PRELUDE TO
RESTORATION IN IRELAND

The end of the commonwealth, 1659–1660

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A kind of colony¹

On the afternoon of Tuesday, 13 December 1659, two veterans of the Irish wars, visiting the capital from their homes in County Kilkenny, walked together in the garden of Dublin Castle. Both were Englishmen. Colonel William Warden had been in Ireland since the 1640s when he had fought with Inchiquin and Broghill in Munster; Captain John Joyner, lately mayor of Kilkenny, had been in the domestic service of King Charles before coming to Ireland with Cromwell’s expeditionary force in 1649. They may have reminisced, but that was not the purpose of their meeting. At about 5 o’clock they called upon the sentinels to let them out through the postern gate, recently reinforced against surprisal by the erection of an inner gate. As he did so, some thirty or forty soldiers thrust him aside, overpowered the castle guard and marched them out of the castle precincts with their hands in their pockets. Shots from the roof of the castle announced success and horse troops at once rode through the town with drawn swords, crying ‘a parliament, a parliament’. At their head were two more veterans, of a different stamp. Both were Irish born. Sir Theophilus Jones, second son of the bishop of Killaloe and younger brother of the bishop of Clogher, had been cashiered from the captaincy of the lord lieutenant’s life-guard in the summer; Major Edward Warren, whose father was dean of Ossory, was a serving officer of republican principles and radical religious opinions. Their objective was to secure both the commissioners who had been appointed to govern Ireland by the English parliament in the previous June and the commanders of the Dublin garrison. Captain Robert Fitzgerald, the earl of Kildare’s son and Lord Broghill’s nephew, seized three of these men in the council chamber in the new custom house and the other two at a religious meeting in South Werburgh Street. The first stage

¹ ‘‘Tis true, we are but a kind of colony’, Henry Cromwell to Fauconberg, April 1658. Thomas Birch (ed.), A collection of the state papers of John Thurloe, esq. (7 vols., London, 1742), vii, 101.
of the coup was complete. No blood had been shed. It remained for fellow conspirators and sympathizers to follow suit throughout the garrison towns of Ireland.

This is, in the words of a contemporary royalist historian, ‘one of the Curtain-Stories that cannot be pryed into as yet, as are the other abstruse contrivances of the King’s restitution’.² Outwardly, the episode is easily explained. Two months earlier, to the day, the English army had expelled the parliament that ruled all three of the former Stuart kingdoms and taken control. In Ireland, both the army leaders and the civil governors were thought to be in sympathy with the military takeover and as resistance mounted in England and Scotland a group of old and new settlers came together to help to reverse it by seizing power in parliament’s interest. Behind the curtain, there was not so much a different story as a number of possible stories, each with different beginnings and with endings which depended upon events that were not under local control, if they were under control at all.

There were both irreconcilable royalists and implacable republicans among the Protestant community in Ireland, but the rule of the Cromwells, whose policies had proved less repugnant than their usurpation, had served the interests of many sufficiently well to lead them to regret the overthrow of the lord protectorship by the alliance of army officers and republicans in May 1659 which had restored its predecessor, the ‘rump’ of the Long Parliament. The rule of the ‘rump’, more doctrinaire and less responsive than that of the Cromwells, brought the unacceptable features of the commonwealth back into renewed prominence. Its replacement in October by a military junta which was still more doctrinaire may have given it some retrospective attraction, but among those who called for parliament’s restoration in December were many who had neither welcomed its recall in May nor been reconciled to what it had done since. A greater antipathy towards military rule served to account for that anomaly. But the catchcry of the horsemen was ambiguous. For Edward Warren and others it meant the reinstatement of the ‘rump’ but that was far from being its only possible meaning, in Ireland or England. Already, some were arguing for the readmission to parliament of the members

who had been purged by Colonel Pride eleven years earlier, so that the ‘rump’ that had executed the king would be reconstituted as the House of Commons that had fought the civil wars. Others called for fresh elections to a ‘free parliament’. In both cases, the intended outcome was usually a return to monarchy. How complete that return should be was a vital point of difference, but only those who wished to preserve the gains that had been fought for in the civil wars were at liberty to state their position plainly.

