Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa

*Global–Local Networks of Power*

*edited by*

Thomas M. Callaghy
*University of Pennsylvania*

Ronald Kassimir
*Social Science Research Council*

Robert Latham
*Social Science Research Council*
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1 Introduction: transboundary formations, intervention, order, and authority

Robert Latham, Ronald Kassimir, and Thomas M. Callaghy

A tale of two countries

What is this book about? Rather than jumping directly into key conceptual matters, perhaps it would be useful to start with a vivid tale that illustrates many of the issues, themes, and questions raised in this volume – ones of order and authority, war and peace, intervention, and the structures, networks, and discourses that shape these outcomes. Hence this tale of two countries whose destinies seem to be closely interrelated and the varied, multi-textured forces that are shaping them.

In the 1970s, Uganda under the tyranny of Idi Amin became the early prototype of the failing post-colonial state as its economy and capacity to govern seemed to melt away while violence and uncertainty spread. Despite external help, the Ugandan governments of the early 1980s were unable to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again, as conflict ravaged many parts of the county. Yoweri Museveni formed a guerrilla army that eventually took power, and he became president in early 1986. To the surprise of most observers, Museveni managed for the most part to put Uganda back together again in the waning years of the Cold War. He had a great deal of external support from Western governments, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, agencies of the United Nations (UN), the Catholic Church and other religious groups, and a whole host of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This help was reinforced and influenced by dominant international discourses about economic reform, political liberalization, human rights, poverty reduction, and development more generally. Complex regional, international, and diaspora trading networks provided additional assistance. Despite this unexpected renaissance, by the mid-1990s Uganda was still not completely free of violence as armed conflict flared in the north and the west with the support of neighboring countries.

The terrible genocide that erupted in Rwanda in April 1994 led to a renewed invasion of that country by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), many of whose fighters had helped Museveni seize power and then
invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990. The combined events resulted in over a million deaths and nearly two million refugees in surrounding countries, most of them in the Kivu region of Zaire (now the Congo). The UN, major Western states, and the international community proved to be totally ineffective in coping with these events, while a number of NGOs struggled mightily to alleviate the horror.

Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), in the 1990s, like Uganda in the 1970s, was a failing state under the brutal tyranny of Mobutu Sese Seko. The state no longer performed basic services, especially education, health care, and the maintenance of basic infrastructure. Its people were worse off than at any time since independence. The army brutalized many Zaireans while Mobutu and his generals auctioned off the country's vast resources to an unseemly set of international business actors.

Continuing turmoil in Rwanda and neighboring Burundi expanded the population in the refugee camps as the United Nations and various NGOs intervened to stabilize the situation. At the same time, the overthrown Hutu government of Rwanda reassembled itself and its army in eastern Zaire with the help of Mobutu, international arms merchants, and mercenaries. This massive social trauma reinvigorated longstanding tensions in Kivu, leading to the reemergence of local militia groups that tried to defend a complex set of local interests, mostly regarding land. Tutsi long resident in Zaire were increasingly in jeopardy, and in October 1996 they launched a rebellion. To the surprise of many, it quickly became a full-fledged effort to overthrow Mobutu, one with striking parallels to events in the early and mid-1960s.

In the post-Cold War context, Mobutu did not receive his usual assistance from major Western governments, while the rebels enjoyed the support of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Angola. The rebels were a strange mix of regular and irregular forces that overwhelmed Mobutu's retreating and looting army. Led by Laurent Kabila, a rebel leader from the 1960s turned minor warlord, they took Shaba (Katanga) and other mineral rich regions. In order to finance the ongoing uprising, Kabila, as the presumptive new leader of the country, hurriedly made deals with an odd assortment of international mining companies and other firms. His forces entered Kinshasa in May 1997 to the rejoicing of almost everybody. Mobutu fled and died in exile several months later.

During Kabila's march to power, the international community had sung its hymns of democratization, economic liberalization, and human rights, but to little if any avail. Zaire was rebaptized as the DRC and became a much bigger and vastly more complex Humpty-Dumpty than Uganda. The tasks that Kabila faced were staggering, and the record
of his government in dealing with them proved to be weak indeed. In addition, he kept the United Nations and most of the NGOs from operating in much of the country, while unseemly business deals continued unabated. The Rwandans and Ugandans at first believed that they had solved their rebel and border security problems by helping put Kabila in power. This proved not to be the case, however, and in August 1998 the war was reignited as Rwandan and Ugandan forces moved against their erstwhile ally. Kabila received last-minute, regime-saving help from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, later reinforced by assistance from Chad and the Sudan.

