The Moral World of the Law

Edited by
PETER COSS
Contents

List of contributors  ix
Preface  xi

1 Introduction  1

PETER COSS

2 The language of law in Classical Athens  17

S. C. TODD

3 The autonomy of Roman law  37

ANDREW D. E. LEWIS

4 Local participation and legal ritual in early medieval law courts  48

WENDY DAVIES

5 Due process versus the maintenance of order in European law: the contribution of the ius commune  62

PAUL HYAMS

6 Inside the courtroom: lawyers, litigants and justices in England in the later middle ages  91

PAUL BRAND

7 ‘Nemo mortalis cognitus vivit in evo’: moral and legal conflicts in a Florentine inheritance case of 1442  113

THOMAS KUEHN

8 Law, litigants and the construction of ‘honour’: slander suits in early modern England  134

MARTIN INGRAM

9 Story-telling and the social imagery of religious conflict in nineteenth-century French law courts  161

CAROLINE FORD
Contents

10 ‘Their idea of justice is so peculiar’: Southern Rhodesia 1890–1910
   DIANA JEATER 178

11 Kenyatta’s trials: breaking and making an African nationalist
   JOHN LONSDALE 196

12 Conclusion
   CHRIS WICKHAM 240

Index 250
Any historian of the law or of legal records is bound to confront, sooner or later, the question of the autonomy of the law. In its crudest form, the notion of autonomy suggests that the law possesses internal structures which operate independently of the society within which it is situate. These structures may have the capacity to act as a separate causal agent. In recent years legal historians have been moving away from this approach. Historians of the English common law, for example, have been much concerned to enlarge the scope of their inquiries and to shift from the ‘legal functionalism’, or ‘evolutionary functionalism’, of the common-law mind which has long dominated the subject. Exactly how the legal historian should now proceed is problematic. The general widening of the project of legal history has been accompanied by a stark realisation that the subject of law in history involves more than the juxtaposition of ‘law and society’, ‘law and economy’ and so on; more than the setting of text within context. Yet few serious scholars of the subject would be happy to subscribe to the antithesis of autonomy, the idea of law and legal practice as mere reflexes or expressions of social value and social change; still less with the law as constitutive, mechanistically, of an ideological superstructure. Most would have at least some sympathy with the manner in which E. P. Thompson voiced his famous reaction against this:

I found that law did not keep politely to a ‘level’, but was at every bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of production and productive

---

1 I would like to thank Joanna Innes and Chris Wickham for their helpful comments on a first draft of this introduction.
2 For the practical, legal consequences of this view see below, Andrew D. E. Lewis, ‘The autonomy of Roman Law’, p. 37.
relations themselves (as property-rights, definitions of agrarian practice) and it was simultaneously present in the philosophy of Locke; it intruded brusquely within alien categories, reappearing bewigged and gowned in the guise of ideology; it danced a cotillon with religion, moralising over the theatre of Tyburn; it was an arm of politics and politics was one of its arms; it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigour of its own autonomous logic; it contributed to the definition of self-identity both of rulers and of ruled; above all, it afforded an arena for class struggle, within which alternative notions of law were fought out. Not surprisingly, revisionist theses tend to take a two-way traffic as axiomatic: ‘law shapes society and its social activities, while its rhetoric, structure and procedures can be regarded as a reflection of society’s own perceptions of (and attempts to reproduce and change) social reality’. For some this hardly goes far enough. In the USA the so-called ‘Critical legal writers’ or ‘Critical scholars’ in their reaction against the traditional legal discourse – in both its ‘formalist’ and its ‘realist’ manifestations – have dismissed even the idea of the ‘relative autonomy’ of legal structures as insufficiently theorised. For them, law and society are so inextricably mixed, so deeply imbricated with one another, to use Thompsonian phrasology, as to render such a conception otiose. In short, law is ‘omnipresent in the very marrow of society’. In consequence the debate around how best to pursue historico-legal inquiries is a long way from being resolved.

