The Power of Human Rights
International Norms and Domestic Change

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Fifty years ago, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). At the time, the delegates clearly noted that the Declaration was not a binding treaty, but rather a statement of principles. Eleanor Roosevelt said that the Declaration “set up a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,” and “might well become an international Magna Carta of all mankind” (Humphrey 1984). On the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration, it seems appropriate to evaluate the impact of these norms, now embodied in diverse international agreements and treaties. Have the principles articulated in the Declaration had any effect at all on the actual behavior of states towards their citizens? What are the conditions under which international human rights norms are internalized in domestic practices? In other words, what accounts for the variation in the degree to which human rights norms are implemented? And what can we learn from this case about why, how, and under what conditions international norms in general influence the actions of states? This book tries to tackle these questions.

Our project relates to broader theoretical debates in the social sciences and law about the influence of ideas and norms on the behav-

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1 The main general international treaties that embody the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Both entered into force in 1976. There are also specific international treaties elaborating certain rights with the UDHR such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force in 1987.
ior of individuals and states. Scholars of international relations are increasingly interested in studying norms and ideas, but few have yet demonstrated the actual impact that international norms can have on domestic politics. Using case studies that explore the linkages between international human rights norms and changing human rights practices, we develop and present a theory of the stages and mechanisms through which international norms can lead to changes in behavior. We believe this theory will be useful in understanding the general impact of norms in international politics.

To carry out this evaluation, we chose to look at paired cases of countries with serious human rights situations from each region of the world. In addition to the well-publicized “success stories” of international human rights like Chile, South Africa, the Philippines, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia, we also examine a series of more obscure and apparently intractable cases of human rights violations in such places as Guatemala, Kenya, Uganda, Morocco, Tunisia, and Indonesia. We reason that these countries with less propitious domestic and international situations would be hard cases for understanding the conditions under which international human rights norms could lead to changing domestic practices. Much of the research on international norms has looked at their international diffusion, or examined their impact in a single country or region. The design of this project allows us to explore the influence that a set of international human rights norms has in a wide variety of states with very different cultures and institutions. By examining the similarities and differences in the impact of human rights norms in these diverse settings, we can see the variation of norm effects across states.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains thirty articles detailing diverse rights from the right to life, to the right to work, and the right to rest and leisure. Because we could not evaluate progress on all these rights, we chose a central core of rights – the right to life (which we define as the right to be free from extrajudicial execution and disappearance) and the freedom from torture and arbitrary arrest and detention. By choosing to focus on these rights we do not suggest that other rights in the Declaration are unimportant. But these basic “rights of the person” have been most accepted as universal rights, and not simply rights associated with a particular political ideology or system.

2 There are two exceptions in this book. Chapter 7 on Eastern Europe concentrates on freedom of expression and freedom to assemble rights, while chapter 3 on South Africa focuses on racial equality.
Also, these basic rights have been widely institutionalized in international treaties that countries around the world have ratified. In this sense, it is around this core of rights that we would most expect human rights norms to have made an impact on human rights practices. If there is no progress here, we would not expect it in other less consensual areas. In addition, due to the work of Amnesty International, various United Nations human rights bodies and missions, and domestic truth commissions, there is now ample data dating back to the mid-1970s on changing levels of human rights practices for these basic rights. These data allow us to be more systematic in our evaluation of the impact of human rights norms.

As we began to complete our research, some of our cases took us by surprise. In late 1998, British officials arrested General Augusto Pinochet, former Chilean dictator, in a response to a request by Spanish judges. They asked that Pinochet be extradited to stand trial for human rights violations during his regime. In Guatemala, where security forces had killed over 100,000 people between 1966 and 1986, by 1997 forensic anthropology teams were exhuming mass graves, and truth commissions were publishing their reports on past human rights violations. In Indonesia in 1998, massive student demonstrations forced Suharto to step down from power, and a National Commission on Human Rights, set up in 1993, has developed a positive, if low-key, track record for documenting some human rights abuses and recommending changes in government policy. Despite the geographic, cultural, and political diversity of the countries represented in our cases, we saw similar patterns and processes in very different settings. On the other hand, in some countries like Tunisia and Kenya, the human rights situation, never as severe as in some of the cases discussed above, worsened or stabilized during the same period. How could we account for these changes, similarities, and differences?

