an article from the Turin *Armonia*.
community, the Mortara family appeared and appealed to the pope for the release of their son. Pius replied that he had no intention of paying attention to the general uproar caused by his actions and praised the Mortaras for having given Europe such a wonderful example of obedience to higher authority(!). Two years later young Edgar was presented to the Jewish community in the robes of a seminarian. Antonelli knew that such intransigent intrusion of religious persuasions into the conduct of foreign relations could cause great harm to the goals set by the Vatican. At the very least Napoleon III was angered, and that, in turn, placed very much in doubt the support of French troops in propping up an already shaky Church State.

By 1864, Napoleon III was ready to act, promising Piedmont that he would withdraw French troops from Rome within two years. In fact, he kept that promise but then turned around and hindered Garibaldi in occupying the city of Rome itself, though the rest of the Church State fell to his army of Italian unity. When the Germans and French came to war just four years later in 1870, Napoleon no longer had the luxury of trying to keep both Cavour and Pius happy: the French troops left Rome for good, and the tiny papal army was quite unable to resist the Italian onslaught. On 20 September 1870 the city was bombarded and then taken. A new “Roman Question” was thus created, very much the result of the first Roman Question forty years previously. While Pius had striven repeatedly to emphasize his spiritual power and authority, first by a papal dogmatic definition (Immaculate Conception, 1854), followed by a religiously dictated kidnapping (Mortara affair, 1858), then by a papal condemnation (Syllabus of Errors, 1864), and finally by orchestrating a conciliar dogmatic definition of his own infallibility (First Vatican Council, 1870), it was now clear that the only action left to Vatican diplomacy was protest. Anywhere in the world that an attack was perceived to be made against the Roman Church, Antonelli was

27 See August Bernhard Hasler, *Wie der Papst unfehlbar wurde. Macht und Ohnmacht eines Dogmas* (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1981), pp. 251–252. Upon the fall of Rome in 1870, Mortara was given the chance to revert to Judaism, but he chose instead to remain a Catholic and entered the Augustinian order, studying at waystations in Brixen (Tyrol) and Poitiers (France), where he was ordained a priest in 1873. He worked hard in support of the poor, achieving an excellent reputation as a preacher in the many countries in which he served (Italy, Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, England, America). Mortara died almost unnoticed at the age of 88 in 1940.

quick to arrange a response. The ironic result of Antonelli’s faithful execution of his master’s wishes, and his skillful manipulation of competing powers in order to keep the Church State propped up as long as possible, was that he missed the notable opportunity to free the Roman Church of the ballast of political government. Instead, the Papal States ceased to exist and a new era in Vatican foreign relations began.

**AN ERA OF ACCOMMODATION** (¼ DETENTE), OR: THE AGE OF RAMPOLLA

In the first nine years of his pontificate, Leo XIII ran through three different secretaries of state, before finally settling on Mariano Rampolla for the last sixteen years of his reign.²⁹ With his appointment the “Spanish connection” to the development of the Vatican’s foreign policies begins to bear fruit: Giovanni Simeoni, Pius IX’s last secretary of state and the successor to Antonelli, had been plucked from his position as nuncio in Madrid to head the entire foreign policy operation (1875–1876); Franchi, Leo XIII’s first secretary of state, had served three years as the nuncio in Madrid (1868–1871); Rampolla himself had served first as the secretary to the Spanish nuncio (1875–1877) and then had been the nuncio for five years before moving up to the papal secretary of state (1882–1887); and the secretary to Rampolla in Madrid had been Giacomo della Chiesa, later to become pope as Benedict XV; finally, Raphael Merry del Val, Rampolla’s successor as secretary of state under Pius X, was the son of a well-known Spanish diplomat. In sum, from 1876 to 1922, Vatican foreign policy was formed by secretaries of state and a pope who either had worked in the Spanish nunciature or had a direct connection to Spanish diplomacy.³⁰

It was Donoso Cortés who provided substance to this Spanish connection. Though his life as an influential theoretician of Spanish, and indeed European conservatism, was brief (1809–1853), he nevertheless bequeathed to his political and ecclesiastical successors a fundamental insight into the likely development of the nineteenth century, for it was Cortés who recognized that the religious and

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²⁹ Two of Rampolla’s predecessors died in office, the first, Alessandro Franchi, after only five months in his new position!

