The voice of Jesus in the social rhetoric of James

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This investigation concerns itself with the socio-rhetorical function of an apparent allusion to a saying of Jesus in the Epistle of James. It approaches James as an instance of written rhetorical discourse, a text that seeks to modify the social thought and behavior of its addressees. It presupposes a broad scholarly consensus, according to which the text appropriates a tradition of Jesus’ sayings, and it seeks to ascertain the social texture of one particular allusion to a saying of Jesus in James 2.5 by a rhetorical analysis according to Greco-Roman conventions.

The reasons for choosing James 2.5 are significant. First, practically all previous investigations that give serious attention to James’ use of Jesus tradition identify James 2.5 as an important allusion to a saying of Jesus (Deppe, 1989, pp. 89–91, 237–38). Second, this verse occurs in a unified argument (James 2.1–13) which is one of the three rhetorical units that, in the opinion of the scholarly majority, have the greatest potential for disclosing the thought, piety, and style of the text (Dibelius, 1975, pp. 1, 38–45, 47–50). Third, we shall see that James 2.1–13 displays a definite pattern of argumentation that evinces Greco-Roman rhetorical strategies. Fourth, James 2.5 addresses a social issue, conflict between the rich and the poor, which is not only a principal theme in James, occupying almost a quarter of the entire text (James 1.9–11; 2.1–13; 2.15–16; and 4.13–5.6),1 but is also a moral issue of social significance in the Jesus tradition and in much of early Christian literature.2

1 Apparently James’ energetic interest in the “poor and rich” became a prominent feature in NT scholarship with Kern (1835). Almost a century later, in 1921, Dibelius would say: “What is stressed most [in James] is the piety of the Poor, and the accompanying opposition to the rich” (1975, p. 48). See also Mußner (1987, pp. 76–84); Rustler (1952); Boggan (1982); and Maynard-Reid (1987).
2 The literature on this is voluminous; see esp. Dibelius (1975, pp. 39–45, and the bibliography). Also, Keck (1965; 1966); Bammel (1968); Hauck (1968); Hauck and Kasch (1968); Dupont (1969); Grundmann (1972); Finley (1973); Kelly (1973);
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis that guides our inquiry, along with the method of analysis it employs, and to explain further its scope and goal. To do this, we shall address the issue of the relation between James’ epistolary format and its rhetoric. Then, presupposing that James makes use of Jesus tradition, we shall discuss its allusions to Jesus’ sayings as an aspect of its strategy of persuasion. Then, we shall give attention to the relation between rhetoric and its social function as a means of setting the stage for the investigation that follows. Finally, we shall provide an overview of the intended progression of our inquiry.

The Epistle of James and rhetoric

James presents itself as an early Christian letter (1.1). As such it is, according to ancient epistolary theory, “a substitute for oral communication and could function in almost as many ways as a speech” (Aune, 1987, p. 158; Demetrius De elocutione 223–24; Malherbe, 1988, pp. 1–14). From a rhetorical perspective, James is also intentional discourse: it has “a message to convey” and seeks “to persuade an audience to believe it [the message] or to believe it more profoundly” (G. A. Kennedy, 1984, p. 3).

Whereas distinctively literary-critical studies of James focus primarily on the question of what the text is, this study is an exercise in rhetorical criticism, which is that mode of internal criticism which considers the interactions between the work, the author, and the audience. As
such it is interested in the product, the process, and the effect, of linguistic activity, whether of the imaginative kind or the utilitarian kind... it regards the work not so much as an object of contemplation but as an artistically structured instrument for communication. It is more interested in a literary work for what it does than for what it is.6 (Corbett, 1969, p. xxii)

Therefore, the function of James, what the text does or rather what it intends to do, shall be our primary concern.

The functional approach to discourse belongs, traditionally and preeminently, to rhetoric (Bryant, 1973, p. 27). So, when Stanley Stowers (1986a, p. 15) says that NT letters should be thought of more “in terms of the actions that people performed by means of them,” than as “the communication of information,” he expresses a view that is characteristic of rhetoric (as do Meeks, 1983, p. 7; and Malherbe, 1977, p. 50). And this perspective clearly coheres with ancient epistolary theory; for example, the letter handbooks of Pseudo-Demetrius and Pseudo-Libanius list, respectively, twenty-one and forty-one “functional” styles for letters. These are not actual letter types, as Koskenniemi (1956, p. 62) correctly observes, but rather the appropriate styles and tones that could be chosen depending upon both the circumstances involved in writing a letter and the “function” the writer intended to perform through the letter (see White, 1986, p. 190; Aune, 1987, pp. 158–225; and Malherbe, 1992). Moreover, because rhetorical discourse is “an instrument of communication and influence on others” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 513), its inherent social aspect lends itself to an instrumental purpose: the exploration of the intended social function of the discourse.7 Rhetorical analysis can help us to discover the latent intent in James’ rhetoric and to understand how that intent is transmitted to its audience (G. A. Kennedy, 1984, p. 12).

An awareness of the relation that exists between James’ epistolary format or genre and its rhetoric is, according to George Kennedy, “not a crucial factor in understanding how rhetoric actually works” in James’ argumentative units (1984, p. 32). On the other hand, it may “contribute to an understanding of [James’]

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6 Also see Corbett (1971); Bryant (1973, pp. 27–42); Hudson (1923); Wichelns (in Bryant, 1958, pp. 5–42); and Ericson (in Murphy, 1983, pp. 127–36).

rhetorical situation” (pp. 30–36), especially the audience the text evokes and the presence of various features in the text (p. 31). Consequently, we shall return to this issue when we focus on the rhetorical situation. At this point, however, it is advantageous to spotlight the difficulties involved in classifying James as an ancient letter, to state our position regarding this matter, and to clarify why a rhetorical approach to James is appropriate for our inquiry.

Modern scholarship remains divided over the possibility of assessing James as a letter. On the one hand, seminal literary and form-critical analyses (e.g., Deissmann, 1901, pp. 52–55; and Dibelius, 1975, pp. 1–11) have rightly pointed out that James does not appear to be a “real” letter, that is, a confidential communication in response to a specific epistolary situation.