In retrospect, the December coup d’état became the defining moment when Protestants in Ireland ‘declared for the Happy Restoration of his Majestye’.³ At the time, its purposes were more circumscribed. The capture of the castle, the government and the army leaders was not the work of a close group united behind a political programme, but of a consortium of men with different interests and different preferences, practising different degrees of pragmatism and dissimulation. What they had in common was a determination to seize the opportunity to wrest power from extremists, recreate acceptable governmental and political processes and find a way of allowing the political nation to arrive at decisions. Once they had done that, they competed with one another to influence the decisions that were to be made. Their disagreements, however, were contained by their realization that the large decisions, which extended to England and Scotland as well as Ireland and ultimately embraced the relations of the king with all three, would be made elsewhere. They could hope to influence what happened, but not to determine it. They concentrated on keeping control of the local situation in their own hands by ‘remodelling’ the command of the army, establishing an executive and summoning a representative convention to legitimate the initiative that they had taken. While in England the ‘rump’ gave way in February to a reconstituted Long Parliament, with the purged members in the majority, and this gave way in its turn in April to an elected parliamentary convention which restored the king in May, the dominant group in Ireland paced their response to the emerging possibilities and extended the range of local political activity and choice in rough step with developments elsewhere. They kept a watching brief on the ‘abstruse

contrivances’ of others and individually engaged in some of their own, but their common concern was to police the Irish boundaries of the political flux which was beyond their control.

It cannot be claimed that their activities contributed directly to the king’s return. But there is a local story to be told, because the central issue of the kingship did not stand alone in Ireland. Entangled with it was the question of how the restoration of the monarchy would affect a Protestant community which had changed fundamentally in character and fortune as a result of the recent conquest, the immigration that had accompanied it, and the massive transfer of property that followed. As the return of Charles became increasingly probable, old and new colonists alike were united in their determination to ensure that the restoration of the old regime did not entail the restoration of the old Catholic proprietors and upset the land settlement fashioned by the usurpers in the 1650s. The political means that they had improvised to protect themselves against the king’s enemies were adapted to preserving their new estates against the possibility of royal reprisal for the disloyalty or collusion to which their gains testified. Their achievement, before normal decision-making procedures were formally resumed on 18 June, when the king granted an audience to a delegation from the Irish Convention and negotiations commenced, was unity. Although the established Protestant colonists and those who joined them in the 1650s had little enough in common, in the last year of the commonwealth both learned to understand that they must subordinate their differences to their shared interests and cooperate to meet the challenge of the restoration ‘all as one body’.

The collective stake that Protestant political action was designed to preserve in 1660 had its origins eighteen years earlier when investors were invited in February 1642 to contribute to the cost of subduing the Irish rebellion in return for a share in the land that would become available through forfeiture when it was over. Some £300,000 was subscribed by about 1500 ‘adventurers’, geared up to a liability of £360,000 by the terms of a special offer made to investors in a doubling ordinance in 1643. Later, when the English civil wars were over and the new republic turned its attention to establishing its authority in Ireland, it was decided to meet the

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pay costs of conquest in the same way. Arrears were allowed to accumulate and officers and soldiers were paid in Irish land to the value of the services they had given, an arrangement which enhanced the security of both countries by ensuring that the soldiers were not demobilized in England. After the conquest, the distribution of confiscated estates amounting to more than half of Ireland in fulfilment of these obligations transformed the political and social geography of the country. The framework of the settlement was established by an initial decision that landownership in the provinces of Ulster, Leinster and Munster should be reserved to Protestants and, accordingly, that Catholics who were able to establish their innocence should be required to surrender their estates in return for land in Connacht and County Clare.

In the Act of Satisfaction, passed in 1653 by ‘Barebone’s parliament’, a nominated assembly convened by the army after it had forcibly dissolved the purged parliament – the ‘rump’ – which had abolished the monarchy, the land forfeited in the ten counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Meath, Westmeath, King’s County, Queen’s County, Tipperary, Limerick and Waterford was designated as the resource from which the state’s debts were to be met. One half of the baronies in each county was to be set aside to satisfy the claims of the adventurers and the other allocated to meeting army arrears. The baronies were sorted into two groups by lottery in January 1654 and a preliminary survey of the extent and location of the forfeited land in each county was made. It was on the basis of this information that the claims of the adventurers, or in many instances those to whom they had assigned the benefit of their investment, were dealt with in the first instance. Lots were drawn and entitlements were conveyed to a total of 1,043 individuals, but the difficulty of the task and the inadequacy of the survey prolonged the business; an exact match between the amount of land allocated to adventurers in particular counties and the amount of confiscable profitable land actually available proved impossible to achieve, and perhaps 10 per cent of the total value of the adventurers’