³⁰ Prior to that string, the secretaries had been marked by service in Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna (Bernetti, Lambruschini).
national conservative powers in Europe—Catholic royalty in its Romance form, the dynastic character of evangelical Prussia, and the partnership of Russian orthodoxy with czarism—were doomed: they would never, in his judgment, be able to achieve the same homogeneous unity that marked for him the movement of “international” revolution. In view of this overwhelmingly likely development, Cortés was convinced that there was only one avenue of escape: dictatorship.\footnote{See Carl Schmitt, Donoso Cortes in gesamteuropäischer Interpretation (Cologne: Greven, 1950), pp. 65–66.}

The Roman Church had, of course, already experienced the power and force of the nineteenth century’s liberal and democratic demands: by 1870 the Papal States had disappeared as a political entity. That event, in turn, threatened to erode the even more essential spiritual obedience to Catholic faith as an objective complex of norms. Certainly one of the chief moments in the definition of papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council was the attempt to centralize the administration of belief and to protect the church against all democratic influences. By proclaiming legal principles (infallible interpreter of belief, universal jurisdiction) in the form of articles of faith, these elements of law were effectively removed from future debate.\footnote{See Fritz Fleiner, “Geistliches Weltrecht und weltliches Staatsrecht,” Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden (Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1941), p. 263.} With this reaction to the collapse of the Church State in place, in complete harmony with Cortés’ predictions, the Spanish connection in the Vatican’s foreign policy machinery was fully prepared to mount an anti-Modernist campaign against any who questioned these legal principles even before the so-called Modernist crisis came on stage. From the vantage point of a papal secretary of state, the Modernist crisis had already arrived.

The chief ideologue of the anti-Modernist party, long before any actual “Modernists” were in view, was a Spanish prelate, Dr. Félix Sarda y Salvany (1844–1916). His influential and widely circulated pamphlet, \textit{Liberalism is a sin!}, provided a blueprint for an anti-Modernist program twenty years before there was a Modernist crisis.\footnote{\textit{El liberalismo es pecado} (Barcelona: Libreria catolica, 1884). By 1885, just one year later, the pamphlet was in its third edition! The German translation made its appearance in 1889 as \textit{Der Liberalismus als Sünde}, trs. from the seventh Spanish edition by Ulrich Lampert with an introduction by Josef Scheicher (Salzburg: Mittermüller, 1889).} Sounding a theme from the later papal pronouncement, \textit{Lamentabili}; Sardà y Salvany sees the real danger in liberalism to be
its uniting of all errors in a synthesis: it is a sin because it includes "all heresies and errors in itself"; it is thus a system just as the Catholic Church is. This "social atheism" has led to devastating practical results: the church has lost its temporal power and possessions. A person, an organization, a book or a government," maintains Sarda y Salvany, "for whom the Catholic Church is not the single, exclusive and only measure in matters of faith and morals, is liberal." This is so because metaphysically religion and politics are one; the latter is contained in the former, just like a limb on a tree. Politics, or the art of ruling people, is morally nothing more than the application of the great principles of religion to the organization, ordering, and governing of society. "The Catholic thesis," he continues, "is the power that belongs to God and His gospel, namely to rule exclusively in the social sphere, and the duty, namely to force all classes in this sphere to subject themselves to God and His gospel." The burden left behind by Antonelli and Pius IX was thus the collapse of a Church State coupled with an unbending persuasion that it must be restored if the church is to rule over the minds and hearts of its members as it should.