This book serves two purposes, one empirical, the other theoretical. First, we want to understand the conditions under which international human rights regimes and the principles, norms, and rules embedded in them are internalized and implemented domestically and, thus, affect political transformation processes. We propose a five-phase “spiral model” of human rights change which explains the variation in the extent to which states have internalized these norms. We argue that the enduring implementation of human rights norms requires political systems to establish the rule of law. Stable improvements in human rights conditions usually require some measure of political transform-
ation and can be regarded as one aspect of liberalization processes. Enduring human rights changes, therefore, go hand in hand with domestic structural changes.

We engage questions that are of interest both to academics and to activists and policy makers. Activists and policy makers have long debated the efficacy of human rights policies and pressures, but rarely had time for systematic study and analysis. Political scientists and other social scientists are increasingly interested in questions about the diffusion of international norms and principled ideas (see, for example, Finnemore 1996a, b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein 1996b; Klotz 1995; Kowert and Legro 1996). However, this literature is underspecified with regard to the causal mechanisms by which these ideas spread (Yee 1996) and, more important, rarely accounts for the variation in the impact of international norms (Checkel 1998). Such norms and principled ideas “do not float freely” (Risse-Kappen 1994) but affect domestic institutional change in a differential manner. The wide variety of cases examined in this volume is uniquely suited to permit a more in-depth understanding of how international norms interact with very different domestic structures.

International human rights norms provide an excellent opportunity to explore these theoretical issues for a number of reasons. First, because international human rights norms challenge state rule over society and national sovereignty, any impact on domestic change would be counter-intuitive. Second, human rights norms are well institutionalized in international regimes and organizations, and finally, they are contested and compete with other principled ideas.

This book also builds upon our earlier work on the subject. Risse-Kappen’s book on transnational relations (Risse-Kappen 1995) argued that the policy impact of transnationally operating non-state actors on state policies varies according to differences in domestic institutional-structures which determine both their access to political systems and their ability to link up with domestic actors. This book goes one step further and explores the conditions under which networks of domestic and transnational actors are able to change these domestic structures themselves. Sikkink and Keck established the importance of “principled-issue” or “transnational advocacy networks” for the diffusion of international norms in the human rights and environmental issue-areas (Sikkink 1993a; Keck and Sikkink 1998). This book further elaborates the conditions under which principled ideas and international norms
affect domestic institutional change and presents a causal argument about the effects of transnational advocacy networks in processes of norm diffusion.

In sum, we argue that the diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western public opinion and Western governments. We argue that these advocacy networks serve three purposes, which constitute necessary conditions for sustainable domestic change in the human rights area:

1. They put norm-violating states on the international agenda in terms of moral consciousness-raising. In doing so, they also remind liberal states of their own identity as promoters of human rights.
2. They empower and legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups against norm-violating governments, and they partially protect the physical integrity of such groups from government repression. Thus, they are crucial in mobilizing domestic opposition, social movements, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in target countries.
3. They challenge norm-violating governments by creating a transnational structure pressuring such regimes simultaneously “from above” and “from below” (Brysk 1993). The more these pressures can be sustained, the fewer options are available to political rulers to continue repression.

This process by which international norms are internalized and implemented domestically can be understood as a process of socialization. We distinguish between three types of causal mechanisms which are necessary for the enduring internalization of norms:

- processes of instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining;
- processes of moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion;
- processes of institutionalization and habitualization.

The significance of each process varies with different stages of the socialization process. In general, we argue that instrumental adaptation usually prevails in early stages of norms socialization. Later on, argumentation, persuasion, and dialogue become more significant, while institutionalization and habitualization mark the final steps in the so-
cialization processes. We develop a five-phase “spiral model” of norms socialization which specifies the causal mechanisms and the prevailing logic of action in each phase of the process. The model also contains hypotheses about the conditions under which we expect progress toward the implementation of human rights norms. Thus, the “spiral model” accounts for the variation in the domestic effects of international norms.