[5] The amount of forfeited land in these counties varied: the Ulster counties were to meet 12.5 per cent of the adventurers’ claims, the Munster counties 30.5% and the Leinster counties the remainder. In total, these claims amounted to about 17% of the debt to be discharged, and this is approximately the proportion of the available land that was assigned to meet them. Bottigheimer, *English money and Irish land*, pp. 143, 153.
claims was left unsatisfied, or ‘deficient’.⁶ In mid-1657 their spokesmen were still complaining that ‘few or none of them can to this day find any such settlement as will admit them with security to build plant or bestow their industry upon their proportions’.⁷ In an effort to expedite the business, they agreed late in 1658 that the details of their settlement should be redrawn in accordance with the later and more sophisticated survey directed by William Petty, which had been used to allocate land to the soldiers, but the business was still unfinished when the Cromwellian protectorate was overthrown and the ‘rump’ was recalled to its duties in May 1659. The adventurers’ settlement had not been at a standstill: some had established themselves on their property, while others had realized their assets or remained at home as absentees, but many waited with increasing impatience for the completion of the administrative process and the final confirmation of their new holdings.

In the meantime, the claims for arrears owing to some 35,000 officers and soldiers, most of them demobilized in the successive disbandments of army units between 1653 and 1656, proved larger and more complicated than the original scheme could contain. The original allocation of forfeited land in the ten counties designated for this purpose had been intended to meet the payments due for service in Ireland after 5 June 1649, which was the accounting date for the commencement of Cromwell’s expedition. Disbandment began in June 1653, however, with men who had accumulated arrears for service in Ireland before that date. Additional resources were needed to satisfy these supernumeraries, among whom were many established settlers who had fought on parliament’s side as well as members of earlier expeditionary forces from England. The land forfeited in County Cavan and in selected baronies in Fermanagh, Monaghan, Louth, Longford, Kilkenny, Cork and Sligo was assigned to the payment of these ’49 arrears, as they came to be known, with the intention of settling those involved, so far as was practicable, in the areas in which they had been stationed, which were also in many cases the places where they had formerly resided. Thus a rough distinction between two categories of military claimant, the pre-Cromwellian and the Cromwellian, was incorporated into the geography of the settlement. As the disbandment of large

⁶ Ibid., pp. 143–52.
⁷ Calendar of state papers relating to Ireland, 1647–60, p. 640. PRO, SP Ire., 63/ 287. 45.
numbers of men who had come with or after Cromwell got under way in 1655, the land which had been assigned to them in the ten counties proved to be insufficient to meet the amounts due, which had grown incrementally since the original calculations had been made. The forfeited land in Londonderry, Tyrone, Wexford and Kerry and in assorted baronies in Fermanagh, Monaghan, Kilkenny and Sligo was added to the pool. There were also obligations to some of these men arising out of unpaid arrears due for previous service in England: parts of County Mayo were appropriated to these.

The reality of the settlement in the 1650s was not as tidy as the paperwork envisaged. This was partly due to technical deficiencies. There were innumerable disputes arising from challenges to the classification of individual liability to forfeiture, from the redemption of confiscated property by the payment of composition fines or from the shortcomings of the surveys on which the distribution was based. A more fundamental reason was the untidiness of human behaviour. Many of the original adventurers had sold their interest before the settlement began, and most of those who received land under this heading never came to settle in Ireland. Likewise, it had not been unknown for army men recalled to England to sell their arrears. Above all, the great majority of the demobilized officers and soldiers converted their entitlements into as much capital as they could realize and went home, most at the first opportunity, others after they had inspected their new property. ‘They have high expectations till they see the country’, explained one of the many established colonists who looked forward to expanding their holdings at bargain prices. Perhaps one in five of the army beneficiaries stayed in Ireland, and by no means all of these retained the property assigned to them. There was a lively buyer’s market in land, in adventurers’ lots and in the greatly depreciated soldiers’ debentures, as the instruments which conveyed entitlement to forfeited land of a stated value were known. Army officers were particularly well

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8 After Henry Cromwell’s arrival in July 1655, thirty-six companies of foot and fifteen companies of horse were disbanded. Calendar of State Papers, Adventurers, 1642–59 (London, 1903), p. xxxiii.