The classification of letters into two fundamental types: (1) “true”/“real” letters, that are private and conversational (such as the authentic letters of Paul, and 2–3 John), and (2) “literary” letters or “epistles,” that are public and artistic (such as 1–2 Timothy, Titus, Hebrews, James, 1–2 Peter, and Jude) harks back to the pioneering epistolary investigations of Deissmann (1927, pp. 233–45). He argued (1901, p. 4) that the “essential character” of a letter is not to be found in its form, external appearance, or contents, but in “the purpose which it serves: confidential personal conversation between persons separated by distance.”

Supporting the view that James is not a “real” letter is the observation that apart from the prescript (1.1) James either suppresses or lacks the epistolary framework and conventions that are customary in the common letter tradition, which includes ancient diplomatic and documentary letters. Diplomatic (royal, negotial, or official) letters are generally defined as those written from a government or military representative to others in an official capacity (Exler, 1923, p. 23), and include royal benefactions and concessions (Welles, 1934; Aune, 1987, pp. 164–65; see Demetr. Eloc. 234; Ps.-Lib. 76; and Jul. Vict. Ars Rhetorica 27). Document-ary (nonliterary or private) letters, to which belong most of the extant nonliterary papyri from Egypt, comprise the largest class of ancient letters and represent the common letter tradition. This

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8 Apparently letter writing began with official injunctions; in time, however, due to the popularity of personal letters, official letters began to reflect the common letter tradition in both form and style. On this see White (1986, pp. 191–93, 218; 1988, pp. 86–87), who draws on Stirewalt (“A Survey of Uses of Letter-Writing in Hellenistic and Jewish Communities through the New Testament Period”).
category comprises letters of recommendation, petitions/requests, invitations, instructions/orders, legal contracts, memoranda, and family or friendly letters (Stowers, 1986a, pp. 17–26; Aune, 1987, pp. 162–64; and esp. White, 1986; 1981b).\(^9\)

Noting James’ aphoristic character, the hortatory tone of much of its content, and its diverse, conventional subject matter which seems to lack a dominant theme and to evince no specific historical location, the scholarly trend has been to view James as a loosely arranged collection of sayings and brief essays or treatises that is merely framed by an epistolary prescript.\(^10\)

Recent studies in ancient epistolography, on the other hand, support the long-held possibility of assessing James as a letter.\(^11\) First, they stress the fact that in antiquity the letter was not only the most popular genre; it was also, due to its incredible elasticity, the most variously used of any literary form (White, 1988; Stowers, 1986a, pp. 15–47). Literary variation was one of the hallmarks of the Greco-Roman world, and motifs, themes, and constituent elements of other genres were frequently subsumed within an epistolary frame and function (Norden, 1983, vol. ii, p. 492; Kroll, 1924, pp. 202–24). In other words, practically any text could be addressed, and could function, as a letter (Aune, 1987, p. 158; Bauckham, 1988). Further, based on the unequivocal variety in both the form and function of ancient letters, scholars now consistently assert that the customary manner of classifying such letters is deficient in both its terminological distinctions and perspectives.\(^12\)

In this light, James’ perceived incongruities with the common letter

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\(^9\) Documentary letters share a number of conventions, themes, and motifs with early Christian letters, especially Paul’s; and, since Deissmann, they have dominated the comparative study of NT letters and have largely determined scholarly assessments of early Christian literature (see Schubert, 1939a; 1939b; and Doty, 1973; cf. Koskenniemi, 1956, pp. 18–53). Klaus Berger (1984c, pp. 1327–40), however, rightly criticizes this approach as too narrow, and proposes that ancient philosophical letters of instruction are more appropriate for comparisons with NT letters.

\(^10\) This is Dibelius’ view (1975, pp. 1–11). On epistolary conventions as framing devices, see Aune (1987, pp. 167–70).

\(^11\) For earlier assessments of James as a literary letter, see Deissmann (1901, p. 4) and Ropes (1916, pp. 6–18).

\(^12\) Deissmann’s terminology: “real” and “non-real,” “private” and “public,” and “specific” and “general” is ultimately misleading. For example, some “epistles” are also “real” letters, and some “real” letters imply a “general,” rather than a “specific,” epistolary setting. On this see Aune (1987, pp. 160–61); Bauckham (1988, pp. 471–73); and K. Berger (1984c, pp. 1327–63). Cf. also Hackforth and Rees (1970); Levens (1970); Dahl (1976); Doty (1969; 1973, pp. 4–19, 23–27); Thraede (1970, pp. 1–4).
tradition are hardly sufficient to preclude its classification as a letter (K. Berger, 1984c; Baasland, 1988). Therefore, while emphasizing that James is not a common, private letter, many hold that it is a type of “literary” letter.

The working definition of the “literary” letter employed in this research is provided by David Aune (1987, p. 165): “Literary letters are those that were preserved and transmitted through literary channels and were valued either as epistolary models, as examples of literary artistry, or as vignettes into earlier lives and manners”; he lists the following varieties: letters of recommendation; letter-essays; philosophical letters; novelistic letters; imaginative letters; embedded letters; letters as framing devices; and letter collections (pp. 165–70; see also White, 1981a, pp. 5–6; Thraede, 1970, pp. 17–77; and Traub, 1955).

In comparing James’ prescript and contents – which suggest a general “circular,” that is, a letter for several communities – with other ancient letters, numerous scholars underscore its similarities with the Jewish encyclical (see Baasland, 1988; Dahl, 1976; Meeks, 1986, p. 121; and Ropes, 1916, pp. 127–28). The latter was a type of letter used for many different administrative and religious purposes. See, for example, the three Aramaic Gamaliel letters (from the Tannaitic period) that are addressed to three regional groups of Diaspora Jews (y. Sanh. 18d; b. Sanh. 18d; t. Sanh. 2.5); the two festal encyclicals in 2 Maccabees (ca. 180–161 BCE): 2 Maccabees 1.1–9 (with a Hebrew prescript), and 2 Maccabees 1.10–2.18 (with a Greek prescript); a prophetic encyclical (ca. 125 CE) in the Paraleipomena of Jeremiah 6.19–25. Moreover, embedded in 2 Baruch is the Letter of Baruch (originally in Hebrew; ca. 100 CE): an unrecorded copy (cf. 77.17–19), described as “a letter of doctrine and a roll of hope” (77.12), was apparently addressed to “our brothers in Babylon” (i.e., “the two-and-one-half tribes in Babylon”); another copy (cf. 78.1–86.3) is addressed to “the nine-and-a-half tribes across the river Euphrates” (texts and discussions of the latter are conveniently found in Pardee, 1982). And this type of letter definitely influenced early Christian letter writing: 1–2 Peter, Jude, and the embedded letter in Acts 15.23–29 evince characteristics of the Jewish encyclical (see also the references to apparent encyclicals in Acts 9.1 and 28.21).