This chapter presents the research design of the book, in particular the “spiral model.” The empirical chapters evaluate the theoretical propositions on the basis of paired comparisons of countries in different regions of the world. We show that the model is generalizable across cases irrespective of cultural, political, or economic differences among countries. These differences matter in terms of timing and duration of socialization processes; but they do not affect the overall validity of our explanatory model. Thus, the empirical chapters examine African (Hans Peter Schmitz on Kenya and Uganda; David Black on South Africa), Arab (Sieglinde Gränzer on Tunisia and Morocco), East European (Daniel Thomas on Poland and the former Czechoslovakia), Latin American (Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink on Chile and Guatemala), and South East Asian cases (Anja Jetschke on Indonesia and the Philippines). Together, these chapters represent a fairly comprehensive overview of the conditions of sustainable change in the human rights area. They allow for comparisons across regions which Stephen C. Ropp and Thomas Risse discuss in the concluding chapter.

**Conceptualizing the impact of principled ideas and international norms on identities and interests**

This book is part of a growing literature on the impact of ideas and norms in international politics (Adler 1987; Finnemore 1993, 1996a; Goldstein and Keohane 1993b; E. Haas 1990; P. Haas 1992; P. A. Hall 1989; Jacobson 1995; Katzenstein 1996a, b; Klotz 1995; Odell 1982; Sikkink 1991; Yee 1996). This new emphasis has resulted from the empirical failure of approaches emphasizing material structures as the primary determinants of state identities, interests, and preferences. We do not mean to ignore material conditions. Rather, the causal relationship between material and ideational factors is at stake. While materialist theories emphasize economic or military conditions or interests as determining the impact of ideas in international and domestic politics,
social constructivists emphasize that ideas and communicative processes define in the first place which material factors are perceived as relevant and how they influence understandings of interests, preferences, and political decisions (Adler 1991, 1997; Checkel 1998; Katzenstein 1996a, b; Kratochwil 1989; Müller 1994; Schaber and Ulbert 1994; Wendt 1992, 1995, forthcoming). In other words, material factors and conditions matter through cognitive and communicative processes, the “battleground of ideas,” by which actors try to determine their identities and interests and to develop collective understandings of the situation in which they act and of the moral values and norms guiding their interactions.

We are concerned about the process through which principled ideas (“beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals”) become norms (“collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity,” Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 54) which in turn influence the behavior and domestic structure of states. While ideas are about cognitive commitments, norms make behavioral claims on individuals (Katzenstein 1996b). To endorse a norm not only expresses a belief, but also creates impetus for behavior consistent with the belief. While ideas are usually individualistic, norms have an explicit intersubjective quality because they are collective expectations. The very idea of “proper” behavior presupposes a community able to pass judgments on appropriateness.

At the same time, the state is not a black box, but is composed of different institutions and individuals. Once ideas have become norms, we still need to understand how those norms in turn influence individual behavior of state actors:

- How and why does a member of the military who has ordered extrajudicial executions in the past decide to stop ordering executions?
- Do human rights abuses end because perpetrators are persuaded they are wrong?
- Do they end because leaders care about their international image and want other countries to think well of them? Or can we explain this behavior with more instrumental factors?
- Do perpetrators come to believe that they will be held accountable, and so they change behavior to avoid punishment?
- Do countries want to renew international military and economic aid that has been cut?
It is often not possible to do the precise research to answer these questions completely, but in this book we work to document the change (or lack thereof) in human rights practices, and then we trace the process of domestic and international normative, political, and institutional developments to try to explain the changes we observe. We also consider alternative explanations for human rights behavior to see which explanation fits the patterns we observe in each country.

In the cases studied, we find many examples of some human rights changes occurring apparently because leaders of countries care about what leaders of other countries think of them. Norms have a different quality from other rules or maxims. James Fearon argues that while rules take the form “Do X to get Y,” norms take a different form: “Good people do X.” Thus people sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and because they want to think well of themselves (Fearon 1997). People’s ability to think well of themselves is influenced by norms held by a relevant community of actors. Scholars in international law have long recognized this intersubjective nature of norms by referring to international law as relevant within a community of “civilized nations.” Today the idea of “civilized” nations has gone out of fashion, but international law and international organizations are still the primary vehicles for stating community norms and for collective legitimation. Some legal scholars now discuss a community of “liberal states” seen as a sphere of peace, democracy, and human rights, and distinguish between relations among liberal states, and those between liberal and nonliberal states (Franck 1990; Slaughter 1995). Human rights norms have a special status because they both prescribe rules for appropriate behavior, and help define identities of liberal states. Human rights norms have constitutive effects because good human rights performance is one crucial signal to others to identify a member of the community of liberal states (on definitions of norms and their constitutive effects see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein 1996a, b; Kowert and Legro 1996; Thomson 1993).

