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INTRODUCTION

DANIELA FRIGO

After Italian historiography’s long disaffection with themes concerning foreign policy and diplomacy, a number of important studies have recently directed historians’ attention to the problem of the origins of diplomacy and to the ties between diplomatic forms and the political and institutional development of the Italian states in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus a manifest gap has been filled in studies on the Italian peninsula in the modern age, where the history of diplomacy displays a curious pattern. On the one hand stands a long tradition of inquiry into the ‘Italian origins’ of modern diplomacy, identified in the closely knit web of political and diplomatic relations that prepared, accompanied and guaranteed the Peace of Lodi of 1454. Also identified with that Peace is the creation of the first ‘balance of power’ system used by historians as their model to explain and interpret subsequent critical episodes in the history of international relations, from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Treaty of Utrecht.\(^1\) On the other hand, this focus on


the theme of the ‘origins’ has given rise to a historiographical bias which has induced research to concentrate on the medieval antecedents of the diplomatic institutions and functions, and to neglect subsequent forms and events. Consequently, we have numerous good-quality studies on fourteenth- and fifteenth-century diplomacy in relation to the evolution of the communal and seigneurial institutions, and on the transition from medieval figures of diplomatic representation (nuncii, procuratores, legati) to that of the ambassador. And we also have the numerous digressions on diplomacy in histories of international relations and manuals on the history of international law.

And yet, as regards the institutions, forms and ‘practices’ of diplomacy between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the attention of historians has long focused on the Venetian ambassadors and on the figure of the papal nuncio, while little or nothing has been written on the diplomatic representations of the other Italian states. Neglected as a consequence have been numerous aspects of the foreign relations and diplomatic apparatuses of the Italian principalities and republics: the use of diplomacy by the small states to pursue their political designs and aspirations; the creation of offices to manage and control foreign policy; the emergence of rules, norms and privileges for ambassadors; the substantial nobiliary or patrician monopoly of the diplomatic service; the development of the functions and forms of diplomatic representation; the introduction of new ‘techniques’ of negotiation; the forms assumed by correspondence and the circulation of information among courts; the reception of the first formulation of jus gentium and of international law; the role of the Italian principalities in European international affairs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition the fact that such a classic study of these themes as Mattingly’s Renaissance Diplomacy (1955) has never been translated into Italian is indicative of the reluctance of Italian historiography to address the history of diplomacy. Nevertheless, there has been no lack of recommendations for a revival of a study of these matters. Almost thirty years ago, Marino Berengo called for a revision of Italy’s political history in the light of new ideas.


3 Besides the studies cited in the following notes see Dupré Theseider, Niccolò Machia-velli diplomatico, vol. i: L’arte della diplomazia nel Quattrocento, Como, 1945.


6 See e.g. E. Serra, Istituzioni di storia dei trattati e politica internazionale, Bologna, 1970.
and new historiographical methods, citing developments in the rest of Europe, where the history of diplomacy had constantly been a major area of historical investigation able to update its research issues and tools of inquiry. One reason for the scant interest of Italian historians in the matter is perhaps an enduring interpretation of Italian history between the later fifteenth and early eighteenth centuries which has only recently been superseded. I refer to the interpretation of these two centuries as largely, if not exclusively, characterized by an economic and political ‘decadence’ which affected – albeit in different forms and at different times – all the states of the peninsula. Distant from the institutional dynamics that distinguished the formation of the great European monarchies, marginal with respect to the pattern of international arrangements decided by the great powers, tied to the Spanish imperial system, and forced into antiquated forms of feudal dependence on the Empire, throughout the modern age the Italian states – according to this interpretation – were characterized by institutional models, political forms and economic developments entirely ‘peripheral’ to European history.

In recent years, however, this conventional view has been challenged by a more careful examination of events in the peninsula during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the concept of ‘decadence’ itself has apparently lost much of its explanatory capacity. The revision began in economic historiography, where discussion of proto-industrialization showed that the productive and commercial trends of the period were not entirely of negative sign, but were instead part of a broader and

7 ‘If by now this constant clash of armies and intrigue by ambassadors and sovereigns has little to say to our historical culture, the refusal to examine the reasons for the rise and decline of a state, for its orientation towards one or other alliance, within this or that sphere of influence, may render all other research meaningless, distorting it into the reconstruction of inert fragments’: M. Berengo, ‘Il Cinquecento’, in La storiografia italiana negli ultimi vent’anni, proceedings of the I Congresso degli storici italiani, Milan, 1970, p. 512.


