British protectionism and the international economy: overseas commercial policy in the 1930s

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Introduction

On 21 September 1931 the United Kingdom abandoned the gold standard. On 1 March 1932 when the Import Duties Act came into effect, Britain had finally adopted full protection. Thus within less than six months two of the great symbols of Britain's leadership of the nineteenth-century international economy, the gold standard and free trade, had gone. Moreover, the Import Duties Act signified more than simple protection. By temporarily exempting Empire products from the new duties, and by including a bargaining clause, the construction of regional or imperial trading blocs was envisaged.

This accords with a view of how a once dominant economic power behaves in retreat. Robert Gilpin writes of Great Britain

As the periphery advances, as it frees itself from dependence on the core and the terms of investment shift to its advantage, the core retreats into protectionism or some form of preference system. It throws up barriers both to the export of capital and to the import of foreign goods. It favors preferential commercial arrangements.1

Robert Skidelsky argues of the emerging economic pluralism before the First World War that the spread of industrialisation created a paradox because it increased global interdependence at the same time as new democratic and nationalist forces were displaying growing intolerance of the Pax Britannica. In the face of such a threat to the stability of the international system, adjustments had to be made: either authority had to be raised to a new level, perhaps with international institutions, or interdependence had to be reduced to the level of existing international authority.2 Ultimately with 'the disintegration of the wider system in the interwar years, there was an increasing tendency to see the economic future in terms of blocks'.3 Stephen Krasner portrays the years between the wars

3 Ibid., 178.
as an interregnum between British nineteenth and American twentieth-century leadership of the international economy. Since in his view it is a hegemonic distribution of power that encourages an open trading system, the transitional period between the eras of British and American predominance saw the closure of the system.\(^4\)

An open world economic system had been in Britain’s interests in the mid-nineteenth century. It had enabled its industrialists to capitalise on Britain’s technical and industrial leadership, and, of crucial importance to those familiar with the ideas of Malthus and Ricardo, it gave access to low cost foodstuffs and raw materials. The opening up of the international economy was in considerable measure a result of British action, including its unilateral adoption of free trade from the 1840s. The UK, as a potentially dominant state, had symbolic, economic and military capabilities to entice or compel less powerful countries to join the system.\(^5\) By 1870 Britain’s position at the apex of the international economy was unchallenged. The era of free trade was reaching its zenith, although with the United States standing conspicuously outside the movement. Britain had harnessed and was continuing to harness the productive resources of the regions of recent settlement to meet the burgeoning needs for foodstuffs and raw materials. In return, and as part of the process, it supplied manufactured goods and long-term investment. Capital exports were a vital component in the weaponry of an ascendant economic power seeking to shape, police and stabilise the international system. But they may also have played the paradoxical role of undermining Britain’s pre-eminent international position. By nurturing its overseas competitors, Britain’s capital exports may have contributed to its own demise. Skidelsky suggests that UK overseas investment diffused industrialisation and shifted the capacity to innovate from Britain to other countries.\(^6\)

It is doubtful, however, whether British funds played such a direct role in financing industrialisation overseas. Sometimes, it is true, British entrepreneurs established textile or iron-works in Europe, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, and some of these investments had an impact out of all proportion to their size. But for the most part British funds did not make an important direct contribution to the indus-


\(^6\) Skidelsky, ‘Retreat from leadership’, 163. In similar vein Gilpin writes that though ‘foreign investment is not the primary cause of the shift in the locus of industrial power from core to periphery, it both accentuates this tendency and tends to abort any effort to invigorate the core’s industrial base’. *American power*, 77.
trialisation of its overseas rivals. If the industrial development of Western Europe or the United States had depended on British finance, it would have been long delayed – only a small proportion of these countries’ total investment was supplied by the UK, and a minute fraction was channelled to industrial enterprises. Where British funds did supply a greater proportion of total investment needs, as in Canada, it has been argued that the net effect may well have discouraged industrialisation.\(^7\) For many primary producing countries, borrowing from abroad served only to lock them more firmly into the international economy, and did little or nothing to stimulate diversification of their economies.