Regional and international efforts to mediate what was being called Africa’s “first world war” had little impact until an agreement was reached in Lusaka in July 1999. It was, however, characterized mostly by its constant violation by all sides. In the meantime, the rebel forces became ever more fragmented, especially with a split in the main rebel group and the addition of a militia force headed by a former Congolese businessman with major backing from Uganda. While the rebels and their allies held much of the north and east of the country, Ugandan and Rwandan forces began battling each other deep in the Congo, largely over the economic spoils of the conquered territory, as well as their mainly Congolese and Zimbabwean opponents. In return for their part in the struggle, Kabila allowed senior Zimbabwean military officers and politicians to engage in a wide range of lucrative economic activities. Under the terms of the Lusaka agreement, the United Nations was to place a peacekeeping force in the Congo, and many NGOs were anxious to get access to the beleaguered populations. By late 2000, this still proved impossible to do. As a result, war continued to rage, more refugees were created, economic resources were pillaged, and social life remained in turmoil as old local orders shattered and new ones emerged. The few coherent organizations that remained, such as the Catholic Church, did what they could to ameliorate the suffering of this terrible regional war. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank tried to assist Kabila’s “sovereign” government, but they too proved to be relatively ineffective. One of the many ironies of this situation is that Uganda, the rebuilt failed state of the 1970s, was one of the major players in the collapse of the Congo in the 1990s.¹

One thing that stands out in this story is the role of “external” forces in its unfolding, the way they intersect with “internal” forces, and the pluralization of the kinds of forces involved over time. Museveni’s

¹ Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards on January 6, 2001 and was replaced by his son Joseph Kabila. The effect of this event on the hostilities, and on politics more generally, in the Congo remains very unclear at this time.
successful rebellion in the mid-1980s was unusual in the degree to which external actors were not involved. Taking place in the waning days of the Cold War and at a time when African states still largely followed norms of non-intervention (the major exception being, ironically, Tanzania’s 1979 invasion of Uganda to oust Amin), both Western powers and Uganda’s neighbors remained on the sidelines. As we chronicled above, this situation changed once Museveni captured the state. Through a combination of genuine goodwill, the desire of international financial institutions (IFIs) to find a willing partner in its structural adjustment prescriptions, and Western fears of the so-called “rogue state” of Sudan looming on its northern border, Uganda became the recipient of huge amounts of aid and the site of much NGO activity. It then became a major actor across its borders, beginning with its tacit support of the RPF invasion of Rwanda (the trigger event in the Great Lakes conflagration) and leading to its military support and adventurism in the Congo.

The Great Lakes conflicts, and especially the wars in the Congo, are thus impossible to make sense of without accounting for the role of regional and transnational forces. From the failure of French and United Nations peacekeeping efforts and the naivete of the NGO community in pre-genocide Rwanda to the establishment of refugee camps in eastern Zaire, from the use of mercenaries to the presence of a range of foreign militaries, and from the influx of multinational firms to the mediation of the United Nations, external forces powerfully shaped the Congo’s fate in the last decade of the twentieth century. They were neither peripheral nor determinative in the political trajectories of Uganda, the Congo, and the Great Lakes region in general. They were, and are, constitutive.

Indeed, the central challenge of this volume is to begin to develop ways of understanding this constitutive effect in general, and in Africa in particular. Both the resurrection of Uganda under Museveni and the disintegration of the Congo, first under Mobutu, then under Kabila, thus illustrate many of the key issues central to this volume. How do state and non-state, local and external forces interact to produce order and authority in various different kinds of social and political space? What kinds of actors are involved? What strategies are used? How stable, extensive, and productive are various forms of order and authority? How do different types of order and authority relate to each other? Whose voices and claims are heard and whose are silenced?

Unlike most standard accounts that employ the normal lenses of international relations and comparative politics, where “internal” and

“external” forces are separated for analytical purposes, this volume conceptualizes and analyzes what we call transboundary formations of considerable diversity. They link global, regional, national, and local forces through structures, networks, and discourses that have wideranging impact, both benign and malign, on Africa, as well as on the international community itself. Above all, they play a major role in creating, transforming, and destroying forms of order and authority.

We now turn to more conceptual matters. This introduction will first discuss the nature and importance of transboundary formations and their relationship to recent discussions of “global” phenomena, then their role and impact in Africa, followed by their relationship to processes of “extraversion,” and, lastly, their considerable institutional variety.

Transboundary formations, orders, and authorities

It is still too early to tell what kind of ultimate impact the surge of interest in things “global” will have on the social sciences. Despite the widespread hum of concern with “globalization,” it is far from clear that work across the disciplines would be seriously undermined if the term were to disappear tomorrow. The analysis of phenomena and processes closely associated with the term – lightning financial exchanges or widely diffused cultural icons, for example – could be carried on under their own rubrics. And while the designation “global” may seem ubiquitous to some, a great deal of research is being conducted with no gesture toward it at all.

It may be some time before the designation “global” gains the kind of theoretical and empirical thickness and richness that terms such as state and society have. Until, or if ever, it does, we should not overlook a closely allied but more general development – the growing concern among social scientists and practitioners with processes and relationships that spill across national boundaries. Increasingly it is being taken for granted that there can be significant crossboundary dimensions to almost any object of study – village, identity group, class, NGO, or political party.

