RESISTANCE AND REBELLION
Lessons from Eastern Europe
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1. Introduction

This book is about ordinary people and the roles they come to play during times of rebellion and resistance against powerful regimes. How is violence against such regimes organized and sustained? How and why do individuals accept enormous risks in the process? On one hand, the subject matter is violence and killing. On the other hand, the subject matter is friendship groups, farming practices, religious and cultural norms – the stuff of the most basic social interactions of everyday life. Whether individuals come to act as rebels or collaborators, killers or victims, heroes or cowards during times of upheaval is largely determined by the nature of their everyday economic, social, and political life, both in the time of the upheaval and the period prior to it. The extraordinary is inextricably linked to the ordinary.

As the reader will discover, this book provides a very detailed theoretical treatment of the process that pushes and pulls individuals into rebellion. Among the most important issues, the work specifies how different social structures tend to change strategic frames and trigger varying sets of causal mechanisms. The book illustrates how variation in community size, homogeneity, and centralization may affect the existence and operation of norms; it examines the role and structural position of “first actors” or entrepreneurs in initiating and sustaining collective action through norms and use of threats; it attempts to identify the conditions when one type of mechanism (rational, normative, irrational) is most likely to prevail over another type of mechanism.

Another aspect of this book is perhaps more important than the development of theory. As much as possible, the work tries to present the story of farmers, students, and workers from their own standpoint. Although much of this work is built on archival and secondary sources, one major part of this project involved interviewing approximately forty elderly Lithuanians in an effort to reconstruct their experiences and the history of their communities.
during the 1940s. Beyond the theory, I have tried to provide an accurate sense of these individuals’ lives and the nature of the decisions they confronted under occupation. If the book accomplishes only this goal, then the effort will have been worthwhile. Before delving into the theory, I wish to provide some examples from these oral histories to illustrate this work’s questions, substance, and method.

Lithuania was occupied three times in the 1940s. The Soviets incorporated Lithuania in 1940, the Germans occupied the country during most of the Second World War, and the Soviets again reoccupied the land during the tail months of the war. One of the fundamental questions of the book asks how and why people with less weapons and fewer numbers create and sustain violent rebellion against stronger forces. During the 1940–1941 Soviet occupation, Lithuanians developed a clandestine organization that included roughly 1 percent of the population. In June 1941, in an effort to reestablish independence before the invading Germans could gain control, this underground resistance launched a violent revolt joined by tens of thousands of previously unorganized Lithuanians. How did the organization of this revolt develop? The oral histories suggest that a two-step process occurred, with each step involving a different strategic frame. Early in the initial Soviet occupation, Lithuanians were confronted with a series of opportunities to commit small acts of resistance: accepting illegal underground newspapers, boycotting Soviet elections, attending public religious ceremonies. At this stage, individuals were scanning society at large for signals to help gauge risk and determine how to act. As more and more individuals participated in these small acts of defiance, confidence grew among those desiring more organized, and potentially violent, forms of resistance. Soon, locally based rebellion organizations began springing up across Lithuania. At this stage, thousands of Lithuanians were confronted with another decision — whether to join their friends and neighbors in support of a community-based rebellion organization. Importantly, as the risks increased, the individual’s set of closest connections, his community, became the key source of information and influence.

This second stage, the movement toward community-based organization, is an issue of widespread importance. In opposing a regime with superior numbers of weapons and trained soldiers, sustained rebellion depends on significant numbers of individuals occupying roles linking armed, mobile resistance movements to fixed populations. Some clandestine organization that is impervious to the generally superior military power and organization
of the occupier or regime must develop and survive. Without this form of organization, rebellion against ruthless regimes (and the cases in this work are the Soviets and the Nazis) is nearly impossible. These actors are important for many reasons: they provide food and information; they serve as a mobilizable reserve for military action; they retaliate against local collaborators and thus serve to deter further collaboration; they are the basis of recruitment for future mobile units.