Meanwhile, social and cultural historians have been turning to legal records with a new agenda, the reconstruction of the mental world of their chosen subjects. Most spectacularly in early modern studies, involvement in the law, and the language deployed in that involvement, has been seen to forge a direct entree into the lives of individuals and of their communities. The new accent upon language, in the wake of the so-called linguistic turn, has shown that it is not only in the words themselves that one can perceive the interpenetration of law and society but in the narrative and linguistic strategies employed. It is here that critical theory has been brought

5 E. P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory* (London, 1978), p. 96. At the same time, Thompson was perfectly well aware that the law operated formally under its own rules, rules which could be difficult for the outsider, even an upper-class outsider, to penetrate. See *Whigs and Hunters* (London, 1975), ch. 10, section iv.


effectively into play. For historians employing the historical record of the law in new, or for that matter in the old, ways it is clearly a vital matter that the relationship between what went on in the courtroom and what went on in the society outside of that courtroom should be properly understood.

For these, and other, considerations, therefore, it seemed to Chris Wickham and myself that the time was ripe for a direct confrontation with the issue of the courtroom and society, and that this was an ideal theme for a Past and Present conference of the classic type, ranging across historical time and across space, and complementing the earlier and highly successful conference on the study of disputes and settlements. A conference on The Moral World of the Law was duly held at the University of Birmingham on Friday 12 and Saturday 13 July 1996. The idea of a separate moral world, with its Thompsonian overtones, seemed to us to offer the most immediate prospect of entering into the legal experiences of people in the past. Accordingly, our speakers and discussants were given a specific brief, which was to look at some of the following issues: how legal rituals, and the culture of the courtroom itself (including the modes of discourse permissible in it), differ from those of the rest of society; how these rituals are generated (whether by legal theory, legal practice, the cultural assumptions of the ruling class, or all three); whether they are internally consistent – for there are often several, competing, legal systems in a given society (canon versus civil law, Roman versus local law, ‘native’ versus colonial law, and so on), all of which may be more or less opaque to outsiders; and how much coercive power they really have. We were also interested in whether periods of sharp institutional change could be identified, when the relationship between law and everyday morality gets particularly out of sync, and in the ways in which access to the practical knowledge of the law may be gendered or class bound.

Not all of these issues were addressed, at least not to an equal degree, and the conference took us in some unexpected directions. The theme itself, if not an aunt sally, was slightly tongue in cheek in that it tended to presuppose the issue in question, i.e. whether or not there were indeed such separate moral worlds and whether or not we should approach the legal record in this way. As is normal with such proceedings, the essays published here do not represent all of the papers and discussants’ rejoinders that were delivered. Several represent fuller and further thoughts on the part of the

13 What follows is taken from the advance notice of the conference in Past and Present, 146 (February, 1995), pp. 188–9.
discussants and one, by Andrew Lewis, was specially commissioned to help produce, as it were, a more rounded volume. At the conference Roman law, if not exactly the spectre at the feast, was at least an absent presence. Most speakers referred to it, none directly addressed it. We are most grateful that Andrew Lewis and Paul Hyams have significantly filled this gap.

The volume begins, as did the conference, with Stephen Todd’s paper on ‘The language of law in Classical Athens’. Todd takes us directly into the question of the autonomy of legal language which, he points out, has two distinct though related dimensions. On the one hand there is ‘a technical legal vocabulary which non-lawyers are in danger of mis-using’, while, on the other, there is language used in legal contexts which ‘has autonomy of meaning over the intention of its users’. Athenian law lacked the formalism of Roman and other ancient legal systems; indeed, it lacked even the degree of formal linguistic usage present in modern civil- and common-law systems. There are a number of reasons for this. Essentially, Athens lacked the means by which precise legal terminology could arise. The necessary preconditions were simply not present. Statutes tended to be imprecise in their meaning, a profession of jurists failed to develop, and the fact that most cases were decided by the verdict of several hundred dikastai – without discussion and by majority vote – left no room for authoritative rulings to which one might subsequently appeal. In a carefully nuanced essay, to which a brief précis is in danger of doing violence, Todd takes us through the use of language by litigants, or more precisely by the logographers or ghost-writers who produced speeches for them, showing how the system worked through the art of persuasion rather than the reception of established interpretation and rules. The language and the rhetoric, however sophisticated, needed to be comprehensible by an essentially non-professional court, where litigants spoke on their own behalf. However, this is not to say that the language of the court and the language of the street were mutually exchangeable. Ordinary words did develop specialised meanings in the courts. What they did not do was to develop autonomous meanings which carried independently of their users’ intentions.