In addition, James’ distinctive character as a direct address or summons and its use of “sententious maxims” (γνωμολογία) and “exhortations” (προτροπαί) move the discourse away from the conversational tone, style, and content of the common private letter toward that of an address or speech. For, “a letter is designed to be the heart’s good wishes in brief; it is the exposition of a simple subject in simple terms. Its beauty consists in the expression of friendship and the many proverbs (παροιμίαι) which it contains . . . But the man who utters sententious maxims (γνωμολογία) and exhortations (προτρεπόμενος) seems to be no longer talking familiarly in a letter but to be speaking ex cathedra” (Demetr. Eloc. 231b–232). Thus, Baasland (1988, p. 3653) correctly says, “Der Jak. ist aber . . . kein Freundschaftsbrief, auch kein Empfehlungs- oder informativer Privatbrief. Eher haben wir es mit einem Bittbrief oder mit ‘Orders and Instructions’ in Briefform zu tun” (“The letter of James is however . . . neither a letter of friendship, nor even a letter of recommendation nor an informative private letter. Rather we have to place it with a letter of supplication or with ‘Orders and Instructions’ in the form of a letter” (cf. K. Berger, 1984c, pp. 1328–29; White and Kensinger, 1976, pp. 79–91).

While this kind of language appears to indicate a measurable distinction for determining the type of letter that James is (Stowers, 1984), it is also extremely important in gauging the social meaning and function that it intends (Mack, 1990, p. 24). For example, speaking from the sociolinguistic perspective, and stressing “the social meaning of language,” M. A. K. Halliday (1978, p. 50) reminds us that: “the whole of the mood system in grammar, the distinction between indicative and imperative, and within indicative, between declarative and interrogative . . . is not referential at all; it is purely interpersonal, concerned with the social-interactional function of language. It is the speaker taking on a certain role in the speech situation.” This also befits the official disposition of the encyclical. Further, James’ concern with moral advice and social issues corresponds significantly with ancient letter-essays.

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14 Baasland (1988, p. 3650) correctly argues that James distinguishes itself among NT letters as a direct summons to its hearers.

15 Ropes (1916, pp. 127–28); Doty (1973, pp. 7–8, 15); Kümmel (1975, p. 408). On letter-essays see Aune (1987, pp. 165–67); Stirewalt (1991); Malherbe (1986); Arrighetti (1973); Cicero, The Letters to His Friends; Canik (1967); Coleman (1974); Betz (1978); Fiore (1986).
and philosophical letters, both of which, incidentally, could also display a remarkably limited use of epistolary convention (Aune, 1987, pp. 167–70).

Letter-essays and philosophical letters (συγγράμματα) are literary letters (see the epistolary theorist Ps.-Lib. 50). While family or friendly letters, “especially when expressed in a cultivated manner,” were deemed by the Greek and Latin rhetoricians “as the most authentic form of correspondence” (White, 1986, p. 218), G. A. Kennedy points out that most writers (including Quintilian, Cicero, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus) apparently regarded letters “as either subliterary or perhaps more accurately as attaining what literary qualities they have by imitation of one of the three literary genres [oratory, historiography, and the philosophical dialogue]” (1984, pp. 30–31; see Dion. Hal. Comp. in W. R. Roberts, 1910, pp. 137–51).

The evidence, then, does seem to suggest that within the vast field of ancient epistolography James may have a place as a type of “literary” letter. For now, therefore, we may tentatively approach James as something of a moral address in the form of an encyclical.

The overlap between letters and rhetoric

Contemporary scholarship increasingly emphasizes the often overlooked fact that, while epistolary theory and rhetoric were not integrated in antiquity, letter writing, at least by the first century BCE, was nonetheless significantly influenced by classical rhetoric, “the theory of persuasion or argumentation.” Rhetoric was in a real sense the dominant culture of the Greco-Roman world: “[it] defined the technology of discourse customary for all who participated [therein]” (Mack, 1990, p. 30; G. A. Kennedy, 1984, p. 5; and Kinneavy, 1987, pp. 56–101).

As the core subject in formal education, rhetoric was evidently

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introduced at the secondary level of the Hellenistic school, when students, in their “first exercises” (*progymnasmata*), were taught to read and analyze literature for its rhetorical principles and practice.19 “One of the results of this merger of literature and rhetoric” was that besides oral discourse, literary composition, including letters, “began to reflect studied attention to rhetorical principles.”20

While it is possible that letter writing may also have been introduced at the secondary level in Hellenistic education, A. J. Malherbe (1988, p. 7) rightly concludes that the evidence is insufficient to make this claim.21 On the one hand, Theon’s *Progymnasmata*, the earliest extant textbook of “preliminary exercises” (ca. mid- or late first century CE),22 mentions letters in the exercise on προσωποποιήματα (“speech-in-character”; Butts, 1987, pp. 444–64). On the other hand, as Malherbe (1988, p. 7) emphasizes, letters are mentioned here not for learning how to write letters, “but to develop facility in adopting various kinds of style.” In other words, προσωποποιήματα involves “writing or giving a speech which reflects the character of another person” (Butts, 1987, p. 460). Moreover, letter writing receives no attention in the earliest surviving rhetorical handbooks (G. A. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 52–79; Malherbe, 1990, p. 30; also 1984; and esp. Mack and Robbins (1989). Among the many scholars who detect the influence of rhetoric in early Christian literature are Church (1978); Jewett (1982); Fiore (1986); and Conley (1987).

20 Mack (1990, p. 30; also 1984); and esp. Mack and Robbins (1989). Among the many scholars who detect the influence of rhetoric in early Christian literature are Church (1978); Jewett (1982); Fiore (1986); and Conley (1987).