Several well-known examples can be readily cited to bring out the importance of locally based organizations. The American failure in Vietnam perhaps best illustrates the significance of local organization. The United States won the military battles but could never adequately identify or isolate the locally based support networks despite major efforts to do so. The strategic hamlet program was essentially an effort to weed out local conspirators vital to the perpetuation of Vietcong efforts. The objectives of this program as well as its failure can be seen in *The Pentagon Papers* and other released documents. German occupation forces in the Second World War had a special term for the local organizations, *Hauspartisanen* or “home partisans.” As Colonel General Rendulic, commander of a German Panzer army, stated about the situation in Yugoslavia, “the life and tasks of the German troops would have been much easier if the opponent had only closed formations. The home partisans were a much more dangerous enemy because it was from them that all the hostile acts emanated against which the troops could protect themselves only with the greatest difficulty and which caused them the largest losses. They could seldom, if ever, be caught.”

The Intifada and Northern Ireland are cases in which the rebels operate almost entirely at a local underground level. The Irish Republican Army has at most 500 actual fighters, but there are, “behind the fighters, a network of supporters, farmers, townspeople, and teenagers, who stand ready when called upon to turn their homes into safe houses, to surrender their autos, to hide the fighters, and most of all to hide from the Brits. These are the dickers, the lookouts in every town, out of every window, in the gas station, at the post office, in the cafe.”

The oral histories produce detailed insight for examining the process leading to community-level organization. In Chapter 3, the reader will en-

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counter descriptions of the events of the 1940–1941 Soviet occupation as they unfolded in several rural and urban communities. In some of these communities, local resistance emerged; in others, it did not. For rural communities, elderly Lithuanians were asked to draw maps of their villages, list local prewar membership in political and social associations, and describe the nature of anti-Soviet resistance. In many cases, the level of detailed information that could be gleaned from this process was remarkable. For example, many interviewees can draw an intricate map of their village as it stood on the eve of the Second World War. The respondent’s map depicted in Figure 1.1 represents a village described and discussed in Chapter 3, a community that developed resistance during 1940–1941. As can be seen, the respondent could draw each farmstead and designate the number of hectares. He could also list memberships in political parties and social organizations. Finally, he gave a rendition of how resistance was organized in this community. For social scientists and historians attempting to reconstruct social life in the 1940s Baltic area, interviews with elderly survivors are often the only available source of information, especially in terms of rural communities. Not only necessary for research, these oral histories are remarkable for their very richness.

Rural villages are by no means the only communities analyzed in this work. Chapter 4 explores the development of organized resistance among the members of one fraternity and its alumni (the Catholic engineering fraternity at the University of Kaunas). I interviewed seven members of this community (G1–G7), one of whom produced a list (Figure 1.2) containing the name and fate of each member. Again, the question is how, in the face of Soviet harassment and surveillance, did such extensive organization of resistance develop in this community but not others? What characteristics or features of this community worked to facilitate decisions to accept the risks involved with this action?

Chapter 6 also addresses the puzzle of community-based rebellion, this time focusing on the organization of anti-Soviet resistance in the immediate postwar years. When the Soviets returned in the tail months of the war, locally based rebellion organizations again formed. Indeed, Lithuanians controlled much of the countryside (at least at night) until the late 1940s. Consider one particular example. In late December 1944, the Soviets returned to southern Lithuania and the area around the town of Merkine. On Christmas eve, they massacred much of the population of a small village named Klepocai. As the smoke rose from burning Klepocai, hundreds of
Figure 1.1. Map of Svainikai village as drawn by a former resident
people from neighboring villages, most of them youth fearing conscription into the Red Army, fled into the woods to buy time to consider their options. Within a short period of time, many of these refugees had reincorporated themselves into their communities, and significant numbers of these com-
munities developed into support networks for the refugee-rebels. In fact, some villages created elaborate systems of underground bunkers that were supplied with food and information by the majority of the community. Buoyed by these local systems of support, a partisan resistance to Soviet rule raged in this area of the countryside for several years.

One section of Chapter 6 describes the experience of five individuals from the area around Merkine (M1–M5), a small town in southern Lithuania, during the postwar years. One interviewee became a member of a locally based Soviet collaboration force whose mission was to pacify the countryside. Another tried to stay out of the conflict altogether. A third joined a band of mobile partisan fighters (and was quickly captured and deported to Siberia). Two others were involved in community-based resistance, although the development of resistance in their respective communities differed. As in other interviews, these two respondents produced community maps, lists, and histories.

