The Logic of Regional Integration

*Europe and Beyond*

Walter Mattli
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1 Introduction

1 The phenomenon of regional integration

Regional integration schemes have multiplied in the past few years and the importance of regional groups in trade, money, and politics is increasing dramatically. Regional integration, however, is no new phenomenon. Examples of Staatenbünde, Bundesstaaten, Eidgenossen- schaften, leagues, commonwealths, unions, associations, pacts, confederacies, councils and their like are spread throughout history. Many were established for defensive purposes, and not all of them were based on voluntary assent. This book looks at a particular set of regional integration schemes. The analysis covers cases that involve the voluntary linking in the economic and political domains of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority over key areas of national policy is shifted towards the supranational level.

The first major voluntary regional integration initiatives appeared in the nineteenth century. In 1828, for example, Prussia established a customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt. This was followed successively by the Bavaria Württemberg Customs Union, the Middle German Commercial Union, the German Zollverein, the North German Tax Union, the German Monetary Union, and finally the German Reich. This wave of integration spilled over into what was to become Switzerland when an integrated Swiss market and political union were created in 1848. It also brought economic and political union to Italy in the risorgimento movement. Integration fever again struck Europe in the last decade of the nineteenth century, when numerous and now long-forgotten projects for European integration were concocted. In France, Count Paul de Leusse advocated the establishment of a customs union in agriculture between Germany and France, with a common tariff bureau in Frankfurt.¹ Other countries considered for membership were Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Spain. In

Austria, the economist and politician Alexander Peez forged plans for a Middle European Zollverein that included France. And Count Goluchowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, passionately advocated the idea of a united Europe in his public speeches. Many other politicians, economists, and journalists made proposals for European union which circulated through the European capitals during that decade. Ultimately, all the projects came to naught.

Half a century later, the idea of European integration was re-invented and the process of merging European nation-states into one prosperous economy and stable polity began. The first step was taken with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. In 1957, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community (EC). The first enlargement of the EC occurred in 1973, with the accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. Greece joined in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. Nine years later, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became the Community’s newest members. In the meantime, European integration had moved beyond trade. In 1979, the European Monetary System was established. And in 1992 the Community adopted the Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary and Political Union. By November 1993, the Community had changed its name to the European Union (EU) to mark the deep level of integration attained.

Integration is not an exclusively European phenomenon, of course. In the 1960s the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Andean Pact, and the Central American Common Market were launched. In the early 1990s, more than half a dozen new integration projects were started in Latin America, the most notable being the Mercado Común del Sur.

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4 The Treaty of Rome established two new communities: the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. The EEC has been referred to as the European Community (EC) for many years. I will follow this convention throughout the book.

5 I use the terms European Community and European Union interchangeably throughout the book.
Explaining regional integration

This book seeks to introduce analytical order to this multitude of integration schemes and to address the general question of what forces drive the process of voluntary integration. The study is motivated by the belief that there is a general logic to regional integration, or — in the words of Milton Friedman — “that there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organizing the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure.” To claim that there are recurring regularities, however, is not to deny the complexity of the phenomenon under study, nor to belittle the importance of differences that remain unexplained by my approach. Regional integration is a product of many and varied forces. This book offers no full account of the phenomenon, neither descriptively nor analytically. It simply seeks to answer a few important questions about regional integration which have remained unaddressed, by incorporating hitherto much neglected factors into the explanation of a complex reality.