Rampolla worked closely with Leo XIII, perhaps as intimately as Merry del Val and Pius X were to collaborate later. For Leo, and thus also for Rampolla, the Church State issue was paramount, taking precedence over the matter of church politics. Thus Rampolla's style of directing the Vatican's foreign relations resurrects an earlier model, striving to achieve a balance of power by helping to build groups that play off against each other, just as his great counterpart, Bismarck, also did. While Leo gave Rampolla his marching order at the time of his appointment — to protect the church against revolution and impiety — how he was to achieve that goal was often his own design.

Conditions, of course, had changed radically for a Vatican foreign policy. Two new states, Italy and Germany, had been added to the European constellation, and these had, in turn, changed the landscape of alliances. The Triple Alliance had begun with Germany

34 Liberalismus, pp. 3, 9, 38, 13, 8 (all citations are from the German translation). Scheicher adds in his introduction the note that liberalism is the foundation of all opposition to the Catholic Church.

35 Ibid., pp. 41, 136, 147.

and Austro-Hungary in 1879; Italy joined in 1882. Almost immediately this group was expanded by the addition of Serbia (1882) and Rumania (1883). Initially Leo, and also Rampolla, hoped that their chief goal of a restoration of the Church State could be achieved through the help of this Alliance. Bismarck, however, wanted to wait, and slowly Rampolla began to see the Vatican’s best chances lay with France. Though he was not an enemy of Germany by any stretch of the imagination, he never forgave Austria’s alignment with Germany and Italy. At the same time Austria was most unhappy with Rampolla’s policy of support for Slavic liturgies in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus endangering, in Vienna’s view, German hegemony in the Danube monarchies. Since, therefore, the Triple Alliance was unlikely to help the return of the Papal States, thereby solving the “Roman Question,” Rampolla shifted his attention to France. It is possible that he also was thinking of a counterweight, together with Russia, against the “German” grouping (including England).37

In any case, the Ralliement, or reconciliation of the Vatican with France, had as its goal a Catholic presence in the French government without deciding whether the form of state should be monarchical or republican. At the same time, Rampolla worked tirelessly to gain as well the emerging French–Russian alliance in support of a restored Church State.38 As things turned out, both France and Russia took advantage of the Vatican: the former to control increasingly unruly French Catholics, the latter to keep Polish Catholics under control. And all the while Rampolla nurtured his (and Leo’s) persuasion that

37 See Rudolf Graber, “Rampolla,” in Sandfuchs (ed.), Außenminister, pp. 58–72. George Kennan also mentions initial Vatican opposition to Russian Orthodox advances in Catholic Poland, in his The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 62. But in the second volume of his study, Kennan acknowledges that the Vatican began, in 1890, to realize the necessity of a reconciliation between the church and Republican France; The Fateful Alliance (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 3–4, 195. Of note, too, was Rampolla’s well-known zeal for the conversion of Russia; the successful reestablishment of a Catholic hierarchy in England (1850) certainly spurred him in this direction as did the 1896 decision against the validity of Anglican orders: if one can move against schismatics in one place, why not another? Cf. Sinopoli di Giunta, Rampolla, pp. 154–166.

38 It was Leo’s and Rampolla’s policy to support the formation of conservative Catholic political parties that would systematically insert themselves into the democratic and parliamentary European states (except for Italy, of course); the goal was to influence the legislative and administrative processes along Catholic lines: Fleiner, “Weltrecht,” pp. 274–275.
a Church State was absolutely essential for Christian civilization to flourish and for Europe to enjoy tranquillity.