9 An example of this interpretation is provided by the essays collected in G. Quazza, La decadenza italiana nella storia europea. Saggi sul Sei-Settecento, Turin, 1971.
more profound structural change in economic processes which affected the whole of Europe.10

Apart from economic history, a different historiographical approach is now emerging also towards political and institutional events in the peninsula during the Spanish period; and the dependence on Madrid of many formally independent Italian states has been analysed not only as political subordination but also in the light of such categories as convenience, convergence of interests, and the trade-off between service and privileges.11 Although confined within much tighter margins of autonomy after 1559, and obliged constantly to calculate the convenience of their political choices, states like the Duchy of Savoy, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany or the Duchies of Modena and Mantua sought tenaciously to preserve their role as actors, albeit minor ones, on the European political stage. As has been rightly pointed out, the interest and preoccupations repeatedly aroused by their initiatives in Madrid demonstrated Spain’s constant fear of any change in the political arena that might threaten her supremacy in the peninsula.12 These were fears, as again has been recently observed, wholly consistent with the nature of the Spanish power system as a primarily ‘dynastic’, and in which all government measures ‘were tied to the military and diplomatic interests of the monarchy and therefore to its international political action’.13 Within the ramified and mutable system of seventeenth-century European alliances, even political realities which in the international hierarchy ranked merely as ‘small states’14 could – in particular circumstances – play a political role of much greater weight than their military and territorial size might warrant. This was the case of Genoa, a

10 For a synthesis of the discussion which preserves the concept of ‘crisis’ in the peninsula’s economy between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but alters its meaning, see P. Malanima, ‘L’economia’, in G. Greco and M. Rosa (eds.), Storia degli antichi stati italiani, Bari, 1996, pp. 249–95.
13 Galasso, Alla periferia dell’impero, p. 31.
financial market of prime importance and a strategic node of communications among the Spanish dominions.\textsuperscript{15} By virtue of Genoa’s crucial role in the Spanish power system, during the seventeenth century its ruling class undertook long and complex diplomatic negotiations to increase its prestige and ranking at the ceremonies of the European courts.

However, there are further reasons for the lack of interest in diplomacy shown by Italian historians in recent decades. The first is their suspicion of political history, even though at the beginning of this century this was the main focus of inquiry by such masters as Sestan, Quazza and Chabod.\textsuperscript{16} The identification of diplomacy with ‘political history’ has stunted the interest of an entire generation of historians, which in emulation of the *Annales* has turned its interest to economic-social history or, under the influence of German authors like Hintze and Brunner, concentrated on social-institutional history. The influence of French historiography has induced many Italian historians to believe that political and diplomatic history has now run its course and is incapable of revising its interpretative categories.

As said, the critical phase of this break with the past is now over. Within these new currents of historical research demands are being voiced for a renewal of political historiography. The areas of inquiry have been defined, as well as the interpretative tools best suited to a re-reading of the diplomatic history and foreign policy of the Italian states in the modern age, with the intention of freeing such research from its too close, sometimes suffocating, embrace with diplomatic history in the strict sense. As one of the most outstanding contributors to the reinterpretation of the fifteenth-century origins of diplomacy has recently pointed out,\textsuperscript{17} the scant interest in the subject since the Second World War has been also due to the excessively sharp demarcation line drawn between the interior and the exterior of the state by early twentieth-century historiography. This artificial division bred historians specialized in international relations, and others specialized in domestic politics, thereby preventing understanding of the close connections between foreign policy and government of the state, between military and diplomatic choices and internal arrangements, and between negotiations,

\textsuperscript{17} P. Margaroli, Diplomazia e stati rinascimentali. Le ambascie sforzesse fino alla conclusione della Lega italica (1450–1455), Florence, 1992, pp. 3–4.
alliances and alignments on the one hand, and the dynastic and patrimonial concerns of the princes, or the political concerns of the republican patriciates, on the other. Now, enriched with new insight, freed from the disciplinary divisions and conflicts that impeded any comprehensive approach to problems, armed with the results of a long tradition of social inquiry, and bolstered by prosopographical research, political historiography is undergoing a period of revival and renewal. And a contributory factor to its resurgence is that the boundaries marking out the ‘political’ in the ancien régime have been extended, while the distinctions between public and private have faded.  

However, as Angiolini has recently pointed out, this is not a matter of replacing the expression ‘political and diplomatic history’ with the more up-to-date and attractive one of ‘history of international relations’. What is required instead, as Livet wrote some years ago, is a re-thinking of politico-diplomatic history which takes account of the most recent methodological advances and conclusions of social and economic history, as well as those of social psychology and research into the history of ideas and mentality.  

In short, in order to overcome the disciplinary dogmatisms of the past, a re-reading of diplomacy is required which not only reconstructs the aims, negotiations, grand alliances and diplomatic alliances of the European states, but examines, for each individual state, the mentality and culture of its leaders, the continuities and cleavages in its foreign policy choices, its disputes with other sovereigns, its wrangling over ceremonial, and the conceptions of state and sovereignty embraced by its ambassadors.  

