Language and Solitude

Wittgenstein, Malinowski and the Habsburg Dilemma

Ernst Gellner (1925–1995) has been described as ‘one of the last great Central European polymath intellectuals. His last book throws new light on two of the most written-about thinkers of their time, Wittgenstein and Malinowski. Wittgenstein, arguably the most influential and the most cited philosopher of the twentieth century, is famous for having propounded two radically different philosophical positions. Malinowski was the founder of modern British social anthropology and is usually credited with being the inventor of ethnographic fieldwork, a fundamental research method throughout the social sciences. This book shows, in a highly original way, how the thought of both men, and both of Wittgenstein’s two philosophies, grew from a common background of assumptions – widely shared in the Habsburg Empire of their youth – about human nature, society and language. It is also a swingeing critique of Wittgenstein, and implicitly therefore of conventional philosophy as well, for failing to be aware of these assumptions. Tying together themes which preoccupied him throughout his working life, Gellner’s final word epitomises his belief that philosophy – far from ‘leaving everything as it is’ – is about important historical, social and personal issues.

Language and Solitude

Wittgenstein, Malinowski and the Habsburg Dilemma

Ernest Gellner
Contents

Preface David N. Gellner  page  vii
Foreword Steven Lukes  xiii

Part I: The Habsburg dilemma  1
  1 Swing alone or swing together  3
  2 The rivals  7
  3 Genesis of the individualist vision  14
  4 The metaphysics of romanticism  17
  5 Romanticism and the basis of nationalism  21
  6 Individualism and holism in society  26
  7 Crisis in Kakania  30
  8 Pariah liberalism  35
  9 Recapitulation  37

Part II: Wittgenstein  41
  10 The loneliness of the long-distance empiricist  43
  11 The poem to solitude, or: confessions of a transcendental ego who is also a Viennese Jew  46
  12 Ego and language  59
  13 The world as solitary vice  62
  14 The mystical  65
  15 The central proposition of the Tractatus: world without culture  68
  16 Wittgenstein mark 2  71
Preface

My father left two unpublished book-length manuscripts when, on 5 November 1995, he died in his flat at the Central European University, Prague. One manuscript required relatively little work and was published by Weidenfeld in 1997 as Nationalism. This is the other.

This book is in many ways a fitting – almost autobiographical – last work. In the first place, it brings together themes that he worked on throughout his academic career, from Words and Things, the attack on Wittgensteinianism that made his name in 1959, through Nations and Nationalism (1983) and Nationalism (1997), to studies of the development of his adopted discipline, social anthropology, and in particular the canonical place of Bronislaw Malinowski within it (published in various articles over the years). But in the second place, the Habsburg social background to the thought of Wittgenstein and Malinowski that he describes here was also his own background, or, strictly, that of his father. The choice that faced Wittgenstein and Malinowski was also the choice that faced every member of his family. On both sides my father was descended from secularised, German-speaking Jews, as was common in Bohemia, though less so further east in Poland. His grandfather was a loyal subject of Franz Josef who had nine children. The men became lawyers, doctors, even, in one case, a theatre director. One of his aunts was an active Zionist. His father, Rudolf, went to Berlin to study history and sociology the year after Max Weber died. Later he studied in Paris and made some money by writing for German newspapers. The birth of my father meant that his parents had to have a more regular income, so his father gave up being a student and returned to Bohemia. They endured real poverty, with Rudolf selling his books so they could eat. Eventually he began a small business and also started a Czech-language law review. Rudolf had had to learn Czech as an adult, after the creation of the Czechoslovak state, but his sympathies were with it rather than with Zionism.

As the 1930s progressed, the threat from the Nazis became clear and Rudolf prepared the family’s flight to England, where one of his sisters
was married to an Englishman. No one knew when or if the final catastrophe would occur, so it was only in 1939, after the Germans had invaded Czechoslovakia, that they escaped. Since adult males were not allowed to travel through Germany, my father, then thirteen, together with his younger sister and his mother, set off by train across Germany. Rudolf and a close friend, who was later to become his business partner, attempted to cross illegally into Poland. Twice they were turned back, but the third time they were successful. In Warsaw, by good fortune, they met some old contacts of Rudolf from Siberia where he had spent some years as a prisoner of war during and after the First World War, contacts now in the Communist Party. They succeeded in getting the all-important visas for Rudolf and his friend to proceed to Sweden and then on to London. In England my father’s family lived first in Highgate and then moved out to St Albans. It was from St Albans County Grammar School for Boys that he won a scholarship to Balliol. He studied for one year before leaving to join the Czech Brigade and spent much of the war besieging Dunkirk. The Brigade went first to Plzen and then to Prague for victory parades. Apparently he was captured on film driving his half-track through Plzen, though he never saw the film himself. In Prague my father demobilized and attended lectures at Charles University. He was cured of his nostalgia for the city of his youth (in England he used frequently to dream about it) by the realization that the Communists were going to take over. This must have seemed likely to his family in England also, since they were worried he would be trapped there a second time. He returned to Balliol to finish his degree after a few months.

The atmosphere in the Oxford of the time is described below in sections 32 and 33. He found the local orthodoxy, which was inspired by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, complacent and trivialising. But so many people took Oxford linguistic philosophy completely seriously that, though he was always convinced that it was wrong, it was a long time before he felt able to tackle it head on. After two years teaching philosophy at Edinburgh University he moved to a lectureship teaching philosophy in the sociology department at the LSE. He published four conventional philosophy articles in 1951 in order to get tenure, but then published nothing for four years. He spent his vacations climbing or skiing in the Alps. The LSE at the time was a dynamic and stimulating place, with Popper dominating the philosophy department, Oakeshott politics, and the disciples of Malinowski in anthropology. On his own account, it was after he began to study anthropology seriously, and had decided to take a PhD in anthropology, that he found himself able to articulate his critique of Oxford linguistic philosophy. Victor Gollancz
approached him after hearing him speak on linguistic philosophy on Radio 3 and the result was *Words and Things*. When it came out in 1959 it became a *cause célèbre* because Gilbert Ryle refused to review it in *Mind*, the leading philosophy journal which had published my father's first article. Bertrand Russell, who had contributed the foreword to *Words and Things*, wrote to *The Times* and, over the next eighteen days, there followed a whole series of letters about the propriety of Ryle's action, culminating in a leader article. The description of these events by Ved Mehta, *The Fly in the Fly Bottle* (1962), infuriated my father with its facile attribution to him of things he never said.

Clearly, then, the ideas of both Wittgensteins, the 'early' Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the 'late' Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* and other posthumously published works, as well as the ideas of Malinowski, were central concerns of my father for most of his adult life. When he was invited to an Italian conference on 'levels of reality' in the early 1980s he produced a paper entitled 'Tractatus Sociologico-Philosophicus' which attempted to outline his fundamental position in terms of a commentary on seven gnomic propositions on the model of the *Tractatus* (Gellner 1987g, ch. 11; for references to my father's works see the special bibliographies below). Psychologically, it was the discovery of the 'school' of social anthropology created by Malinowski at the LSE that enabled him to produce his first critique of Wittgenstein in *Words and Things*. As with Wittgenstein, he never met Malinowski himself; but in both cases, he had prolonged exposure to their closest disciples.

Like both Wittgenstein and Malinowski, my father left Central Europe and had to make his way in England. Of course, he was younger when he came, and it was a generation later. Wittgenstein he always thought of as a brilliant curiosity, but in no way as great a philosopher as Karl Popper. Likewise, he makes it clear here that he believed Malinowski to have been far more original than Wittgenstein in the way he dealt with the Habsburg intellectual inheritance. He seems to have identified with Malinowski particularly in his attitude to nationalism, since he advocates, as the only humane way to deal with multi-ethnic situations of conflict, exactly Malinowski's combination of cultural freedom and decentralisation, on the one hand, with political centralisation, on the other (see section 28 below and *Nationalism*, section 16).