9 Cal. SP, Ire., 1647–60, p. 496.

10 Cal. SP, Ire., 1647–60, p. 625. SP Ire., 63/287. 9.

11 It was reckoned that of those who remained in the army ‘not one in fifty of them hath one foot of land in Ireland’. Memorandum on the north of Ireland. SP, Ire., 63/305. 113.
placed to accumulate soldiers’ portions, ‘being well stored with money, and the soldiers greatly wanting the same’,¹² but purchases were made by old colonists as well as by newcomers. As a result, involvement in the arrangements was far from being confined to the nominal beneficiaries and vested interest was spread widely throughout the older Protestant community. The pattern of settlement was disturbed by these uncontrolled variables, while its density was not only uneven but random, depending as it did both on variations in the amount of forfeited land available in different areas and on the totality of the decisions made by individuals, to come or to stay as the case might be. None the less, a significant number of newcomers did settle in Ireland. Most of these acquired relatively small amounts of land and the number of proprietors increased sharply as estates were subdivided into soldiers’ portions. A significant number of officers, however, availed of the opportunity to assemble cut-price estates which were inestimably larger than the realizable value of their arrears would have purchased for them in England. The configuration of the scheme, though greatly modified in application, provided the structure of the new colonial Ireland. There were differences of interest between those who had been disbanded and those who remained in arms, but the ex-army component of this settlement process was by no means fully differentiated from the army itself. Those officers who remained in service had shared in the distribution of lands, though their claims had not been met in full. Many of them had received temporary grants of land from government reserves, known as custodiams, to provide for their support and some had received grants as security for their unpaid arrears.¹³ Conversely, disbanded officers and soldiers remained as an essential reserve force in the security system.

Formally, the army in Ireland had been reduced to eighteen regiments by 1659, six of horse, one of dragoons and eleven of foot, but, in real terms, the military establishment was not clearcut in either composition or structure. The arrangements were complicated by a proliferation of ‘loose’ companies and troops, free from regimental associations, and often commanded by senior officers. In some instances these were dedicated to

a specific purpose, usually garrison duty under the command of a formally disbanded officer who had settled in the vicinity; in others, they served as appendages to prominent individuals whose status and influence they both signified and upheld. Structurally, moreover, the operational deployment of the army diluted the impact of the nominal lines of command. Policy dictated that the soldiers should live in quarters and security demanded the presence of force everywhere. There was a minimum of fifty-seven garrisons to be manned,¹⁴ and fifteen administrative precincts to be serviced. In these conditions few if any of the regiments, horse or foot, existed as a coherent entity. As a matter of course, the various troops or companies were dispersed over the area of the regiment’s responsibility, if it had one, and often beyond, for units and officers were routinely detached for special duty in distant places, so that Carrickfergus, for example, was governed by the lieutenant-colonel of a regiment stationed in north Munster. Some regiments were literally nominal in character: they consisted of unrelated companies grouped together for administrative purposes, and had neither territorial base nor corporate identity. Senior officers commonly combined garrison commands with their regimentsal duties, and many carried out onerous local, regional or national administrative functions as well. The interests that most had acquired in landed property absorbed some of their energies and some spent a good deal of time in the political centres of Dublin or London. In these circumstances, the degree of devolution was large and the real distribution of authority might bear little relation to the simple pyramid of military line management.

With the implementation of the land settlement and the institution of regular machinery for the government of the country came the elaboration of a bureaucracy. Although many of the administrative and executive tasks were carried out by army officers, the train of ancillary officials and administrators who came to assist in the administration of Ireland in the 1650s constituted a further element in the new population, alongside the ‘adventurers and debenturers’ whose interests they came to share,

¹⁴ Cal. SP, Ire., 1647–60, pp. 687–8. This was an assessment of the strategic requirements: it was alleged that in reality the garrisons were ‘most partially placed, not according to the Commonwealth’s interest but as relations or friends can procure them’. HMC, Report on the manuscripts of the earl of Egmont (3 vols., London 1905–23 ), i, 560.
partly because a portion of their salary was often paid in debentures and partly because opportunities to acquire property were readily available.¹⁵ A motley collection of opportunists and job seekers, merchants, lawyers, ministers and other professionals among them, contributed to the profile of the new colonists.