However, a division of labor, sometimes explicit, generally exists within and across the social science disciplines. Analyses can focus on phenomena that are by definition transboundary in nature (such as trade, migration, and diplomacy) or that are only influenced by cross-boundary forces (such as a national economy or local activism). US political science offers the most blatant form of division with its sub-field of international relations that stands apart from comparative politics, political theory, and the study of its own polity (American government). In sociology and anthropology there are less formal divisions, but the relatively recent attention to
transnational cultural flows, and in the past to dependency theory, stands out against the tradition of studying societies and communities as though they were self-contained. The recent challenge to that self-containedness has come in numerous forms: from research into the ways that external forces such as multinational media or foreign-owned factories become integrated into a place or community, to the analysis of domestic political responses to international institutional pressures (Stallings 1995) produced, for example, by the IMF or international human rights organizations.

The distinction between objects of study that are by definition cross-boundary and those that are not overlaps with a number of binary oppositions that became quite fashionable in the 1990s – global/local, space of flows/space of places, external/internal, and outside/inside (Castells 1996; Hannerz 1996; Massey and Jess 1995; Robertson 1992; Walker 1993). Of all of these, the opposition global/local has had the greatest resonance in the social sciences. Not only have the terms global and local enjoyed incredibly stellar careers inside and outside the academy, but the two terms have conveniently subsumed an unusually wide band of referents (including flows, places, integration, fragmentation, regions, cities, systems, and sites). Opposing global with local is quite intuitive since the former term ultimately refers to some kind of claim about the range of forces operating across space. Typically, the local is either a discrete element within that global range or simply a site or phenomenon subject to global forces that are external to it.

This volume starts from the assumption that what is compelling about the opposition global/local is what lies silently between: the structures and relations that emerge through the intersection of social phenomena that vary in range, as well as form. The point is to pull back the global/local as though it were a husk comprising conceptual claims about what the global and the local are, or about how they shape one another. What should be exposed are the rich kernels of specific junctures joining diverse structures, actors, ideas, practices, and institutions with varying ranges in a common social and political frame. As the chapters in this volume show, these frames can involve civil war, the generation of wealth, or the protection of human rights.

As implied above, applying the label global, external, or foreign to something makes sense to us only if it is contrasted with phenomena that we might label local or national. Even in analyses of existentially cross-boundary processes, such as transnational migrations, it is the relationship to some place left or arrived at that is central. What is unique

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3 See, for example, a recent edited volume on “transnationalism” and migrant communities,
about this collection is that each chapter strives to identify specifically how intersections form and operate; how they draw in and are shaped by institutions as diverse as states, international organizations, NGOs, transboundary corporations, and national and local polities. These transboundary formations defy simple classification as existing at one level of analysis or another (local, national, or global). Sometimes they involve networks reaching around the world from diamond mines in Angola to the boards of trade in Antwerp. Other times they involve international arenas of discourse (for example, around human rights, the environment, and development) within which various actors, local and global, vie to set agendas, contest policies, and garner support. And at still other times they involve systems of rule – often violent and exploitative – over enclaves of territory involving state and private militias and transnational corporations. Occasionally, there may be direct intervention by external military forces that may be sanctified by the norms advanced by international organizations such as the UN. Some transboundary formations are seen as instances of “intervention” while others are perceived to be the natural outgrowth of regular socio-economic and political interaction. This volume deals with both and with the blurred line between them. The central concern in this effort is to show how cross-boundary forces become directly involved in the constitution of forms of order and authority in various social and political contexts that can range from the local, translocal, and national to the regional and transnational. The chapters seek to address the question of how orders and authorities that shape social existence form and operate at specific sites within societies or across multiple territories (in transboundary distribution systems, political alliances, or social organizations). It is important to assess how cross-boundary forces enter into these sites and contexts and with what consequences. These orders and authorities – which are not necessarily based on legitimate force or voluntary compliance – are not merely a function of activities of central state governments. Competition and conflict between and among both international and local NGOs are treated with the same seriousness as the politics of concerted pressure by or on state officials. The drawing up of life in towns into informal, sometimes illicit webs of distribution is taken as seriously as formal, national markets. Connections between non-governmental and state institutions, and between informal and formal realms, are central to the kinds of orders that concern us in this volume.

whose editors state that their guiding concern is “to discern how this process (transnationalism) affects power relations, cultural constructions, economic interactions, and more generally, social organization at the level of the locality.” Thus, one of the volume’s main analytical themes is “the centrality of ‘locality’ in a historicized sense” (Guarnizo and Smith 1998, 6).
There is actually very little organized knowledge about how forms of order and authority operating in specific contexts are shaped by and in these junctures. Certainly there is no body of theory to turn to automatically or a language to rely on to describe transboundary units of analysis, besides general and often arbitrarily defined terms such as “transnational,” “international,” or “global.” A related body of work, which is applied to historical contexts, is contemporary (post-) colonial studies, where the concern has been to understand the role of imperial power in the construction of the order and authority of colonial states of one form or another (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Mamdani 1996; Young 1994).

