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Becoming mindful of biology and health: an introduction

*Michael Siegal and Candida C. Peterson*

Despite the large amount of investigation devoted to cognitive development, it has been only recently that attention has come to be directed to children’s understanding of biology and health. The aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive view of the research that has been accomplished to date on development of children’s biological understanding, its relevance to health issues, and applications in educational and legal settings, and to offer prospects for the future.

In this introduction, we examine alternative theoretical and methodological approaches to what children know in this vital area. First, we give a historical background in terms of the knowledge and beliefs about biology and health that were held by lay adults and health professionals in the nineteenth century. Such consideration leads to the conclusion that magic and religion as well as science retain prominent roles in the explanation of illness. In this respect, three contemporary research orientations – Piagetian, naive theory and conceptual change, and adaptive-evolutionary – are discussed in terms of predictions for what children can and do know about the mind–body distinction, processes of birth and death, illness transmission, food selection, pain, and the nature of disease prevention and cure. We then turn to considering the extent to which the predictions generated by these orientations differ from adults’ expectations of what children can and do know, and how different types of methodologies may reveal the extent of children’s knowledge. Although young children may not be credited with a full understanding, new evidence suggests that they are constrained towards learning about biology and health and possess an implicit “skeletal” causal knowledge that is highly dependent on the nature of the problem and the way in which it is encountered. This knowledge may be used as a basis for preventive health education.

Views on biology and health in the nineteenth century

Knowledge of biology and the implications for health cannot be considered independently of concepts of disease that are influenced by culture.
Reznek (1987, p. 211) has addressed two key questions: “Do we invent diseases or do we discover them? Do disease judgments express value-judgments or are they purely descriptive judgments?” According to Reznek, some putative diseases are not diseases because they do the individual no harm. However, the notion of “harm” can be broadly constructed so as to extend rather than limit conferral of disease status on a person’s physical or mental condition. Shweder et al. (1997), for example, maintain that there are three moral codes and that each have implications for health: (1) an ethics of autonomy that aims to protect individual freedom and promote individual choices; (2) an ethics of community that aims to protect the duties and hierarchies in communities; (3) an ethics of divinity that aims to protect the soul and spirit of humans against pollution and degradation. Harm may thus occur not only through restricting individual liberty but also through violating family and community obligations or engaging in behavior that jeopardizes the divinity and purity of the self such as through the ingestion of disgusting substances.

On this basis, a broad concept of disease emerges in that diseases are invented by those who make and share judgments of harm in relation to one or more moral codes. But at the same time, as Reznek (1987) points out, the conferral of disease status is restricted by the need to determine that the objects of such judgments have distinct identities that are grounded in biology. For prediction, treatment, and cure, we need to be able to determine whether the causal agents of disease share the same explanatory or unique natures. In this respect, contagious diseases such as hepatitis and tuberculosis certainly qualify as these have a biological basis and there is a consensus that such diseases cause harm in relation to one or more moral codes. Alcoholism and smoking – or even masturbation and homosexuality to use Reznek’s provocative examples – can be classified as diseases if these are judged to be harmful in keeping with the ethics of divinity and if the identity of these “diseases” can be established in terms of a physiological addiction rather than one that is learned. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that a judgment that harm has occurred is incompatible with a position of relativism in that those who judge are set against those who disagree.

During the nineteenth century, both physicians and lay people granted disease status to conditions that were viewed to reflect moral vices rather than unique biologically determined identities, and beliefs about the nature of illness that are tied to visible events have endured in the twentieth century throughout innumerable societies (Murdock, 1980). As Thomas (1997, p. 18) has observed, the commonest reaction to severe sickness throughout modern British history has been to ask, “What have I done to deserve this?” To the extent that morality accommodates the biological determination of disease, moral codes endure such as
aspects of Christianity and Judaism that focus on the importance of cleanliness and hygiene that have a clear biological utility (Thomas, 1997, p. 29).