The predicament of the old colonists in 1659, in wishing to be rid of the usurping regime while preserving some of its works, had been adumbrated in the confusions of the 1640s. When civil war in England had impeded the suppression of rebellion in Ireland after 1642, Protestant loyalty to King Charles I had been strained by the fact that his policy of arranging a truce and coming to terms with the rebels in order to concentrate on winning the civil war was less attractive than parliament’s policy of containing the rebels while it lasted and defeating them after it was over. At various times and places, circumstances or inclination led Protestant colonists to cooperate with the king’s enemies against the Confederate Catholics.¹⁶ This posture briefly received implicit official sanction in the aftermath of the king’s defeat in England when his lord lieutenant, the marquess of Ormond, made the same choice and surrendered Dublin to the victorious parliament before leaving Ireland in 1647.¹⁷ When he returned late in the following year and brought the royalist cause into an incongruous coalition with that of the Catholics, the issue was less clear than it seemed because the Irish and English dimensions of royal policy were in conflict. The question for Protestants in Ireland could not be confined to whether they were for or against the king; they had also to determine whether it was proper or wise to join with Irish Catholics against English Protestants in an effort to prevent the decisive conquest of Ireland and secure the free exercise of the Catholic religion and the retention of Catholic political influence. In that dilemma, some followed Ormond and some did not. It was not until after August 1650, when Charles II restored the rebellious status of the Catholics in arms by repudiating the terms on which the coalition was based and Ormond once

¹⁶ In 1660, Captain Fulke Rokely claimed to have been the only commissioned officer under Sir Charles Coote’s command in Connacht who had remained consistently loyal to the king. Cal. SP, Ire., 1660–2, p. 65.
again withdrew, leaving the country without the vestige of a royal presence, that it became possible for Protestants to concentrate with a clear conscience on the primary local priority of bringing the rebellion forcibly to an end in cooperation with the only force capable of doing so. In this task there was ready collaboration with the usurping regime, but for most of those involved it was subject to the same reservation that had accompanied collaboration with parliamentary forces and their Scottish allies in the 1640s: that to combine with the king’s enemies against the Catholic forces in Ireland was an act of preservation rather than an act of rebellion, a necessity not a choice.

The way in which the members of the established Protestant colony had conducted themselves in the 1640s determined how they were dealt with in the settlement of the 1650s. Broadly, they were sorted into two categories. One consisted of those who had remained loyal to the crown throughout all the vicissitudes of the war years until the royalist cause ceased to have substance. The other comprised those who had shown ‘good affection’ to parliament. In the Act for the Settling of Ireland, passed in August 1652 by the ‘rump’ of the Long Parliament, those who belonged to the first group were made liable to the forfeiture of one-fifth of their estates. Those who qualified for the second not only escaped this penalty but were rewarded by the state’s acceptance of the obligation to pay arrears due for military service against the rebels in the same way as it paid those of its regular soldiers, in debentures. The sorting process was not simple. Those who claimed to have shown ‘good affection’ had done so in a wide variety of ways and circumstances. Many benefited from the fact that the confused manner in which the war had developed in most parts of the country lent itself to simplified judgements of what constituted a transfer of allegiance to parliament. Those who had accepted parliamentary authority after Ormond’s departure in 1647 and continued to do so after his return were accorded equal status with those who had not observed the 1643 Cessation of hostilities between the king and the confederates. So also were the regiments supported from 1642 by parliament in Ulster, despite the fact that they had not only been raised and deployed with the king’s ostensible approval but had at least nominally recognized Ormond’s authority.

Simplification could go only so far, however, and the complexities of
the war in Munster gave rise to a further distinction. Many of those who had followed the earl of Inchiquin into the parliamentary camp in 1644 in defiance of the Cessation had also followed him back to the king in 1648. Some made handsome amends when they defected to parliament after Cromwell came to Ireland, preferring, in the later words of parliament’s general of horse for Munster, Lord Broghill, ‘the hazard of their lives once more before the Servitude of their Country’.¹⁸ The terms of the Act of Settlement nonetheless made them liable to partial forfeiture. This was attended to by an ordinance made in June 1654 which gave indemnity to ‘all persons British and Protestant’ in the province but distinguished between those who had come to parliament’s support before and after 1 December 1649 by imposing composition fines on the latter. A few months later, this concession was extended by an ordinance which allowed Protestants in the rest of Ireland to avoid confiscation by paying a fine of not less than twice the 1640 income from the property, though it did not similarly confer indemnity.¹⁹ Arrangements to meet ’49 arrears for the absolved Munstermen were incorporated into the scheme of settlement and the forfeited land in Donegal, Wicklow and the unassigned baronies in Longford was allocated to these claimants.²⁰ Placed as they were at the end of a lengthy queue, they had received nothing by 1659.