Questions about transboundary constructions of order and authority in the post-colonial period have received less attention. The chapters in this volume by Barnett, Cooper, and Latham deal in different ways with some of the intellectual fallout from this gap. Post-colonial studies have focused on the enduring, especially cultural, legacy of colonialism for contemporary politics and society. While the problem of authority – understood as Michael Barnett shows below, borrowing from Bruce Lincoln (1994), to be a matter of who or what is able to establish a presumptive right to speak or act – has figured meaningfully in post-colonial studies, the problem of order itself has taken a less prominent place. When it comes to the post-colonial period, authority, if anything, is generally treated as though it has been unhinged from order. Authority is now often seen as being embedded in discursive webs and the micro-practices of particular agents. Order has become something of a dirty word, associated with the Hobbesian (and, later, Huntingtonian) sense in which order seemed to stand as an end in itself rather than as a means to justice or what is now called human security or human development. Order of this sort was understood as a stable system, national in reach and conservative by design. We need not assume, however, that order is by definition a territory-wide or national phenomenon. As this volume will show, order can also be a transboundary phenomenon, though not necessarily in a zero-sum relation to the national state. At the same time, order can be situated in a locale or anchored in a particular domain such as religion or finance. In all of these cases, it can also be transitory and provisional. It is our contention that the term “order” should be used to denote what is produced when groups and institutions attempt to establish reproducible boundaries to what they do in the world, involving

4 Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson have recently examined the question of “cultural order,” but are quick to dismiss its analytical utility (Gupta and Ferguson 1997a, 4).

5 The term “political order” developed by Samuel Huntington has recently been revived in the literature on Africa, without such biases but as yet without much specificity. See Goran Hyden (1999).
specific people and places, social relations and practices, and mechanisms and methods (violence, law, command, redistribution, etc.). When the UN High Commission for Refugees establishes a refugee camp in some locale it must establish who is a refugee and who is not, what it will do for them and what it will not, and how it will do it or what the effects will be if it does not.

Thus, the right to pronounce and act – to be authoritative – is not just a function of circuits of discursive reproduction. It is inseparable from order-making, however contingent or provisional. The chapters in this volume treat authorities and orders not only as things to be discovered, announced, or imposed, but as things that can be pursued, produced, and contested in often novel ways. Orders can emerge not only as overt programs but as corollaries of the search for security, survival, or wealth.

That order, especially local order, had dropped more or less from analytical sight owes something as well to the post-World War II assumption that it is whole sovereign states and societies that are drawn into transboundary and external orders and authorities. Thus was born dependency theory. External – or if you like global – forces were typically understood in the dependency framework either to emasculate the possibility of real politics, of real sovereign leadership and governance, or to render indigenous, authentic, or natural economic and social relations inoperative. Ministries and presidents do not “really” rule, and markets are shot through with outside goods and extractions. One version of the dependency perspective underscored that “real” politics and authenticity were illusions from the start, not least because they were constituted from the very start by external forces. In this extreme version, real agency and autonomy on the part of local actors (politicians, “comprador” capitalists, and the masses) become impossible because of global capitalism.6

Cardoso and Faletto (1979) offered a correction to the strand of dependency analysis that focused on how local economic life was drawn up into international capitalist structures. They insisted that analysis also needed to be thrown into reverse, with a focus on the specific dynamics and history of local political-economic relations.7 This call was heeded, but far too infrequently.8

6 For a recent and critical reflection on underdevelopment and dependency theory by an influential contributor to the approach as it was applied to Africa, see Leys (1996).
7 The parallel within colonial studies was the emphasis, associated with John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953), on what happened outside of metropoles and cores.
8 One important example of doing so regarding Africa is Bayart (1993) whose concept of “extraversion” is discussed below. Other examples from Latin America include Bergquist (1986) and Coronil (1997).
While it is true that external forces have received increasing attention in the social sciences and humanities, they often serve only as a background context from which a scholar can select the actors of interest to him or her (merchant, missionary, soldier, or diplomat). In such analyses, cross-boundary relations and processes are merely drawn from external contexts (see for example, Buell 1994). This volume seeks to help rectify this situation by focusing on transboundary formations. However, it does not start from any single perspective fixing the types of transboundary formations that are the most crucial to investigate. The authors instead center their chapters on the particular configurations of forces and processes relevant to their cases. The resulting diversity of transboundary phenomena examined in this volume – for example, illicit networks, social movements, intervening states, international financial institutions, NGOs, militias, and multinational corporations – have received varying degrees of attention in international relations, history, and the fields that have been central to area studies (see the chapters by Barnett, Cooper, and Kassimir this volume). However, questions about how they produce order and authority have generally been overlooked. Consider the well-studied subject of local and transnational social movements, which are seen as central to the politics of globalization (Smith et al. 1997; and Obi this volume). Numerous studies exist of how groups organize on a worldwide basis to contest state and international policies, or of how organizations can emerge, even just locally, in reaction to practices and pressures from forces identified as global. However, serious questions have not even been raised yet about whether or how such movements actually shape and produce order and authority not simply in the international realm but in communities and political institutions within and across a variety of territories. The chapters in this book should prompt readers to consider why these questions matter.