In nineteenth-century North America, the most frequent interpretation of ailments labelled as disease was that these were due to leading an immoral lifestyle. This was the case for cholera epidemics that affected New York in 1832 and 1849. Rosenberg (1962) documents the common belief that those who succumbed to cholera were morally depraved in that they lived in filth and squalor, were intemperate, were not gainfully employed, and did not attend church. When people of substance did perish, it was suspected that they had engaged in secret moral vices. Many doctors held an “atmospheric” theory of the transmission of cholera in that those who breathed filthy air were likely to become ill. They often rejected the proposal that cholera has a contagious basis as the acceptance of such a theory would mean that persons from all walks of life could succumb to the epidemic and thus jeopardize the moral structure of society. Even by the time of the third epidemic of the century in 1866, only one in seven North American doctors believed in some kind of germ theory of the transmission of cholera (Rosenberg, 1962, p. 199). Instead, many subscribed to the view that the “intemperate” would be predisposed to drink filthy water. Only slowly did the medical profession and lay people come to accept that cholera could be prevented through destroying micro-organisms and education about hygiene rather than through fasting and prayers.

Even more vehement was the resistance against accepting the role of micro-organisms in the transmission of venereal disease. Most authorities in nineteenth-century America believed that the epidemic of syphilis and gonorrhoea in the United States was due to punishment for leading an immoral lifestyle involving sexual promiscuity and consorting with prostitutes (Brandt, 1987). The treatment prescribed by doctors was justly seen as painful and thus appropriately punitive. Doctors often attempted to conceal the cause of suffering if possible from reputable patients and their spouses. At all costs, it was to be kept out of the newspapers. Though there were those who advocated sex education as a means of preventing the spread of disease, frank discussion of venereal disease was often condemned as an exaggerated risk that could jeopardize marriage. It is often held that talking about sexually transmitted disease would encourage undue interest in sex and lead to wickedness and sin. Similar beliefs are present today among many adults in both industrial and non-industrial societies. They exist as formidable obstacles against efforts to prevent the spread of AIDS, as well as sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis, gonorrhoea, and herpes that remain in massive numbers, affecting millions each year throughout the world.
The heterogeneity of explanations for specific diseases that were held by adults in nineteenth-century America and Britain persist now. These draw on magic and religion, as well as science, and reflect an imperfect relationship between increasing age and cognitive development in the domain of biology. Rather than confining their explanations of disease to conceptions that are limited to biology and heredity, contemporary adults commonly view illness in terms of divine punishment or a “price to be paid” for genius and exceptional achievement or a “modern way of life” that involves the debilitating effects of diet and work (Herzlich and Pierret, 1986). Thus it is hardly surprising that there are numerous accounts of what children can and do know about the biological identity of specific diseases as distinct from judgments based on considerations of harm.

**Approaches to conceptualizing what children can and do know about biology**

Piagetian accounts

A good deal of the work on children’s understanding of biology has been influenced by the seminal work of Piaget. According to Piaget ([1932]1977), young children have a belief in immanent justice. They believe that transgressors against adult authority will inevitably meet with a mishap and that adults are so powerful that they can enlist inanimate objects to punish the naughty.

Piaget’s method was to present stories to children aged 6 to 12 and to probe for responses. For example,

There was a little boy who disobeyed his mother. He took the scissors one day when he had been told not to. But he put them back in their place before his mother came home, and she never noticed anything. The next day he went for a walk and crossed a stream on a little bridge. But the plank was rotten. It gave way and he falls in with a splash. Why did he fall into the water? (And if he had not disobeyed would he have fallen in just the same?)

According to the results reported by Piaget ([1932]1977, p. 243), 86 percent of 6 year olds believe in immanent justice as an explanation for the mishap declining to 34 percent by age 11–12.

Kister and Patterson (1980) gave similar stories to children aged 4 to 9 years to examine the development of conceptions of illness. Again there was a strong relationship between age and belief in immanent justice. Compared to older children, 4–5 year olds were more likely to say that illness such as colds result from disobedience of parents. Nevertheless, from the Piagetian viewpoint on immanent justice, there is no such thing
as “clear-cut” stages (Piaget, [1932]1977, p. 257) – a qualification that has been echoed by researchers over and over again in the decades since Piaget first wrote on the topic.