Our approach to the constitutive and behavioral effects of principled ideas and norms draws on social constructivism (for applications to international relations see Katzenstein 1996a; Kratochwil 1989; Wendt 1992, forthcoming). Actors’ interests and preferences are not given outside social interaction or deduced from structural constraints in the international or domestic environment. Social constructivism does not take the interests of actors for granted, but problematizes and relates
them to the identities of actors. What I want depends to a large degree on who I am. Identities then define the range of interests of actors considered as both possible and appropriate. Identities also provide a measure of inclusion and exclusion by defining a social “we” and delineating the boundaries against the “others.” Norms become relevant and causally consequential during the process by which actors define and refine their collective identities and interests.

In our case, human rights norms help define a category of states – “liberal democratic states.” Many (but certainly not all) of the interests these states have are quite different from those of the “others” – the authoritarian or “norm-violating” states. In some cases, these liberal “clubs” are quite specific; in the case of the European Union, for example, the formal and informal rules and norms specify that only democratic states with good human rights records can join the club. In the Inter-American system, such norms are just now emerging. The Organization of American States (OAS)’s Managua Declaration of 1993, for example, is very explicit about this process of stating norms that contribute to identity formation of member states. In it the OAS members declare “the need to consolidate, as part of the cultural identity of each nation in the Hemisphere, democratic structures and systems which encourage freedom and social justice, safeguard human rights, and favor progress” (Vaky and Muñoz, 1993).

But emphasizing the contribution of international norms to identity formation is not to suggest a “fair-weather” model of norm-induced domestic change whereby power, political struggles, and instrumental interests of actors are somehow absent from the story. We do not argue in terms of simple dichotomies such as “power versus norms” or “norms versus interests.” Instead, we are interested in the interaction among these various factors. For example, we explore the “power of principles,” that is, the use of principled ideas and international norms in domestic struggles among political actors. To the extent that human rights norms have become consensual, they can be used instrumentally in such power struggles. In the case of South Africa, the “power of principles” resulted in a sanctions regime which had powerful effects on the availability of material resources to the South African government (see chapter 3; Klotz 1995).3

Moreover, we also do not suggest that the causal arrows always point in one direction, as in “norms lead to a change in interests.” There are

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1 Audie Klotz refers to “normative power” in this context.
ample examples in this book where national governments changed their human rights practices only to gain access to the material benefits of foreign aid or to be able to stay in power in the face of strong domestic opposition. In fact, the process of human rights change almost always begins with some instrumentally or strategically motivated adaptation by national governments to growing domestic and transnational pressures. But we also argue that this is rarely the end of the story. Even instrumental adoption of human rights norms, if it leads to domestic structural change such as redemocratization, sets into motion a process of identity transformation, so that norms initially adopted for instrumental reasons, are later maintained for reasons of belief and identity. While the old leadership is not persuaded, the new leadership has internalized human rights norms and shows a desire to take its place in a community of human rights abiding states. The Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos, for example, adopted some human rights norms for instrumental reasons, but once democratization occurred and Corazon Aquino took office, the very identity of the Philippine state changed.

A similar process might explain the Reagan administration’s pro-democracy policy. When the principled position in favor of democracy was first adopted by the Reagan administration, most interpreted it as a vehicle for an aggressive foreign policy against leftist regimes, such as the USSR, Nicaragua, and Cuba. (This would be consistent with the instrumental use of a principled idea.) But because democracy as a principled idea had achieved consensus among political elites and the general public in the United States, the Reagan administration found itself obliged to a minimal consistency in its foreign policy, and thus eventually actively encouraged democracy in authoritarian regimes which the Republicans viewed as loyal allies, such as Chile and Uruguay.