The lack of a specialised legal profession did not mean, however, that people were not advantaged or disadvantaged before the courts. Participation – as dikastai, as witnesses and as public officials, and of course as litigants – was wide in democratic Athens; or it was for adult male citizens. As large numbers of dikastai were required, many male citizens would have become quite experienced in the ways of the court. This inevitably created difficulties for others, whatever the level of transparency in the proceedings. Strangers, for example, could be significantly disadvantaged. Metics, the free non-citizens who were resident in Athens, enjoyed only limited participation while women, who could not testify, were represented
by male citizens when litigants and rarely seem to have been present in court. We find that those who had social influence outside of the court are likely to have had distinct advantages inside the court too. Rich men who had financed public works had reason to feel that they were in credit with the citizens who would be giving their verdicts. The drama of the court had much in common with Athenian theatre, not least in that the cases were judged by non-experts: ‘what made the process “democratic” was not that poor contestants would have stood an equal chance if pitted against rich ones, but that it was the démos (common people) which was allocating the prizes among the elite’.\(^{14}\) Just as the Athenians lacked the autonomy of legal language, so they appeared to have lacked the notion that the operation of the law was autonomous from outside pressures. Indeed, this appears to have been a Roman construct, and has been traced to Cicero in the first century BC.\(^{15}\) One might also reflect that as far as the law courts are concerned the practical advantages possessed by the rich and otherwise socially advantaged in human society are not necessarily dependent upon access to legal counsel and other professional expertise. In some societies the relationship between power and influence inside and outside of the courtroom can be much more direct.\(^{16}\)

When we turn to Roman law we are, needless to say, in a radically different world. Andrew Lewis, in ‘The autonomy of Roman law’, elegantly re-examines the development of legal autonomy from the time of Cicero in the first century BC through the classical period in Roman law, from the first century AD to the beginning of the third. In so doing he tells us a great deal about the relationship between jurists, advocates and judges and their respective relationships to the law. Two principal factors combined to promote autonomy. One was the separation of the roles of jurist and advocate. The other was the primacy of procedure. The jurists, the legal specialists whose writings were transmitted to posterity through Justinian’s codification of the law in the sixth century, developed ‘a highly specialised framework of peculiarly juridical argument’. Consequently, it was ‘no longer sufficient to present a court with a series of arguments drawn from commonplaces about honesty, justice and piety’.\(^{17}\) The advocates (orators, not lawyers), who represented their clients in court, became detached from the legal consequences of their pleading, while the judges, who were laymen or officials and generally lacking in legal training, were required to pay...
attention to the detailed arguments of the law according to criteria presented, via a rather complex mechanism, by jurists. The outcome of cases was much dependent upon precedent with only marginal interaction with ‘general moral and ethical thought’. The situation is encapsulated in an anecdote by Aulus Gellius in his *Attic Nights*, written during the first century AD. Called upon to act as judge in a case of debt, he found that his instincts favoured the creditor as opposed to the debtor, who was of ill repute. However, the failure of the plaintiff, without witnesses, to make a *prima facie* case meant that he should find for the defendant. Gellius consulted a philosopher, Favorinus, who urged him to proceed on moral grounds. But this did not help him. As he would have no option but to reach his decision upon formal grounds as directed by the jurists and their rules Gellius asked to be relieved of his case. The dictates of conscience were thus external to the court and should not intrude upon its peculiar moral world. Nevertheless, there must always have been ways in which external pressures could bend the law. Most interestingly, Cicero’s speeches reveal that advocates sought to obfuscate the issues in such a way as to impede the application of the law.

Justinian’s reification of the writings of the jurists in his *Digest* led the way to their magisterial treatment during the legal revival that began in the late eleventh century. In his ‘Due process versus the maintenance of order in European law: the contribution of the *ius commune*’, Paul Hyams examines the decisive moment in the appropriation of Roman legal thinking by the medieval world. He shows how the West’s ‘highly significant differentiation’ – from ancient Athenian and early medieval law, for example, as much as from non-western systems – ‘came as a result of choices made in the period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries’. As a result of the legal revolution of the period 1175 to 1215 lawyers came to refer to the principles they knew to be common to western Christendom as the *ius commune*. Hyams outlines the characteristics of this *ius commune*, concentrating on its concept of natural rights and its protection of the individual in the courts through the *ordo iudicarius*, the high medieval equivalent of ‘due process’, itself a term coined in fourteenth-century England. He points out, however, that procedures were not employed uniformly in the middle ages but varied according to gender, social status and reputation, and he adds the cautionary note that ‘mere notions of fairness, however attractively packaged in maxims, are likely to be ineffective until they are provided with procedural teeth’. The long reach of medieval principles into the modern world is illustrated through the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the US Constitution. The principal long-term significance