This book is also an invitation to the reader to think scientifically about integration and to be wary of so-called explanations that fail basic tests of scientific inference. Unfortunately, these explanations are many. In the context of recent European integration, three popular accounts of the forces driving integration are frequently encountered. First, it is said that politicians, haunted by the horrors of the Second World War, were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of integration scheme</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle German Commercial Union 1828–1831</td>
<td>Closer commercial ties. To keep commercial expansion of Prussia in check. No common tariff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Zollverein 1834</td>
<td>Developed from customs union of 1828 between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt; all German states eventually joined; laid down the economic foundation for political unification of Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Union (Steuerverein) 1834–1854</td>
<td>Established by Hanover and Brunswick; Oldenburg joined in 1836; Lippe Schaumburg in 1838. Genuine customs union with common tariff, common excises, joint customs administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Monetary Union (Deutscher Münzverein) 1838</td>
<td>Fixed rates (based on the Cologne mark of fine silver) between the thaler of Prussia, Hanover, and other North German states and the florin currency in the South German states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovan-Wallachian Customs Union 1847</td>
<td>Led to the foundation of Romania in 1878.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Confederation 1848 (completed in 1874)</td>
<td>Economic and political unification of Switzerland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Monetary Convention 1857</td>
<td>Attempt to secure fixed rates between Prussian thaler, South German florin, and the Austrian monetary system; a Union thaler (Vereinthaler) was introduced (equal in value to one Prussian thaler).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Monetary Union 1865</td>
<td>The basis of this union was the French franc (established in 1803 as a metric coin on a bi-metallic base). Belgium based their franc on French coin in 1832; Switzerland in 1850; Italy in 1865 (year of conference establishing LMU); Greece joined in 1867.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian Monetary Union 1875</td>
<td>Based on crown of 100 ore; included Sweden, Denmark, Norway.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benelux 1944</td>
<td>Customs convention between the Netherlands and the Belgian–Luxemburg Economic Union of 1921.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community (EC) 1958</td>
<td>By 1968 removal of tariffs and quotas; common external tariff; common policies in agriculture, regional development, research and development, education, economic cohesion etc. Powerful supranational institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
naturally driven to devise a novel structure of European governance capable of eradicating the very roots of intra-European conflicts. The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community served this purpose directly. It established supranational control over resources that render warfare possible. The concern about securing peace may also have contributed to the set-up of the European Community, and there is evidence that this concern lingered on into the 1980s. But is it the main force that has driven European integration? Why then was a rival regional community set up, the European Free Trade Association, given the tendency of rival commercial unions to exacerbate conflicts? Why did not all European countries participate in the peace-building effort from the beginning? Did the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland join the European Community in 1973 because of concerns about peace?

A second set of explanations centers around the notion of leadership. Insightful, charismatic leaders, it is alleged, managed to transcend the narrow-mindedness and selfishness of domestic pressure groups hostile to integration and European unity. But this account is flawed by its inability to explain numerous failures of these leaders and long phases of stagnation in the process of community building.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of integration scheme</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gran Colombia 1948</td>
<td>Plan to establish a Greater Colombia Economic and Customs Union (members: Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American Common Market (CACM) 1960</td>
<td>Objective: customs union and joint industrial planning (import substitution industrialization). By 1966, tariffs were removed on 94% of intraregional trade, and 80% of extraregional imports were covered by a common external tariff. Intraregional trade increased from 5.9% in 1958 to 24.2% in 1968. CACM's success story ends with the “Soccer War” of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras. 1991: Renewed effort to implement free-trade agreement. (Adoption of timetable for trade liberalization. Members, however, fail to agree on common external tariff by 1992.) 1993: CACM and Panama sign the Central American Economic Integration Treaty. Members: Costa Rica (1963), El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua. 1993: CACM signs free-trade agreement with Colombia and Venezuela. 1994: CACM signs free-trade agreement with Mexico.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Pact (AP) 1969</td>
<td>Objective: Customs Union and joint industrial planning. Postponed several times. 1989: AP targets 1995 for the establishment of a free-trade area and 1997 for the establishment of a common market. 1996: The Trujillo Act changes the group’s name to Andean Community and lays down proposals for the strengthening of the political aspects of the bloc through the creation of a secretary general and an Andean Parliament. Members: Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela (Chile withdrew in 1976).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explaining regional integration

An ever-popular third explanation refers to changed preferences. The timing of a new application for membership, it is claimed, is attributable to the pressure from growing segments of society desirous of being connected to the larger “Euro-culture.” These accounts based on ad hoc shifts in preferences seem little more than thinly veiled acknowledgments of theoretical ignorance. They shift the causal impetus to the social level, but then leave it unexplained.