In this manner the history of diplomacy will offer fresh insights and open new directions for research on the themes of the state, the government, and of the ruling classes of seventeenth-century Italy, furnishing different materials and sources for those who set out to


19 Angiolini, ‘Osservazioni su diplomazia’, p. 443.

analyse the political categories (honour, grace, service, reputation, etc.) of the Europe of the ancien régime.

At the same time, careful reappraisal of the politics and diplomatic practices of the Italian states in the age of the Counter-Reformation can shed clearer light on the connection between politics and religion, and between secular power and ecclesiastical power (further issues that recent historiography has addressed with updated tools of inquiry). In their policy choices, regarding foreign policy as well, the Italian states were constantly conditioned by their relations with Rome and by their need to obtain or keep the support of the Roman Curia, which throughout the modern age dispensed offices and benefits to sovereigns and nobles as well as to the members of local ruling groups, and acted as a springboard to the cardinalate for European aristocrats embarking on ecclesiastical careers.

Besides these little explored areas of inquiry, recent studies have also taken a different approach to the theme of the origins of ‘resident’ diplomacy, going well beyond the customary interpretation of diplomacy as signalling the advent of the modern state, of which the Renaissance state was some sort of precursor. In the wake of Burckhardt’s pioneering work, the growth of diplomatic representation and control over foreign policy were viewed as indicative of the political maturity and institutional robustness of the seigneurial and princely states that, between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, supplanted medieval political forms (fiefs, communes, republics) in much of the peninsula. Although many of the findings of traditional historiography are still valid today, doubts have been raised over the ‘stability’ of inter-state relations from the fifteenth century onwards. More specifically, the idea has been challenged that this was the century in which sovereigns acquired that monopoly over foreign policy which has long been taken to be one of the distinctive features of sovereignty. The concept itself of ‘state’ has been recently revised as a concept too restrictive to contain the dynamics and practices that wove personal, familial and dynastic interests tightly together, as the study of modern diplomacy confirms.

23 The term ‘state’, notes Prosperi in his fine study, is hazardous when applied to sixteenth-century Italy. It conveys an image of a power strong in territorial terms, jealous of its prerogatives, and able to counteract another entity sharply distinct from it, the Church. ‘This was not the state of affairs in sixteenth-century Italy. The Pope’s interlocutors in Rome were men whom he kept around his person to conduct multiple and complicated personal negotiations, who depended on him as
To be sure, in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in almost all the states of the peninsula, the reorganization and strengthening of the organs and offices responsible for foreign policy got under way, while stable relations between Italian and European potentates were intensified. But what seems to emerge from most recent studies, altering the picture for so long propounded by historiography, is the plurality of the centres of power involved in the web of diplomatic relations, and the variety and flexibility of legations: in short, the impossibility of fixing categories (the ambassador extraordinary, the resident, the legation, etc.) valid for every situation. Studies have emphasized the large number — and diversity in terms of legitimacy, power and representativeness — of the actors who conducted international (or better ‘supra-state’) relations in the early modern age. These actors were so numerous because of the numerous and diverse networks of contact and exchange in operation, not only among the great and small potentates of Europe at that time but also among factions, court parties, aristocratic groups, large mercantile companies, and so on. Hence, the expressions ‘international relations’ or ‘foreign relations’ are of little use for description of the phenomenon and its features. The term ‘international’, in fact, presupposes the existence of nations, or at least of ‘homogeneous’ political organizations, which establish relationships with each other, and this was certainly not the case of Renaissance and sixteenth-century Italy. The expression ‘foreign relations’, for its part, is predicated on the idea that precise boundaries can be drawn between ‘internal’ and ‘external’, between ‘domestic’ affairs and military and diplomatic interests: an assumption that is not always valid for the culture and political praxis of the Europe of the Renaissance and the ancien régime. Bonds of fealty, constraints of protection, interweaving interests, and clientelistic networks took no account of still uncertain and insecure territorial borders. Rather, they acted as autonomous criteria of recognition,

24 On this see the excellent study by Margaroli, Diplomazia e stati rinascimentali. Margaroli analyses the Sforzas’ network of diplomatic contacts in relation to their diverse interests with regard to other states, which gave rise to distinct forms of legation and to differing relations between the ambassadors and their duke.

membership and alliance which were broader and more blurred than political, dynastic or territorial ones. If, therefore, and only for the sake of convenience, the expression ‘foreign relations’ can be used to denote the multiple political, diplomatic and military contacts among distinct centres of power, it must always be borne in mind that these exchanges took place not only among sovereigns, princes and republics, but also among local lords, feudatories, city magistracies, and peasants: the many and diverse subjects, that is to say, of Italian and European society of the ancien régime.