---

18 Hyams, below p. 62.  
19 Hyams, below p. 75.
of the *ius commune*, arguably, is that the notions of human rights that we see as ‘self-evident’ are so ‘engrained’ in our culture as to give ‘the illusion of their indisputable rightness’, and it is this illusion which underlies much of the conflict between western and non-western ideas in the modern world.\(^{20}\)

Hyams also points out that we seek two barely compatible goals from our legal system; both safeguards for ourselves under the law, and protection against the criminal activities of others. The tension between these two desires was as present in the early centuries of the *ius commune* as it is today, and he traces the development of summary process alongside ‘due process’ from the formation of the ‘persecuting society’, as R. I. Moore famously put it, in the thirteenth century onwards.\(^{21}\) One of the most absorbing features of this discussion is the frequent use of legal maxims. Their usage here reflects the fact that they were in themselves ‘one of the routes by which the teachings of the *ius commune* passed into the legal culture of the west’. In an appendix Hyams examines why legal maxims should have so developed and have carried the legal weight that they did. But their significance is greater even than this. Some of them passed from the law into other dimensions. Hence their appearance in literary texts. In a call for further research on the subject, he suggests that those maxims that reached a general public ‘must have contributed in many ways of which we currently know very little to inform ordinary folk (those whom lawyers call laymen) what law was about’.\(^{22}\) Maybe they were assimilated to the general compendium of proverbs, to be deployed in similar ways. Here, perhaps, is a novel way of approaching ‘the boundaries of the law’s autonomous domain within western culture’,\(^{23}\) of examining what Robert Gordon calls its ‘positive feedback loop’.\(^{24}\)

In ‘Local participation and legal ritual in early medieval law courts’, Wendy Davies examines the situation in western Europe from the seventh to the tenth centuries, prior that is to the legal revolution which Hyams describes. She finds that there were considerable similarities across time and space and across language groups. In those we can designate rulers’ courts litigants usually spoke through advocates, and women necessarily so, although these advocates (Ireland excepted) were not generally professional lawyers. There was a heavy emphasis upon correct procedures and courts were highly ritualised. Although many of the rituals may appear to the twentieth-century observer as quaint, and the language arcane, below the surface there was broad consistency in practice and much of what went

\(^{20}\) Hyams, below p. 62.


\(^{22}\) Hyams, below p. 90. \(^{23}\) Hyams, below p. 84.

\(^{24}\) Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’, p. 60.
on was in essence mundane. It was the ‘emphasis on right order’ which ‘pro-
claimed both the existence of a distinctive system and its separation from
“everyday life”’. Tellingly, Davies points to the existence of contempt of
court – for producing false written evidence, for example, or for sending a
substitute to answer a charge – which in itself indicates ‘systems with their
own rules and own logic’. In this sense, the courts constituted a world
apart, but they tended nevertheless to be large public gatherings and, as in
ancient Athens, this appears to have added rather than detracted from the
courtroom as the scene of dramatic performance. Some of the drama took
place, in fact, outside of the court as a designated space; in the highly ritu-
alised walking of the boundaries, for example.

Rulers’ courts were often political instruments, and there is no necessary
separation between judicial and political functions. However, it was not
only rulers who manipulated courts for personal ends. They tended to be
seen by litigants as ‘an instrument for securing personal advantage’. Partici-
ipation in the law courts may have been wide, but it was restricted to
only a proportion of the population – those who were adult, male and free.
As in the ancient world, the unfree played little or no part. Serfs are to be
found at rulers’ courts claiming free status. When they did so they were
likely to be defeated. Unfamiliarity with the courts and inexperience in the
use of evidence generally told against them. They could be defeated by
superior witness or on the basis of written texts. Peasants seeking fairer
treatment would often fare no better. Even where, as at Fiesio in the ninth
century, a group of peasants challenged a written text in a fairly sophisti-
cated way, they were defeated by the greater ingenuity of their monastic
opponents. Written evidence, ‘part of the special apparatus of the world of
the law’, was highly selective in the benefits it conveyed.