The problem with explanations of this kind is not necessarily that they are wrong but that they are insufficient. The fact that a country or a region has a particular historical, political, or geographical trait provides no justification for the inference that there is a causal connection unless it identifies an attribute that can also explain a number of other cases or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Agreement</th>
<th>Objective: customs union and joint industrial planning.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) 1991</td>
<td>Creation of a single market in goods, capital, and people by January 1995, but the treaty was amended by the Protocol of Ouro Preto in December 1994 with the member states agreeing on an imperfect customs union by January 1995. 1995: MERCOSUR agrees to a five-year program under which it hopes to perfect the customs union. Members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1994</td>
<td>Objective: NAFTA is a new, improved, and expanded version of the US–Canada FTA. It provides for phased elimination of tariffs and most non-tariff barriers on regional trade within ten years. A few import-sensitive products will have a fifteen-year transition period. NAFTA extends the dispute settlement of the US–Canada FTA to Mexico.</td>
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**Table 1.3. Selected regional integration schemes in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and Middle East**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of integration scheme</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Dounière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) 1973</td>
<td>Objective: Customs union. Little progress. Common external tariff was abolished <em>de facto</em>; intra-union trade in manufactures restricted to those produced by firms enjoying the status of <em>Taxe Unique</em> system. Members: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) 1980</td>
<td>Objective: reduce economic dependence on South Africa through cooperation on projects to foster balanced regional development. Members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia (1990), Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Explaining regional integration

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Recent Developments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>Objective: free-trade area and common industrial projects. Minimal intra-trade liberalization achieved. Industrial cooperation scarcely implemented. Effective in promoting regional political stability. Recent proposals by Thailand to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within fifteen years. Plan endorsed in 1992 by ASEAN ministers. Members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam.</td>
<td>1997: ASEAN decides to extend membership to Burma, Cambodia, and Laos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)</td>
<td>Objective: customs union and political cooperation. Harmonization of policies, and customs unions. A common external tariff has not yet been implemented. Members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.</td>
<td>1981: Common external tariff has not yet been implemented. Members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC)</td>
<td>Started as a consultative body for trade issues. Members signed in 1994 an APEC “free-trade” agreement that is nonbinding and fails to define the scope of free trade. Members: ASEAN countries, Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China (1991), Taiwan (1991), Hong Kong (1991), Mexico (1993), Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994). Vietnam has applied for membership.</td>
<td>1989: APEC “free-trade” agreement that is nonbinding and fails to define the scope of free trade. Members: ASEAN countries, Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China (1991), Taiwan (1991), Hong Kong (1991), Mexico (1993), Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994). Vietnam has applied for membership.</td>
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phenomena or is logically derived from a theory that has wide explanatory power. It is almost always possible to provide an "explanation" after the event if any amount or type of information about a sufficiently complex single case can be used in constructing the explanation.\textsuperscript{7}

At various times, social scientists have searched for more rigorous explanations of economic and political integration. In political science, one major analytical framework for understanding integration is neofunctionalism. It clarifies and refines many of the ideas developed by its predecessor theory, functionalism. It begins with the assumption that supranationality is the only method available to states to secure maximum welfare and then proceeds to provide an insightful account of how integration evolves using concepts such as functional spillover, updating of common interests, and subnational and supranational group dynamics. Neofunctionalism is an important building-block of a comprehensive account of integration. But it is not enough. By its very assumption it fails to give an explanation of the link between welfare maximization and regional integration. It seeks to account for the institutional arrangements within a region in which economic transactions take place, but it leaves these transactions unexamined. Another weakness is that it never fully specifies the conditions under which subnational demands for integration become accepted at the national level. As a result, neofunctionalism fails to answer several important questions: what exactly are the forces that render the nation-state obsolescent? Why is decision-making at the supranational level more efficient? Why have some integration schemes failed? Why does a country seek to join an already existing community and what explains the timing of such a request for membership? Other questions that neofunctionalism fails to address are: what role do external events play in regional integration? What is the impact of community-building on non-members?