It is evident that in 1950s and 60s the theme of the present book – the roots of both Wittgenstein's and Malinowski's thought in the social and ideological conditions of the late Habsburg Empire – had not yet occurred to my father. He reviewed the Malinowski Festschrift edited by Raymond Firth very favourably without mentioning Wittgenstein
(Gellner 1958b), even though Firth, in his contribution on language, had already raised the possibility of a connection between the two (Firth 1957: 94). In the 1960s my father also briefly compared the two thinkers – very much to Malinowski's advantage – while reviewing A. R. Louch's *Explanation and Human Action* (Oxford, 1966), without considering their common Habsburg background. When *Words and Things* was reissued in 1979 the new introduction was sub-titled ‘Wittgensteinianism Reconsidered in Historical Context’; its arguments prefigured much of the analysis given here, but there was as yet no mention of Malinowski or of the Habsburg Empire. It is my guess that it was at the centennial conference of Malinowski’s birth, held in 1984 in Cracow, that the seeds of the present book were sown. By the time of his interview with John Davis (*Current Anthropology* 32 (1991): 69–70; Gellner 1991a) the argument was already clear to him (cf. Gellner 1991d, 1992c: 116–23). Furthermore, since his thought had considerable unity, it is not surprising that certain parts of this book are prefigured elsewhere: for instance, the arguments on Hume and Kant in section 12 will be familiar to readers of *Legitimation of Belief* (1975a) and *Reason and Culture* (1992e), and much of the material on Frazer and Malinowski builds on or repeats arguments made in his essay ‘Zeno of Cracow’ (Gellner 1987h) and in *Politics and Anthropology: Revolutions in the Sacred Grove* (1995x). The arguments about nationalism are made at greater length in *Nations and Nationalism* (1983e), in an essay published in G. Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (Gellner 1996i), and in *Nationalism* (1997). They were also tried out in numerous other places, since nationalism was the topic about which he was most often asked to speak in the 1990s (see bibliography on nationalism below).

In short, *Language and Solitude* is a synthesis of several themes that concerned my father all his adult life: the thought of Wittgenstein, the history and theory of social anthropology, the causes of nationalism, the nature of modernity, and the social roots of rationality and irrationalism.

Since this book attempts to identify the social context of ideas, it is worth remarking that my father’s approach was far from determinist. Although he clearly believed that Wittgenstein’s development could not be understood without taking into account the ‘Habsburg dilemma’ which Wittgenstein himself was not consciously aware of, the substance of my father’s critique of Janik and Toulmin is that they go too far in attempting to derive the *details* of Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas from the local context. In other words, my father allowed considerable scope for the power of ideas to work themselves out independently. One can contrast the procedure of Clifford Geertz who, being concerned only with Malinowski’s text, draws attention to the constant juxtaposi-
tion of ‘High Romance and High Science’ in Malinowski’s writing (Geertz 1988: 79) without any attempt to explain either the origins or the originality of his characteristic and unique combination of romanticism and positivism.

Another ‘health warning’ may be in order for those who are not familiar with my father’s style of writing (he was both amused and pleased to have been included in an American collection supposed to illustrate fine essay writing). One should not be misled by his frequent metaphorical usages. I am reliably informed that Carpathian villages do not actually have ‘village greens’; that should not detract from the point being made by his references to worshippers of it or them.

As noted, my father had been working on and revising this book for some years. The manuscript in its latest version was scattered with notes to himself, such as ‘END OF PASSAGE PROBABLY DUE FOR EXCISION’, ‘WHAT FOLLOWS REDUPLICATES EARLIER PASSAGES BUT SOME BITS MAY NEED TO BE RETAINED’ or ‘QUOTATION FROM MACH TO FOLLOW.’ In other words, he had yet to work through the entire book and revise it in the light of repetitions. I have adopted a fairly conservative policy, cutting out and rearranging as little as possible, but readers should be aware that it is not in the form that he would have given it and is certainly more repetitious than it would have been had he lived. I am responsible for adding the sub-title and the division into five parts. I have made numerous small stylistic changes that I certainly would have suggested to him anyway if given the chance (he always insisted, no doubt in deference to some distant lesson at the Prague English Grammar School, that ‘a number of’ should be followed by a singular verb; alas I have had the last word on this). I have tried to check all quotations and I have systematized the references, adding some relevant works to the bibliography that were in his library but are not quoted or mentioned. In the case of the quotation from Mach I had to select it as well. Most importantly, I have moved and amalgamated material as follows:

1 Section 12, ‘Ego and language’, was composed separately and has been slotted in by me;
2 What is now section 3, ‘Genesis of the individualist vision’, was originally section 5, coming after ‘Romanticism and the basis of nationalism’;
3 The last two paragraphs of section 9 originally appeared at the end of section 5;
4 What is now section 32, ‘The impact and diffusion of Wittgenstein’s ideas’, originally appeared immediately after section 17;
5 There was a section called ‘Populism to philistinism’ appearing immediately after ‘The impact and diffusion . . . ’ which has been
absorbed into section 33, ‘The first wave of Wittgenstein’s influence’;
6 Sections 15 and 20 have absorbed what were originally separate
following sections;
7 The final section, ‘Our present condition’, seems to have originally
had the title ‘The truth of the matter II’.

Should anyone wish to make a scholarly study of the draft as it was, they
should write to me at the Department of Human Sciences, Brunel
University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH.

The painting that appears on the cover is by an unknown Russian
artist, called Ella, who gave it to my parents in 1989. When he began
writing this book my father always intended that it should be on the
cover. Unfortunately all attempts to trace the artist or to discover her
surname have failed.

Special thanks are due to Gay Woolven who spent many years trying
valiantly to bring some order into my father’s affairs and who typed and
retyped versions of the manuscript over several years, digging out the
final version after my father’s death. John Hall, Ian Jarvie, and Chris
Hann read through an earlier draft and made detailed suggestions for
improvement, as did my mother, Susan Gellner, and my wife, Lola
Martinez. Ian Jarvie provided the bibliographies and Steven Lukes
kindly agreed to write a foreward. For all this help and moral support, I
am deeply grateful.

DAVID N. GELLNER
David Gellner is right to describe this exhilarating book as a synthesis of several themes that concerned Ernest Gellner all his adult life: 'the thought of Wittgenstein, the history and theory of social anthropology, the causes of nationalism, the nature of modernity, and the social roots of rationality and irrationalism'. Exhilarating and unclassifiable: at once a synoptic interpretation of the thought of Wittgenstein and Malinowski; a comparative assessment of their world-views – of their accounts of knowledge, language and culture; a brilliant sociological sketch of the common socio-political and intellectual background which they shared; a view of their influence upon their respective disciplines; and a passionate and polemical argument with them and some of their successors, in which Gellner once more and for the last time eloquently and succinctly expresses his own world-view. He expresses it here, with all his characteristic verve, by engaging directly with what he takes to be the egregious and wholly pernicious errors of Wittgenstein, early and late, in the light of what he sees as Malinowski’s liberating but only partially developed (and partially retracted) insights into the interrelated themes that have together been central to his own life’s work.