Most importantly, Davies contrasts rulers’ courts with local courts. The
latter differed in important respects. The litigants tended to speak for them-

25 Davies, below p. 54. 26 Davies, below p. 53. 27 Davies, below p. 58.
28 Davies, below p. 61. 29 Davies, below p. 61.
which specialised in civil pleas. From around 1270 the formal records of the court, the plea rolls, are supplemented by unofficial law reports, produced for the most part by law students (apprentices) who were present in the court. Unlike the plea rolls which are in Latin and in indirect speech, the law reports are in French, the language actually spoken in the court, and are in direct speech. They afford us the kind of access into the deliberations of a law court which we lack for almost any previous time or place. Rarely did litigants speak for themselves in this court, although they were not formally barred from doing so. Most employed attorneys to act on their behalf. Attorneys, however, did not plead for their clients but acted as intermediaries between them and the court. Anyone could be appointed attorney but increasingly it became the preserve of the ‘exclusively male, professional attorneys’. What the reports reveal in detail is the pleading dominated by highly experienced professional lawyers, the serjeants at law. Generally speaking, the litigants were thus at two removes from the court, separated by the attorneys who handled their cases and then serjeants who spoke on their behalf. Litigants (or their attorneys) could be asked to avow (that is, confirm or deny) what was said on their behalf, but as often as not those litigants were not even present in court. In one respect, Brand argues, the employment of professional serjeants could have been of particular value to lower-class litigants: ‘For a man of lower social standing engaged in litigation with a man of higher social standing, it may have been valuable to have someone speaking for him whose very appearance and way of speaking was not a constant reminder to the court of the relative position of the two sides in the case.’

The rich, of course, could be advantaged through their personal contacts with the professionals. On one occasion we learn of a judge inviting himself to sit alongside the judge who was presiding over a case, as a ‘well-wisher’ of one of the parties, a fact that was the subject of a later complaint.

It was partly the language itself that made much of the pleading inaccessible to lay people. It was not just that it was in French – although by 1300 it could no longer be relied upon that even members of the gentry automatically spoke French – but because the vocabulary had become technical and specialised. The law reports reveal the phenomenon once again of words bearing meanings in a legal context which they did not possess outside. There is little wonder that the court was a classroom as well as a court of law.

In common with other contributors, Brand reflects on the resemblance between litigation and dramatic performance: serjeants spoke as if playing a part; people, including judges, made entrances and exits; props were

---

30 Brand, below p. 95.
brought in; the demeanour of a litigant might be noted – one defendant was said to be ‘sighing’ and ‘in tears’. The court was not the sedate forum suggested by the formal plea rolls, but a lively, even rowdy place. Above all, everyone had their role to play. The judges intervened in a variety of ways. After a man admitted that he was of unfree condition, a judge directed his lord to ‘take him by the neck, as your villein’. Part of a judge’s role seems to have been to introduce a note of humour into the proceedings. Brand suggests that they may have been the only people who were truly at their ease in the court. The coarseness of some of the reported humour may reflect the fact that this was a drama in which all the parts were played by men.

In ‘Moral and legal conflicts in a Florentine inheritance case of 1422’, Thomas Kuehn argues that ‘the historian needs to come to grips with specific and not generic forms of moral and legal dilemma’. The case in question arose from the will of ser Viviano di Neri Viviani, one of Florence’s wealthiest citizens. Two issues were contested between one of Viviano’s eight sons, Giovanni, and the hospital of the Innocenti, testamentary beneficiary of Giovanni’s brother, Ludovico. One of the issues revolved around the legal technicalities resulting from the several types of substitution. It was effectively decided by the Florentine jurist, Benedetto Barzi, and his fellows. In a fascinating display of verbal dexterity and specialised learning – combining acute clausal analysis and centuries of juristic commentary – they resolved the issue in favour of the hospital. The second issue went to arbitration, but in practice the arbitrators sought resolution, once again, from the jurists: this time the college of jurists of Genoa. The underlying conflict was born of tensions between brothers and between the demands of the family and the demands of the soul. What the jurists contributed to the dispute, however, was not ‘a perception of conflict or of the interests at stake’. ‘They brought a professional expertise that could determine what rules to apply, a presumed impartiality even when retained by litigants, a type of charisma captured in their wax seals and textual citations, and a certainty of judgement.’ The parties themselves, however, were not entirely ignorant of the law and its potentialities. The law itself contained ambiguities to be exploited by those parties and their professional counsel. They could do so because of another set of ambiguities, those surrounding the contemporary ideology of inheritance. Both family interests and individual rights warranted protection. It is the potentiality for conflict here which demands that the modern commentator should view a case such as this from an anthropological as well as a legal perspective. In short, what we see is a complex interaction between