Intergovernmentalism is an alternative approach to integration in political science. Unlike neofunctionalism, it assigns a central role to heads of states. It argues that regional integration can be best understood as a series of bargains among the political leaders of the major states in a region. These bargains are the result of converging preferences among these leaders. Small states are often bought off with side-payments offered by the leading states. The emphasis on power-related variables does enable intergovernmentalists to elucidate important features of regional agreements that elude neofunctionalists. Nevertheless, as a theory of integration, intergovernmentalism suffers from several

\textsuperscript{7} Mancur Olson, \textit{The Rise and Decline of Nations} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 10–11.
shortcomings. For example, by focusing solely on episodes of interstate bargains, the theory cuts into on-going economic, legal, and social processes and presents a picture of integration that ignores, discounts, or treats in an *ad hoc* fashion defining events that precede or follow interstate bargains. Further, if progress towards integration through interstate bargains is the result of converging preferences on the part of the leaders of major states, then the stopping or slow-down of the process of integration must, by implication, also reflect such preferences. However, a theory that “explains” the varying course of integration in terms of shifting preferences offers little to assess the theory’s validity.

Economists who study regional integration look primarily at market relationships among goods and factors of production within a region and assume away the relevance of institutional and political forces. They are interested in the welfare effects of integration. For example, one classic economic account of integration, customs union theory, seeks to understand the welfare implications of integration in terms of trade creation, trade diversion, and terms of trade. More broadly, economic explanations are positive theories of welfare gains and losses associated with regional integration, not explanations of the political choices that produce such areas. The weakness of these explanations is evident. By narrowly focusing on markets, these theories overlook a key aspect of integration, namely the provision of common rules, regulations, and policies that govern regional economic areas. The failure to consider this institutional dimension renders economic theories of integration ill-equipped to tackle questions that pertain to the deepening and broadening of integration.

The analytical framework presented in this book seeks to remedy some of the weaknesses of traditional approaches by bridging political science and economics. Such an analysis is based on the conviction that market integration cannot be explained without reference to institutions, and that institutional analysis that fails to refer to market transactions risks being empty. This framework also incorporates factors, such as new technologies, that have been overlooked in many analyses of integration despite their obvious importance to the process of integration. Finally, this book pays particular attention to the external causes and effects of integration.

3 Themes and organization of the book

After a brief review of existing theories of integration in chapter 2, the book turns to two related puzzles in chapter 3, one implicating the
insider countries in an integration process, the other, the outsiders. First, why have so many attempts at integration failed while a few have been crowned with success? Failure and success are primarily measured by the extent to which integration groups manage to match their stated integration goals with subsequent achievements. Second, what explains when outsiders become insiders? Outsiders can become insiders either by joining an existing economic union or by launching their own regional group.

The analysis of the first puzzle is primarily concerned with identifying the conditions under which implementation of an integration scheme is likely to succeed or to fail. It takes the decision to adopt an integration treaty as a given. The signing of such a treaty does not establish integration. It only signifies a promise by the leaders of several states to engage in a particular course of action over a period of time towards the aim of tying the economies of their countries closer together. True integration is achieved through the implementation of this promise, which entails a lengthy process of establishing common rules, regulations, and policies. It is these rules, regulations, and policies, based either on specific treaty provisions or derived over time from the general principles and objectives written into integration treaties, which will translate the aspiration for regional prosperity into reality.

Treaty implementation, that is, the attainment of a treaty’s stated integration goals, is far from easy and automatic, as a glance at the history of regional integration schemes reveals. Indeed, the majority of integration schemes have failed at the implementation stage, including the Middle German Commercial Union, the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Andean Pact, and the Economic Community of West African States. Some projects, on the other hand, have been extremely successful, notably the European Union and the German Zollverein. Between these polar cases are a few integration projects with mixed results. What explains this variation of outcomes?