Riccardo Fubini has been the first to take an innovative approach to the theme of diplomacy. In numerous studies, he has analysed the evolution of diplomatic practice in fifteenth-century Florence, at the same time raising issues for fruitful further inquiry: first and foremost, the institutionalization of a function – that of representation – which arose in Florence above all as political praxis. Equally interesting is the case of fifteenth-century Milan, which has been studied for some time and is now the focus of recent studies which, besides describing the features, functions and recruitment procedures of the Sforza ambassadors, suggest further methodological criteria for the study of diplomatic apparatuses. As Leverotti writes, historians of the evolution of diplomatic institutions too should always bear in mind that it is the ‘history of men’ that provides the key to the weight, significance and development of institutions, including diplomatic ones. More than ever before, therefore, it is necessary to return to the documentary sources. Only these, Margaroli declares, enable us to follow the progress of individual missions, to measure the coherence between a legation’s goals and the results achieved, and to assess the choice of the most suitable ambassador, thereby reconstructing the overall workings of the diplomacy pursued by a state or a prince.

The figure of the ambassador, too, which certain historical works of

26 For his individual studies see the notes to Fubini’s contribution in this book. Many of his essays have been collected in Italia quattrocentesca. Politica e diplomazia al tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico, Milan, 1994.
28 F. Leverotti, Diplomazia e governo dello stato. I ‘famigli cavalcanti’ di Francesco Sforza (1450–1466), Pisa, 1992; Margaroli, Diplomazia e stati.
29 Leverotti, Diplomazia e governo, p. 10.
30 Margaroli, Diplomazia e stati, p. 11.
the past invested with an aura almost of sacredness, has been more realistically evaluated by recent studies which draw directly on the sources. Thus, alongside the most celebrated missions – often entrusted for the purposes of propaganda to ‘literati’ ambassadors (Bembo, Castiglione, Tasso, Ariosto, and many others) – these studies have elucidated the patient day-to-day work carried out by envoys, secretaries, chancellors, and informers. Behind the pomp that surrounded the Renaissance ambassador on solemn occasions, his function was often and much more realistically viewed as a sort of ‘honoured’ espionage. In his Dizionario filosofico-politico-storico, the Genoese Andrea Spinola assured his readers that ‘spying on the designs and secrets of princes is the proper business of ambassadors, and especially of residents’. More recent works have therefore emphasized the diverse and sometimes conflicting nature of the protagonists of Italian diplomacy: the famuli cavalcanti of Ludovico Sforza, the communal orators, the papal nuncios, the ambassador men of letters despatched by the princely courts, the jurists engaged in the most sensitive negotiations, the secretaries, the residents, as well as the secret envoys, informers and spies. However, only when we have more complete biographies, and more detailed analyses of negotiations and diplomatic missions, will it be possible to provide a better description of the political culture and functions of the ambassador, undertake comparative study of the Italian states between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and thereby gain clearer understanding of Italy’s contribution to the formation of modern diplomacy, which lies not only ‘upstream’, so to speak, in its fifteenth-century origins, but also in the Venetian model of relations, in the political praxis of the Roman court, and in the ‘courtly’ style that one of the most celebrated ambassadors and men of letters of the Renaissance, Baldassare Castiglione, elaborated and codified on the basis of first-hand experience.

The aim of this book is to contribute further to this revival of studies on political history and diplomacy, and to provide a synthesis of problems, methods and results. The studies just discussed, in fact, highlight the wide variety of problems raised by investigation into diplomatic sources,

and the diversity of the approaches and tools that can be used to shed light on the foreign policy of the Italian principalities and republics in the modern age. From institutional and formal aspects of the exercise of diplomacy (chancelleries, archives, embassies, regulations, controls, expenditure, correspondence, couriers, etc.) to the political and institutional context in which the ambassadors operated (the power and resources of the state, social dynamics, power balances at court, forms of political authority), from the legal features of the ambassadors' function (privileges, immunity, careers, degree of autonomy) to their cultural and worldly educations (colleges, courts, tutors, studies, academic background), to the forms of diplomatic ceremonials which codified the legitimacy of sovereignty and the ambitions harboured by the European sovereigns: these and many other topics are explored by the essays in this book. As Vincent Ilardi rightly pointed out, far from constituting an independent area of inquiry, diplomacy should be understood as ‘the expression of all the activities of a particular state’, and also, one might add, as the arena of action into which the manifold currents of a state’s political life flowed: power balances within ruling elites or at court, individual careers and fortunes, the influence of groups and factions, legal and political culture, religious and confessional motives, military force, economic expansion, the degree of consensus enjoyed by the government or dynasty.