Following Piaget, Bibace and Walsh (1979, 1981) proposed a stage analysis of children’s knowledge of the causes of illness. Children between 2 and 6 years of age account for illness by immediate temporal or physical cues. People are said to catch colds from magic, or from the sun, trees, or God. Disease is defined in terms of a single perceptual event that is relevant to their own experience. Later children say that colds are caught when someone else goes near them and when touched by sick persons. Thus physical contact may be seen as important in the transmission of some illnesses, and that these may involve the ingestion of germs. Finally, at approximately 11 years of age, they give “formal-logical” explanations. There is a differentiation between external and internal causal agents. While a cold may be transmitted by an external agent, the illness is located within the body and develops in multiple external systems through the malfunctioning of internal structures. Children may describe colds as transmitted by viruses and consisting of blockages in the sinuses and lungs.

In fact, according to Bibace and Walsh, young children may regard all illness as contagious and believe that toothaches, as well as colds, can be caught by proximity to a sick person. Because children do not reason about causality, they may view illness as punishment. Bibace and Walsh speculate that the clinical usefulness of a Piagetian theory for the prevention and treatment of illness in children is to alert health professionals to children’s immature understanding in order to promote empathy with their irrational fears. For example, health workers should be told that children may find closeness to a sick person unnerving. Because children have only a limited appreciation of the nature of contagion, they may want to be moved lest they catch the illness themselves. This situation may involve the need for health workers to prepare children for possible distress or to take measures to prevent this distress from occurring in the first place.

Though Bibace and Walsh (1979, p. 285) observe that “children’s beliefs and assumptions about health, illness, and medical procedures differ dramatically and in unexpected ways from those of adults,” they are careful to note that even adults may not have a well-formed scientific view of illnesses such as heart disease. They go to some lengths to recount incidents such as one in which a 30-year-old woman explained to her family doctor that the pain in her side resulted from having touched her sister who was under a “curse.” Both children and adults may be prone to immanent justice explanations in an environment where alternatives are
not available or are unappealing (Siegal, 1988; Nemeroff and Rozin, 1994). In their respective chapters (2, 5, and 6), Inagaki and Hatano, Kalish, and Taplin, Goodenough, Webb, and Vogl consider the extent to which a Piagetian analysis of children’s biological knowledge can apply to voluntary and involuntary bodily processes, the understanding of contamination and contagion, and knowledge of the determinants of pain. Moral overtones are also seen to be pervasive in the incisive chapter 8 by Nemeroff and Cavanagh on the development of perceptions of body image.

Theory change account

Carey (1985, 1995) has proposed that that the heterogeneity in which children respond on measures of their cognitive development reflects reasoning on tasks that is specific to the domains of knowledge in which these are situated. Thus there is no need to appeal to general Piagetian stages as an explanation of development.

According to Carey (1995), young children’s ideas about biology go through two phases of development. In the first phase, from the preschool years to approximately age 6, children learn facts about the biological world. For instance, preschool children know that animals are alive, that babies come from inside their mothers and look like their parents, that people can get sick from dirty food or from playing with a sick friend, and that medicine makes people better. As Carey points out, knowing these facts is an impressive achievement, and children certainly benefit from having this sort of encyclopedic knowledge as a basis for making decisions and learning new facts. Having access to a mass of biological facts, however, is quite different from having a “framework theory” of biology. A framework theory (Carey, 1995; Wellman and Gelman, 1992; Keil, 1994) involves the connecting of facts to create a coherent, unified conceptual structure. Carey and her colleagues have claimed that it is not until the age of 7 years or so that children begin to construct a coherent framework theory of biology, through a process of “conceptual change.”

One of the most important conceptual changes that occurs within children’s biological knowledge is the construction of the category “living thing” from two initially separate categories of plants and animals. As an example, young children tend to deny that plants and animals share any biological properties. They commonly say that plants aren’t alive, can’t die, don’t eat or move. After the age of 6 years, children’s knowledge undergoes a conceptual change and restructuring, and the concepts of plants and animals become joined to create a new biological concept “living thing.” Carey and her colleagues have proposed that other con-
ceptual changes occur alongside the development of a concept of living thing. For instance, the concept of “not alive” becomes more precise, so that children differentiate biological death (the cessation of bodily function) from the concepts “inanimate” (as in a telephone is not alive) and “unreal” (as in Bugs Bunny is not alive). Another concomitant conceptual change is a new concept of babies. Young children see the origin of babies in terms of the intentional behavior of parents who purchase them from stores or who manufacture them and place them in the mother’s tummy; by contrast, older children and adults recognize that babies originate from intercourse that is intentional and that babies then grow by themselves through cell reproduction that occurs through nourishment and protection within the womb (Carey, 1985, p. 58).