21 See Malherbe’s theory that a handbook such as *Bologna Pyrus 5* (a third- or fourth-century CE collection of eleven samples of letters without any introductory descriptions as to their letter-type and evincing no interest in epistolographical theory) may have been used at this elementary level (1988, pp. 4–6, 10; 44–57). Cf. also Rabe (1990); O’Neil’s “Discussion of Preliminary Exercises of Marcus Fabius Quintilianus” (in Hock and O’Neil, 1986, pp. 113–49); Colson and Whitaker (1919 and 1921).

22 Apparently, *progymnasmata* were in use already in the first century BCE (Bonner, 1977, p. 250; Hock and O’Neil, 1986, p. 10; Mack and Robbins, 1989, p. 33). Apart from Theon’s (Walz, vol. i, pp. 137–262; Spengel, vol. ii, pp. 57–130; and Butts, 1987, which is the most recent critical edition), the three most important *progymnasmata* are: (1) Hermogenes’ *Progymnasmata* (second century CE; Rabe, vol. vi, pp. 1–27); an English translation is provided by Baldwin (1928 [1959], pp. 23–38). (2) Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata* (fourth century CE; Rabe, vol. x); English trans. Nadeau (1952). (3) The *Progymnasmata* of Nicolaus of Myra (fifth century CE; in Felten, 1913). There is no English translation of the latter.
1988, pp. 2, 8 note 11); in fact, its earliest mention in a rhetorical treatise (mid-third to first century BCE) belongs to Demetrius De elocutione (223–25).\(^{23}\)

Incidentally, epistolary handbooks, such as Pseudo-Demetrius’ Τύποι Ἐπιστολικοί (first century BCE to 200 CE) and Pseudo-Libanius’ Ἐπιστολιμαίοι Χαρακτήρες (fourth–sixth centuries CE) do not appear to have belonged to this stage in the curriculum. Their narrow concern with epistolography, their rigor in classification, and the rhetorical theory they presuppose combine to suggest that these handbooks were most probably used in the training of professional letter writers.\(^{24}\) Therefore, despite the difficulty of assessing the relation of these two handbooks both to formal education and to the discussion of epistolary theory in general, the frequent violations of letter theory in the actual practice of letter writing leads J. L. White (1988, p. 190) to conclude: “One thing is certain. There was never a full integration of the practice and the theory.”\(^{25}\)

In sum, the judgment of G. A. Kennedy (1983, pp. 70–73) reflects the evidence well: on the one hand, letter writing in antiquity remained on the fringes of formal education;\(^ {26}\) on the other, the influence of rhetoric on both oral (conversations and speeches) and written discourse is undeniable (1984, pp. 8–12, 86–87; 1980, p. 111). One of the dominant cultural contexts for early Christian letters was Greco-Roman rhetoric.

Thus, in this investigation the fundamental approach to James proceeds according to Greco-Roman rhetorical conventions: the statements in this “literary” letter will be interpreted by their

\(^{23}\) G. A. Kennedy (1984, p. 86; see also 1963, pp. 284–90). Cf. Grube (1965, pp. 110–21); and Roberts’ introduction to Demetr. De eloc. (1953, pp. 257–93). This disquisition is most probably incorrectly ascribed to Demetrius of Phaleron (Kennedy, 1963, p. 286). Julius Victor, a minor Latin rhetorician (fourth century CE), provides the earliest mention of letter writing “as part of the *ars rhetorica*” (Malherbe, 1988, p. 3; Halm, 1863). Yet it was not until the Middle Ages that “the rhetorical art of letter writing” (i.e., the *dictamen*), became “a major development within the discipline of rhetoric” (Kennedy, 1980, pp. 185, 186–87).

\(^{24}\) Malherbe (1988, p. 7). Whether the instructors of professional letter writers were also teachers of rhetoric (as Malherbe supposes) or civil servants who were experienced letter writers (as G. A. Kennedy suggests, 1983, pp. 70–73), the epistolary handbooks clearly evince the influence of rhetorical theory.


\(^{26}\) This is noted in Malherbe (1988, p. 11 note 62).
rhetorical origin and function. The basic methodology utilized for our rhetorical analysis is proposed by G. A. Kennedy (1984, pp. 33–38), it consists of five interrelated steps: delimiting the rhetorical unit; analyzing the rhetorical situation; determining the species of the rhetoric, the question and the stasis; analyzing the invention, arrangement, and style; and evaluating the rhetoric. As a matter of course, it applies insights derived from investigations of Hellenistic handbooks, textbooks, and treatises on rhetoric. Moreover, wherever possible, the effort to integrate rhetorical theory and epistolary theory will be made.

James as rhetorical discourse

The high literary quality and rhetorical character of James are readily acknowledged by most scholars. Dibelius’ assessments are representative; he concludes that James is composed “in relatively polished Greek,” and that the vocabulary and the grammar reveal “a certain linguistic cultivation.” He notes the presence of Semitic influences or Biblicisms, but rightly argues that these are “not contrary to Greek usage.” He finds that while James contains a considerable amount of traditional material, the discussion is arranged mostly in obvious groupings in a comparatively uniform “linguistic dress.” And he concludes that the speech and style of James, its distinctive syntactic preferences, and its feeling for rhythm and emphasis demonstrate its “rhetorical character” (Dibelius, 1975, pp. 34–38).

In addition to the rhetorical features mentioned above, which clearly move the discourse away from a common private letter toward that of an address or speech, analyses of James detect the

27 See Bryant (1973, p. 35). Further, as G. A. Kennedy (1984, p. 33) suggests, it is from the rhetoric of smaller units in James that we can perhaps better understand the rhetoric of the whole.

28 An excellent example of this method’s viability is D. F. Watson’s (1988) Invention, Arrangement, and Style: Rhetorical Criticism of Jude and 2 Peter.

29 Mayor (1892 [1990], pp. ccxl–ccxlv); Ropes (1916, pp. 25–27); Chaine (1927, pp. xci–civ); Schlatter (1956, pp. 77–84); Wue¡ller (1978a, pp. 7–11, 62–63); and Baasland (1988, pp. 3650–62).