Instead, the connection between Britain’s overseas lending and the industrial growth of its rivals was an indirect one. British funds contributed to their development in two major ways. The first of these lay in the boost they gave to primary production, sometimes through investment in land and mines, but principally through the construction of railways, port facilities and urban infrastructure. This helped ensure plentiful and cheap supplies for rivals as well as itself. The maintenance of free trade by the UK was an integral part of the growth-inducing process. Access to the British market enabled borrowing countries to service their debts, and it provided West European countries with the sterling to buy food and raw materials. The second vital contribution was the reinvestment of Britain’s current account surplus. Counter-cyclical investment meant that the international system as a whole was never short of sterling. Charles Kindleberger lists this, together with the maintenance of an open market for ‘distress’ goods at times of overproduction, and the fulfilment of a lender of last resort function (discounting in a crisis) as the three major ways in which the UK stabilised the international economy before 1914.\(^8\) Whether the gold standard also contributed to stability may long remain a matter of debate. If it did so, it was powerfully supplemented by other factors, and was confined to the industrial powers; for the periphery the gold standard mechanism was almost certainly a destabilising agent.\(^9\)

\(^7\) The increase in the money supply from imported capital is likely to be inflationary, even when in a country such as pre-1914 Canada a fairly sophisticated banking system provides some offset. A. K. Cairncross, *Home and Foreign Investment 1870–1913* (Cambridge, 1953), ch. 3. The corollary to this is that inflation is likely to be greatest in ‘non-traded’ and ‘domestic’ goods, as opposed to internationally traded goods. Therefore import substitution may be checked when capital imports are high because domestic capital is diverted into the non-international sectors. A. R. Hall, ‘Capital imports and the composition of investment in a borrowing country’, in A. R. Hall (ed.), *The Export of Capital from Britain 1870–1914* (1968), 143–52.


In the course of the nineteenth century the UK shaped the international economy to its own particular needs. Britain also helped keep the system relatively free of crisis, and thereby further facilitated its integration and growth. Ultimately Britain contributed to its own demise as the pre-eminent power. In part this may have occurred because the international economy acted as an agent in the transfer of technology and in the transmission of industrialisation. Perhaps overseas investment fatally weakened the domestic economy. Certainly the scale of international investment was unprecedented, and in relation to national income dwarfed the foreign investments of the USA in the twentieth century. An institutional bias in the London capital market might have deprived British industry of funds and have inhibited necessary structural change. If so, evidence nonetheless suggests that overseas investment yielded higher returns than home investment, even when allowing for their greater risk. Perhaps the City missed the more profitable ventures in Britain, but otherwise, judged by the criterion of private returns, the market acted rationally and overseas investment may have postponed a decline in the rate of profit. From the perspective of maintaining British power the problems were not merely the domestic costs of heavy overseas lending but the fact that the social return on these investments was shared by potential rivals.

Whatever the mechanism, British industrial hegemony was seriously challenged during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. UK steel output was exceeded by that of the USA in 1890 and by Germany in 1893. Britain’s share of world exports in manufactures declined from 40·7 per cent in 1890 to 29·9 per cent in 1913. In the half-century before 1914 imports, both in terms of value and volume, were growing faster than


exports. By the 1880s there was widespread concern in industry about foreign competition, and particularly about German rivalry. E. E. Williams, *Made in Germany* (1896), reflected and fed a growing awareness of the conditions faced by British producers. Anxiety was all the greater because wages appeared to be eating into profits. The problems faced by British entrepreneurs were greatly aggravated by the revival of protectionism among the larger European states after 1878, and by higher American tariffs from 1890. Industrial protection in the more sophisticated North American and West European markets was high and often aimed specifically at British exports. Roderick Floud has suggested that two courses of action were open to British businessmen: to develop new products, or to find new markets. Again, British entrepreneurs actedrationally by taking both courses. They concentrated on higher quality exports to the industrial countries of Western Europe and the USA, and for the older products they sought new and bigger markets among the semi-industrial and primary producing countries of the southern hemisphere. The second response, however, was the predominant one.

The return to protection in the late nineteenth century meant that the European countries were in some measure detaching themselves from an international economy dominated by Britain who now lacked the power and resources to prevent them doing so. A close assessment of the interest of the state at this time might have suggested that since Britain’s hegemony was now threatened, Britain should leave the system. One answer for the UK was to move to greater self-sufficiency, or to seek closer ties with the Empire and client states, thus perpetuating its dominance within a more restricted sphere. The main thrust of the Fair Trade movement of the 1880s was towards protection. In the early years of this century Joseph Chamberlain revitalised the movement and gave it a clear and explicitly imperial dimension. A formidable campaign came close to success. It probably failed because it embodied too many contradictions as well as threatening strongly entrenched interests. Not the least of its difficulties