Of particular concern is whether or not children have an understanding of properties that are transmitted through biological inheritance and those that are transmitted by cultural influences such as through non-biological, adoptive parentage. According to Solomon et al. (1996, p. 152), “to be credited with a biological concept of inheritance, children need not understand anything like a genetic mechanism, but they must have some sense that the processes resulting in Resemblance to Parents differ from learning or other environmental mechanisms.” Based on this criterion, they claim that previous research in which it is concluded that young children have an explanatory biological framework is flawed as it does not provide a clear comparison of how children regard the respective contributions of biological and adoptive parentage (Gelman and Wellman, 1991; Springer, 1992; Springer and Keil, 1989).

To support the position that young children do not have an explanatory framework in the domain of biology, Solomon et al. carried out a series of four studies. In study 1, children aged 4 to 7 years were asked to indicate whether a child born to a biological parent but adopted by another would be more like one than the other in his or her physical traits and beliefs. The children were told a story about a little boy, who, depending on the counterbalanced version of the story, was born to a shepherd but grew up in the home of a king or vice versa. Before proceeding with the testing, the children were asked two control questions to ensure their comprehension in the sequence, “Where was the little boy born? Where did he grow up?” They were then asked questions concerning, for example, pairs of physical traits and beliefs such as, “When the boy grows up, will he have green eyes like the king or brown eyes like the shepherd?” and “When the boy grows up, will he think that skunks can see in the dark like the shepherd or that skunks cannot see in the dark like the king?” Many of the 4-year-olds answered that both physical traits and beliefs are determined environmentally. Not until 7 years of age did children often report that physical
traits are associated with the biological parent and beliefs with the adoptive parent. The results of study 2 indicated that preschoolers recognize that physical traits cannot change whereas beliefs can change. However, their judgments of whether beliefs can change were dependent upon whether this change was desirable or not. Study 3 replicated the results of study 1 using female story characters as did study 4, in which an attempt was made to lessen the environmental focus of the stories by showing the children only schematic pictures of the adoptive mothers rather than pictures of their homes.

The important findings of Solomon et al.’s research suggest that only after age 6 do children start to differentiate biological from cultural influences within a framework theory of biology (see also Solomon and Cassimatis, 1999). Resistance to training about the nature of biology simply means that the child’s whole theory must undergo a restructuring. Whether children can and do understand these issues is taken up by Springer and by Slaughter, Jaakkola, and Carey in their chapters (3 and 4).

Adaptive-evolutionary accounts

Naive framework theories such as those proposed by Carey have often been viewed to operate on the basis of domain-specific constraints that reflect the problem solving that is evolutionarily adaptive (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994). Vosniadou (1994; Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992, 1994) claims that such constraints can be seen as “entrenched presuppositions” that are resistant to change as these are constantly confirmed by everyday experience. In the domain of physics, for example, children’s early models of the earth appear to be constrained by two beliefs: (1) the earth is a flat plane (the “flatness” constraint) and (2) unsupported objects fall “down” on an up–down gradient (the “support” constraint). Thus they initially have the misconceptions that people live on a world that contains a flat surface, that the sky is above the earth rather than around, that the earth moves around the sun, and one could reach and fall off the “edge” of the earth. Theory revision can be very difficult to achieve when the information to be acquired is inconsistent with these presuppositions. In fact, in some cultures, indigenous cosmologies may come to rival those of western science in that children may readily construe the information presented by the culture as consistent with the flatness and support constraints. For example, children in India often ascribe to the Hindu religious mythology that the earth floats on an ocean that provides separation from “nether worlds” populated by other beings (Samarapungavan et al. 1996).
Yet it is by no means certain that presuppositions such as the flatness and support constraints must be entrenched and that misconceptions inevitably flow from these. The significance of evolution goes beyond the notion that exerts constraints on early cognitive development in the form of entrenched presuppositions that are confirmed by everyday experience. Rather evolution can be seen to have a more powerful role in development in relation to a process of cultural evolution. For example, Australian Aborigines have exceptional visuo-spatial memories that are highly adaptive in tracking and pathfinding in deserts (Kearns, 1981). Australian children generally are advanced in their geographical and astronomical concepts; even preschoolers often express the beliefs that the world is shaped as a sphere, that one cannot fall off the edge, and that the earth goes around the sun (Butterworth et al., 1999). These beliefs seem ones that are cultivated through Australia’s distinctive remoteness and position in the southern hemisphere and close cultural ties with people in the northern hemisphere – a unique set of conditions to which even very young children are exposed in the course of conversation with others. Furthermore, it is now well established that immediate experience is not all that contributes to the growth of children’s scientific understanding as even infants have mental representations that go beyond immediate experience and guide their expectations of behavior (Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Mandler, 1992; Spelke, 1994).