To this end Rampolla sought to bolster the pope’s standing by encouraging his role as an international arbiter, thus enhancing the pope’s legitimacy as a source of universal moral judgment. Already a participant through the Madrid nunciature in the Caroline Islands arbitration, Rampolla was the chief tool for the reinsertion of the pope into international politics. At the same time he was the beneficiary of the end to the Kulturkampf, in which Leo, and also Rampolla, helped Bismarck put this hindrance behind him, while in the same moment undercutting Windhorst and the Catholic Center Party. Bismarck had, in fact, “gone a long way toward Canossa, but not all the way,” and Bismarck only had to revise, but not do away with the hated May Laws.39

Rampolla’s end came with the death of Leo in 1903, though much attention is directed to the dramatic conclave that elected Pius X. The Austrian veto could have been ignored if the college of cardinals had wished; in fact, Rampolla’s vote count went up on the next two scrutinies after Puzyna’s announcement of the veto. But secretaries of state rarely follow themselves, either in that office or as pope (Gasparri and Pacelli are the exceptions), and the usual desire to see a change of direction manifested itself here.40 In any event, Rampolla’s policies had ultimately failed: there was no new Church State at Leo’s death. In addition, Austria’s veto against his election as pope was based on the Vatican move toward France; there seems little doubt that Berlin and Vienna coordinated the veto for the same reason. However, the French policy was doomed anyway: in 1905 under Combes, the complete separation of church and state in France was proclaimed.41 And in perhaps the chief irony of Rampolla’s long tenure as secretary of state, working hard at arranging an

39 Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, vol. ii. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 219, 197. Ultimately Bismarck had made some important advances in separating church and state in the German Empire; what he had to give up, as Windhorst immediately recognized, was far less.
40 Ludwig Pastor reports a conversation with Merry del Val from 29 December 1920, in which Pius’ former secretary of state maintained that Rampolla never had a chance at papal election; a block of at least forty cardinals were opposed to his election from the very beginning because they felt a change in the system was needed; Rampolla was never able to garner more than thirty votes from the 63 cardinals in conclave: Tagebücher, Briefe, Erinnerungen (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1950).
edifice of foreign policies for the Vatican that would hold off the onslaught of a liberal modern world responsible for the elimination of the Church State, Pius X, the successor to Rampolla’s Leo, delivered himself of the judgment, just weeks before his death, that Rampolla had been allied with the Modernists!\footnote{Pastor, Tageb"ucher, entry for 30 May 1914.}

\textbf{AN ERA OF STRUGGLE (= WAR), OR: THE AGE OF MERRY DEL VAL}

Like Consalvi a century before, Raphael Merry del Val was plucked from his role as secretary of the papal conclave to be secretary of state by the new pope, Pius X. Consecrated bishop just three years before by Cardinal Rampolla (his predecessor in office), Merry del Val was marked by the same uncompromising intransigence that had been characteristic of the English Cardinals Manning and Vaughan. And that style fit his new pope perfectly. While Leo XIII had been a “political” pope who sought influence for the church in world affairs, mainly through diplomatic and political avenues, Pius X sought the same goal but chiefly through “purely” religious and spiritual ways. And that strategy fit his new secretary of state perfectly. For Merry del Val had set pastoral care, as he understood it, as the criterion of his actions: “Bring me souls” was his motto. Alberto Canestri, an early biographer, once called him a “missionary in scarlet,” hitting the nail on the head.\footnote{Cf. Josef Oswald, “Merry del Val,” in Sandfuchs (ed.), \textit{Außenminister}, pp. 73–93, here p. 85.} This was a fundamental characteristic of Merry del Val, and thus of his conduct of the Vatican’s foreign policy. As late as 1909 Count Szeczen von Temerin, the Austrian ambassador to the Vatican, observed that the pope was even less well informed about diplomatic practices than his secretary of state – and this, after six years of on-the-job training! And like a missionary, Merry del Val and, consequently, his foreign policy were extremely focused. In the controversy in Germany over confessionally mixed versus confessionally limited labor unions, he observed that the former (the so-called Cologne model) were as bad as mixed marriages (the Berlin model)!\footnote{Ibid., pp. 84–85. The Count added that Merry del Val pushed his \textit{Kampfeslust} a bit too far in order to be a successful diplomat.} In other words, both Pius and Merry del Val saw politics and foreign policy as the practice of proceeding always down the right path, not as the art of compromise.
Unlike Rampolla and Leo, Merry del Val was convinced that a restored Church State, one that involved political control over parts of Italy, was not desirable. Rather, he sought a new and different Church State, one independent of Italy; in contrast to Pius, therefore, he opposed any reconciliation with Italy. Toward this end he advanced the notion of an international treaty that would confirm the independence of the Holy See; the only role for Italy would be the protection of the Vatican in the name of the European powers. Though this scheme was discussed at high levels in Vienna, it never achieved large scale agreement. At the same time, however, and in concert with Pius, Merry del Val encouraged the participation of Italian Catholics in public life, just as Rampolla and Leo had done in France and Germany. This step may well have preserved Italy and the Vatican from a full-scale Kulturkampf.\footnote{One danger he perceived in any possible reconciliation with Italy was an Italianization of the curia; this is why he remained until the very end opposed to the Lateran Treaties of 1929. For a discussion of these themes, ibid., pp. 90–91.}