30 Baasland (1988, p. 3653): “Am besten kann man jedoch den Jak als eine Rede, die Bitte und Befehle/Anweisungen enthält, charakterisieren, die später als Brief publiziert wurde, wie schon die ἐπιστολαῖ Δημοσθένους die Reden des großen Rhetors wiedergeben. Die Briefform ist deshalb nicht vorschnell als eine Fiktion abzutun, was ein bestimmtes Konzept des Privatbriefes voraussetzen würde” (as do Dibelius, 1975; and Deissmann, 1927; though Deissmann, pp. 242–43, did regard James as a “literary letter”). On James as “a speech,” see also Wue¡ller (1978a).
influence of rhetoric in the following: 31 alliteration and assonance (James 1.2; 3.2, 5, 6, 8, 17; 4.1); rhyme (1.6, 14; 2.12; 4.8); perechisis (1.24, 25; 3.6, 7, 17); word plays and paronomasia (1.1, 2; 2.4, 13, 20; 3.17, 18; 4.14); rhythm (1.2, 13, 20; 2.8, 9, 15, 18; 3.3, 5, 8, 14; 4.4; 5.10–11); hexameter (1.17); anaphora (4.11; 5.7–8); epiphora (3.7–8; 4.11, 14); anadiplosis (1.3–4; 1.19–20; 1.26–27); gradatio (1.3–4, 15); parallelism (3.6–7; 5.2–3, 5); chiasmus (1.19–21, 22–25; 3.13–18; 5.7–8); inclusio (1.2–4 and 12; 1.17 and 27; 2.14 and 26); a remarkable similarity in the length of the argumentative units; 32 asyndeton (1.19, 27; 2.13; 3.15; 4.2; 5.6); 33 antithesis (1.4, 5–8, 9–11, 13–15, 26–27, and passim); pleonasm (3.7); synonymia (1.5, 25; 3.15; 4.19); digressio (2.14–26); analogy and example (2.2–4, 15–16, 21–24, 25–26; 3.7; 5.7); comparatio (1.6, 10–11, 23–24; 3.3–4); metaphor (3.2, 6); personification (1.15; 2.13; 4.11; 5.14); irony (1.9–10; 2.19; 5.5); metonymy (1.1); rhetorical questions (2.2–4, 5, 6b, 7, 14a, 14b, 15–16, 20, 21, 25; 3.11, 12, 13a; 4.1a, 1b, 4a, 5–6a, 12); 34 exclamation (3.10b); apostrophe (4.1, 4, 13, 5.1); imaginary dialogue (2.18); and invectives (2.20; 4.4).

In the terminology of Greco-Roman rhetoric, James generally exhibits the characteristics of symbouleutic or deliberative discourse. 35 Such discourse seeks to make an effective difference in a given social history by using exhortation (protrophē) and dissuasion (apotrophē) to persuade its addressees to take a particular course of action in the future (Arist. Rhet. 1.3.3–9). 36

31 With few exceptions, however, analyses that have detected the influence of rhetoric have failed to address the social significance of rhetorical performance. On this issue, see Wuellner (1986; 1987) and Robbins (1984).


33 Schlatter counts 79 instances (1956, p. 84).

34 The RSV adds James 4.14b; 5.13a, 13c, 14a.

35 This is the conclusion of K. Berger (1984a, p. 147; cf. 1984b, pp. 457–61 section 71); Baasland (1982; 1988); and Wuellner (1978a). For example, James may be divided into eight (argumentative) sections (1.1–12; 1.13–27; 2.1–13; 2.14–26; 3.1–18; 4.1–12; 4.13–5.6; 5.7–20); each section is characterized by exhortation and dissuasion that concerns thought and action of social consequence in reference to the future or the present. Cf. Shepherd’s (1956) eight subdivisions of James.

36 συμβουλευτικόν (Arist. Rhet. 1.3.3); συμβουλή (Rhet. 1.3.3; 1.3.9); δημηγορικόν ([Rhet. Al.] 1.1421b.8); δημηγορία ([Rhet. Al.] 1.1421b.13); deliberativus (Rhet. Her. 1.2.2; Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.5.7; 2.1.155–58.176; De Or. 2.81.333–83.340; Quint. Inst. 2.4.24–25; 2.21.23; 3.3.14; 3.4.9,14–15; deliberatio (Inv. Rhet. 1.9.12; Quint. Inst. 3.8.10; Rhet. Her. 3.2–5. In the LCL, see Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica, 1926; Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, 1965; Rhetorica ad Herennium, 1954; Cicero, De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica, 1949; De Oratore, Books I–II, 1942; De
Approaching James in this way, however, requires an awareness of a certain artificiality that exists in classifying rhetoric by different species. Quintilian tells us: “it is quite certain that all the most eminent authorities among ancient writers, following Aristotle . . . have been content with the threefold division of rhetoric [i.e., epideictic, deliberative, and forensic]” (3.4.1). Although Quintilian is himself an adherent of this view (3.4.1), firmly believes that the adoption of the threefold division is “the safest and most rational course” (3.4.12), and contends that “there is nothing that may not come up for treatment by one of these three kinds of rhetoric” (2.21.23), he marvels that “a subject of such great variety” is restricted “to such narrow bounds” (3.4.4). Further, in thinking about the subjects which are treated by each respective division of rhetoric, he notes that in any one discourse “all three kinds rely on the mutual assistance of the other” (3.4.16; see Mack, 1990, pp. 34–35; and G. A. Kennedy, 1984, pp. 18–20). He observes that in epideictic discourses one treats both judicial and deliberative topics, like justice and expediency, respectively; that in deliberative discourses an epideictic topic like honor may be incorporated; and that it is rare not to find something of both deliberative and epideictic in a judicial case (3.14.16). In other words, the classifications of rhetorical species are heuristic, not definitive (see Perelman, 1982, pp. 9–20).