Similarly, in the domain of biology, presuppositions from everyday experience that animals are unlike plants in that they eat, move, and are alive or that children resemble their parents irrespective of biological inheritance do not exhaust the range of constraints on early biological knowledge. As Rozin (1990, 1996) has proposed, an adaptive intelligence must to some extent be present to avoid the catastrophic consequences of illness on health and survival. In particular, solutions to the problem of procuring a safe diet require an adaptive, specialized intelligence that involves an awareness of health-endangering contaminants that involves a preparedness for knowing what to identify as safe to eat. In the same way, Hatano and Inagaki (1994) have perceptively observed that children's grasp of human biology is adaptive in that it performs three functions. First, it enables children to form predictions about the behavior of familiar natural kinds such as mammals regarding food procurement, sheltering, and reproduction. Second, it enables children to make sense of biological phenomena such as animals and plants that become unhealthy when they are fed too little or too much or with inappropriate food. Third, it helps children to learn rules for taking care of animals and plants, as well as themselves. Their knowledge of internal bodily functions constrains their choices of the variety and quality of food. Therefore
children should be capable of an early understanding in the domain of biology to the extent that they may in some respects be credited with an incipient framework theory that accurately accounts for the facts of biology.

Several studies support this view. Inagaki and Hatano (1993) examined children’s understanding that some bodily characteristics such as eye colour are not modifiable in contrast to the modifiability of bodily characteristics such as the speed of running and mental characteristics such as memory. Most 4 and 5–year-olds were able to distinguish accurately among the modifiability of these three categories, and almost all were able to say that they could not stop their heartbeat or stop their breathing for a couple of days. In a series of studies carried out by Hickling and Gelman (1994), children aged as young as 4½ years were generally able to identify that same-species plants are the sole originator of seeds for new plants of that species. Similarly, according to a series of experiments reported by Springer (1995), 4 and 5–year-olds who understand that human babies grow inside their mothers (77 percent of the total number of 56 children in his first experiment) possess a “naive theory of kinship” in that they could use this knowledge to predict the properties of offspring. They can say that a baby which is physically dissimilar to the mother will likely share her stable internal properties (e.g., “gray bones inside her fingers”) and lack transitory properties (e.g., “scrapes on her legs though running through some bushes”). Finally, Hirschfeld (1995, experiment 5) gave children aged 3 to 5 years two simple situations. In one, they were asked to indicate whether the baby of a black couple who grew up with a white couple would be black or white. The other situation involved the inverse in which the child of the white couple grew up with the black couple. Both the 4 and 5–year-olds clearly favored nurture over nature and were able to give justifications to this effect.

Hirschfeld (1995, p. 239) contends that these results differ from those of Solomon et al. because children in the Solomon et al. studies were asked to infer biological and cultural traits from the same event. According to Hirschfeld, by asking children to make many more judgments about traits that are environmentally as opposed to biologically transmitted, they may have been prompted to respond that even biological traits such as eye colour are the result of adoptive parentage. Nevertheless, Hirschfeld’s method does not provide a stringent test of what children know about family resemblance as his subjects were not asked to differentiate between biologically and culturally transmitted traits. In chapter 3, Springer picks up on this theme in examining the relation between specific knowledge such as adoption and children’s understanding of biological traits and resemblance to families and discusses it in relation to
theory change accounts. In chapter 7, Birch *et al.* examine how children come to learn about diet.