---

31 Kuehn, below p. 113. 32 Kuehn, below p. 131.
familial and charitable expectations and the law. It was an interaction in which the law ‘in its technical richness and complexity gave shape to the moral and legal claims’ of the parties.\textsuperscript{33}

As with inheritance in fifteenth-century Florence so with slander in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. In his ‘Law, litigants and the construction of “honour”: slander suits in early modern England’, Martin Ingram takes a broad sweep in which he illustrates the constant dialogue between ‘the arcane laws that constrained would-be litigants’ and ‘the streetwise strategies that enabled plaintiffs and defendants to exploit these rules to their own advantage’.\textsuperscript{34} A major complication here was the existence of rival systems of law, comprising the church courts as well as a variety of secular jurisdictions. As a result, ‘the lines of demarcation cut across the realities of argy-bargy on the streets, in the fields, and wherever else that people quarrelled and fought’.\textsuperscript{35} In the highly litigious society of Tudor and early Stuart England there were many possibilities open to litigants seeking to save themselves from ignominy, but they had to know which court provided the best means of redress in their particular circumstances. They had to know, for example, which words were actionable in common law and which were not. If, in broad terms, the law reflected the social needs of the time, it also helped to shape that society, and not least in its gender relations. What is apparent is that defamation cases need to be interrogated extremely carefully if they are to be brought to bear effectively in understanding the sexual mores of society. Ingram shows, for example, that the incidence of female agency in matters of sexual reputation is exaggerated if one takes the suits at face value. In many cases women were attempting to clear the names of both themselves and their husbands, or indeed acting on the man’s behalf. Controversially, again, he argues that in Tudor England there were slanderous words to denote a sexually lax man which approached that of ‘whore’ in their acerbity: ‘whoremaster’ and ‘whoremonger’, for instance, ‘knave’, and, sometimes, ‘rogue’. In the late sixteenth century the secular courts decided that such words as ‘knave’ and ‘rogue’ were ‘words of choler’, without definite meaning, and hence were not actionable. As a consequence of legal decisions the sexual connotations of these words atrophied. The double standard in sexual matters was not constant in its intensity but varied, with legal considerations playing a major role in determining those variations. The decline in the communal regulation of morals in post-Restoration England, and after, may well have liberated male sexuality more than female, intensifying the differences in how their respective reputations were defined. The ensuing partly ‘deregulated’ world was also one in which ‘the construction

\textsuperscript{33} Kuehn, below p. 121.  \textsuperscript{34} Ingram, below p. 135.  \textsuperscript{35} Ingram, below p. 142.
of honour or reputation was less dependent on the moral world of the law’.36

Caroline Ford turns to close examination of the actual narratives presented in court. As she points out, story-telling is a normal part of any legal system, and these systems seek to formalise the conditions under which the stories are told. Nevertheless, the study of such narratives ‘provides a window on to the social and moral categories of a given society as well as hidden and sometimes unspoken cultural codes and societal fears’.37 In ‘Story-telling and the social imagery of religious conflict in nineteenth-century French law courts’ she examines the case of the nun, Jeanne-Françoise Le Monnier, who in 1845 brought a case over her incarceration within her convent and subsequently in an insane asylum, seeking both damages and the right to re-enter her order. Her story was presented by her lawyer in the form of a mémoire judiciaire, a phenomenon inherited from the Old Regime which became a type of popular pamphlet literature and a major factor in the formation of popular opinion. Such mémoires judiciaires were written with a wide, popular audience in mind as well as the court. Ford shows how the mémoire of Jeanne-Françoise drew on the widely read claustral literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We see its familiar plots and its characteristic imagery, we see its strategy of narrative constructed in the first person to enhance the ‘immediacy and pathos’ of the story, and we see direct references to popular works of literature; in short, we see ‘the devices of theatrical melodrama’. Jeanne-Françoise Le Monnier is presented to the court as the romantic heroine of a Gothic novel. As her lawyer taps into the anticlericalism, even anticlerical hysteria, of contemporary France, what opens up in front of us is not only the social stereotype of the cloistered nun but also what Ford calls the ‘collective fantasies of claustration’. This nun’s story, mediated through the skilful constructions of her lawyer, an anticlerical republican male with his own political agenda, both appeals to and draws its inspiration from the popular imagination.