The importance of the latter observation is perhaps especially


37 According to Aristotle (*Rhet*. 1.3.3) there are three species of rhetoric (1.3.3): symbouleutic (συμβουλευτικόν), judicial (δικανικόν), and epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν), which distinguished according to their (A) divisions, (B) times, and (C) ends are as follows. (I) Symbouleutic or deliberative rhetoric (A) is characterized by exhortation and dissuasion (προτροπή and ἀποτροπή, 1.3.1), (B) refers mainly to the future (1.3.4) but on occasion to the present (1.6.1 and 8.7); and (C) has as its end the expedient or harmful (1.3.5); “all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honor and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this” (1.3.5). (II) Judicial rhetoric (A) is divided into accusation and defense (κατηγορία and ἀπολογία, 1.3.1), (B) refers to the past (1.3.4), and (C) has as its end the just or the unjust (1.3.5), and “all other considerations are included as accessory” (1.3.5). (III) Epideictic rhetoric (A) concerns the subjects of praise and blame (ἐπαινοῦς and ψώγος, 1.3.3), (B) refers “most appropriately” to the present but may recall the past or anticipate the future (1.3.4); and (C) has as its end the honorable or disgraceful, and to these “all other considerations” are referred (1.3.5).

38 This complaint is frequently heard in both ancient and modern discussions; e.g., Cic. *De Or*. 2.10.43–12.54; 2.15.62–16.70; Stowers (1986a, pp. 51–52, 91–94); and Aune (1987, pp. 198–99).
pertinent with reference to James on account of its large hortatory content. Because exhortation is a subject that appears to transcend the classifications of rhetorical species and is not systematically treated by the rhetoricians, it may be perceived as particularly troublesome for rhetorical criticism. On the other hand, because exhortation appears so pervasively in the writings of certain moral philosophers, there is considerable discussion of it. According to Seneca (Ep. 94.39), exhortation (adhortatio) is really a type of advice (monitio).39 This at least suggests its affinity with deliberative or advisory rhetoric. In addition, Seneca equates “advice by precept” (praeeceptiva) – which he names as the “third department” of philosophy40 – with παραίνετική, an adjective which generally qualifies a statement as “hortatory” or “advisory” (see LSJ, s.v. παραίνετικός). It is noteworthy, however, that there are problems with Seneca’s “apologetic” usage of praeeceptiva.41 For one thing, it is strictly philosophical and not rhetorical or grammatical (Dihle, 1973); it is used technically with reference to Posidonius’ moral philosophy (Ep. 95.65). Moreover, E. N. O’Neil has pointed out that this “apologetic” usage is questionable. On the one hand, Seneca “gives the Latin word a sense that is outside its normal range of meaning” (Hock and O’Neil, 1986, p. 124);42 on the other, παραίνετική “appears nowhere in the fragments of Posidonius collected by L. Edelstein and I. F. Kidd (Posidonius: The Fragments [Cambridge, 1972])” (Hock and O’Neil, 1986, p. 141 note 27). O’Neil concludes that this is perhaps an indication that the word “paraenetic” had a technical use in both philosophy and rhetoric (p. 124).43

39 Other types of advice, according to Seneca (Ep. 94.39), include: consolation (consolatio), warning (dissuasio), reproving (obiurgatio), and praising (laudatio). See Seneca, Epistulae Morales (LCL, 3 vols., 1917; 1920; 1925).
40 See Ep. 94.48; cf. 94.1 and Ep. 89. Concerning the pars praeeceptiva of philosophy, Seneca writes to Lucilius: “You keep asking me to explain without postponement a topic which I once remarked should be put off until the proper time, and to inform you by letter whether this department of philosophy which the Greeks call paraenetic, and we Romans call the ‘preceptorial’ [praeeptivam], is enough to give us perfect wisdom” (Ep. 95.1; cf. also 95.34, and Appendix A, in Epistulae Morales, vol. iii, pp. 451–52).
41 See the discussion in Hock and O’Neil (1986, pp. 123–24; and also pp. 140–41 note 26).
42 O’Neil notes: “The Oxford Latin Dictionary s.v. praeeptio fails to include this meaning and lists Seneca’s passage under the meaning ‘the inculcation of rules, instructions’” (p. 141 note 28).
43 On the differentiation between προτρητική and παραίνετική, see chapter 2, below.
Another problem of usage with respect to παραινετική is raised by the epistolary theorist Pseudo-Libanius, who would differentiate the paraenetic letter (λόγος παραινετικός) or letter of exhortation from the symbouleutic or advisory letter (λόγος συμβουλευτικός; see Ps.-Lib. 5, in Malherbe, 1988, pp. 68–69). For Pseudo-Libanius the essential difference between paraenesis and advice is that advice admits a counter-statement, while paraenesis does not. Again, this distinction does not derive from rhetorical theory, but is ideological or philosophical. From the point of view of rhetoric (or argument), every statement theoretically admits a counter-statement and is thus subject to debate. Moreover, Pseudo-Libanius’ distinction between exhortation and advice does not cohere with the conceptions of symbouleutic rhetoric in Aristotle (Rhet. 1.3.3), the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1.1421b.8–2.1425b.35), Cicero (Inv. 1.5.7; 2.51.155–58.176; De Or. 1.31.141; 2.81.333–83.340), the Rhetorica ad Herennium (1.2.2; 3.2.1–5.9), Quintilian (2.21.23; 3.3.14; 3.4.15), or Syrianus (Walz, vol. vii, p. 763), nor even with the earlier epistolary handbook of Pseudo-Demetrius.

On the one hand, Pseudo-Demetrius has no reference to the paraenetic letter; on the other, his definition of the letter of advice, as one in which “by offering our own judgment [opinion or advice, γνώμην] we exhort [προτρέπωμεν] (someone to) something or dissuade [ὑποτρέπωμεν] (him) from something” (Ps.-Demetr. 11, in Malherbe, 1988, pp. 36–37) is a rather straightforward example of what the rhetoricians call symbouleutic or advisory rhetoric. Furthermore, Pseudo-Libanius’ definition of paraenesis is itself also the rhetoricians’ definition of advisory rhetoric: “the paraenetic style is that in which we exhort [παραινοῦμεν] someone by urging

44 This point is also made by Perdue (1990). Ps.-Libanius’ epistolary handbook dates from the fourth to the sixth centuries CE, a period in which there was a conscious rapprochement between philosophy and rhetoric. The rigorous distinctions between paraenesis and advice made by Ps.-Libanius possibly derive from that discussion. Perhaps an investigation that focuses on the philosophical understanding of paraenesis and its relationship to rhetorical theory during that later period could provide some clarification of this issue.