**The coexistence of magic, religion, and science in culture and cognitive development: methodological and interpretative issues**

Might it be that adults themselves are so willing to accept that children are capable of interpreting illness only in terms of magic and religion since they themselves retain components of these in their own theorizing? One of us vividly recalls a visit to a city in the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico in the 1970s in which a cleaner carefully boiled, filtered, and cooled drinking water for guests, and then added ice cubes that were made from straight tap water! Given the lack of understanding of hygiene in many parts of the world, are we expecting too much of children to have this sort of knowledge? Yet work generated from an adaptive-evolutionary perspective indicates that even many young children should be able to build on an understanding of the microscopic basis of contamination as this understanding is close to survival, and perhaps other conditions that are associated with chronic illness (Eiser, 1990).

The authors of the chapters in this book attribute different sorts of competence to children and adolescents. This competence can be partly seen in terms of children’s implicit and explicit knowledge. As Karmiloff-Smith (1986) points out, we can usefully examine knowledge in terms of that which is consciously accessible and that which can be implicitly represented in behavior. Although each of these terms have connotations with different levels of awareness, knowledge that is consciously accessible has at times been called “explicit” or “declarative knowledge” and implicit knowledge has at times been referred to as “procedural knowledge.” For example, in communication tasks, young children can implicitly identify linguistic forms such as sentences by responding correctly when they are asked to repeat the last sentence that they heard in a story. However, if asked directly and explicitly to say whether linguistic forms such as the articles “a” and “the” are words, they may not be able to reply explicitly. Similarly, children may demonstrate a procedural or implicit knowledge if the experimenter examines their understanding as a means to obtain a clear-cut goal such as the detection of pretence in familiar situations or the procurement of food and the avoidance of illness. Even many 2–year-olds, for example, may implicitly demonstrate health knowledge by labelling as inedible food that appears safe but is contaminated in reality. Certainly, we would feel more secure in these circumstances if they could display a convincing explicit knowledge by
spontaneously telling us that “Even if a drink looks OK it may have had a bug in it. So the drink may be contaminated.” But to recognize that their knowledge in a domain may be mainly of the implicit sort is very different from embracing the conclusion that they have little or no understanding at all. The need for food drives children to an awareness of reality and deception. Kass (1994, p. 98) remarks that the possession of an incipient concept of cuisine as shown by “what and how a person eats reveals who you are, humanly speaking.”

The issue of drawing out children’s implicit knowledge can be examined with respect to children’s understanding of the purpose and relevance of questions. As Trabasso (1997, p. 430) notes, how children understand questions is a powerful determinant of “what and how much is reported . . . one major influence on the child’s ‘memory’ is what is asked and what the child ‘remembers’ is not solely the child’s creation.”

Philosophers of language such as Grice (1975) have shown that adult conversation is characterized by rules or maxims which enjoin speakers to: “Say no more or no less than is required. Try to say the truth and avoid falsehood. Be relevant and informative. Avoid ambiguity and obscurity.” In communication between adults, it is usually mutually understood that the rules may be broken to make “conversational implicatures.” For example, adults know that speakers may be uninformative and state the obvious for purposes of irony or that they may be redundant and speak more than is required to probe an initial answer out of politeness or curiosity to ensure that this is the respondent’s choice. However, children who are inexperienced in conversation may not share the scientific purpose underlying departures from conversational rules in adults’ questioning. There may be a communication barrier which can prevent children from identifying the purpose and implications of adults’ questions. As a consequence, children frequently do not disclose the depth of their understanding when questioned in cognitive developmental experiments.