Ford presents the historian of court narrative with three dimensions: the manner in which those narratives draw on pre-existing moral categories and assumptions, whose origins are external and anterior to the court; the constraints imposed by the social and political, as well as the legal, contexts in which they are told; and the historical moment as determinant not only of the types of case that come prominently before a court but also of the manner in which they are presented. In consequence, such cases ‘are often themselves markers of social, political, or moral preoccupations that in turn shape the way in which stories are ultimately told in legal courts’.38

36 Ingram, below p. 160. 37 Ford, below p. 162. 38 Ford, below p. 177.
Passing now to the world of colonial studies, Diana Jeater in “‘Their idea of justice is so peculiar’: Southern Rhodesia 1890–1910’ takes us directly into the clash of legal systems and the worlds they represented or, more accurately in view of what has gone before, of the moral worlds of which those legal systems formed a part. The cases that came before the District Magistrate and the local Native Commissioner at the town of Melsetter in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries indicate an almost unbridgeable gap between the Roman-Dutch criminal law administered by the British South Africa Company on the one hand and native law on the other. The decision to leave the latter intact as ‘civil law’ meant that the administrators were forced to confront a moral world very different from the one they understood as ‘civilisation’. The crux of the problem was that African law was ‘restorative’, that is to say it functioned in terms of ‘recompense and reparation’ and knew no distinction between criminal and civil law, while European law was ‘retributive’ on the criminal side and ‘contractual’ on the civil side. Which jurisdiction a case would be brought to was often a matter of choice. However, the problems went far deeper than the choice of process. In observing the outcome we are brought face to face with the European sense of ‘self-evident’ and ‘engrained’ principles to which Paul Hyams has referred. While the Africans found the idea of retribution ‘futile and unpleasant’, the notion of compensation for crime was ‘actively abhorrent’ to white administrators. In fact, they frequently conflated the Africans’ notion of compensation with the (for them) mere payment of a fine. Through a close examination of cases deriving from the custom of bride-wealth (lobola) – the means by which the prospective husband or his family compensated the wife’s in return for her person – Jeater demonstrates the utter incomprehension of the white administrators when faced with an alien worldview. Since for them marriage was ‘an event not a process’, the bride-wealth could be understood only in terms of the singular, one-off, purchase of a bride. Any infringement of the custom was consequently seen as a breach of contract. In short, the ‘entire African bridewealth system was viewed through contract and tort-tinted spectacles’. \(39\) This could lead to judgements that were incomprehensible in African eyes, as for example when a widow was allowed to return to her own family but only if they paid the lobola to get her back. When the whites experienced abhorrence at ‘barbaric’ practices they were viewing, it was often in their own misinterpretation of those practices that their abhorrence chiefly lay. Thus the ‘sale’ of women was found distasteful because the ‘complex web of patronage and kinship which the bridewealth relationship encompassed was crudely misinterpreted as the open-ended transfer of disposable goods’. \(40\)

\(39\) Jeater, below p. 188. \(40\) Jeater, below p. 192.
In ‘Kenyatta’s trials: breaking and making an African nationalist’, John Lonsdale shows white inability to comprehend the moral world of a colonial people being displayed in full view of the world’s press. The trial of Jomo Kenyatta and five others opened at Kapenguria on 3 December 1952. The charges were management of an unlawful society, conspiracy to forcibly administer oaths, incitement of disaffection and the promotion of ill-will and hostility between different classes. The aim was to convict Kenyatta after due process. As the British press later reported on the verdict, he was to enjoy all the advantages of British justice in ‘a trial of scrupulous fairness’. The world would then appreciate Kenyatta’s guilt which would be open for all to see. The trial reveals, *inter alia*, a deep trust in the autonomy of the law on the imperial side: ‘The legal cement of the empire-commonwealth was the common law, based on the universal validity of judicial precedent and respect for the liberties of individuals who are deemed to be equal. It was more of a tie than parliamentary democracy, the crown or even cricket.’\textsuperscript{41} This was a political trial, sure enough, but it was not a show trial. Notwithstanding the deep presumption of Kenyatta’s guilt, there was always the possibility of Kenyatta’s acquittal, an eventuality much feared in certain quarters within Kenya.