The case of the Scots settlers in Ulster, who greatly outnumbered their English fellow colonists, perhaps by as much as fifteen to one, was more problematic still.²¹ There were unswerving royalists among them, as there were in Scotland also, but many had been drawn into the convolutions of Scottish opposition politics. They had sympathized with Covenanter resistance to royal policy in the late 1630s, welcomed the Scottish army which had come to their defence in 1642, supported the alliance of the Scots with the English parliament in 1643, approved the design to impose Presbyterianism on England and Ireland which moti-

²¹ Shortly after the restoration, it was estimated that Ulster contained 80,000 Scots ‘able to beare Armes’ and ‘not 5000 English’; ‘both towne and Country in a manner swarme with the Scotch’. SP, Ire., 63/305, 113.
vated it and subscribed to the Solemn League and Covenant which cemented it. When the Scots government divided its supporters by changing sides and invading England in the king’s cause during the second civil war in 1648, the response of Scots in Ireland was similarly divided, but they were numbered among parliament’s enemies when Cromwell brought the New Model Army to Ireland in 1649 and the subsequent conquest of Scotland placed them firmly among the un-reconciled. As Ormond observed in July 1649, ‘I understand not perfectly the submission of that province, that fatal ingredient of the covenant having still some mixture in it.’²² In the 1650s there were degrees of intransigence among them. At one end of the spectrum, there were some who renounced the covenant; at the other, there were a good many who were sufficiently disenchanted with the Stuarts to cooperate with those who had overthrown them. All, however, remained suspect to the regime because their close connections with Scotland and their outspoken commitment to Presbyterianism or monarchy, or both, made them potentially dangerous.²³ A scheme to transplant them to parts of Ireland more remote from Scotland was formulated, but dropped, and the act of settlement and the ordinance which ameliorated it protected their position. Almost all of them, however, remained somewhat apart from their fellow colonists because their loyalty to the crown was defined by their Presbyterian principles and was predicated upon Charles II’s adherence to the terms of the covenant of 1643, which he had taken at his coronation in 1651 and which called for the English and Irish churches to be reformed along Scottish lines.

Few Protestants who remained in Ireland in the 1650s remained uncompromised in some degree. As the republican commonwealth established after the execution of Charles I in 1649 and the Cromwellian protectorate which replaced it in 1653 successively went about the business of arranging a settlement designed to make Ireland safe for Protestantism, they could

²³ Anthony Morgan informed parliament in 1656 that ‘in the North, the Scotch keep up an interest distinct in garb and all formalities, and are able to raise an army of 40,000 fighting men at any time, which they may easily carry over into the Highlands upon any occasion’. T. K. Lowry (ed.), The Hamilton Manuscripts (Belfast, 1867), p. 69n.
count on local Protestant cooperation. From the outset, leading members of the old community played a willing part as members of the commissions of revenue and sequestration of delinquents’ estates established in each precinct, and there seems to have been little reluctance to undertake the usual chores of local government and administrative office thereafter. That acquiescent tendency was reinforced after the mid-1650s when the severity of the regime was significantly softened in the lord deputyship of Oliver Cromwell’s son Henry who cultivated the support of the established Protestant communities and sought to restore normal civilian routines in an effort to counterbalance the predominant military and radical influence. Composition fines unofficially ceased to be enforced, the law courts were reinstated, new town charters were issued, sheriffs and justices of the peace were appointed to carry out their familiar functions and office holders in the central administration resumed their duties. The traditional elite was brought comfortably into complicity with the usurping regime. But the framework of administration remained the new military precincts into which the counties had been grouped and the reality was that power in Ireland had changed hands and was sustained by an army of occupation, partly under arms and partly settled on the land. The Irish parliament had been replaced by token representation in a union parliament at Westminster, where members from Ireland and Scotland were outnumbered, almost seven to one, by the representatives of English and Welsh constituencies. Moreover, while Henry Cromwell displayed a welcome conservatism in religious matters and gradually curtailed the influence of the radical extremists imported with the army and encouraged by his predecessor, Charles Fleetwood, the fact remained that the Church of Ireland had been abolished and a non-episcopal church imposed.