In the end, the precise direction of the causal arrows – whether norms lead to a change in (collective) identities which in turn leads to a change in (instrumental) interests or whether interests lead to a change in norms which in turn lead to a change in identities – has to be determined through careful empirical process-tracing. This book does not have a preconceived notion of the way in which the causal mechanisms work in general. But we do suggest that instrumental and material interests, processes of norm-guided identity formation, as well as argumentation, persuasion, and dialogue, on the one hand, and strategic bargaining, on the other, differ in significance during the various stages of norms socialization.
A theoretical framework of norms socialization processes

The process by which principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense of collective understandings about appropriate behavior which then lead to changes in identities, interests, and behavior is conceptualized in this book as a process of socialization (Finnemore 1993; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Müller 1993; Schimmelfennig 1994). Socialization can be defined as the “induction of new members… into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a society” (Barnes, Carter, and Skidmore 1980: 35). What is crucial to this definition is that socialization presupposes a society. Internationally, it makes sense only within the bounds of an international system defined as a society of states (Bull 1977). Contrary to some conceptions of international society, however, this definition suggests that international society is a smaller group than the total number of states in the international system, and that socialization to international norms is the crucial process through which a state becomes a member of the international society. The goal of socialization is for actors to internalize norms, so that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure compliance. The classic social science literature on socialization recognized that much socialization occurs among peer groups and social groups. “Political socialization produces a political self… It is political socialization which molds and shapes the citizen’s relation to the political community” (Dawson and Prewitt 1969). Because a state’s political identity emerges not in isolation but in relation to and in interaction with other groups of states and international non-state actors, the concept of socialization may be useful in understanding how the international society transmits norms to its members.

We distinguish in this book three types of socialization processes which are necessary for enduring change in the human rights area:

1. processes of adaptation and strategic bargaining;
2. processes of moral consciousness-raising, “shaming,” argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion;
3. processes of institutionalization and habitualization.

These processes constitute ideal types which differ according to their underlying logic or mode of social action and interaction. In reality, these processes usually take place simultaneously. Our task in this book
is to identify which mode of interaction dominates in which phase of the socialization process. We suggest a rough order, which is depicted in figure 1.1.

The first type of socialization process concerns the instrumental adaptation to pressures – both domestic and international. Governments accused of violating human rights norms frequently adjust to pressures by making some tactical concessions. They might release political prisoners or sign some international agreements, for example, in order to regain foreign aid, to overcome international sanctions, or to strengthen their rule vis-à-vis domestic opposition. They might also engage in bargaining processes with the international community and/or the domestic opposition. They might even start “talking the talk” of human rights in international fora such as the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission. Such activities are essentially compatible with rational choice arguments about human beings as expected utility-maximizers. Actors – norm-violating governments in this case – pursue exogenously defined and primarily instrumental or material interests and change their behavior in order to reach their goals. They adjust their behavior to the international human rights discourse without necessarily believing in the validity of the norms. We argue in this book that instrumental adaptation to growing international and domestic pressures is a typical reaction of norm-violating governments in early stages of the socialization process.
The second type of socialization process which we investigate in this book, concerns argumentative discourses in the Habermasian sense (Habermas 1981, 1992, 1995b; for applications to international relations see Müller 1994; Prittwitz 1996; Risse 1997). While adaptation refers to an instrumental adjustment to international norms irrespective of discursive practices, socialization through moral discourse emphasizes processes of communication, argumentation, and persuasion. Actors accept the validity and significance of norms in their discursive practices. The notion of “moral discourse” needs to be strictly distinguished from daily communicative practices. We can differentiate between two ideal types of communicative behavior: the first focuses on the exchange of information through verbal utterances. In these instances, speakers know what they want and how they see the situation in which they act and communicate this to others. Information exchanges through communicative behavior can well be incorporated in rational choice models (see, for example, Morrow 1994; Schneider 1994). This is not what we have in mind.

The other type of communicative behavior which we identify with the notion of “discourse” in this volume, challenges the validity claims entailed in these “informations.” At a most basic level, actors might try to clarify whether they understood correctly the information submitted. Do we understand you correctly that you accept the validity of international human rights norms, but claim that the alleged violations did not occur? More significant are discourses arguing over whether the situation is defined correctly. You claim that these actions are part of a fight against terrorism, but we think that they constitute human rights violations. What are they an instance of? In this case, actors might actually agree on the moral validity of the norm, but disagree whether certain behavior is covered by it.