Transboundary formations and Africa

While this volume’s authors focus on African examples, the relevance of these questions is not limited to the region of the globe often labeled as the most extreme in lacking “political order” and which stands as the exemplar of a new form of global “disorder” (Kaplan 1994). We witness various permutations from Central Asia to Southeast Asia, from the Balkans to the druglord-dominated regions of Latin America. There are, however, several advantages to examining transboundary formations in

9 For a recent survey, see Keck and Sikkink (1998).
Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, many African countries, especially in Central Africa as described above and parts of West Africa, are viewed as “failing” or “collapsed” states (Zartman 1995). As with the Congo, they have become sites for external intervention, refugee “management,” armed conflict, economic extraction, and political engineering. Following on earlier models of relief aid, development assistance, and structural adjustment, there is now a diverse set of mechanisms for intervention by the “international community” in the continent – peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, democratization, building of civil societies, environmental preservation, and coping with special diseases, for example. Beyond the international community, there has been a proliferation of a variety of institutions, many of them new, others reconfigured – private security companies and arms dealers, missionary organizations, NGOs, and multinational firms that operate under different logics and in different contexts than their predecessors. Longstanding trading networks now not only cross national borders, but reach into diaspora communities in New York, Paris, and elsewhere.

The scope and diversity of these forms of intervention and connection make Africa a particularly trenchant place not only for viewing the intersection of “the global and the local,” but also for revealing the assumptions and folk theories that various international actors have with regard to the way orders and authorities “work” in Africa. The region thus provides an arena for recording and analyzing how these institutions and networks become insinuated in political structures and relations “on the ground.”

Political analysis of Africa has typically treated the kinds of linkages, formations, and processes that this book highlights in one of two ways. First, large parts of the academic literature have either ignored transboundary phenomena or treated them as residual to the states and populations that are affected by them, help to create them, or use them for their own purposes. Ironically, this is particularly true for parts of the literature that focus on various “transitions” that are presumed to be under way in Africa, such as economic liberalization, democratization, and the growth of civil society. The approach advanced in this volume seeks to problematize the implication that the links between international and local realms can only be encompassed through the lens of international relations theory or the classic dualism of state and civil society. We are

10 For exceptions, see Aina (1997), van de Walle (1999), and Mkandawire (1999). In an influential volume on the role of civil society in state reform and political transition (Harbeson et al. 1994), only the chapters by Guyer and Callaghy treat the international dimensions of, and constraints upon, African civil societies as central to the latter’s political role.
suggesting that these linkages cannot be automatically subsumed by the macro-categories of state, civil society, and international community.

Second, in other parts of the literature which have been more attuned to transboundary phenomena, states appear to fade rapidly into a pale background – seen as actors no longer relevant to African realities, accounted for by failure or sheer lack of presence (e.g. Forrest 1998). Undergirding this perspective is the observation that African states have never been very close to the model of the Weberian, “modern” state assumed by much of the literature, especially in international relations. The general conclusion reached is that African post-colonial states have been long on juridical sovereignty and weak on empirical sovereignty (Jackson 1990). This gap in authority and presence is typically assumed to be filled by either patrimonial networks or communal leadership and not the variety of transboundary formations discussed in this volume. This volume underscores that it is important not to overlook the range of actors, processes, and forces that are driving political realities in Africa;11 or to underestimate the degree to which states are bound up in transboundary formations along with a wide variety of non-state actors.

**Transboundary formations, states, and the global context of “extraversion”**

One way to understand how states have been bound up in transboundary formations is through what Jean-François Bayart (1993) has called strategies of “extraversion.” Rulers build relationships largely with non-African states, transnational corporations, and international organizations as ways of surviving and compensating for their weak empirical stateness. These extraversions have altered over time as African and external conditions have changed. Individual states have used them in different ways: first, to stabilize or strengthen themselves, sometimes after serious decline (Uganda, Mozambique); second, to slow decline by deflecting certain kinds of challenges, often from non-state transboundary formations (Nigeria, Kenya); or third, to manage decline (Angola, Cameroon, both Congos, Chad, and Sierra Leone) while attempting to carve out new orders that might benefit those who control the increasingly hollow state.