Again, the interviewees could recall remarkable detail. One of the respondents took out a large piece of cardboard and drew the location of the twelve farmsteads of his community as they were aligned along the Merkys River. He listed the number of hectares and total number of family members. On the right margin, lists of members of various social or political groups can be found. Specific details regarding family history can be found under each farmstead. For example, the Tomas Barysas farmstead comprised forty hectares and sixteen family members. Jonas Barysas was killed as a partisan; Vladas Barysas had formerly been in a Lithuanian military unit and changed his name to conceal that background from the Soviets; Cezaris Barysas became a Soviet informant. This village developed widespread and organized support for the postwar partisans. In these years Lithuanian rebels hid in underground bunkers in several locations indicated on the map by small squares. In the nearby village, no such widespread participation developed, although a few members of the community, including the respondent, served as liaisons for nonlocal partisan groups.

This brief discussion of the multiple cases from the Merkine region illustrates how this type of thorough study can create a field of variation crucial to understanding resistance and rebellion against powerful regimes. First, there is obvious variation among individuals. The five individuals from Merkine played distinctly different roles in the postwar drama: collaborator, neutral, liaison, locally based rebel, and mobile partisan. Further, clear variation occurred at the community level. Some of the communities
in the region, like the one just discussed, developed elaborate bunker systems to hide homegrown rebels. These communities maintained their crucial support of partisans until collectivization or significant deportation decimated the village. Other communities were ready to support partisans that passed through and might have a liaison or two but were never organized in even an informal fashion. Yet other communities in the same region remained neutral.

What Is to Be Explained?

With these brief descriptions in mind, the question becomes how to represent the reality of rebellion against powerful regimes. Three methodological points emerge. First, the unit of analysis should not be the “nation” or a “people” because tremendous variation in rebellion activity exists within these large units. This variation can be readily observed at both the community level and the individual level. Second, a great deal of variation exists in the types of roles that individuals come to play during sustained rebellion. As shown in the Merkine example, there are collaborators, neutrals, locally based rebels, mobile fighters, and gradations in between. In much of the rebellion literature, individuals are portrayed as deciding among just two choices, two roles – either to “rebel” or “not rebel” – and then the analyst tries to determine the payoff structures that explain choices to rebel. In particular, this framework is typical of the literature treating rebellion as Olsonian collective action problems solved through “selective incentives.” Such treatment obfuscates the actual choices being made during rebellion. Third, the same individuals pass through different roles in the course of rebellion. As indicated in the discussion of the first Soviet occupation, individuals often progressed through a two-stage process, moving first from neutrality to acts of nonviolent resistance and then to participation in community-based rebellion organization.

In sum, at a most fundamental level rebellion involves individuals moving across a set of multiple possible roles. The social scientist must therefore develop conceptions that are able to represent rebellion as a process capable of generating considerable variation. With these points in mind, rebellion behavior in this work will be described with reference to a spectrum of individual roles represented by Figure 1.3. The zero position represents neutrality. The individual does nothing for or against the regime and nothing for or against the resistance. The +1 level represents unarmed
and unorganized opposition to the established regime. Attending a mass rally or writing antiregime graffiti are classic examples of +1 behavior. The +2 position stands for direct support of or participation in a locally based, armed organization. Finally, the +3 node represents mobile and armed organization, meaning membership in a guerrilla unit or rebel army. The left side of the spectrum mirrors the right but represents functional roles in support of the occupier or regime – in other words, collaboration. It is important to understand that these roles are based on observable behavior and not attitudes. For example, an individual either decides to join the local rebellion organization (+2) or remains outside of it.

The advantages of this operationalization are numerous. First and foremost, it captures the reality of the phenomenon to be explained as it allows for multiple roles and differentiates the crucial role played by members of locally based organizations (+2). This spectrum might best apply to populations occupied by a foreign power, but it can be applied to a host of rebellion situations.