45 “Because rhetoric was understood as debate, with two sides to every issue, it was natural for the Greeks to distinguish two contrastive subtypes for each of the three species of rhetoric. These were designated in terms of the overall mode of argumentation that characterized each one . . . In actual practice, however, a given speech might contain all six forms of argumentation at given junctures, depending on the circumstances” (Mack, 1990, p. 34). On the other hand, one of the fundamental reasons some philosophers denounced rhetoricians was that some sophists enthusiastically cherished the ability and willingness to argue both for and against any issue.
[προτρέποντες] him to pursue something or to avoid something. Paraenesis is divided into two parts, persuasion [προτροπή] and dissuasion [ἀποτροπή]” (Ps.-Lib. 5; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1.3.3, 5–6). Thus, while it is possible in certain cases – from a philosophical point of view – to differentiate paraenesis from advice, it is, as S. Stowers notes (1986a, pp. 91–94), practically very difficult to do; and, as a rule, it is not a great issue for the rhetoricians.

Stowers (1986a, p. 93) also points out “a closely related question,” namely, “whether paraenesis or exhortation in general belongs to deliberative (that is, advising) rhetoric or to epideictic rhetoric (the occasional rhetoric of praise and blame).” And he rightly observes, as mentioned above, that exhortation transcends rhetorical categories, inasmuch as it is found in both of the latter species (pp. 51–53, 91–94). According to G. A. Kennedy (1984, p. 146; see pp. 145–47), however, “exhortation (or paraenesis) is one of the two forms of deliberative rhetoric, the other being dissuasion (Quint. 3.4.9).”46 This is further corroborated by Quintilian, who says: “Arguments such as the following belong in the main to the hortative [hortativum] department of oratory: – ‘Virtue brings renown, therefore it should be pursued; but the pursuit of pleasure brings ill-repute, therefore it should be shunned’” (5.10.83). H. Lausberg (1973, vol. ii, p. 717 section 1244; vol. i, p. 210 section 381; see also sections 61.2, and 224–38) also agrees with this and concludes that the hortativum genus is the genus deliberativum. Moreover, G. A. Kennedy’s and Lausberg’s view coheres with J. Martin’s summary of advisory rhetoric (1974, pp. 167–76).

According to the rhetoricians, the fact that paraenesis is incorporated within epideictic discourse need not invalidate exhortation’s fundamental rhetorical categorization as symbouleutic, any more than the presence of praise in a symbouleutic discourse invalidates its fundamental categorization as epideictic (Rhet. Al.

46 Quint. (3.4.9) refers to Anaximenes (see [Rh. Al.] 1.1421b.7–23), equates hortandi and dehortandi with προτρεπτικόν and ἀποτρεπτικόν, respectively, and argues that they are “clearly deliberative.” Cf. Aune (1987, p. 199): “The two basic forms of deliberative rhetoric, persuasion [protreptic or exhortation] and dissuasion, included not only advice but also most of the features associated with moral and religious exhortation: encouragement, admonition, comfort, warning, and rebuke.” In antiquity the terms παραίνεις and προτροπή are familiar as synonyms (cf. Burgess, 1902, esp. pp. 229–34). Despite this, some scholars have pressed for an (artificial and patently) technical distinction between these terms. This matter will be taken up in chapter 2.
1.1427b.31–34; cf. Cic. *De Or.* 2.82.333–83.336; and G. A. Kennedy, 1980, pp. 167–76). Further, the presence of exhortation or praise in a discourse does not automatically determine its rhetorical species. What does determine the species is the overall context in which the exhortation or praise occurs. Thus, for hortatory statements, G. A. Kennedy maintains that the issue is whether the exhortations “inculcate belief without calling for action, in which case they are epideictic, or [whether] they exhort the recipient[s] to a particular course of action, in which case they are deliberative” (1984, p. 147).

Consequently, in our analysis of James we will treat exhortation and advice as interchangeable. This seems to reflect the predominant, familiar usage of the terms in the ancient sources. Similarly, the analysis will presuppose that exhortation (paraenesis or protropē) and advice belong primarily to deliberative rhetoric, though they are by no means limited to it. Again, this appears to be the predominant understanding in the rhetorical theory of both the Greco-Roman world and the most eminent contemporary historians of classical rhetoric.

James’ allusions to sayings of Jesus and rhetorical theory

One of the most fascinating features of James’ rhetorical discourse is its use of Jesus tradition, namely, its numerous allusions to sayings of Jesus. In “Der geschichtliche Ort des Jakobusbriefes,” G. Kittel (1942, p. 84) asserts: “Es gibt keine Schrift des NT außer den Evangelien, die so mit Anklängen an Herrnworte gespickt ist wie er” (“There is no other writing of the NT outside the Gospels, which is so enhanced with echoes to the Lord’s words as is James”). Though there is much speculation and debate about the origin, form, and content of the tradition known to James, there is a broad, scholarly consensus that this document reflects a widespread terminological, material, and religio-historical appropriation of a tradition of Jesus’ sayings in its discourse. The text at no time attributes a saying to Jesus; rather, it alludes to sayings that

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47 See also Kittel (1950/1, pp. 54–112, esp. pp. 83–109). For criticism of Kittel’s historical conclusions about James, see Aland (1944) and Lohse (1957); cf. also von Campenhausen (1972, pp. 103–46, esp. 118–22).

48 On the similarity of James’ sayings and those of Jesus, see esp. Dibelius (1975, pp. 28–29).
other Christian texts attribute to Jesus. In other words, this discourse attributes the wise sayings of Jesus to “James, a servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ” (1:1).50

From a rhetorical perspective, the echoes of or allusions to Jesus’ sayings are an important aspect of that part of persuasion the rhetoricians called invention (εὑρεσία, inventio). The art of rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is “the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion on any subject” (Rhet. 1.2.1), and this art consists of five parts: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.52 Of the five parts, invention is the most important.53 Invention refers to the process of finding and selecting the “proofs” (πίστεις; ἐπιχειρήματα) that, from the speaker’s point of view, would make a convincing argument for the audience.54 The process includes determining the species of rhetoric, the question or cause in the debate, and the stasis or main points at issue.55 This means that invention is primarily conceptual or ideational and only