Collaboration with the regime in securing Protestant Ireland was qualified not only by disapproval of its political principles but also by disagreement about what Protestantism itself properly was and what the relationship between the church and the community should properly be. Though members of the formerly established Church of Ireland and their Presbyterian rivals differed in their views on church government and liturgy, and English and Scottish Presbyterians were also at odds, all shared the conviction that the only acceptable ecclesiastical system was an established church, uniform in belief and practice, to which everybody
was obliged to belong. By contrast, the religious purposes with which the anti-royalist movement was suffused were novel and diverse. A pragmatic mainstream Presbyterianism had been influential for some time, and had proved acceptable to many who, though they would have preferred Episcopalianism, believed that God had enjoined conformity but had not ruled on church government. However, the political calculus which led first to the purging of parliament and the abolition of the monarchy and later to the expulsion of the parliament itself placed power in the hands of men who respected variety, within puritan limits. The ecclesiastical arrangements which evolved were based on two novel principles. The first was an acceptance of the responsibility of the state to provide and pay for religious services for the community at large without prescribing their precise form, so that the system which evolved was made up, in James McGuire’s words, of ‘autonomous congregations served by licensed ministers of various theological positions’.²⁴ The second and even more obnoxious principle was that those who wished to come together to worship outside this framework should be free to do so. The religion prescribed by law was not grossly offensive, except in so far as it restricted admission to communion, nor need it even be oppressively prescriptive in practice. Moreover, only those who took the extreme view that episcopacy was divinely ordained objected passionately to its absence. But the licence given to the Independents and the extremist sectaries and the iconoclastic influence that they were able to exercise through the authority of zealous army officers were deeply disturbing. It was intolerable that a local commander could deprive the local congregation of their place of worship by removing the roof of the church and replacing it with ‘a speaking-house in a bog for his soldiers to take their turns of speaking in’, as Major John Desborough did in Ballinasloe, or by demolishing it to build a house in Kildare and pave his kitchen in Dublin, as Captain Aland did in Tallaght.²⁵ For a time, under the rule of Fleetwood at the beginning of the

protectorate, the Baptists in particular seemed irresistible and not the least of the virtues of Henry Cromwell (a man, it was said in Ireland, who deserved to be the son of a better father)²⁶ was that he increasingly favoured the relatively conservative ministers, moderated the influence of the radicals and seemed to accept the arguments in favour of a uniform national church urged upon him by collaborationist clergy. Nonetheless, different religious values divided most of the established settlers from most of the newcomers.

By contrast, the degradation and expropriation of the Catholic communities and the associated redistribution of their property, which together conferred both direct and indirect benefits, was widely approved and deeply compromising. The Munster settler, Vincent Gookin, argued that ‘the confiscation of lands in Ireland is soe generall, the setters and sellers soe many, the buyers and takers soe few, except [the old Protestants] that it is certain, within a year or two, all these men will have too great interests in forfeited lands to give them up to Charles Stuart’.²⁷ Moreover, property acquisition was not the only common ground between old and new settlers. Members of both groups objected to the level of taxation, which was significantly higher than in England. In 1657, it was reported to Henry Cromwell that a motion had been proposed in parliament ‘that the members serving for Ireland might be sent to the tower for their contest about the apportioning the assessment twixt England and Ireland’ and a year later Henry himself protested that the levies for the army were ‘10 times more than in due proportion they ought to be’.²⁸ Likewise, both resented the failure to fulfil undertakings to allow Ireland to trade freely with England and Scotland. They also shared a unifying interest in guarding against a Catholic counter-offensive and both were concerned that government in England should maintain the stability and authority to enable it to provide the defence that the colony in Ireland required. Representatives from both sections were prominent among the members of the union parliament at Westminster who promoted the proposal to replace the

²⁷ *TSP*, v, 646.
protectoral constitution and offer the kingship to Oliver Cromwell in 1657. The same fear of diminished security encouraged widespread civilian acceptance of Richard Cromwell’s succession as lord protector on his father’s death in September 1658.

When ‘the lion was forced to quit his prey’, as an Irish parliamentarian glossed Oliver’s passing, the balance of political forces in England was significantly altered.²⁹ On the surface, the change offered little hope to royalists, but one of the consequences of the increasing instability that followed was the remodelling of the organization of royalist resistance in England. For some years royalist strategy had been based on the Treaty of Brussels which committed Spain to bringing an invasion force to the assistance of a royalist rising, and Charles himself had built up a small expeditionary force, largely composed of Irish soldiers who had transferred from French regiments. It became clear, however, that nothing could be done unless the sequence was inverted: the invasion was needed to trigger the rising, because England was effectively policed and English royalists were divided. There had been differences of opinion from the outset. Some favoured a united front which would bring together all opponents of the regime, particularly those former parliamentarians, typically Presbyterian, who had never intended or approved the abolition of monarchy. The argument in favour of this course was that committed royalists were too few and too disadvantaged to rise on their own. The arguments against were, first, that these allies would require conditions that would preserve what they had fought for against the king’s father in the civil war, usually presumed to be the terms of the Newport treaty which had been aborted by Pride’s purge of parliament and the regicide, and second, that true hearted royalists might be unwilling to ally with their former enemies. The alternative view, based on the unwavering belief that the king must be restored on his own terms, was that conspiracy should be confined to royalists and that patience would provide an opportunity sooner or later when the victors fell out among themselves. Both the king’s chief advisors on the continent – Lord Chancellor Hyde, Secretary Nicholas and the marquess of Ormond – and the accredited putative leaders of English royalists, organized in the Sealed Knot, took