The book examines the many still unanswered questions on the diplomacy of the Italian states, while also discussing the quantity and diversity of the archival resources available to scholars who set out to address these questions. One might add to what has already been said about the reluctance of historians to enter these areas of inquiry that, paradoxically, the history of Italian diplomacy has perhaps suffered from an over-abundance of sources. A large proportion of the Italian state archives concern, more or less directly, the exercise and control of diplomatic relations. They contain not only sets of chancellery registers and files of correspondence, the instructions to envoys, their final reports and registers of diplomatic expenses, but also the many documents concerning the European states (edicts, agreements, legal verdicts, legal and political culture, religious and confessional motives, military force, economic expansion, the degree of consensus enjoyed by the government or dynasty.


economic data, descriptions of fortresses, portraits of key personages) that the ambassadors regularly sent back to the peninsula.

The need to take account of the social and institutional aspects of diplomatic practice as well has not only determined the organization of this book as a whole but is also evident in its individual essays. These latter start with the theme of the ‘origins of diplomacy’, which Riccardo Fubini reinterprets in the broader context of the changes that occurred in diplomatic institutions and practices during the passage from the Middle Ages to the early modern age. ‘Residentiality’ as the fundamental outcome of these transformations thus appears tied to very specific cases and situations. In reality, as Fubini points out in his essay on Florence, ‘prolonged embassies only became possible when Lorenzo [de’ Medici] had achieved full power as a result of the reforms of 1480, and they served as political bonds among regimes which provided each other with mutual support in potential situations of crisis’. However, this is by no means to imply that a situation of stable relations – like that of the next century – existed between two states, a conclusion which can be extended to other Italian states as well, ranging from the Milan of the Sforzas studied by Margaroli to the small states of the Po valley analysed by the present writer. Fifteenth-century diplomacy therefore proceeded within a web of mutable alliances, rather than within a network of permanent inter-state contacts. It was a flexible instrument of defence and legitimation for dynasties but not yet a stably organized sector of state business.

It was only from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards that diplomacy became a permanent sector of a state’s activities. As we know, the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) settled the Franco-Spanish struggle for domination of the peninsula in favour of Spain, precluding territorial change in the peninsula (save for some minor variations) until the early eighteenth century. The Peace therefore marked the beginning of alliances and boundaries, institutional forms and power balances which were destined to endure for more than a century. The Italian dynasties, as well as the few surviving republican orders, henceforth devoted their energies to the ‘conservation’ of power and state, while their ambitions and political projects gravitated more towards ceremonial gratification and status-building than towards territorial enlargement or impracticable military or economic expansion.

However, even with the apparently stable framework of pax hispanica,
the Italian states displayed marked heterogeneity in their management of foreign policy, in their elaboration of diplomatic practice, and in their construction of ritual and ceremonial apparatuses. The particular stance adopted by each of the essays in this book, therefore, does not merely arise from its author’s particular preferences but also closely reflects the diverse political, institutional and social dynamics of the Italian states in the modern age.38

Accordingly, of great significance is Alessandra Contini’s contribution to this book in which she reconstructs the institutionalization of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany’s diplomatic activity, examining the ‘normative’ and bureaucratic dimension as well as cultural and social aspects: court relationships, the training and functions of envoys, forms of ceremonial. Before and after their ascent to power, the Medici played their diplomatic game mainly in political arenas external to Florence: at the Roman and imperial courts, and in the mercantile and financial marketplaces of Europe. Thus, in parallel with an internal opposition of aristocratic-republican nature, the diplomatic designs of the Medici regime created a sort of counter-diplomacy of exiles and political refugees convinced that they could counter the rise of the Medici by skilfully forging alliances with the European powers hostile to Spain, principally France. But it was the diplomatic ability of Cosimo, with his adroit manoeuvring between Empire, France, Papacy and Spain, that impeded these oppositions and centrifugal forces from once again upsetting the Florentine order. The ‘new’ prince’s awareness of the precariousness of his power and his fear of revolution seemingly conditioned his every diplomatic initiative. The fruit of largely unpublished archival research, Contini’s study reveals the workings of Cosimo’s diplomacy as the essential instrument of the affirmation and consolidation of Medici power on the European stage. It was not yet a formalized apparatus, however, but preserved the flexibility and adaptability so distinctive of fourteenth-century diplomacy, and above all the close dependence of ambassadors and envoys on the will of the Duke. To borrow an apt expression from Contini’s essay, diplomacy became ‘a free zone in which the sovereign exercised his discretion unhindered’, and in which the search for legitimation by a power aware of the fragility of its legal basis was obvious. This was a dynastic weakness made manifest – despite repeated attempts to conceal it – on the occasion of the celebrated querelle with the Este over precedence between the two houses, which

38 Greco and Rosa (eds.), Storia degli antichi stati, with its final bibliography. The wide variety of institutional arrangements devised by the Italian states emerges very clearly also from Storia d’Italia edited by G. Galasso and published in the 1970s by UTET (Turin), with each of its volumes devoted to a particular state.
Contini reconstructs in detail from previously unexplored archival sources. The biographies presented in her study, beginning with that of Averardo Serristori, a figure exemplary of the passage of Medicean diplomacy from a ‘heroic phase’ to progressive formalization, also demonstrate the ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ enjoyed by the Florentine ambassadors: often recruited from the leading families of the oligarchy, they were anything but simple executors of Cosimo’s orders, reflecting in their behaviour the conflicting pressures of membership of an ancient mercantile oligarchy and political loyalty to a dynasty.