49 That James is a wisdom document is clearly the consensus among NT scholars; see Dibelius (1975, pp. 1–57); Meyer (1930); Thyen (1957), Lohse (1957), Gertner (1962); Reicke (1964); Ward (1966b); Kürzdörfer (1966); Luck (1967; 1971; 1984); Halson (1968); Thomas (1968); Kirk (1969); Francis (1970); Poehlmann (1974); Hoppe (1977); Wanke (1977); Davids (1982); Baasland (1982); Popkes (1986).
50 I hold that James is a pseudonymous, Jewish-Christian letter. The “James” to whom the letter is attributed is most probably James, the brother of Jesus. See chapter 6, pages 201–02.
51 “The technique of allusion assumes: (1) an established literary tradition as a source of value; (2) an audience sharing the tradition with the poet; (3) an echo of sufficiently familiar yet distinctive elements; and (4) a fusion of the echo with the elements in the new context . . . It usually requires a close poet–audience relationship, a social emphasis in literature, a community of knowledge, and a prizing of literary tradition” (Preminger, 1974, p. 18, as quoted in W. G. E. Watson, 1984, p. 300). See chapter 4, below, pages 114–16.
52 Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.7.9; De Or. 1.31.142; Rhet. Her. 1.2.3; Quint. 3.3.1. See G. A. Kennedy (1984, pp. 12–14, 15–30); D. F. Watson (1988, pp. 18–27). Of the five parts of rhetoric, only invention, arrangement, and style have immediate pertinence to our study; memory and delivery will not be discussed, inasmuch as they concern oral discourse.
53 The first two books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric deal with invention (see G. A. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 87–103). Cicero says that invention “is the most important of all the divisions, and above all is used in every kind of pleading” (Inv. Rhet. 1.7.9; cf. Quint. 3.3.1–6). See Lausberg (1973, vol. 1, sections 260–442); J. Martin (1974, pp. 15–210); and Perelman (1982, pp. 3–4).
secondarily linguistic: it “deals with the planning of a discourse and the arguments to be used in it” (G. A. Kennedy, 1984, p. 13).  

To understand invention in rhetorical theory and practice, one should recall that rhetorical “proofs” are of two kinds. The first kind are extrinsic (ἐξεξοντοί) to the art of rhetoric, such as laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths (Arist. Rhet. 1.2.2; 1.15.1–33; Quint. 5.1.1–7.37). These proofs evoke authority “from outside” the immediate context. The second kind are intrinsic (ἐνεξοντοί) to rhetoric, being drawn from the case in question (Arist. Rhet. 1.2.2; Quint. 5.8.1–14.35). These intrinsic proofs inhere in the three universal factors of the rhetorical or argumentative situation: the speaker, the audience, and the speech itself. According to Aristotle (Rhet. 1.2.3), these factors are respectively the sources of the three modes of intrinsic or “artistic” proof: ethos, which concerns the character and credibility of the speaker (Rhet. 1.2.4; 1.8.6; 2.1–17; 3.7.6; 3.16.8–9; Quint. 6.2.8–19); pathos, which concerns the mood and emotions of the audience (Rhet. 1.2.5; 2.1–17.6; 3.7.1–7; 3.17.8; affectus, Quint. 6.2.20–36; 8.3.1–6); and logos, which concerns the reasoning and argumentation in the discourse (Rhet. 1.2.6–22; Quint. 5.8.1–10.19). Moreover, argument has two forms: deductive proof or the enthymeme (Rhet. 1.2.8, 13–18; 2.22–26), and inductive proof or example (Rhet. 1.2.8, 13; 2.20.1–9; Quint. 5.11.1–44). Finally, in constructing arguments, the speaker or writer has recourse to both the common and specific topics (τόποι), that is, “places” where it is possible to find arguments or lists of arguments and argumentative techniques (Arist. Rhet. 1.2.21–22; 2.18.3–19.27; 2.23–24; and Topica; Cic. Top. 2.8; Quint. 5.10.20).  

Of particular importance for our purposes is the form of inductive proof called “judgments” (κρίσεις) or recourses to ancient authorities.  

56 The classical understanding – that rhetoric is primarily conceptual and secondarily linguistic – is apparently forgotten or ignored by scholars who typically reduce rhetoric to literary style “or elocution, the study of ornate forms of language” (on this, see Perelman, 1982, pp. xvii–xviii; 3–4; cf. G. A. Kennedy, 1984, p. 3; Wuellner, 1987, esp. pp. 450–54). The conceptual basis of rhetorical behavior is, however, fundamental (see Baldwin, 1924 [1959], p. 43).  


to legal precedents, but “in philosophical, educational, and ethical environments of thought,” as Vernon K. Robbins points out, “judgments can have a much wider reference” (Mack and Robbins, 1989, p. 28). This coheres with Quintilian’s view that judgments include “the opinion of nations, peoples, philosophers, distinguished citizens, or illustrious poets,” as well as “common sayings,” “popular beliefs,” and “supernatural evidence” (5.11.36, 37, 42–44). So, while generally presented as either a primary or supporting argument, “a well-known saying in the culture may function as a judgment about some aspect of life and its challenges” (Mack and Robbins, 1989, p. 28). Therefore, Robbins stresses that while “some early Christian literature uses quotations or allusions from scripture as judgments . . . sayings of Jesus appear to be the primary resource for judgments about life and its responsibilities in the Synoptic tradition” (p. 29).

Against this background, then, the sayings of Jesus to which James alludes appear to manipulate a tradition that is a widespread social possession of early Christians. By making statements that have an intertexture that resonates with sayings that circulate throughout early Christianity as sayings of Jesus, the text relocates judgments traditionally attributed to Jesus by attributing them to James. These statements, then, are neither haphazard nor mechanical appropriations of tradition, as Dibelius and others have argued. They manipulate tradition in a specific way that has social ramifications for traditions about Jesus, James, and early Christianity. Most of all, however, this manipulation of tradition provides clues to the social location of the thought that manifests itself in the discourse of James (see Rohrbaugh, 1987; and Robbins, 1991a).

James’ rhetorical discourse and its social function

To argue that the discourse in James intends to evoke a social response in the thought and behavior of its addressees and that it offers clues to the social environment or location of thought that stands behind and in the discourse, is merely to lay claim to understandings that are elemental in the classical conception and

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60 On the sayings of Jesus and their character as a social possession, see Kelber (1981, esp. pp. 1–43).