Extraversion is a strategic disposition of state leaders in relation to both their domestic spaces and their international realm. When this strategy produces specific structures of order and authority, a transboundary

11 An excellent, recent study of those processes and forces that overcomes that risk is Clapham (1996).
formation of one form or another is likely in operation. As Reno’s chapter shows, for example, where empirical stateness has significantly weakened, certain types of transboundary formations that may create quite violent forms of order and extraction enter into play. Yet we know from the chapters by Schmitz and Callaghy that occasionally more benign outcomes can be seen in the formations that coalesce in areas such as human rights and debt relief.

The chapters in this volume also demonstrate that, over the course of the post-colonial period, extraversion strategies have increasingly spread to non-state actors and social movements.\(^\text{12}\) This happens in a conjuncture where processes of state decline occur at the same time that international organizations and NGOs assert or respond to perceived new needs in Africa that they claim they can do something about – human rights, refugees, debt, environmental concerns, and the spread of various diseases. As Kassimir and others illustrate, African non-state, “societal” actors have turned increasingly to extraversion strategies as a way of managing their fraying socio-economic situations and asserting new claims on resources, claims to authority, and claims for representation.

The volume’s chapters quite vividly demonstrate that relations between states and non-state institutions should not be presumed as zero-sum in nature, although, under certain circumstances, this may be the case. Transboundary formations initiated by non-state actors can coexist with weakening states, possibly leading to slower decline or, conversely, to partial stabilization (see Roitman this volume). As Reno shows, they may also help to determine winners in “countries” that face major factional struggles or civil wars. This may produce significant overlapping and intermingling of various forms of order that result from even quite narrow and temporary transboundary interactions, as Latham illustrates. State as well as non-state organizations may operate in more than one transboundary formation in quite effective, if often not benign, ways (see chapters by Nordstrom and Roitman this volume).

In this sense, both African and non-African states, or parts of them, can be drawn into transboundary formations in ways that are unexpected and have unintended consequences. With regard to the latter, many non-African states are now much more leery of becoming part of certain types of transterritorial deployments described by Latham – mostly interventionist, order-oriented ones – while continuing to be involved in others, such as those relating to economic reform, democratization, and “building” civil societies. In some cases, state-oriented transboundary

\(^{12}\) For discussions on extraversion and religious institutions in Africa, see Bayart (1989a), Gifford (1998, ch. 7), and Kassimir’s contribution to this volume.
formations have succeeded in strengthening the capabilities of some states (Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique), especially on the economic side. Even here, however, “donor fatigue” continues to take its toll as these cases remain relatively few in number.

In thinking through the origins and consequences of transboundary formations in Africa, we must take care not to get too carried away with a focus on purely “global – local” interactions. As several of the chapters show, transboundary formations do not have to be primarily composed of external (non-African) institutions or actors. They can also be the result of largely transnational regional adaptations, which may then develop external ties (see Roitman, Reno, and Nordstrom in this volume). Especially on the non-state side, the tendency is to view transboundary formations as being generated largely externally. But several of the chapters underscore the point that regional transboundary formations emerge out of local institutions. At first they may be transboundary within the regional context, but eventually they may develop a variety of external linkages – to transnational religious movements or international market networks in weapons, drugs, and people, for example. Many of the emerging order-creating regional transboundary formations may be forged initially by the intersection of non-state institutions. In some cases (Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, for example), the “order” they impose has a distinctly malign character and no developmental potential.

But in other emergent regional transboundary formations, African states play a major role. This is most dramatically apparent in several overlapping transboundary formations that may be emerging from Africa’s first major inter-state war unfolding in Central Africa, with which we started this chapter. While this war originated in local and regional conflicts in the Great Lakes region, most of the actors have increasingly developed external linkages to states, international organizations, firms, and global markets (Reno this volume, and Callaghy forthcoming).

New transboundary formations may not be, as Roitman argues, sovereign in any traditional sense, certainly juridical or even ideational, but they often constitute quite viable “regulatory authorities.” They may overlap relatively comfortably with existing states, but, as they become more coherent and are able to approach higher levels of control over resources, people, and territory, their status may take on a zero-sum quality in regard to the juridical states on whose territory they operate. But the potential zero-sum quality of these new regulatory authorities may pertain for some domains of what are conventionally seen as state functions (provision of security, economic management), but not others.
The institutional diversity within transboundary formations

As we have noted, transboundary formations, and the institutions that shape them, have grown in number and type. A point of departure for this volume is the recognition of the wide range of institutions shaping order and exercising authority in Africa.

Institutional diversity has, of course, been a hallmark of Western theories of pluralism that highlight the role of civil society in the political realm. Foucault – by building on the kinds of insights provided by Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci, and by undertaking specific histories – made clear that in modernity institutions such as professional associations could also be authoritative shapers of social orders. However, both the pluralists and Foucault took for granted that a formal, neo-Weberian state would be central to politics and governance, serving as the predominant, authoritative underwriter of order (for Foucault, through law, knowledge, and violence). The authors of this volume are forced to relax this assumption and thereby treat the myriad of institutions they study in Africa as producers of forms of order and authority that involve states in uneven and often problematic ways.