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17 The process of detachment should not be exaggerated however – the multilateral economy evolved a new degree of refinement in the twenty years or so before 1914. S. B. Saul, *Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870–1914* (Liverpool, 1960), ch. 3.
18 Krasner, ‘State power’, 341. He argues that vested interests and inertia delayed such a change. The response will be delayed until a cataclysmic event (war, famine or severe depression), forces a reassessment.
was having to create new forms of conceptualising the economy.\textsuperscript{19} The vision of maintaining an old complementarity between Britain and the Empire was probably already false: economic nationalism was apparent in the dominions, certainly in Canada and Australia, and it was unlikely they would have been prepared to sacrifice their secondary industries. It is also questionable whether protection and preference would really have helped solve Britain’s economic problem.\textsuperscript{20} Apart from iron and steel, import penetration was not a serious threat, and even in the steel industry many of the imports were of semi-manufactures which other sectors of the industry processed further. The outstanding problem was of competition in overseas markets, and the imperial solution hardly helped here. Even in the peak year of 1902 the Empire absorbed only 38.5 per cent of UK exports.\textsuperscript{20} Not only were tariffs likely to raise costs and jeopardise exports to non-Empire markets, but they also carried with them the danger of retaliation, particularly if Europeans had greater difficulty in earning in Britain the sterling they needed for their imports. Here lay the fundamental problem of the imperial solution – it cut across Britain’s global interests. This was most apparent in Britain’s role as world shipper, and in the City of London’s role as world banker and financier: the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ were hostile to any policy that by restricting access to the British import market would have impaired their role by threatening the servicing and redemption of overseas debt.\textsuperscript{21}

In effect Britain continued at the centre of the international economy, playing the part of stabiliser even while its predominance faded. The UK could still perform this stabilising function because it managed to avoid any external economic crisis. But despite signs of external strength the domestic economy was weak in the early years of the twentieth century. Gross domestic product per man-year grew at only 0.5 per cent a year between 1899 and 1913\textsuperscript{22} and industrial productivity at a lower rate still. This was not only a slower growth rate than in late Victorian times, but was comfortably exceeded by Britain’s competitors. Testimony to poor economic conditions is that by the early years of the twentieth century Britain alone among the countries of North-west Europe experienced substantial emigration. The UK merchandise trade balance had widened until 1904. During the next ten years it narrowed. Partly this was because

of the sluggishness of the domestic economy; but exports received a stimulus from the rising incomes of the primary producers and from a great burst of overseas investment. The current account was helped by the growth of income from services: shipping receipts, especially high with rising freight rates and expanded world trade, were supplemented by income from investments that grew to around £200 million annually on the eve of the First World War. Britain’s long-term creditor position was immensely strong and confidence in the pound remained high. A crisis at the centre was avoided and the British market remained open.

The cost was not immediately apparent. With hindsight it is clearer: failing to make much headway in the markets for newer and more sophisticated products in Western Europe and North America, Britain came to depend more heavily on the less industrial countries as an outlet for its manufactures. Capital exports had accentuated this process, giving the economy a curiously lopsided appearance. Before the war, textiles, iron and steel and coal accounted for 70 per cent of British exports. The UK was supplying 70 per cent of world cotton textile exports, 80 per cent of coal, and had a virtual monopoly of world exports of ships. This dependence on a narrow range of export products was dangerous. Business decision-making had in many ways been rational in its own terms. It had meant exploiting Britain’s comparative advantage in skill or labour-intensive technologies: shipbuilding exemplifies this. But what was rational, judged by immediate private returns, did not always accord with broader conceptions of social or national interest, all the more so when viewed in longer perspective. This is true of the slow progress of new production techniques, particularly those involving a deepening in capital, the structural rigidity of the economy reflected in the commodity composition of exports, and in heavy overseas investment, none of which necessarily met broader national interests, especially in the long term. In retrospect the dangers were apparent enough. Like any export economy with a narrow base, Britain was vulnerable to unfavourable shifts in demand, to the development of substitutes and to the emergence of new sources of supply. Above all, the ability to remain competitive in the supply of these products was to be crucial to its future prosperity. Before 1914 there were intimations of failing competitiveness and of unfavourable trends in world demand and supply conditions, but these were either muted or were masked by the overall expansiveness of the international economy. However, the war and the 1920s saw an acceleration in the pace of developments that undermined the internal stability and external balance of the UK economy. By the end of the 1920s the British economy no longer

possessed the resilience to withstand an international crisis. Ultimately the pressures generated by the slump forced Britain off the gold standard and delivered the final blow to free trade. With their abandonment, Britain relinquished its pretensions to global economic leadership, seeking instead regional and imperial trading and monetary arrangements within the framework of a protectionist regime.