Chapter 3 argues that two sets of conditions must be satisfied if integration is to succeed, namely, demand-side and supply-side conditions. The demand-side condition is derived from insights provided by economic institutional theories, such as property rights theory, economic history, and new institutional economics. These theories seek to explain the evolution of domestic institutional arrangements in terms of changes in the extent and structure of markets. Chapter 3 extrapolates their insights to an account of the demand-side condition for integration. In short, the argument is that regional institution-building may be viewed as an attempt to internalize externalities that cross borders
Themes and organization of the book within a group of countries.\textsuperscript{8} Externalities affecting cross-border trade and investment arise from economic and political uncertainty as well as a wide range of financial risks that market actors face when dealing with foreign firms and governments. The cost of these externalities increases as new technologies raise the potential for gain from market exchange, thus increasing the payoff to regional rules, regulations, and policies which alleviate these costs.

However, demand is not enough for integration to succeed. Economic institutional theories have rightly been criticized as “naive” for assuming that demand alone would miraculously generate institutional change. What they have overlooked are supply conditions. These are the conditions under which political leaders are willing and able to accommodate demands for deeper integration at each step of the integration process. Willingness depends on the payoff of integration to political leaders. Chapter 3 assumes that these leaders value political autonomy and power, and that their success in holding on to power depends on their relative success in managing the economy. It follows that leaders may be unwilling to deepen integration if their economies are relatively prosperous. Why sacrifice national sovereignty if the economy is growing relatively quickly and the people are thus content? Put differently, economically successful leaders may not see the need to pursue deeper integration because their expected marginal benefit from further integration in terms of retaining political power is minimal and thus not worth the cost of integration. However, in times of economic difficulties, political leaders will be more concerned with securing their own survival and will thus be more willing to accommodate demands by market players for regional rules, regulations, and policies.

But even willing political leaders may be unable to supply regional rules, regulations, and policies because of collective action problems such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) and, even more importantly, the Coordination Dilemma (CD). The PD problem is one of free-riding.\textsuperscript{9} It is mitigated if the integration agreement provides for the establishment of “commitment institutions,” such as centralized monitoring and third-

\textsuperscript{8} The meaning of the terms “internalization” and “externalities” in the context of regional integration is explained in section 3 of chapter 3. Externalities involve an interdependence of utility or production functions. A negative externality lowers the utility or production of an affected party. For example, the upstream pulp mill which discharges effluent in the river thus reducing the scope for fishing downstream is said to impose an externality on the fishermen. Internalization describes the process of taking into account an externality and reducing the output of the offending good to its optimal level, i.e., the level at which the cost of reducing the externality (by a further unit) is equal to the benefit from such a reduction.

\textsuperscript{9} “Free-riding” here means defecting from the obligation to contribute to the building of an integrated economy while enjoying the fruits of the joint effort by others.
party enforcement. The provision of such institutions is one supply condition for successful integration, but it is a weak one. In its absence, cooperation may still be possible on the basis of repeat-play, issue-linkage, and reputation. Nevertheless, “commitment institutions” can catalyze the process of regional integration, particularly if they offer direct access to those actors with the greatest vested interest in seeing integration completed.

The problem in the Coordination Dilemma is not one of free-riding but of agreeing on one of several possible courses of action in a situation in which the states have opposing interests. Coordination problems are particularly salient in integration, because most regional integration schemes, including free-trade areas, customs unions, or economic unions go beyond the removal of border barriers. They may include efforts to adopt common rules of origin, common commercial policies, common investment codes, common health and safety standards, or common macroeconomic policies. Coordination also gives rise to distributional issues, as a chosen course of action benefits some states within the group more than others. Questions of fairness and equitable distribution of the gains from cooperation will need to be addressed to prevent discontent from derailing the integration process. These observations lead to a key supply condition for successful integration, namely the presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties. Such a state serves as a focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies; it may also help to ease distributional tensions by acting as regional “paymaster”. In sum, regional groups that satisfy both demand and supply conditions stand the greatest chance of succeeding, whereas groups that fulfill neither set of conditions are least likely to attain any significant level of integration.