It is, moreover, a genuine effort at synthesis: a bringing together of purely philosophical theories, about the nature of reality, knowledge and language; contending accounts of what he calls ‘socio-metaphysic, or philosophical anthropology’; and alternative political standpoints seen as expressing alternative responses to a common historically-given predicament. The essence of his argument can be briefly stated. These various elements are ‘aligned’ with one another, forming ‘two poles of looking, not merely at knowledge, but at human life’ and ‘the tension between them is one of the deepest and most pervasive themes in modern thought’. The ‘two poles’ are given a variety of labels. One is the ‘atomic-universalist-individualist vision’, beginning with Descartes and Robinson Crusoe, typified by Hume and Kant, and reformulated by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell. It is variously identified with empiricism, rationalism and positivism, and with Gesellschaft, with economic
markets and political liberalism, and bloodless cosmopolitanism. The other is the ‘communal-cultural vision’, the organic counter-picture, first lived and practised unreflectively, then articulated by Herder and by countless ‘romantic organicists’, ‘nationalist populists’ and ‘romantic rightists’, stressing totality, system, connectedness, particularism, cultural specificity, favouring Gemeinschaft, roots, ‘closed, cosy’ communities, Blut und Boden. The ‘alignment’ of the elements within these poles and the tension between them was especially strong in the Habsburg lands, not least Poland and Austria, as the Empire reached its end, where ‘the confrontation of atomists and organicists . . . meshes in with the alliances and hatreds of daily and political life’.

Wittgenstein, trapped within this polar opposition, veered from one philosophical system to another, expressing in extreme form first the one and then the other of these polar alternatives. Malinowski, by contrast, recombined elements from both – romantic and positivist, organic and liberal – thereby prefiguring and expressing a version of Gellner’s own position. This is that a ‘third option’ is available which combines the recognition that ‘shared culture can alone endow life with order and meaning’ with understanding that ‘the notion of a culture-transcending truth’ is inseparable from cognitive (notably scientific) and economic growth, that it is central to our culture and indeed that ‘the possibility of transcendence of cultural limits’ constitutes ‘the most important single fact about human life’.

Clearly, Gellner’s argument, as presented here, relies upon his construction of the two poles. The text begins with the dramatic claim that there are ‘two fundamental theories of knowledge,’ standing in ‘stark contrast to each other,’ which are ‘aligned’ with ‘related, and similarly contrasted, theories, of society, of man, of everything.’ This ‘chasms’, he writes, ‘cuts right across our total social landscape’. The confrontation is ‘deep and general’. Yet we are very soon presented with a variety of telling examples of British thinkers whom it does not fit. In Britain, Gellner suggests, the confrontation between atomists and organicists ‘cannot be tied in with, and reinforce, any political cleavages in the country.’ On the other hand, it ‘really came into its own within the Danubian Empire’, with individualist liberals, often Jews, defending the idea of a pluralistic, tolerant, patchwork empire and nationalist intellectuals offering the alternative of ‘a closed, localised culture, idiosyncratic and glorying in its idiosyncrasy, and promising emotional and aesthetic fulfilment and satisfaction to its members.’ Generalising the point, he suggests that ‘the opposition between individualism and communalism, between the appeal of Gesellschaft (‘‘Society’’) and Gemeinschaft (‘‘Com-
munity’) is a ‘tension which pervades and torments most societies disrupted by modernisation’. In any case, it was, he claims, deeply embedded in the Central European world, from which he himself came, where it was ‘closely linked to the hurly burly of daily political life and pervaded the sensibility of everyone’.

This claim suggests that there is a distinctly personal, even autobiographical aspect to the present work. Its argument proceeds, one might say, from exposition to exposure. Gellner first expounds by reporting on the apparent naturalness and self-evidence of the linkages between the components of these two great complexes of ideas and attitudes and of the tension or confrontation between them. He then exposes that naturalness and self-evidence as an illusion. The overarching dichotomy in question is a massive but historically contingent construction urgently in need of deconstruction. And he makes this argument through a multiply paradoxical interpretation of the thought of his two principal dramatis personae, which in turn provides a commentary upon his own intellectual choices.

Thus Wittgenstein, explicitly assuming these to be the only alternatives, first expressed ‘the solitude of the transcendental ego,’ by giving an account of ‘what the world looks like to a solitary individual reflecting on the problem of how his mind, or language can possibly “mean”, i.e. reflect the world’; and then offered a second philosophy, transplanting ‘the populist idea of the authority of each distinctive culture to the problem of knowledge’, concluding that ‘mankind lives in cultural communities or, in his words, “forms of life,” which are self-sustaining, self-legitimating, logically and normatively final’. Wittgenstein did this, Gellner argues, even though he was totally ahistorical and lacked ‘any sense of the diversity of cultures, and indeed of the very existence of culture’ and, moreover, was uninterested in social and political questions. In short, Gellner’s Wittgenstein is a sort of unwitting transmitter of prevailing cultural assumptions, with a ‘ferocious narrowness of interest’, whose expression of ‘the deep dilemma facing the Habsburg world’ was all the more effective because ‘it was never consciously thought out and never at the forefront of his attention’, expressing those assumptions in successive, one-sided philosophies, the later of which retains enormous cultural influence.

Malinowski, on the other hand, was able to escape the tyranny of those assumptions, partly because they were less dominant in Cracow than in Vienna and because his life situation and temperament made him more inclined to ‘doubts’ and ‘rational thought’, but principally because he applied a biologically-based philosophy of science to cultural objects. Malinowski combined the radical empiricism he had learnt
from Ernst Mach with a penchant for ethnographic fieldwork, which in Eastern Europe had a ‘culture-loving and culture-preserving’ significance inspired by populism and nationalism. In consequence he was able to develop a powerful new, scientific methodology within modern social anthropology, whose founder he became, combining an ‘empiricist abstention from the invocation of unobservables’ with ‘a both functionalist and romantic sense of the unity and interdependence of culture’. At the same time, according to Gellner, while allowing that language could be ‘use-bound and context-linked’, he also allowed (though subsequently mistakenly denied) that in scientific and philosophical contexts, it properly strives to be context-free. He further reflected in a fruitful and original way upon the relation between cultural and political nationalism, exhibiting a ‘remarkable freedom’ from the latter. He argued, in a way that foreshadows Gellner’s own position, that the only hope is to ‘limit the political power of nations, but permit, indeed enhance and encourage, the perpetuation of all those local cultures within which men have found their fulfilment and their freedom’, thus ‘depriving boundaries of some of their importance and symbolic potency’. Thus in these several but allegedly related ways the social anthropologist Malinowski reflected critically upon assumptions that the philosopher Wittgenstein merely reproduced. Gellner’s own intellectual career, which began with a sociological as well as philosophical critique of Wittgensteinian philosophy, went on, among other things, to explore the philosophical contribution of Malinowskian social anthropology.

This structure of argument, moving from the construction of an overarching dichotomy to its deconstruction, has several significant virtues. It gives a satisfying unity and direction, even drama, to the present work. It provides a challenging basis from which to interpret and compare the thought of Wittgenstein and Malinowski. And it raises the highly interesting issue of just what the relations are between the extremely various theories, doctrines and political positions gathered around the two supposedly opposite polar views of knowledge.