In children’s responses to instances of microscopic contamination, experimenters may present children with an apparently fresh substance that in reality is not good to consume in order to determine whether children understand the microscopic basis of contamination. In response to such direct questioning, preschoolers often say that they would like to drink juice that has been in prior contact with contaminants. Once a contaminant such as one described as a ground-up grasshopper has been dissolved or removed and the drink no longer appears contaminated, they may indicate that it can be safely consumed (e.g., Rozin et al., 1985). Such responses are consistent with Piaget’s theory in that these focus on states rather than transformations and are in keeping with Piaget’s notion
of a preoperational childhood realism in which the appearance and reality of an object are undifferentiated.

However, although children may know that a drink that has been in contact with a foreign substance is harmful, they may not truly recognize that a well-meaning experimenter would contravene the quality rule to be sincere by offering them a polluted drink in order to probe for their understanding of the causes of illness. The implied question (e.g., “Would you like to have this drink that may be contaminated?”) is almost certainly one that they would have never encountered before. Instead they may defer to a unskeptical belief that the purpose inherent in the experimenter’s question is to make a sincere offer of a drink; indeed, the very act of offering implies that the drink would not be polluted. By contrast, children may be given a naturalistic situation such as one in which a cockroach is made to fall accidentally into a drink and is then removed with a spoon so that the drink looks fresh but is in reality contaminated. In this type of situation that aligns children’s interpretation of the purpose and relevance of the questioning with that of an experimenter, preschoolers in industrialized countries such as Australia and the United States can often say that an apparently fresh drink that had previously been in contact with a contaminant is not good to consume (Siegal and Share, 1990; see also Kalish, 1996; Springer and Belk, 1994). In many cases, providing children with explicit representations of expected and changed states permits them to identify readily that the changed situation is something other than what it appears (Saltmarsh et al., 1996). In solving problems that are relevant to the food domain and are germane to survival, children are therefore more likely to share the purpose for an experimenter’s question. With respect to this domain of knowledge which is highly relevant to their own concerns (in line with the Gricean conversational rule, “Be relevant”), they are apt to recognize that the purpose is to determine their ability to detect edible substances and reject those that are inedible. Therefore, even 3–year-olds should often be able to distinguish reality from appearance in recognizing that a food that looks edible may be in reality contaminated.

All the same, young children cannot be expected to justify their responses and their behavior by giving an elaborate account of the microscopic basis of contamination. They are very unlikely to say that a drink that has been in contact with a foreign object may be infected with germs that grow and multiply or, for that matter, to say that the AIDS virus can be transmitted only through the transmission of bodily fluids in intimate contact that almost always involves sexual contact (see chapter 9 by Au, Romo, and DeWitt). To state that illness can occur only in a specific manner that focuses on biological causation involves a great deal of
sophistication that in many cases eludes adults. Nevertheless, researchers from any of the three perspectives that we have outlined may credit children with competence in their operations only if they explicitly use logical necessity to justify their solution to a problem. As Smith (1993, p. 2) has described the position of Piaget, “Necessary properties lay down both why something is, and has to be, what it is, and why it is not, and cannot be, anything else.” Both the explicit and implicit is important.

However, this requirement goes beyond the normal facility that children whose conversational awareness is not well developed (or, for that matter, adults, particularly in cases involving intercultural communication or communication between superiors and subordinates) can often exhibit (Siegal, 1996, 1997). Not only does it assume that children recognize the purpose and relevance of questions, but also it assumes that children can boldly portray the strength of their beliefs in providing an explanation that they know the adult already knows – one that involves spontaneously evaluating the often inscrutable actions of the experimenter. At the same time, it does not accord recognition to the rather obvious fact that, regardless of characteristics such as age, a person may have a grasp of logical necessity but not be able to justify his or her understanding in a dialogue with the investigator.

While acknowledging that justifications are needed to determine the operational competence underlying children’s judgments, followers and defenders of the orthodox Piagetian approach refer to children’s performance on tasks that “appeal strongly to the child’s nonverbal performance” (e.g., Piaget, 1952; Piaget et al., 1960) as the other major source of evidence to support the contention that children’s persistent difficulties on such tasks are not owing to difficulties in conversation (Lourenço and Machado, 1996, p. 154). Yet as these tasks still require a modicum of language, ambiguity may persist. The minimization of conversationally obscure instructions in cognitive developmental tasks does not detract from the need to ensure that the remaining information is clear, relevant, and explicit and embedded within a purposeful dialogue with the experimenter.