Chapter 3 also considers the effect of regional integration on outsider states and examines outsiders’ responses to integration. In a nutshell, the argument is as follows: countries that are negatively affected by regional integration can pursue one of two strategies. They can either seek to merge with the group generating the external effects (I call this the “first integrative response”) or they can respond by creating their own regional group (this I call the “second integrative response”). The first integrative response is possible only if the existing group is willing to accept newcomers. However, if an outsider is not a desirable candidate in the sense of being able to make a net positive contribution to the union, the union is generally unlikely to accept it. If an outsider is rejected, or knows it is likely to be rejected if it were to apply, or is unwilling to accept the terms of membership in a given group, it may opt for the “second integrative response.” Like any integration scheme,
to be successful counter-unions must satisfy both demand and supply conditions.

Chapter 4 illustrates and tests the analytical framework of chapter 3 on integration schemes from nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe. It begins with an examination of a particularly successful integration scheme, the European Union, tracing the EU’s achievement to the existence of demand and supply conditions. Discussion of the demand side focuses on the role played by market actors in promoting legal integration (i.e., the constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome) and in the revitalization of the integration process in the 1980s which led to the Single European Act. The discussion of the supply side of European integration highlights the importance of two “commitment institutions,” the Commission and the European Court of Justice, as well as Germany’s critical role as an institutional leader and regional paymaster. The German Zollverein is the second successful integration scheme analyzed in chapter 4. A key factor on the demand side of the Zollverein was the German Commercial and Industrial League which untiringly pushed for integration. Prussia, the largest and wealthiest state in the region, played a critical role on the supply side, assuming the role of regional paymaster, and serving as institutional focal point and coordinator in the deepening process of German integration.

Chapter 4 also examines the responses of outsiders to integration. A striking regularity that emerges from the analysis of the enlargement of the European Union and the Zollverein is that the outsiders sought no integration when there was no performance gap with the regional group, and that sustained performance gaps always eventually triggered moves toward integration. Countries that failed to experience such a gap saw no reason to pay the price of integration and thus opted to stay out. More specifically, the finding is that eighteen out of twenty applications for EU membership by eleven West European states were submitted after one or more typically several years of economic growth rates that fell well below the Community average. Similarly, the results from the Zollverein show that the rulers of the many German kingdoms, electorates, and duchies clung to their sovereign rights and obstructed proposals for economic unification till economic crisis and empty treasuries forced them to seek membership of the Zollverein. Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of several failed European integration schemes. The focus is on projects for a “United States of Europe” in the 1890s. Failure can be explained in terms of absence of demand and supply conditions.

Chapter 5 examines the logic of integration beyond Europe. It argues that most integration projects in the Americas and in Asia were triggered
by external events that threatened economic prosperity. The predominant external causes were integration in Europe and, more recently, in North America. Thus many of the integration schemes in Latin America and Asia can be understood as examples of the second integrative response. Most developing countries depend heavily on the markets of industrialized countries for their exports. Potential trade diversion is viewed with great alarm. The reaction by the President of Uruguay to the creation of the European Community is typical: “[T]he formation of a European Common Market . . . constitutes a state of near-war against Latin American exports. Therefore, we must reply to one integration with another one, to one increase of acquisitive power by internal enrichment by another, to inter-European cooperation by inter-Latin American cooperation.”\textsuperscript{10} The main analytical concern of chapter 5 is to explain the varying outcomes of these “counter-unions” outside Europe. The argument is that, in all cases, the fate of these regional integration projects can be explained parsimoniously within the demand and supply framework presented in chapter 3. The chapter also uses the framework to predict the likely outcomes of the most recent integration schemes, including MERCOSUR, APEC, the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and NAFTA.

Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of the book and considers the implications of these findings for the development of the world economic order over the next decade.