Yet here Gellner’s readers will doubtless be provoked to ask a number of pertinent questions. First, just what are they to make of his arresting claim that ‘the universalist-populist confrontation pervades Habsburg culture and consequently, for those who are immersed in it, it has the power of a compulsive logical truism’? How is this to be squared with his argument (against Peter Winch’s cultural holism) that our world consists of ‘unstable and, above all, overlapping cultural zones’ with ‘conflicts or options within them’ and ‘multiple competing oracles’? And why would the inhabitants of the Habsburg lands be so ‘immersed’ in their culture...
that the indicated polarity should be so inescapable and ‘compulsive’? Why should that cultural zone – and, more generally, those of ‘most societies disrupted by modernisation’ where, on Gellner’s theory, nationalism tends to flourish – be particularly inhospitable to the doubts and rational thought that would put it in question? David Gellner is right: Ernest Gellner was no social determinist in relation to ideas. Yet his argument seems here to require (at least in ‘less blessed parts of the world’ than Britain) a pervasive ‘compulsion’ that only a fortunate few can escape.

Moreover, the polar opposition in question is of course a massive reduction of complexity – a caricature of the history of ideas which, however, as a caricature, would succeed to the extent that its simplifications capture the essentials of what it simplifies. But here too several related questions arise. Max Weber once remarked that ‘Individualism’ embraces the utmost heterogeneity of meanings. It has been assigned innumerable origins and meanings and characterised from many different points of view, often hostile, ever since it was first identified by de Maistre in 1819 as a corrosive threat to social order and by Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America* as a new term to which a new idea has given birth, a turning away from public involvement that threatens what we now call civil society. Since then virtually every writer on the subject offers a different constellation, with a different purpose in view.

Gellner’s version here is one such. The ‘individualist’, he writes, ‘sees the polity as a contractual, functional convenience, a device of the participants in pursuit of mutual advantage’ as opposed to the ‘holist’ who ‘sees life as participation in a collectivity, which alone gives life its meaning’. Individualism is a tradition:

The Crusoe tradition, which begins with Descartes, finds its supreme expression in Hume and Kant, and is reformulated again in the second positivism and the neo-liberalism of recent times, offers the story of how a brave and independent individual builds up his world, cognitively, economically, and so forth.

But is this really a ‘tradition’ or does it only look that way through a seriously distorting lens (in this case, perhaps, that used by an archetypal Central European nationalist)? Does Defoe’s fable really illustrate Cartesian doubt? Are Humean empiricism and Kantian rationalism really bedfellows, and is the anti-contractualist, custom-favouring historian Hume really an arch-individualist? Are there not innumerable elementary errors involved in this agglomeration, confusing, for instance, abstraction, reductionism and the search for universal laws? Epistemology, economics and political theory have complex links, but not of this simple kind. Liberals (whether neo- or not) have differed extra-
ordinarily widely about economics and politics and can be rationalists or empiricists or positivists and much else besides. And from within this so-called tradition, there is unending disagreement and contestation about all these issues, and not least about what individualism is. And the same, of course, goes for the many versions and varieties of collectivism-communism-communitarianism.

Of course, the first person to acknowledge this is Ernest Gellner, who writes, immediately following the passage just quoted, ‘All this simply will not do either as an actual descriptive or as an explanatory account.’ We ‘have come to understand our world a little better than when its nature was disputed by two parties’. But was there really such a time and place, rather than the construction or illusion of it? It is not clear why the illusion should only now be unmasked and why we needed to wait for Malinowski to see through it. If it simply will not do, then, of course, it never did. Which raises the interesting and important question of what account Gellner himself offers of how these ideas, doctrines and political positions properly fit together.

His position, well-known and often expressed, is a distinctive contribution to current debates embracing postmodernism and relativism, the so-called culture wars, post-positivist philosophy of science, and method in social and cultural anthropology. His case, as formulated here, is a defence of ‘individualism’ (or ‘the Crusoe model’) as an ‘ethic of cognition’: a ‘normative charter of how one particular tradition, namely our own, reconstructs and purges its own cognitive and productive worlds’. It maintains that ‘all cognitive claims are subjected to scrutiny in the course of which they are broken up into their constituent parts and individuals are free to judge as individuals: there are no cognitive hierarchies or authorities’. It is thus atomistic, egalitarian and universalist in that it is committed to the practice of criticism by reference to a ‘notion of culture-transcending truth’. As he has put it elsewhere, one cognitive style, namely ‘science and its application’, is governed by ‘certain loosely defined procedural prescriptions about how the world may be investigated’: ‘all ideas, data, inquirers are equal, cognitive claims have to compete and confront data on terms of equality and they are not allowed to construct circular self-confirming visions’ (Gellner 1995x: 3, 6–7). This (broadly Popperian) account of the validation (though not the origination) of cognitive scientific claims marks out the ground that Gellner has, over the years, sought to defend against relativists, idealists, subjectivists, interpretivists, social constructionists and other exponents of ‘local knowledge’ – inheritors all, he believed, of the (late) Wittgensteinian error that this work, once more, aims to expose and uproot.
In what way can it be seen as carrying the debate further? In large part, it is, as I have suggested, a defence and restatement of Gellner's anti-relativist stance in respect of what he calls the new style of cognition constituted by science and technology that is central to our culture and has transformed our world. Here he argues that what he variously calls 'universalism-atomism' and 'individualism' 'probably gives us a correct answer to the question of how valid and powerful knowledge really works, and, in that sphere, deserves a kind of normative authority'. But what is the scope of that sphere? Is the understanding of our natural environment inherently unlike that of our social environment? And how and where is the distinction between natural and social to be drawn? In the last paragraphs of the book, he expresses a genuine and honest uncertainty concerning the reasons for science's limited success in the realm of social and human phenomena, and further uncertainty as to whether these limits are in principle surmountable or not. Furthermore, he writes of values as 'instilled by contingent and variable cultures'. And yet his intellectual heroes, notably Hume and Kant, and other thinkers of the Enlightenment, were universalists in respect of morality as well as knowledge. Is not the notion of culture-transcending moral principles also central to our culture, and do they not also deserve a kind of normative authority, and, if not, why not?

These are, of course, old, classical questions but they will not go away. Yet a further virtue of Ernest Gellner's last work is that it raises them once more in a new and unfailingly provocative way.

STEVEN LUKE
INTRODUCTION

In 1995, in the afterglow of the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) which it had hosted the previous year, Indonesia celebrated its fiftieth anniversary as a newly visible power on the international scene. Some believed Indonesia came of age twice then, at a doubly vindicating moment for the regime which had overseen its conspicuously successful thirty-year project of nation-building. Since 1965, the quasi-military New Order state had progressively centralized its political control and implemented an uncontested, long-term project of national development. Under its supervision a Western-educated, technocratic elite had successfully engineered the macrodevelopment which has gained Indonesia newfound stature on the world scene.

From Jakarta, the national capital and nexus of political and economic power, the New Order had progressively spread and deepened its oversight across the Indonesian archipelago. Communities once at the peripheries of the state’s jurisdiction, and hardly touched by state institutions, are increasingly engaged with the ideology of nationalism and modernity which it propagates. As state institutions increasingly impinge on everyday life, ideas of modernity, national identities, and obligations of citizenship are increasingly salient in communities which only recently were loosely integrated into the national polity.

The New Order can be seen as fostering a native sense of Indonesian-ness by “ethnicizing” the Indonesian polity, yet simultaneously working to avoid overtly effacing antecedent ethnolinguistic diversity, or promoting the ascendance of any “native” subnational group. But in fact there is one ethnic group, the Javanese, which looms very large on the national landscape. Javanese dominate demographically in the nation as a whole; sixty million or so live in the ethnic “heartland” of Central and East Java – two of Indonesia’s twenty-seven provinces but home to almost a third of its population – and a century of migration has led to the growth of large, distinctively Javanese ethnic communities elsewhere in Indonesia and the world.