The study by Riccardi examines the origin and functions of the papal nuncios. By means of a clear synthesis of the numerous studies available today on the subject, it shows the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Holy See’s diplomatic representation in the modern age, especially in the period following Gregory XIII’s reform in the latter half of the sixteenth century, when the temporary nunciatures were made permanent and new ones were created.\(^{39}\) As well as examining the figure of the nuncio, Riccardi highlights the value of the concordat as the distinctive expression of the relations between the Holy See and the states of Europe, dwelling on the decline in the Papacy’s mediatory role after the Peace of Westphalia. The growth of the nunciatures and the formation of a diplomatic apparatus are interpreted, in the wake of other important studies,\(^{40}\) as both the outcome and instrument of the ‘modernization’ of the Catholic Church, and also as demonstrating the Holy See’s ability to understand and employ the techniques of European policy developed in the modern age. More recent studies have examined the role and evolution of the pontifical State Secretariat, which supervised the preparation and handling of diplomatic documents and correspondence by secretaries of state invested with the Pontiff’s trust, and who, until 1692, worked under the direct control of the cardinale nepote.\(^{41}\) An area of constant scholarly interest is the correspondence and documents of the nunciatures. These, together with the Venetian diplomatic archives, are undoubtedly the sources most widely used to reconstruct not only diplomacy but also international relations in the modern age. Further


\(^{41}\) On this see M. Belardini, ‘Del “Secretario” e “Secretaria di Nostro Signore”’ Appunti per una ricerca sulle istituzioni diplomatiche della Santa Sede in età moderna’, *Le Carte e la Storia* (Bollettino Semestrale della Società per gli Studi di Storia delle Istituzioni), 2 (1996), pp. 149–54.
indications for research, as well as important results, have been forthcoming from a number of recent conferences which have relaunched Rome’s role as ‘the centre of European politics’, and the function of diplomatic ceremonial as crucially defined and updated by the papal Curia.

The exception in the fragmentary historiographical panorama of Italian diplomacy mentioned above is undoubtedly Venice, whose diplomacy has been the subject of a long-standing and authoritative tradition of studies and editions of diplomatic sources with roots extending into nineteenth-century political historiography. Although in this case there is no lack of research and analysis, the interpretative framework employed by this historiographical tradition today seems outmoded and in need of revision. This is the perspective adopted by Zannini’s essay in this book, which draws on social and institutional history to describe the ‘bureaucratic’ aspects of diplomatic activity, analysed also as an important sector of the civil service and an area of activity for the ‘citizenry’. Thus innovative treatment is given to such classic themes as careers, diplomatic expenses, control over ambassadors, the workings of Venice’s information system, and the chancelleries. But Zannini’s study highlights above all the figure and function of the secretaries, the veritable ‘pillars’ of politico-diplomatic activity both in the Venetian offices and in legations abroad. A careful re-reading of the quantitative data enables Zannini to provide further confirmation for recent scholarly opinion concerning the growth of Venetian diplomacy in the seventeenth century, firstly in relation to the numerous crises – both political (the Interdict, the so-called ‘Spanish plot’, etc.) and military (the war against the Turks in the east, the struggle for Crete) – that beset the Republic during that century, and secondly in relation to the diversification of the reasons for establishing or resuming permanent representation – reasons which ranged from strategic considerations, commercial convenience, political affinities and religious conflict to the need for information. It was these factors that obliged the patrician class to assign diplomatic posts and non-executive tasks to chancellery personnel and the secretaries, who were largely recruited from the ‘citizenry’ and therefore excluded from the decision-making organs of the Republic.

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Since it has not been possible, for reasons of time, to include an essay on Genoa in this book, and because this would have enabled close comparison between the two republics – characterized as they were by similar institutional and social systems but tied to different European alignments – it is perhaps appropriate to mention here certain features of the diplomatic praxis of the Republic of San Giorgio. Even more than Venice, throughout the seventeenth century Genoa displayed an institutional order very different from that of the systems ruled by a prince, which were endowed with rapid and flexible foreign policy instruments. Whereas a distinctive feature of the republics was the determination of their governing bodies to maintain close control over their ambassadors – amongst other things to forestall political and diplomatic scheming that might upset delicate internal equilibria – diplomatic practice in the principalities was based on the ‘personalization’ of the political jockeying typical of their courts, and on a close relationship of trust between ambassador and sovereign. Throughout the seventeenth century, numerous features of the republics’ political life proved incompatible with the style imposed by the great monarchies on the diplomatic game. That ‘secrecy’, for example, was far from being a republican virtue was understood by the Genoese diplomat Spinola: selected, after months of indecision, to represent Genoa at the 1635 negotiations between Rome, Venice and Savoy concerning formation of an Italian league, Spinola remarked bitterly that it was impossible to count on the secrecy and discretion of a Council consisting of 125 persons. And some decades later, another Genoan observed that ‘the architecture of the Republic’s government is not suited to negotiations of state, and unless a restricted junta able to handle political matters is created, everything will collapse’. In the next century, this keen awareness of the weakness of the republican institutions compared with the much more efficient and rapid bureaucratic apparatuses of the sovereigns became a crucial issue of political debate within the republics – an issue raised in eighteenth-century Venice, for example, by Andrea Ton with his proposals for strengthening the bureaucratic powers of the Council of Ten.