The diversity of institutions drawn into analysis across the chapters of this book vary along two basic dimensions. On the one side, there is the classic distinction between those institutions that are part of, or directly (re)produced by, the state and those that are not. On the other, we introduce a less conventional distinction: juridical and non-juridical institutions. We use the term juridical to designate that an institution’s existence rests on some form of legal expression, such as a constitution or charter that is accorded recognition by other institutions and groups operating as legal entities. Put together, these two dimensions produce the following institutional map presented in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 is meant to underscore that the four institutional fields are quite proximate to and apt to intersect with one another in the ways mentioned throughout this introduction and the chapters that follow. This emphasis is important, since all too often we have been faced with the assumption either that the juridical dimensions of states are the only places to look when analyzing structures of order and authority, or that when states are apparently incapable of living up to the Weberian ideal type, “real” authority lies in other institutions. While there may be empirical examples that approximate either of these extremes, patterns of authority in Africa and elsewhere for the most part feature dense inter-connections of institutions and hybrid formations. These institutions may have their own relatively autonomous (even if contradictory)
logics, but it is only through the juncture points that we can understand how people’s everyday lives are or are not ordered, how local security is constructed or ruptured, and what possibilities exist for the representation of identities and interests when the audiences for such claims are often fragmented, opaque, or unaccountable. It is precisely because so many institutions are drawn up into global, transnational, or other cross-border webs of activities that we refer to these juncture points as transboundary formations.

The introduction of the juridical/non-juridical distinction is critical in capturing the complexities of order and authority. Indeed, while much scholarship recognizes the existence of non-juridical arenas and institutions (e.g. “parallel” or “informal” economies), most studies of African politics continue to treat states and civil societies in the juridical realm as discrete units of analysis. Institutional innovations in the non-juridical realm are often dismissed as unfortunate pathologies, or alternatively celebrated as examples of local invention, while the connections between them and juridical institutions are considered, if at all, in an ad hoc manner. For example, and as some observers and the chapters in this volume point out, state institutions and the actors populating them are embedded not only in the juridical realm, but also in a wide range of non-juridical informal or illegal political and economic arenas and practices (e.g. Reno
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1995). A customs official in a lonely border outpost may also be a central node in a smuggling network; a member of parliament may be the most public face in a gray zone of patron–client ties; a defense ministry official may be a principal mobilizer of a private militia. “State power,” to the degree it exists, might sometimes best be understood from a vantage point that encompasses the intersection of juridical and non-juridical realms (see Obi, Reno, and Roitman this volume).

The juridical/non-juridical distinction also provides much greater depth to our understanding of the political possibilities of non-state institutions. Non-state, juridical institutions include those organizations that much conventional analysis labels as “civil society” (see Kassimir this volume). The international equivalent would involve entities such as international NGOs and advocacy networks and is sometimes labeled “global civil society” (see Callaghy and Schmitz this volume). Yet, as Schmitz shows, these institutions are quite often connected to non-juridical realms, patronage systems, ethnic networks, or “non-civil” protest movements. In Kenya, the most visible (juridical) human rights organizations are linked (and, perhaps even more critically, are perceived to be linked) to those (non-juridical) ethnic groups that have been denied access to state power. A similar connection between social movements that make rights claims and ethnic-based mobilization can be observed in the conflict over oil extraction in the Niger Delta. In addition, as Obi demonstrates in his chapter, peaceful protests, secessionist claims, and violent acts of sabotage against Western oil companies and the Nigerian state cannot be neatly compartmentalized into discrete “civil” and “uncivil” components of local resistance, not to mention the obvious connections between “private” transnational corporations and the juridical and non-juridical arms of the Nigerian state.

The volume’s chapters analyze how domestic institutions that are either juridical (Callaghy, Obi, Schmitz) or non-juridical (Reno, Roitman, Nordstrom) are enmeshed in translocal and transnational networks through which ideas about human rights, neo-liberal economic theories, diamonds, arms, and foreign aid flow. In his contribution, Latham makes a distinction between such networks and transterritorial deployments where “external” forces are physically present within a domestic setting. These deployments can take either juridical or non-juridical form. Juridical forms include transnational corporations, development agencies, and peacekeeping troops. Non-juridical forms include syndicates and trading diaspora conducting illegal commerce and rebel forces penetrating neighboring territories. What is unique about the chapters here is not only their concern with exploring how these networks and deployments are imbricated with one another, with communities, and with
other locally based institutions such as towns, but also their concern with how states figure into this mix. In this conjuncture, forms of social existence are shaped in often transitory orders, and more formal modes of authority are exercised by institutions such as the UN and international financial institutions (see Barnett, Latham, Callaghy).