Officials of Javanese descent likewise predominate in the state apparatus, and in urban elite circles a new version of “high” Javanese cultural
Shifting languages
tradition is being actively reinvented. Upwardly mobile Indonesians, not all of whom are Javanese, are adopting modern versions of a refined “hothouse” culture which flourished during the Dutch colonial era. This new urban elite tradition refers back to a Javanese golden age, and so to the two royal cities of south-central Java: Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Both were once famous primarily for their courtly elites, and as the political and cultural centers of the prenational Javanese heartland. Both cities now count as the originary homes of traditions of the priyayi community, which the New Order elite had taken for its cultural if not genetic precursor. (For more on this connection see Anderson 1966; Pemberton 1994; Florida 1987; J. Errington 1986, 1998.)

Through a dynamic which Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis (1987) appropriately calls priyayization, this small bit of south-central Javanese territory has become a cultural epicenter for the nation at large. It does not seem coincidental in this respect that the national motto, Bhinneka tunggal ika, “Unity in diversity,” likewise acknowledges the nation’s ethnic diversity in a Javanese idiom: its Old Javanese form and nationalistic content together suggest a modern version of ethnic Javanese tradition, which is helping to elide or straddle received distinctions between modern and traditional forms of governmentality (see, e.g., Tsing 1993).

In 1998 the New Order found itself grappling with social upheaval and economic uncertainty in troubled times, which recall for some the circumstances of its emergence more than thirty years ago. International praise for successful New Order development has suddenly begun to ring hollow, and Indonesia’s progress toward “national modernity” seems more illusory than real. But these troubled conditions and uncertain successes throw into relief what may prove to be among the New Order’s most enduring effects on the Indonesian landscape: its success in propagating Indonesian-ness with and through the Indonesian language.

Every aspect of the New Order’s “development” of Indonesia has been subserved by the Indonesian language. As the language of state, Indonesian is infrastructural for institutional development; as the language of the nation, it effaces differences between citizens who live in antecedent, ethnolinguistically distinct communities. At the end of World War II, the artificial administrative Malay which counts as Indonesian’s immediate precursor was just one of several dialects of that language, spoken natively by a few million residents of the Dutch East Indies’ colonial empire. Now Indonesian is a fully viable, universally acknowledged national language, non-native but also clearly ascendant over hundreds of languages spoken natively among more than two hundred million Indonesians. Notwithstanding difficulties in evaluating the results of censuses which include questions about knowledge and use of Indonesian
(see Steinhauer 1994), such censuses provide grounds for broad consensus that Indonesia is well on its way to solving “the national language problem,” and enhancing its status as what Fishman (1978:333) has called a “miraculous” language in the developing world. The slogan “language indicates nationality” (I: bahasa menunjukkan bangsa), which once expressed a nationalist hope, seems more and more to describe a national condition (Geertz 1973:315).

But in ethnically homogeneous areas, like south-central Java, Indonesian is little used across self-evident lines of ethnolinguistic difference. Speakers there have no native models to emulate because, as ethnic Javanese, they are not in contact with a native-speaking Indonesian community. They are learning to speak Indonesian not by emulating the concrete verbal “practice[s] of . . . specific group[s] of [Indonesian] speakers” but instead by assimilating an underdetermined, “vague ideal norm” to local, native ways of dealing with coethnics (DeVries 1988:125).

So in Central Java, at least, Indonesian is not so much a non-native language learned from or used with members of some linguistically distinct group. It is more an un-native language, whose forms and uses are being acquired and used in interaction with otherwise native (-speaking) Javanese. As an outgroup language without an outgroup, Indonesian carries no immediate sense of social “otherness”; it can be said – with apologies to Gertrude Stein, and prior to discussion in chapter 10 – that for Indonesian there is no native (-speaking) “they” there.

**Indonesian’s modernity**

Indonesian’s un-nativeness crucially enables and informs its place in the Indonesian national project. As Benedict Anderson recognized in the 1960s, it makes Indonesian a “project for the assumption of ‘modernity’ within the modalities of an autonomous and autochthonous social-political tradition” (1966:89). Anderson wrote these words on the eve of the fall of President Sukarno, in 1965, but they are still apposite for considering here Indonesian’s broadest political cultural saliences in the 1990s, and in communities well beyond the elite circles which he discussed.

As New Order development has been superposed (“from above”) on communities which were recently peripheral to state control, Indonesian territory has become the scene of many such “projects of modernity.” These can be thought of as emerging situations of “contact” – between local community and national polity, between citizen and authoritarian state – which are mediated and shaped by the Indonesian language. At the same time, Indonesian is an increasingly common way of talking in
the “ordinary” interactional engagements which make up much of the fabric of everyday interactional experience. Among the many institutions which subserve New Order power and oversight over Indonesians’ lives, Indonesian is uniquely available for appropriation to the most self-interested purposes, which can be entirely at a remove from state interests or venues. For this reason, Indonesian can be considered a state-fostered institution which is subject to situated appropriation “from below.”

On one hand, then, the Indonesian language is quite transparently part of a state system, that is, a “palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure, extensive, unified and dominant” (Abrams 1988:58). On the other hand, Indonesian talk, situated in conversational contingencies of everyday life, can mediate a “state idea” of Indonesian-ness as it is “projected, purveyed, and variously believed” (ibid.). Indonesian can figure in such interactional self/other relations as the intimate vehicle for a doxa – “diffuse, full, complete, and ‘natural’” (Barthes 1989:121) – of modernity and nationalism. This point of convergence has been recognized by observers other than Anderson who see Indonesian as “perhaps the most important single ingredient in the shaping of the modern [Indonesian] culture” (Liddle 1988:1).


My expository strategy for sketching this scene of “contact” between Javanese and Indonesian is two-sided in ways signaled by the book’s systematically ambiguous title. On one hand, the phrase “shifting languages” resembles “language shift,” the sociolinguistic term of art used for patterns of historical change in the knowledge and use of two languages within communities. Typically, language shift occurs as a community’s native language (usually minority or “ethnic”) is progressively displaced by or relinquished for another (usually majority or “national”). These are cumulative, “long-term” processes which occur among collectivities of speakers, and as such can sometimes be read as mediating the effects of “large-scale” forces – political, cultural, economic – which shape broader senses of collective identity. As a rubric for collective phenomena, more sociohistorical happenings than intentful doings, “language shift” corresponds to a grammatically intransitive reading of “shifting languages.”
On the other hand, “shifting languages” is a phrase which can be used to describe what happens in interactional process when bi- or multilingual speakers juxtapose elements (minimally phrase-long) of two languages. Such transient bits of conduct, more commonly called instances of code switching, are particulars of talk in the “real time” of social life, concrete enough to leave traces (in recordings and transcriptions) for retrospective scrutiny. This is the sphere of language as immediate, situated, other-oriented self-conduct. As other-directed social practice in which speakership presents at least the guise of communicative agency, code switching corresponds to a transitive reading of “shifting languages.”

Even if the pun is clumsy, it helps here to thematize the expository counterpoint I try to develop in the following chapters between institutional and interactional aspects of Javanese and Indonesian language in change and use. It provides a way of framing distinct issues while avoiding either a prejudicially unitary metatheoretical profile, or juxtaposed, disjoint sketches. I try instead to develop a dynamic tension between these institutional and interactional perspectives, a tension which is a bit like the one linking yet separating these two readings of “shifting languages.” To read the phrase in one sense does not cancel the other possibility; instead it binds them in an asymmetric, “both/and” relation of foregrounded and backgrounded element. I can outline this double strategy here by showing how it helps me to work against the grain of accounts which are predominantly weighted to the side of macro institutional forces, and residualize micro interactional processes.