Does this analysis mean therefore that we should be confined only to measuring children’s appreciation of logical necessity and abandon the search for scientific knowledge that is anything less than fully explicit? Ironically, perhaps the best starting point comes from the considerable research on infancy in which children cannot misrepresent questions because none have been asked. In such cases, infants often stare longer at impossible than at possible events, indicating their surprise that some necessary physical principle of object identity and constancy has been violated (Baillargeon and Graber, 1988; Spelke, 1994; Wynn, 1992). Of
course infants’ responses may reflect a disposition to regard such events as unexpected or unfamiliar rather than as impossible and a violation of necessity. In the absence of language, it is difficult to distinguish between these alternatives. However, research with preschoolers who do have language points to a very good knowledge of necessity— one that can be violated only through “magic” as a term that is applied to events that are judged as impossible. As Subbotsky (1994) has proposed, for both children and adults, there appear to be certain cultural conventions that permit the practice of magic even though magical events such as magical causality and magic in time and space are defined in terms of the violation of logical necessity. In the case of children, magic can take place in the form of a belief in the activities of fairy tale characters; in the case of adults, it can take the form of a belief in protection from disease through an association with loved ones irrespective of their state of health (Nemeroff and Rozin, 1994; Rozin et al., 1986; Rozin and Nemeroff, 1990). Johnson and Harris (1994) have shown that children often distinguish between the causality of physical events that are possible or necessary and those that are impossible with the exclusion of some form of special magic. As they point out, the “credulity” of young children in wishing to investigate “magical” outcomes can be deemed rational in the absence of evidence that invalidates the existence of supernatural creatures. Guided by cultural conventions that permit them to engage in the practice of magical fantasies, children often strive to reveal charming violations of logical necessity, that fit in with Piagetian viewpoints on development.

Shultz et al. (1979, p. 100) have noted that “one might well question whether human cognition could ever be entirely logical to the total exclusion of empirical content and, conversely, whether it could be ever be entirely empirical to the total exclusion of logical structure.” According to Shultz et al., children do not ordinarily feel that judgments of equivalence between two quantities do not need to be checked empirically. Thus the logical aspect of the children’s knowledge such as that shown in their performance on conservation of quantity tasks is developmentally stable. However, when children are actually asked to do perform this empirical check after a quantity undergoes a perceptual transformation (e.g., when two formerly “equivalent” stimuli such as two rows of seven counters each that were once in one-to-one correspondence are now put out of alignment), their verbally expressed confidence in conservation can waver. Thus the empirical basis of conservation judgments is influenced by its dependence on relevant experience; whether children actually do make conservation judgments depends upon their familiarity with the purpose and relevance of the task. In this connection, the “magic” inherent in the perceptual transformation induced by an
experimenter may prompt children to dispense with logical necessity and to look instead for an empirical basis for their initial responses. Even if children are quite certain of the answer, they may not share the conversational implications of questions as experimenters have intended and respond incorrectly.

Therefore interviewing techniques that have resulted in well-meaning investigators’ assessment of a low level of early competence often involve the assumption of an early conversational wizardry. Even tasks that are assumed to appeal to children’s nonverbal performance can jeopardize determining what they know. Explicit understanding in Piaget’s sense may be the ultimate aim and certainly would give us confidence in predicting and accepting what children know about medical procedures. It would better enable us to prepare children with the capability to make intelligent, health-related decisions as evidenced in chapters 10 and 11 by Herbst, Steward, Myers, and Hansen, and Peterson and Siegal. Even so, for both children and adults, there may be considerable implicit knowledge of biology present that is infused with beliefs in magic and religion. It is this competence that may be used as foundation to draw out a deeper, explicit discussion and knowledge of the biological determinants of specific diseases in conjunction with normative judgments of harm.

As Kleinman (1986, p. 226) has pointed out, primary medical care has frequently overlooked psychology and related disciplines despite the “epidemiological reality” that over 50 percent of clinical practice deals with the psychological and social aspects of illness. Investigations of what children can or do know about biology such as those reported in this book should enable adults to have a more accurate appreciation of this knowledge and to promote communication with children on health matters.

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References


Introduction


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