Finally, there are moral discourses which challenge the validity claims of the norm itself. You argue that human rights are universal, but we think that our culture and way of life are alien to these individualistic norms. We argue in this book that such discourses challenging validity claims inherent in definitions of the situation as well as in principled beliefs and norms are all-pervasive in the human rights area and need to be analyzed in order to explain socialization processes leading to sustainable domestic change. Moral discourses in particular not only challenge and seek justifications of norms, they also entail identity-related arguments. What I find morally appropriate depends to some degree on who I am and how I see myself. As argued above, for
example, human rights define a certain category of states and, thus, relate to collective identities. The logic of discursive behavior and of processes of argumentation and persuasion rather than instrumental bargaining and the exchange of fixed interests prevails when actors develop collective understandings that form part of their identities and lead them to determine their interests. Those principled beliefs carry the day when they persuade actors in potentially winning coalitions to interpret their material and political interests and preferences in light of the idea and to accept its social obligations as appropriate. Coalitions are formed not just through the convergence of pre-existing actors’ interests, but also through argumentative consensus. People become convinced and persuaded to change their instrumental interests, or to see their interests in new ways, following the principled ideas.

This is not to argue that moral discourses and discursive practices in general resemble “ideal speech” situations in the Habermasian sense, where power and hierarchies are absent and nothing but the better argument counts. In real-life situations, relationships of power and interest-based arguments are rarely completely out of the picture. Nor do communicative processes always involve the exchange of logical arguments. Actors rely on a variety of techniques to persuade, including appeals to emotion, evoking symbols, as well as the use and extension of logical arguments. Although some authors privilege the role of logic in the extension of norms (Crawford 1993), psychological research suggests that both emotion and cognition operate synergistically to produce and change attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialization often involve processes such as shaming and denunciations, not aimed at producing changing minds with logic, but on changing minds by isolating or embarrassing the target. Persuasion is also not devoid of conflict. It often involves not just reasoning with opponents, but also pressures, arm-twisting, and sanctions. For example, Audie Klotz’s work on norms and apartheid discusses coercion, incentive, and legitimization effects that are often part of a socialization process (Klotz 1995; see also chapter 3 in this book).

Nevertheless, we claim that the logic of persuasion and of discourse is conceptually different from a logic of information exchange based on fixed preferences, definitions of the situations, and collective identities. Discursive processes are precisely the types of human interaction in which at least one of these properties of actors is being challenged.

We expect to find a mix of instrumental and argumentative rationalities governing the process by which domestic and transnational actors,
states, and international institutions impact upon the human rights performance of particular regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating the characteristic patterns in the mix of the instrumental and the communicative, and the conditions under which actors change from one mode of action to the other. Here are a few examples taken from the human rights area of how argumentative rationality and policy deliberation, on the one hand, and instrumental adaptation, on the other, might relate to each other:

1. Repressive governments often adapt to normative pressures for purely instrumental reasons. When the pressure decreases, they return to repression, as was the case in Kenya in the early 1990s (see chapter 2). Sometimes, however, they start institutionalizing human rights norms into domestic law and change their discursive practices. This in turn opens space for the domestic opposition to catch the government in its own rhetoric. At this point, instrumental and communicative rationality intertwine. It becomes very hard for the government to deny the validity of human rights norms. Political psychology talks about “self-persuasion” in this context. Over time people come to believe what they say, particularly if they say it publicly (Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly 1996: 703–705).

2. Moral consciousness-raising by the international human rights community often involves a process of “shaming.” Norm-violating states are denounced as pariah states which do not belong to the community of civilized nations, as was the case with South Africa (chapter 3). Shaming then constructs categories of “us” and “them”, that is, in-groups and out-groups, thus re-affirming particular state identities. Some repressive governments might not care. Others, however, feel deeply offended, because they want to belong to the “civilized community” of states. In other words, shaming then implies a process of persuasion, since it convinces leaders that their behavior is inconsistent with an identity to which they aspire. This was the case with the Moroccan king, as Sieglinde Gränzer shows in chapter 4.

3. Domestic opposition groups might rally around human rights issues for purely instrumental reasons at first, for example, to be able to communicate and to link up with international and transnational networks or to broaden the basis of
domestic opposition by bringing in ideologically diverse groups. If they succeed in overthrowing the oppressive regime, however, there is less instrumental need to act upon their opposition rhetoric and to implement the human rights norms. It is, therefore, noteworthy that, in all cases of successful human rights change documented in this book, the new regimes matched their opposition words with deeds, although the fit was often less than perfect. This suggests a communicative process of identity change which leads actors to behave in ways consistent with their identity when they acquire the means to do so.