Certainly the figures on language use cited earlier are easily mobilized for predictions of massive social and language change which will lead to a shift from Javanese to Indonesian. Here is one such vision of Java’s linguistic future, taken from the writings of Yoshimichi Someya (1992:61–62):

Indonesian will spread . . . like a tide to rural areas . . . eventually replacing Javanese [which] is gradually becoming incompatible with such values as directness, clarity, effectiveness, and speed of communication – necessary conditions for the national unity, the “blending” of Indonesian ethnic groups, democracy, modernization, and rationalization required by today’s Indonesian government, industries, education, arts, and sciences.

However much some New Order officials would deny it, this allusion to Indonesian “values” resonates strongly with the state’s own ideology of development. Because he emphasizes the homogenizing effects of “large-scale” institutional forces, operating uniformly across Javanese territory and communities, Someya likewise echoes writings on “language engineering” dating from the heyday of development (see, e.g., Fishman et al. 1968). Predictions like these center Indonesian among the various state-
fostered institutions which will presumably become social grounds and taken-for-granted frames of reference in everyday life.

Before critiquing this politically fraught position and its ideological grounds in chapter 4, I can quickly consider it here in terms of the complicating factors which it elides and which I address in the following chapters. Each point of criticism can be thought of as an upshot of tacit assumptions about the autonomy of the Indonesian language: as a structured linguistic system, as a social institution shared within and across communities, and as a verbal instrument mobilized for situated communicative ends. So too each of these issues can be broached preliminarily here with an eye to its correlates in Javanese language structure, political culture, and interactional dynamics.

**Language, territoriality, and ideology**

Someya tacitly dissociates Indonesian’s “values” from its role as an instrument of New Order oversight; he similarly brackets any relevance which Javanese might have for contemporary, national political culture. I seek to avoid such simplifying assumptions in this book’s first chapters, where I foreground aspects of language use which mediate and legitimize authority. To this end I contrast Javanese and Indonesian with an eye to recent work at the juncture of human geography and critical theory (see, e.g., Peet and Thrift [1989]), which provides a way to consider each language as integrally bound up with a distinct mode or strategy of territoriality. In this way, each language can be considered as institutionally and ideologically bound up with one of two distinct strategies to “affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over geographic area” (Sack 1986:19).

Chapter 2 provides a territorially framed, language-centered sketch of ongoing change in upland village communities of south-central Java where I spent time. It juxtaposes Javanese and Indonesian as extensions and symbols of two distinct modes of lowland territorial power, and in shifting perceptions of the modes of territoriality which bind these rural peripheries to cities, where prenational Javanese and national Indonesian authority have both been centered.

Someya’s top-down picture of Indonesian’s spread likewise ignores any possible salience which antecedent, ethnic, social, and linguistic conditions might have for a national future. It presupposes, rather, that Indonesian language and culture are autonomous with respect to “local” language and traditions, and so together will effect a quantum leap which leaves the prenational era to recede on the rear horizon of history. It matters little from this broadly epochalist point of view that prena-
tional south-central Java has for centuries been far from a social or linguistic *tabula rasa* onto which New Order institutions and language are now being straightforwardly superposed.

This politically fraught assumption is thrown into question in chapters 2 and 3 alike, which center on some enduring political and cultural saliences of Javanese as a mediator and symbol of authority. I sketch there the Javanese language’s role in the territorially or geosocial control which was exercised by the colonial-era kingdoms based in Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Language and social hierarchy were then linked in obvious and complex ways through Javanese linguistic etiquette, best known as the “speech levels.”

These speech styles, as I prefer to call them, are still hallmarks of elite Javanese tradition, and still famous for their extensive vocabularies of “crude” and “refined” elements. In use, these styles serve as interactionally nuanced and very conspicuous mediators of status and intimacy between people. But in chapter 3 I focus less on their overt interactional saliences than on their broader institutionally grounded roles as naturalizers of sociolinguistic inequality, within and across lines of territorial hierarchy. In this way they can be considered as the idiom of non-national imagined communities of persons, linked in asymmetric “nets of kinship and clientship” (Anderson 1991:6) which were centered on south-central Java’s “exemplary centers” (Geertz 1980) or “galactic polities” (Tambiah 1976). (See in this regard also Cohn and Dirks’ discussion [1988:224] of “theater[s] of power.”)

Finally, Someya’s prediction of language shift is overtly teleological, like New Order development rhetoric. It promotes a secular, ameliorative vision of profound social change, framed as a broad transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, or from mechanical to organic divisions of social labor. This developmentalist ideology accords to language a special place in social change, which I consider in chapter 4 with an eye to the striking fit between New Order development ideology on one hand, and Ernest Gellner’s (1983) functionalist account of nationalism on the other. Because of the privileged place of standard languages in his account of nationalism, Gellner helps to explicate the consequences of un-native Indonesian’s curious social history, and what Someya calls its value for “directness, clarity, effectiveness, and speed of communication” (Someya 1992:61). Someya’s specific assertion, together with Gellner’s general account, speaks to the broadest, tacit assumptions of New Order development ideology regarding the “meanings” which accrue to Indonesian, over and against ethnic pasts and languages. In this way the ideological correlates of Indonesian’s institutional grounds can be explicated, and its perceived privilege as the vehicle of abstract, rational thought can be foregrounded.
Syncreric usage

Over and against such sweeping pictures of sociohistorical change stand the modest particulars of everyday life, including talk: the fabric of situated, face-to-face relations cocreated among persons who are each others’ consociates, and share the social biography of “a community of space and a community of time” (Schutz 1967a:163).

Even statements as broad as Someya’s carry implicit predictions about such situated transiencies of Indonesian and Javanese usage. By imputing autonomy or separateness to Indonesian in relation to Javanese, he makes it easy to figure particulars of “mixed” Javanese—Indonesian usage as historically transitional in an epochal shift between languages and eras, as socially residual in everyday life, and as structurally interstitial with respect to two distinct, autonomous language systems.

This book’s middle chapters speak to this position through descriptive particulars which reflect indirectly, narrowly, but (I hope) revealingly on considerably more complex shapes of sociolinguistic change. In chapters 5 through 8 I rebut such epochalist positions with sketches of usage, ranging from authoritative public discourse to everyday conversation, in which Javanese and Indonesian intimately shape each other in discourse. These can be read as syncreric in two broad senses of that term.

“Syncreric” recurs in writings about Javanese culture as a notion which has proven malleable enough for self-conscious framings of ethnicity in the nation (e.g., former minister of education, Professor Priyono 1964:23), for ethnographic description (e.g., Geertz 1960), for analysis of political culture (e.g., Anderson 1972), and for quasi-prescriptive social criticism (e.g., Mulder 1978). In such contexts, “syncreric” can intimate a sense of Javanese tradition as being mutable but coherent, accommodative yet resilient, perduring in the distinctive manner in which it incorporates “outside” influences. But in this way “syncreric” can also license essentialist understandings of Javanese culture’s unity and autonomy in the face of variation across geosocial space, and change across historical eras.

In chapter 5 I try to read “syncreric” dimensions of Javanese cum Indonesian political culture from a few transcribed specifics of authoritative public talk. Framed with an eye to the preceding chapters’ sketches of shifting territoriality, a few tiny texts of official Indonesian and formal Javanese speech are considered as more or less efficaciously representing Indonesian authority to peripheral Javanese publics. This is an account of public speech, speakers, and audiences which locates such talk in triadic relations created and presupposed between sources of territorial authority, the speakers who im-person-ate it, and the collective addressees who count as an audience. The ways public Indonesian
business is sometimes done in Javanese, and in which Indonesian sometimes figures in otherwise markedly Javanese ceremonial occasions, show such “mixed usage” to be constitutive of emergent, syncretic understandings of authority.