But the republics had other problems to contend with, notably those concerning the recruitment of ambassadors and envoys. Apart from the

46 ‘It grew increasingly evident to him [Ton] that what the ancient republics lacked was the nucleus of a bureaucratic state’: ibid., p. 46.
real risks of undertaking a mission abroad, and without the incentive of ‘honour’ (which derived from the presence of a sovereign and the mechanisms of the courtly world), diplomatic posts held out little attraction for the republican aristocracies. Consequently, the exercise of diplomacy in the republics was made an obligatory stage in a citizen’s *cursus honorum*, and it was combined with other inducements, for instance the patrician’s moral obligation to take part in the city’s government, and the dignity of diplomatic service. ‘The ambassadorships are among those things in a city which do honour to a citizen, nor can one summon to the state those who are not suited to such a station’: Machiavelli’s admonition, echoed throughout the seventeenth century in the preambles to legislation *de legationibus* and in treaties, obviously did not suffice to meet the republics’ needs, which consequently introduced laws to punish those who refused diplomatic appointments. The main reason, however, for such reluctance lay in the enormous financial outlay required of the ambassadors, which was only partly covered by the stipends assigned to them. Scrupulous checks were conducted on missions and their costs: at Genoa, a *scriba* recorded every item of spending on the ambassador’s accommodation, travel and board; at Venice, the legation secretaries were created not only to assist the Republic’s ambassadors but also to monitor their spending. In both systems, while the ambassadors submitted final reports recounting the negotiations conducted, the secretaries filed detailed statements of mission expenses with the financial magistracy. The republican regimes obviously cannot be considered to be unique in this respect: while the obligation of diplomatic service was accepted in Venice as a distinctive component in the formation of the governing class, in other contexts, as Berengo has pointed out, there was a sort of ‘instinctive rejection of any aspect of foreign policy that was not tied to, and immediately referable to, the world of the city, and the discomfort suffered by men accustomed to mercantile life when they came into contact with the courts of the princes played a large part in transforming appointment to ambassadorships into a general stampede away from them’. The honours and prestige of the diplomatic function were perceived in the republics as annoying encumbrances and as a pointless distraction from more

48 For examples of laws punishing refusal to accept diplomatic missions see V. Vitale, *La diplomazia genovese*, Milan, 1941, passim.
lucrative business in the city. As a Venetian diplomat remarked, ‘it is no
wonder that many prefer to live privately in Venice rather than as
ambassadors away from it’.\textsuperscript{51}

When in Genoa, in 1659, it was ruled that ambassadors could no
longer belong to the \textit{Minor Consiglio}, the highest legislative body of the
Republic, there was a marked increase in the number of appointees to
ambassadorships who asked to be ‘excused’. The even greater difficulty
in filling diplomatic posts that resulted from the provision forced the
republic to revise it, providing in 1665 that ambassadors could sit on the
\textit{Minor Consiglio} during the last year of their missions. However, exemp-
tion from ambassadorial service was made even more difficult in 1686,
and those wishing to be absolved had to justify their claim in a written
petition.\textsuperscript{52} In the case of the republics it is therefore evident that, in
addition to economic concerns, or anxiety over entrusting their dom-
estic affairs to others, diplomatic appointees were also worried about
being isolated from politics and consequently missing precious opportu-
nities for personal advancement in the city’s power structure.

As said, by virtue of its privileged relationship with Spain, during the
seventeenth century Genoa was able to wield international influence
that far exceeded its real military and political ‘power’. This inter-
national role (which was also Genoa’s role in the Spanish power system)
was commensurate with the Genoese governors’ awareness of the
importance of their state, and also with the republic of San Giorgio’s
aspiration to the royal crown – an ambition nourished in the seven-
teenth century by other states in the peninsula as well. The aristocratic
mentality of the time, which also profoundly permeated relations
between the courts and the dynasties, viewed the increase in formal
honours as adequate compensation for the effective lack of influence of
certain sovereigns, and it functioned in some cases as some sort of poli-
tical ‘dissimulation’ of their political–military marginality.