4 Caveats

Before proceeding, I would like to preempt some possible criticism. First, the analytical framework of the book seems to attribute a strong form of rationality to decision-makers. It may be objected that this is not realistic. Rightly so. I do not make the assumption that political or economic actors consciously calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of actions, any more than the modern consumer engages in utility maximization when buying one good instead of another. The rationality I attribute to actors is primarily a matter of consequences, not states of mind or intentions. Some readers may still take offense at the self-consciously rationalist perspective of the book and argue that non-rational motives are equally or more important to understand integration. My response is not to deny this possibility but to ask: how can we know? The answer I suggest is that by starting with the assumption of narrowly rational motivation we may obtain predictions that serve as

\textsuperscript{10} The Observer (London, July 30, 1961), 1.
useful benchmarks by which to assess the extent and impact of other motivations.\textsuperscript{11}

Second, in focusing on characteristics common to many integration schemes, I play down the many significant differences among regions. I do this by design. The purpose of an analytical framework is not to deny the variety of a phenomenon or to provide a full and realistic description of a particular case, but to capture general tendencies and explain those fundamental traits that are common to most cases. Such an approach, I feel, is necessary to get at some important questions that have been neglected by earlier studies.

Third, the book does not seek to offer a comprehensive explanation of regional integration. Its purpose is to shed light on certain facets of integration. As a result, the scope of the framework is limited in several ways. Coercion, for example, is left out, even though its role in building certain types of communities is well known. However, to reduce the complexity in a manageable way, I have defined my object of study as \textit{voluntary} integration. Thus coerced integration does not fall within the scope of my study. The mechanisms, for example, by which Nazi Germany swallowed Austria are altogether different from those by which Austria became a member of the European Union. The framework of this study is contractarian and focuses on welfare, not on military aggrandizement or mergers by intimidation.

The scope of the framework is also limited by the research questions. For example, the second puzzle concerns “What explains when outsiders become insiders? Outsiders can become insiders either by joining an already existing economic union or by creating their own regional group.” It follows that I do not seek to explain the creation of all regional groups but only those set up in response to an original group. The explanation of the formation of the original group is beyond the scope of the book. Nevertheless, the framework does claim to offer a broadly applicable explanation of the outcomes of regional integration schemes – that is, success or failure – for both original groups and groups which correspond to the “second integrative response”.

The analysis focuses primarily on economic factors. On the demand side, the explanatory variable is economic gains from market exchange; on the supply side, it is national economic growth, even though the role of power is also considered. Some readers may find such a focus too narrow and the framework too parsimonious. They may ask that other variables be incorporated into the model, notably the quest for national security and the role of military alliances. Security issues are far from

irrelevant in integration, but they shed little light on the specific questions asked in this book. For example: why did the UK, Norway, Denmark, and Ireland opt to remain outside the European Community in the 1950s but not in the 1960s? It is not plausible to assume that their assessments of the security implications of membership changed. There are many questions about integration which are formed within a context of unchanging military alliance patterns. In such a context, economic variables may take us a long way toward explaining puzzling aspects of integration.

By focusing on economic factors, I do not wish to imply that other variables are irrelevant or that economic variables are all that matter in understanding regional integration. Far from it. My study leaves some variation unexplained. Consider, for example, the finding regarding the timing of membership presented in chapter 4. It states that a country seeks to integrate its economy only when there is a significant positive cost of maintaining its present governance structure in terms of forgone growth as measured by a continuing performance gap between it and a more integrated rival governance structure. In the case of the European Community, a state tends to seek membership after growing for two and a half years, on average, at a rate significantly below EC average growth. The reaction time for all EC applicants appears to be normally distributed around that average. My analysis contents itself with this finding and could thus be labeled a macroanalysis; but it invites further research at the unit level to explain the varying reaction times. Differences in the domestic politico-institutional structures or in the sectoral composition of the economies of applicants may account for some of the variation in time lags. A more general point is that by asking new questions and sketching possible answers my hope is not to provide complete and definitive solutions to puzzles regarding regional integration but, instead, to arouse curiosity for a fascinating research topic and invite refinements of the framework proposed in this book.

A first systematic attempt to link domestic politics and international relations is offered in Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Milner’s approach suggests several ways in which the present framework could be extended to provide a more fine-grained account of integration outcomes.