the cautious long-term view and were fitfully challenged by more impa-
tient men who wanted quicker results and were prepared to canvass wider
support to achieve them. In the aftermath of Oliver’s death, as circumstan-
ces seemed to become increasingly favourable, the opinion of the court
itself began to change. Early in 1659, the Knot was effectively superseded
in the court’s confidence by a fresh organization under the direction of
John Mordaunt, the Great Trust, which aimed to organize a more broadly
based rising with the support of Presbyterians and others. This revised
approach was not accompanied by a new willingness to compromise. It
was founded on the belief that there existed a growing number of men
who were so far alienated from the regime and so emboldened by the
signs of its vulnerability that they would no longer insist upon terms for
their support.

The instability that gave this sense of opportunity to royalist conspira-
tors was created by a combination of the determination of the army
leaders to recover lost influence, the strivings of the republicans to revive
the ‘good old cause’ that Cromwell was thought to have betrayed and the
growing confidence with which men of more moderate opinion con-
fronted both. In due course both the officers and the republicans seized
their chance, spurred on in part by the fact that the parliament that
Richard convened at the beginning of 1659 proved so conservatively
inclined in matters of both religion and constitutional form as to seem to
endanger everything that had been accomplished. For those newcomers
to Ireland who were committed to the commonwealth and who sup-
ported one or other of its competing factions the choice that now fell to be
made between the continuation of the protectorate, the recall of the
‘rump’ and the rule of the army leaders was an important one. Some were
‘Cromwellians’ who believed in the protectoral formula of rule by ‘a
single person and parliament’. Some were republicans, ideologically op-
posed to the ‘single person’ and committed to the reinstatement of
legitimacy through the return to government of the members of parlia-
ment expelled in 1653. Some were indifferent to governmental forms and
believed that the army alone could uphold what had been achieved and
that it must not be prevented from doing so, either by opposition from
without or dissent from within. Few of the established settlers belonged to
this ethos. Some had certainly adopted republican or commonwealth
principles and some had embraced religious innovation, but these were small minorities. For the majority who had done neither, the issue was nonetheless significant and those who had come to terms with the regime took sides as it became destabilized. Some of them were no doubt acting within the system only to subvert it, as they afterwards maintained, but others were pragmatically concerned with the need to ensure the most favourable immediate outcome, and not all of these were wholly uncommitted in terms of post civil war factional politics. They belonged to that spectrum of royalism which consisted of unrepentant parliamentarian supporters who believed that the wrong turn had been taken as late as 6 December 1648, when parliamentary authority had been subverted by the army in the purge which had brought peace negotiations to an end and prepared the way for the execution of the king.

Most fundamentally, what old and new settlers discovered in common as the survival of the riven commonwealth became increasingly unlikely was the predicament created by the interests that they had acquired in the 1650s. The old were faced with the problem of reconciling a genuine desire for the return of monarchy with a recognition that Charles I would never have done what parliament and Cromwell had done to secure and enrich Protestants in Ireland, and that his son might not be willing to uphold a settlement which was neither legal nor just. As the usurping regime began to crumble, their concern was to find a way to ensure that if it proved possible to restore what had been lost they did not thereby lose what had been gained. The new settlers, by contrast, could not hope to have the best of both worlds. Their difficulty was to decide whether their stake in Ireland was detachable from the cause that had brought them there and, if so, to find the strategy that would allow them to keep it if the regime were overturned. Thus, between established Protestants who did not wish to have to choose between the king and their gains and new ones who were increasingly ready to settle for both, there was a sound basis for cooperation. In May 1660, Charles II was confronted by a unified demand from the enlarged Protestant settler community for the preservation of their gains. Before that point was reached, however, in the twelve months which followed the overthrow of Richard Cromwell, the alternative to monarchy was destroyed by the obstinately conflicting purposes of those who had created it. The collaboration which developed in Ireland, as new
and old settlers sought to control the local consequences of what was happening elsewhere, in Scotland and among the royalists on the continent as well as in England, shaped the social and political relationships of restoration Ireland.