In structural linguistic description, “syncretism” has a distinct technical sense which was introduced to the study of bilingualism in Jane Hill and Kenneth Hill’s work on “mixed” language use in upland communities of central Mexico (1986). In chapters 6 and 7 I broach similar particulars of bilingual usage with an eye to their adaptation of Kuryłowicz’s structurally grounded definition of syncretism as the “suppression of [system internal] relevant opposition[s] under certain determined conditions” (1964:40). My interest, like theirs, is in “mixed” usage which suppresses the social relevance of oppositions between systems, and in which the provenances of talk’s elements – native Javanese, or un-native Indonesian – are interactionally muted.

Chapter 6 deals with personal pronouns and kin terms, resources for speaking of the speech partners, interactional selves and others, who cocreate the intersubjective grounds for conversation. Javanese Indonesians have common recourse for such acts of reference to kin terms, which are interactionally focal and broadly syncretic. That such usage represents a point of convergence between interactional and institutional identities is obvious enough, but has unobvious social implications. Formerly Javanese kin terms have been subjected to institutional treatment in Indonesian venues; they have been assimilated to new hierarchies and understandings of status. In use, then, they count as “small-scale” transiencies of talk which reflect “large-scale” shifts in status, class, and territoriality; they mediate face-to-face relations in ways which are tacitly shifting along with understandings of collective identity on an ethnic yet national landscape.

Personal pronouns, on the other hand, are indexically grounded in the interactional identities assumed by persons, speaker (“I”) and addressee (“you”), to whom they refer. In chapter 6 I also focus on unobvious but interactionally salient patterns of non-use of Indonesian pronominal resources. Javanese speakers tacitly but consistently avoid using a full stylistic range of (prescribed) Indonesian pronominal reference, and so seem to create rather than merely accept a sense of interactional “flateness” in their national language. This interactionally keyed “anti-syncretism” makes Indonesian relatively de-situated in comparison with stylistically nuanced Javanese; it is part of the reason why Indonesian can be counted over and against Javanese as a “third person” or im-personal language which is relatively uninflected for self/other relations.

I believe that these narrow but revealing aspects of usage represent points of purchase in everyday life for the developmentalist ideology of
language, explicated in chapter 4. If such otherwise negligible patterns of (non-)use mark a point of entry for national modernity into everyday conversational life, then it shows that conversational practice can, as Woolard and Schieffelin put it (1994:70), “distort . . . [Indonesian] in the name of making it more like itself.”

Chapter 7 deals with two other, more disparate patterns of syncretic language use involving discourse particles on one hand, and lexical items on the other. Extensive repertoires of discourse particles serve Javanese Indonesians as means for marking feelings about and stances toward conversational topics, contexts, and participants. Their non-referential, crucially situated significances appear to make them peripheral for speakers’ awarenesses relative not just to their encoded linguistic functions (Silverstein 1976, 1981), but also with respect to their various provenances as well. For this reason their use takes on an osmotic quality across categorical, prescriptive boundaries between the codes of Javanese and Indonesian.

Lexical borrowings from Indonesian into Javanese, on the other hand, are conspicuous in what Javanese themselves sometimes call “salad language.” But I suggest in chapter 7 that grammatical and phonological homologies between the two languages enable intimate borrowing from Indonesian to Javanese which recalls stylistically “mixed” Javanese usage sketched in chapter 3. Considered in light of antecedent patterns of Javanese usage, even these conspicuously bilingual ways of talking can be seen as tacitly syncretizing un-native lexical resources into otherwise native interactional dynamics.

Chapters 6 and 7 together frame particulars of everyday Javanese Indonesian bilingual usage to elude broadly epochalist visions of language shift like that quoted earlier. Such syncretic aspects of usage, considered to be “sedimentation[s] of practices that incorporate extra-linguistic social . . . factors” (Hanks 1996:195), provide clues to broader, partial accommodations between native and un-native languages. As points of interactionally situated language “contact,” they provide structural insights into interactional dynamics of the bilingual usage I sketch in chapters 8, 9, and 10. They are oriented to talk as it is shaped by native senses of Javanese conversational practice on one hand, and an un-native Indonesian language ideology on the other.

**Javanese conversation and Javanese–Indonesian code switching**

Code switching is a central topic in sociolinguistics, but deserves broader attention among students of social change as a point of convergence between social life and social history. On one hand, code switching emerges in the transient, interactionally situated micro-phenomena of
Introduction

Talk which mediate social biographies of relationships among consociates. On the other hand, acts of code switching involve languages which have distinct institutional grounds, yet come together in situations of sustained “contact” between social collectivities of speakers. In this respect code switchings can be read as transient, interactional figurations of “self” and “other” shaped within broader political and economic contexts (cf. Gal 1988:247).

Code switchings’ significances, situated in microinteractional processes but informed by macrohistorical change, can have a double meaningfulness which makes them daunting for descriptive and interpretive projects. Socially relevant studies of code switching must draw a few drops of water from oceans of talk, and make them speak to the nature of shifting social tides.

Two major, socially relevant factors obtrude in such an effort for “the Javanese–Indonesian case.” On the macrosocial side is Indonesian’s un-nativeness, which raises obvious questions about the social “otherness” it might serve to figure in interaction among Javanese. Under received comparative approaches like the one I discuss in chapter 10, it seems problematic that Indonesian lacks a native speaking outgroup (or “they”) over and against which Javanese counts as the language of an ingroup (“we”). In south-central Java, at least, “they” (with apologies to Walter Kelly) can only be “us.” Indonesian’s un-nativeness in this way throws expository weight onto its institutional groundings in the nation-state and the “project of modernity” it symbolizes and subserves. For this reason the ways Indonesian figures in otherwise Javanese interaction invite interpretation relative to the modernist language ideology discussed in chapters 4 and 6.

The other unusual aspect of Javanese–Indonesian code switching involves the Javanese speech styles: speakers commonly shift between them in ways which, Suzanne Romaine has suggested, are “tantamount to code switching between different languages” (1995:321). But these monolingual, multistylistic patterns of usage turn out to be related to broader, less obvious interactional dynamics in which style shiftings sometimes, but not always, figure. I discuss this broader aspect of Javanese interactional process in chapter 8, under a broad rubric of “speech modeling” (which also covers “thought modeling”). There I develop a context for considering shiftings between Javanese styles as broader shiftings in interactional self/other relations, what Erving Goffman (1981) famously dubbed “footing.”

These speech modelings involve rapid, minimally cued, transient shifts in modes of conversational engagement; they have close analogs (as far as I can tell) neither in Javanese uses of Indonesian, nor in native speakers’ use of English. Because of their language- and culture-specific
character, particularly when they serve to exteriorize internal states, I can deal with speech modelings only illustratively, through selected transcriptions of recordings of talk in which they occurred. One reason for relativizing style shifting to this broader practice of speech modeling is to show how style shifting and code switching fit together, and so to speak to Goffman’s concerns (1981:155) about descriptions of (sub)code switching which are “too mechanical and too easy.” In chapter 9 I show multistylistic usage to be more than a matter of switching between distinct communicative vehicles; it is bound up with shifts in interactional *cum* intersubjective engagement which, like changes in glance or stance, can be more or less intentful, strategic, or shifty.