Such a battle was not avoided with France, however. Merry del Val and Pius shelved Rampolla’s program of a Ralliement and fought fiercely against a laicization of the French state. This struggle, begun almost immediately in 1903, culminated in the formal and final break in 1905. The results were a complete separation of church and state in France and the end of the concordat. At the same time Spain broke off its relations to the Vatican, while Portugal implemented a separation of church and state modelled after the French example.

Such unwillingness to face the necessity of compromise came naturally to Merry del Val. Born into and raised in a Catholic Church in England that felt itself to be a distinct minority and one under implied, if not always open, attack from the anti-Roman Anglican majority, he was from the beginning a thorough-going ultramontane. However cosmopolitan Merry del Val may have become by exposure to the diplomatic life of Europe through the agency of his father as well as his service as secretary of state, he remained subject always to the quasi-paranoia which permeated the English Catholic Church at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries.

The fundamental inheritance of this church was its strict adherence to a papally endowed hierarchy of authority. As is usual for cases of cognitive dissonance, this view of Catholicism saw itself under siege and strove to achieve survival by dependence upon an
external authority which could not and would not be questioned. This position, buttressed by the definition of papal authority at the First Vatican Council just thirty years before, was ready-made to capture the allegiance of a minority Catholic Church such as was found in England; Merry del Val’s early theological training hammered this principle home. All through his life one can find him describing a current situation in military and combative terms; he is constantly under attack and therefore constantly in need of defending himself, that is, the church. Equipped with a penetrating but narrow intellect, perceptive but inflexible, Merry del Val treasured the virtues of obedience and loyalty. While such hallmarks saw him through his most difficult times, they were also the virtues least able to deal with the rising forces demanding change in the face of the age’s intellectual advances.

Since his involvement in the commission to investigate the validity of Anglican orders (1896), Merry del Val had identified closely with the exercise of papal authority. His appointment as president of the Academy of Ecclesiastical Nobility in 1900, followed so quickly by his elevation to both the secretariat of state and the red hat just four years later, bolstered this persuasion that no representative of central authority may be criticized or called into question without also calling into question that central, issuing authority itself. This principle remains a key to understanding Merry del Val’s strategies, tactics, and operations as the Vatican’s secretary of state, a role that helped determine in a substantive way the next fifty years of the Roman Church’s presence on the world stage.

As a result of these persuasions and tendencies, Merry del Val, under the direction of Pius X, abandoned any attempt to achieve reconciliation or accommodation with the new political constellations in Europe, North and South America, and the East. Instead, their reaction to the collapse of a Church State and the resultant decline in the political power and role of the Vatican was to refocus the church’s attention and energies upon the so-called inner forum, namely the consciences of the faithful. If one cannot control the actions and policies of other countries and their governments, then one can at least control what their populations believe.\footnote{Fleiner, “\textit{Weltrecht},” pp. 262–269. By maintaining the old rule from the Decretals, namely that all matters involving sin belong before the forum of the church (taken over by the 1917 Codex, c. 1553), the Vatican sought to retain control over its members.} In concert with the infallibility and jurisdiction definitions of the First Vatican