Our chapters show in rich detail the diversity of processes that cross boundaries. For instance, international financial institution policies on debt are revised by coalitions of debt forgiveness movements and economic experts (Callaghy); diamonds are traded both for weapons that fuel civil wars and for contraband which then figures into the survival strategies of street children (Nordstrom, Reno). International norms and discourses are appropriated in local political struggles – e.g. human rights and environmentalism (Obi); invoked in order to gain access to juridical and economic resources – e.g. sovereignty (Reno, Callaghy); and repudiated in the face of civil conflict – e.g., rules of war (Nordstrom, Reno).

At each of these points of intersection, configurations of power emerge that are at once “global” and “local.” None of the chapters offers anything like a model for comparing across specific instances, but by focusing on transboundary formations they help create an analytical basis for comparison. Many of the authors argue, implicitly or explicitly, that formal institutional changes in regime (democratization) and economy (marketization) occur in the shadow of these structures, and thus efforts to promote juridical reforms ignore these chains of political and social intersection at their peril.

Around these intersections, the themes of violence and representation recur throughout the volume. The monopoly of legitimate violence that is seen as a critical marker of the juridical Weberian state appears as a chimera in most of the cases offered here. Vigilante groups and civil defense forces emerge to provide local order in the context of civil war, while external peacekeeping missions may attempt the same on a national level (Barnett this volume; Herbst 1996; Richards 1996); paramilitary groups, private security firms, and mercenary armies provide protection for mineral extraction and forge military-commercial networks (Roitman, Nordstrom, Reno); militias encouraged by state officials engage in ethnic cleansing and in attempts to derail political reform (Schmitz); and national armies provide security to multinational firms, acting against their own citizens in the process (Obi). Violence, both legitimate and illegitimate, and order, both brutal and just, are imposed by a wide range of “local” institutions, but rarely without connections to state officials and transboundary forces. Again, this points to the overlaps between the state and non-state, juridical and non-juridical. Vigilante groups and militias (that are non-state and non-juridical) are typically linked to components
of the state apparatus. And these linkages change over time, as Roitman and Reno demonstrate.

How are local identities and interests voiced and represented under such conditions? Again, here we must relax the assumption, handed down to us by the juridical state model, that representational claims are made to a state which provides order, promulgates and implements rules for the allocation of resources, and asserts a national purpose. In addition, and as Kassimir argues in his chapter, many non-state, juridical institutions can be seen not only as “representers” of societal interests to the state, but also as authority-claiming and order-making agents in their own right. Many of our chapters show the multiple faces of the institutions making representational claims and the increasing diversity of the audiences toward whom such claims are directed. International financial institutions (Callaghy) and NGOs (Callaghy, Schmitz, Obi) are drawn up into local politics of representation, especially in the cases where state officials are deaf to many representational claims. Latham, Barnett, and Callaghy discuss the problems of accountability of international institutions that emerge in such interactions. More broadly, if non-state institutions are themselves not simply representing societal groups but also part of the construction of order and authority, we need to understand how these organizations and their leaders become the targets for appeals by various social forces (Kassimir, Barnett, Obi). But in those localities where state and/or non-state forces either provide a brutal form of order or have interests in maintaining disorder, representation becomes increasingly problematic (Nordstrom, Obi) or infinitely more complex (Roitman). In the cases presented by Reno and Nordstrom, questions of who represents which social groups are virtually erased under the weight of violent collective institutions (state and non-state) with no stake in accountability, while Roitman, in discussing paramilitary commercial networks in the Chad Basin, suggests that certain forms of reciprocity can develop between such networks and at least some parts of local populations. In all cases, even when the state is no longer a major presence, as an imagined force or a reference point it does not disappear from representational politics.

We started this introduction with the vivid tale of two countries in Central Africa, which raises many of the themes and questions central to this volume. After assessing the intellectual context in which these issues are typically discussed, we laid out the conceptual basis for investigating them using the notion of transboundary formations. The rest of the volume will expand on this discussion. It is divided into five parts, the first of which focuses on “Historical Dimensions and Intellectual Context,”
with chapters by Fred Cooper and Michael Barnett. A second part explores “Theoretical Frameworks” through chapters by Robert Latham and Ronald Kassimir. Parts III and IV examine empirical manifestations of transboundary formations in Africa: Part III, “Transboundary Networks, International Institutions, States, and Civil Societies,” has chapters by Thomas Callaghy, Hans Peter Schmitz, and Cyril Obi, while Part IV, on “Political Economies of Violence and Authority,” contains chapters by William Reno, Carolyn Nordstrom, and Janet Roitman. The volume ends with a chapter by Kassimir and Latham, which reviews where we have been and where we might go in analyzing transboundary formations and their relationship to order and authority in Africa and beyond.