These joined discussions of speech modeling and style shifting serve as grounds for sketching bilingual code switching in chapter 10 as shaped by Javanese conversational practice on one hand, and an Indonesian language ideology on the other. Together, chapters 8 and 9 inform an interpretive approach to Javanese–Indonesian code switching, one which attends to both languages as shapers of interactional relations. On one hand, I provide examples of usage which show Indonesian’s assimilation to the distinctively Javanese conversational practices of modeling speech and thought. On the other hand, I foreground Indonesian’s use in situatedly impersonal, “third-person” guises, which serve to transform social relations.

These three chapters center on transcriptions of talk, and so involve expository strategies which are fraught with operational and interpretive problems. Because I seek to present these transcriptions as traces of conduct – informed by shared senses of native practice and un-native ideology – it is difficult for me to treat them as transparent records of categorically intentful conduct. To read “through” them to the taken-for-granted, “large-scale” grounds of “small-scale” interactional transiencies, I must treat them instead as highly mediated re-presentations of Javanese–Indonesian bilingualism. So I work in this exposition to avoid presenting transcriptions of talk as im-mediate windows on or im-mutable records of social reality.

**From talk to transcription to text**

The transcriptions of everyday talk set out in this book’s later chapters may seem overnumerous and overlong. But they are just a tiny fraction of the thirty-one hours of usage which I and my collaborators recorded and transcribed at different times, in different communities, and on different occasions. A few are drawn from recordings made by a colleague, David Howe, during his research project in 1980 and 1981 in Surakarta, where I was also working (see Howe 1980). But many more
were made during research focused on bilingualism in rural Java, between January and August of 1986. Some were recorded by me, but most were made by five consultants/collaborators who lived in various of the peripheral communities of Surakarta and, in one case, of Jogjakarta (shown on map 2).

Earlier research had already made me familiar with what William Labov (1971:113) dubbed the “observer’s paradox”: wishing to observe how people talk when one is not there to observe that talk. Only after gaining adequate facility in a range of spoken Javanese styles could I feel that my own talk was not too obtrusive in casual conversation; only among people I knew fairly well could I feel that my tall, white foreignness might not fundamentally shape interactional dynamics.

So I had strong practical reasons for enlisting help from Javanese collaborators who used the inexpensive tape recorders I provided. At the outset I asked each to record casual talk in his or her home, neighborhood, and workplace, suggesting that bilingual usage in everyday contexts might be most interesting. I asked each to carry the tape recorder for a while before using it, so as to acclimatize people they saw regularly to its presence. I also asked them to explain my efforts to study the ways Javanese is spoken on an everyday basis, and to request permission before turning the tape recorder on, while also minimizing its visual presence by using small omnidirectional clip-on microphones.

All five of my collaborators had at least high-school educations; three (two women, one man) were in their late twenties and teaching in high schools (Sekolah Menengah Atas) while living in their respective home villages. This may have had a skewing effect on the material which they recorded and which I present here. Still, as some of these rural communities’ first bilinguals, “locals who have made good,” they may likewise represent the first wave of bilingual community which will come of age with youngsters like those they are teaching. My other two consultants, a man and a woman, both in their forties, were a farmer and housewife respectively; though they lived in rural communities, they had lived outside rural Java for some time, and so were slightly unusual as older, bilingual village residents.

When the first recorded cassettes were returned to me by consultants, I listened to them with the idea of selecting particular segments for transcription. But it did not take long to realize that this strategy was leading me away from interesting aspects of usage. Thereafter I asked consultants to transcribe as much of the recordings they made as was audible. Though I paid for transcribing on an hourly basis, this intensive, time-consuming work was onerous enough to cost me early on the services of three other consultants, who were unwilling to listen repeatedly to tapes to pick up fast speech, tease apart voices in overlapping
conversation, or catch repetitions of words or interspersed, back-channel comments.

All transcriptions were written in standard Javanese spelling or some approximation of it which I have normalized here (see the note on orthography). I did not ask my collaborators to try to transcribe details of talk’s sequencing – the gaps and overlaps in turns taken by speech partners – nor much other fine-grained information which is often included in transcriptions intended for conversation-analytic purposes. These original transcriptions are highly partial but, with suitable emendation, adequate for my purposes here. (For discussion of the theory- and interest-laden nature of transcription see Ochs 1979, Urban 1996, and Haviland 1996a.)

I was fortunate to be able to have these transcriptions keyed into the laptop computer I had brought with me to the field, which made it easy to revise and emend transcriptions after reviewing them. I did this on my own and with consultants on a recurring, usually weekly basis. This slow, painstaking process yielded rich, specific contextual information – about the social surround of talk, the people involved, the prior and following dynamics of interaction, etc. – as well as background on the aspects of usage taken up in this book.

Just as significantly, these sessions made me forcibly aware of speakers’ common lack of verbalizable “insight” into many of the aspects of monolingual and bilingual usage which attracted my attention, and which I repeatedly queried. I discuss in later chapters their seeming indifference, if not resistance, to my attempts to elicit focused interpretations of particular aspects of usage with recourse either to “forced choice” strategies of interpretation, or to collaborative interpretation in some “native” metalinguistic vocabulary. This practical aspect of the research has in turn shaped my discussion here of expository and theoretical problems of comparison. I am recurringly concerned with the “potential circularity” which, as Romaine (1995:175) observes, is a real danger for analyses of code switchings (or speech modelings, or style shiftings) which lack fit with or confirmability from native speakers’ points of view.

Before returning to the United States, I intended to visit and introduce myself to all the persons whose voices had been recorded, and personally to ask their permission to use transcriptions of those recordings in my writing. This proved to be impossible due to a serious illness which left me bedridden during four of my last six weeks in Java. When I asked consultants to request permission on my behalf, they reported back to me that none of the persons they had recorded objected.

It is important to make clear here that I did not witness or participate in all of this talk, and so cannot license all these transcriptions “in the
first person.” They came to me as recordings and transcriptions: physical traces which speakers’ actions left on magnetic tape, and their orthographic surrogates. Those recordings and transcriptions, in turn, required extensive supplement in the form of contextualizing narratives by the persons who recorded them. These descriptions, like their objects, can be only partly reproduced here, and in “the third person.” So these transcriptions are neither transparent windows on concrete social realities, nor empirical bedrock for general social description: their intelligibility rests on situated paraphrase, explication, and interpretation.

These mediating operations are in the first place practically motivated by the need to select very small portions of indefinitely long transcriptions for re-presentation here. This operation presupposes their separability and self-contained character as records of conduct; it requires me to assume my ability to supplement them with adequate narrative descriptions of their originary, verbal, and non-verbal surround. These excising operations are in turn grounded in the thematic purposes of an expository “here and now,” which confer salience to records of conduct in an originary “there and then.”

To keep in mind the mediated character which these expository operations confer on usage in the last three chapters, I refer to them as texts of usage. This helps to maintain an expositiorily keyed sense of variation in the kinds of explications I make of them, and the motivations or intentfulness I impute to the conduct of which I present textualized traces. A notion of “weakly” intentful conduct helps to adduce recurring patterns from use on which native speakers had little post hoc interpretive purchase. I contrast these with other, fewer, “strongly” strategic or intentful instances of usage which offered themselves to speakers, and sometimes to me, as parts of larger social and conversational projects, as transparently verbal means to identifiable, extrinsic social ends.

This distinction helps me to avoid conflating distinct analytic and interactional perspectives under an overbroad rubric of “function” or “strategy.” It also helps me to work toward a dynamic sense of relation between the shared, tacit grounds for use of language systems, and the to-handedness of language in the “small-scale” immediacies of social life. By developing a productive, “both/and” tension and simultaneity between both faces of language, I try to avoid reducing one to the other, and develop a double, shifting picture of Javanese and Indonesian in use and change.