This was even more the case of the minor Italian principalities, where
the exercise of diplomacy was closely tied to the political designs of
their ruling dynasties as they pursued their various goals: enhancing
their presence and political role on the European stage by creating an
appropriate system of alliances; or – in the case of Tuscany analysed by
Contini’s essay in this book – reinforcing their power at home; or,
thirdly, reviving or maintaining their prestige through exercise of the
virtues of munificence and magnificence, constructing a stately and

\textsuperscript{51} Words spoken by the ambassador Marino Cavalli on returning from a mission to

\textsuperscript{52} Vitale, \textit{La diplomazia genovese}, pp. 14–16.
sacred image of the dynasty and its princes. In the case of small duchies like Mantua and Modena, diplomacy was apparently entirely subservient to dynastic designs, so that domestic politics and diplomacy closely interwove: one constantly finds the same key personages, at different stages of their careers, running government offices, foreign relations and embassies.

It was precisely the dynasties of ancient origin, after passing first through seigneury and then principality, that were most severely disrupted by the War of the Spanish Succession, first in a sequence of political, military and dynastic events which brought the peninsula back to the centre of European politics, even though the final outcome, with the exception of the Duchy of Savoy, was once again that ‘the Italian states played the part of the spoils and the rewards, rather than that of the players’.\(^{53}\) As a crisis of dynastic succession, but also a clash among the conflicting interests of the European powers, the War of the Spanish Succession profoundly altered the configuration of Italy, sanctioning the political and territorial expansion of the House of Savoy and instead revealing the crisis of legitimation assailing ancient seigneurial powers like the Gonzaga of Mantua, whose centuries-long history ended in accusation of treachery and confiscation of their fiefs by the Emperor.\(^{54}\) The Peace of Utrecht decreed England’s success, the decline of French hegemony, and the rise of the Austrian Habsburgs, who gained dominion over the Italian territories previously controlled by Spain. But the Treaty failed to resolve dynastic and territorial questions in the peninsula which would weigh heavily upon later events. The political pattern of Italy and the fate of the Italian dynasties were consequently at the centre of numerous European negotiations in the first part of the eighteenth century: the Treaty of The Hague (1720), which assigned Sardinia to Savoy in exchange for Sicily; the Treaty of Vienna (1738) following the War of the Polish Succession; and the Peace of Aachen (1748), which ensured fifty years of dynastic and institutional stability in the peninsula that enabled each state to introduce reforms and to reorganize its administrative and judicial apparatuses.

The first decades of the eighteenth century marked an important stage in the organization of diplomatic activities and in the definition of the ambassador’s functions. Almost everywhere, the ancient state


\(^{54}\) However, the entire peninsula suffered the consequences of the War of the Spanish Succession, principally states like Genoa whose international role depended on their relationship with Spain: Bitossi, ‘La repubblica è vecchia’, pp. 425ff.
secretariats were reformed to ensure greater efficiency and closer control from above. As part of a far-reaching programme of institutional reform, in 1717 Victor Amadeus of Savoy began reorganization of the State Secretariat, which was now divided according to subject matter, with an independent Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. The management of the embassies was also given more precise definition, both in order to ensure greater continuity of diplomatic action, and to give the sovereign closer control over the work of his representatives. Thus there slowly began the practice of giving priority to the office of ambassador over its incumbent, with a silent revolution in the diplomatic customs of the ancien régime. One may interpret in this light the appearance of the legation secretary, an authentic functionary charged with the twofold task of, on the one hand, monitoring the state’s diplomatic representatives and reporting directly to the sovereign and his bureaucracy and, on the other, ensuring the continuity of activity between one ambassador and the next – or in the event of the ambassador’s incapacity. It was the work of the legation secretaries that led to the accumulation and management, in each diplomatic seat, of the documents that would later grow into full-fledged legation archives, ensuring amongst other things a ‘material continuity’ which enables researchers to grasp and analyse the profound changes that occurred in diplomatic practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries between the Napoleonic period and the Congress of Vienna.  

The Kingdom of Naples displays highly distinctive features throughout the eighteenth century, given that the Bourbon dynasty were obliged to build an entire diplomatic system from scratch. It was therefore a system born already ‘adult’, so to speak, from the experience accumulated by the European states – in particular by Spain, to which the young kingdom was tied by a ‘family pact’. The start-up of international relations by Carlo di Borbone, and the creation of the structures responsible for the administration and control of diplomatic activity, came about in very particular circumstances, with the emergence of new economic and commercial interests in the diplomatic field, on the one hand, and the entry onto the European scene of new powers like Prussia and Russia on the other. Thus the beginnings of Bourbon rule were marked by the ‘heroic’ phase of the creation of the public apparatuses and insti-