The ideological force of autonomy was shown at the trial itself. One fascinating episode was when the presiding magistrate insisted that the leading defence counsel be tried for contempt for asserting to British MPs and the press that the handicaps he faced amounted to a denial of justice on the part of the British government. As Lonsdale points out, contempt was a lawyer’s issue, turning on English precedents. It was not of great interest to the African defendants. For them, the resulting delay in their trial amounted to ‘a Christmas break’. The contempt issue failed to reinforce the principle that politics had no place in the court; on the contrary, its effect was to bring the political nature of the trial into sharper relief. Due process was supposed ‘to produce forensic fact by shutting politics out’. In reality, politics constantly intruded. How could they not in the circumstances of the trial? Nor is it surprising that, in practice, the proper rules of procedure were not adhered to. Unproven prior knowledge was allowed and the magistrate proved to be a player not an independent arbiter. As Lonsdale says, the ‘majesty of the law did not beyond doubt cast out partisan white interest with pedantic procedure’.\textsuperscript{42}

While much revolved around supposed understanding of the African way of life, the trial actually revealed profound ignorance on the part of the magistrate and the respective counsel. Why was this? At the heart of Kenya’s agrarian problem there lay a clash of moral worlds, in the classic

\textsuperscript{41} Lonsdale, below p. 215. \textsuperscript{42} Lonsdale, below p. 215.
Thompsonian sense: the one was peasant, the other capitalist. In essence, for the white settlers the Kikuyu squatters were – or at least they should have been – a rural proletariat, for whom they had no responsibility beyond the payment of a wage. This attitude tore at the heart of African understanding of the relationship between land and labour. For them their very presence on the land conferred rights: ‘To African farmers land was people and authority, land was labour and obedience. The equation was reversible. People were land, obedient labour deserved land from a patron.’\(^43\) The problem lay much deeper, however, than a clash between legal perceptions. In any case, the notion of ‘customary law’ was itself a difficult one, closely bound up with colonial politics. The fundamental clash was between legal and moral memory. If the imperial power failed to understand this, it equally failed to understand the deep divisions within African society on how the community’s rights to land should be understood. On one level this was a division between political theories; on another it was a rift between chiefs and juniors, between ‘elderhood’ and ‘impatience’. It was this rift which gave rise to Mau Mau. How could the authorities understand when the basic colonial official on the ground, the district commissioner, saw his role as a civilising one? As Lonsdale puts it, they were ‘Trustees of their African wards, they were schoolmasters in modernity’\(^44\).

At his trial Kenyatta’s responses were often unintelligible to the court or wholly misunderstood. On one level he was perhaps content that they should be. Many of the contributors to this volume have affirmed the dramatic nature of court proceedings. In this case the drama unfolded in a global arena. Kenyatta probably realised at the outset that by fully participating in the trial he would ultimately win through. Not that he would be acquitted – which was always unlikely despite the paucity of genuine evidence against him – but because the global audience would make him the star of the show. This show became a contest between ‘nationalism’ and ‘imperialism’; the Kapenguria trial ‘dramatised the decline of empire’\(^45\).

In his Conclusion to the volume, Chris Wickham characterises the ‘three rough categories of legal practices’ in relation to civil society as they emerged at the conference: the relatively unprofessionalised legal system, where the moral world of the law is analogous to that of society though by no means synonymous with it, the professional legal system whose crucial feature has been shown by several contributors to this volume to be not so much the written law itself as the role of its legal professionals, and the imported legal system, where the law had no roots in the society to which it was being applied. Even within the second and the third of these categories, however, it is rare for the law to remain impervious to the moral values

\(^{43}\) Lonsdale, below pp. 204–5.  \(^{44}\) Lonsdale, below p. 199.  \(^{45}\) Lonsdale, below p. 231.
of at least some sections of its laity. As Wickham observes, the interpenetration between law court and society, its circumstances and its consequences, is likely to remain a focus of research, both specific and cross-cultural, for some time to come. Drawing on recent work in the anthropology of law as well as the studies presented in this volume, he suggests some specific lines of future inquiry, focusing on the strategies deployed by litigants and lawyers, the specific ways in which their narratives actually functioned in court, and the relationship between the strategies chosen by them and the dominant power relations within their respective societies. At the same time he conveys some of the flavour of the lively, rich and intellectually generous debate which characterised the conference.