The three examples suggest that socialization processes start when actors adapt their behavior in accordance with the norm for initially instrumental reasons. Governments want to remain in power, while domestic NGOs seek the most effective means to rally the opposition. The more they “talk the talk,” however, the more they entangle themselves in a moral discourse which they cannot escape in the long run. In the beginning, they might use arguments in order to further their instrumentally defined interests, that is, they engage in rhetoric (on rhetorical action see Schimmelfennig 1995, 1997). The more they justify their interests, however, the more others will start challenging their arguments and the validity claims inherent in them. At this point, governments need to respond by providing further arguments. They become entangled in arguments and the logic of argumentative rationality slowly but surely takes over. It follows that we expect argumentative rationality, dialogue, and processes of persuasion to prevail in later stages of the socialization process.

But argumentative processes are still not sufficient in order to socialize states into norm-abiding practices. Human rights norms can only be regarded as internalized in domestic practices, when actors comply with them irrespective of individual beliefs about their validity. In the case of Uganda (see chapter 2), for example, national leader Yoweri Museveni can probably be regarded as a “true believer” in human rights. But it is less clear whether the drastic improvement in human rights conditions will survive his presidency. This points to a final type of socialization process emphasizing the gradual institutionalization of norms as theorized by sociological and historical institutionalism (P. A. Hall and Taylor 1996; Jepperson 1991; March and Olsen 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Steinmo, Thelen,
and Longstreth 1992). Actors incrementally adapt to norms in response to external pressures, initially for purely instrumental reasons. National governments might then change their rhetoric, gradually accepting the validity of international human rights norms, and start engaging in an argumentative process with their opponents, both domestically and abroad. The more they accept the validity of the norms and the more they engage in a dialogue about norm implementation, the more they are likely to institutionalize human rights in domestic practices. Human rights norms are then incorporated in the “standard operating procedures” of domestic institutions. This type of internalization process can be conceptualized as independent from changes in individual belief systems. Actors follow the norm, because “it is the normal thing to do.” Whether they are convinced of its moral validity and appropriateness or not is largely irrelevant for habitualization processes. When we stop at a red traffic light, we usually do not question the normative implications of the rule we are just following. Once human rights norms are institutionalized in this sense, changes in government and in individual leaders matter less and less. Norms are implemented independently from the moral consciousness of actors. They are simply “taken for granted” which marks the final stage in a socialization process (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Institutionalization and habitualization are necessary to “depersonalize” norm compliance and to insure their implementation irrespective of individual beliefs.

**Transnational advocacy networks and human rights socialization: the “spiral model”**

So far, we have developed a theoretical argument about socialization processes by identifying three ideal types of social action: instrumental adaptation, argumentative discourse, and institutionalization. To guide our empirical analysis, however, this conceptual framework needs to be operationalized and applied to the human rights area more specifically. In the following, we develop a five-phase “spiral model” of human rights change which incorporates simultaneous activities at four levels into one framework:

- the international–transnational interactions among transnationally operating international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), international human rights regimes and organizations, and Western states;
The “spiral model” builds upon previous work on “principled issue or transnational advocacy networks” in the human rights area. A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998; see also Risse-Kappen 1995). We follow various studies on the impact of human rights norms in Latin America emphasizing how domestic and transnational social movements and networks have united to bring pressure “from above” and “from below” to accomplish human rights change (Brysk 1993; Osiel 1986; Sikkink 1993a). Keck and Sikkink have referred to this process as the “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

A “boomerang” pattern of influence exists when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside. National opposition groups, NGOs, and social movements link up with transnational networks and INGOs who then convince international human rights organizations, donor institutions, and/or great powers to pressure norm-violating states. Networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) to struggling domestic groups. International contacts can “amplify” the demands of domestic groups, prise open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into the domestic arena (see figure 1.2).

The “boomerang model” can be integrated in a more dynamic conceptualization of the effects which these domestic-transnational-international linkages have on domestic political change. The “spiral model” which will be explored in the empirical chapters consists of several “boomerang throws” with diverging effects on the human rights situation in the target country (see figure 1.3). It is a causal model which attempts to explain the variation in the extent to which national governments move along the path toward improvement of human rights conditions. We do not assume evolutionary progress. Rather, below we identify those stages in the model where governments might return to repressive practices. We develop hypotheses about the conditions under which we expect movement from one phase of the “spiral