Second, the spectrum allows for the treatment of individual and local variation. In addition to identifying individual behavior, the spectrum provides analysis of the way community-based mechanisms influence individuals. As seen in the preceding example, communities tend to develop their own “equilibriums” – that is, their members tend to bunch at particular nodes of the spectrum. Thus, community-level variation may also be discussed in terms of this concept.
This community-level variation holds the key to understanding rebellion. Why would the individuals composing two villages in the same region exhibit different patterns of rebellion behavior? This variation within a single region cannot be easily explained by terrain, history, culture, or the overall balance of power and resources between the regime and the rebels because these elements are roughly the same for all the communities within the area. It is also difficult to explain this variation by reference to attitudinal factors, relative deprivation, or ideology. The argument could be made that charismatic and ideologically driven individuals are the catalysts for rebellion and these individuals are probabilistically distributed across communities. This may, in fact, be part of the story, but I try to show in the following pages that something more interesting and more complex occurs – that relatively small differences in community structure can create different signals for potential rebels that, in turn, produce different rebellion dynamics. By specifying the reasons for variation at this level, the fundamental mechanisms that drive high-risk resistance action can be identified. When remaining at the level of huge aggregates, or relying on relatively vague concepts such as “institutions” or “ideology,” the actual causal forces driving individual action are left as too much of a mystery. These individual-level causal forces are the focus of this work and are treated in terms of mechanisms.

Mechanisms

Mechanisms are specific causal patterns that explain individual actions over a wide range of settings. As Jon Elster has summarized, a mechanism is an intermediary between law and description. Thomas Schelling uses the word “template” to emphasize the generalizability of the identified causal pattern. Diego Gambetta has defined mechanism as “hypothetical causal models that make sense of individual behavior.” Again, his emphasis is on the

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3 As many readers will recognize, the conception of mechanism underlying this work borrows heavily from several works of Jon Elster. See Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially the first chapter, for an overview of Elster’s definitions and use of mechanism.


5 Diego Gambetta, “Concatenations of Mechanisms,” in Peter Hedström and Richard Swed-
specification of causation at an individual level. As described by some, a mechanism approach is a style of theorizing that cannot be given a precise definition, although several examples can be readily given. Gambetta lists several types of established mechanisms identified in the social sciences:6

1. Instrumental rationality.
2. Focal points.
5. Self-validating beliefs, such as distrust.
6. Emotions, such as envy.
7. Passions, such as amour propre.
8. Evolved dispositions toward altruism, sex, or children.
9. Special cognitive quirks, such as endowment effect.

I would add to this list a few more examples that are especially salient or relevant to this book’s theory and substance:

10. Norms of reciprocity.
11. Threshold-based behavior.
13. Relative deprivation.

Consider one particular example: “tyranny of sunk costs.” An old automobile that is constantly breaking down and being repaired might be retained by the owner despite the likelihood of numerous additional costly repairs due to the tyranny of sunk costs. Although the optimal choice might be to “junk” the car, the owner refuses to rationally calculate probable future costs because he or she cannot bear the thought of previous repair efforts “going down the drain.” The same process might be involved in dysfunctional personal relationships or marriages. One or both partners in a relationship may find themselves continuously dissatisfied, in conflict, and on the verge of breaking up. Rather than ending the relationship, they may choose to remain together and ignore the probability that problems will recur because they cannot accept the fact that investments in the relationship have been in vain. The tyranny of sunk costs mechanism is both general in that it can be applied to a wide variety of cases (cars and spouses) and spe-
cific and causal in that it explains why an event occurs. This combination of generality and specificity is one of the benefits of a mechanism approach. Another benefit is the wide possible range of behaviors that mechanisms can encompass. Irrational psychological processes such as the “tyranny of sunk costs” or cognitive dissonance reduction are mechanisms, but so are rational adaptation and social norms. Concentration on mechanisms allows the social scientist to deal with realistic actors affected by a complex variety of forces; it forces the social scientist toward causal explanations of increasingly finer grain.

The mechanism approach can be clearly contrasted with common alternatives. Variable-based treatments usually aim to estimate causal influence through statistical association. In this method, prediction becomes the primary goal. In opposition, a mechanism approach aims for explanation over prediction. Elster provides an illustration in which prediction can be easily made from a variable (price) but could not be made from any single mechanism:7

To predict that less of a good will be bought when its price goes up, there is no need to form a hypothesis about human behavior. Whatever the springs of individual action – rational, traditional or simply random – we can predict that people will buy less of a good simply because they can afford less of it. Here, there are several mechanisms that are constrained to lead to the same outcome, so that for predictive purposes there is no need to decide among them. Yet for explanatory purposes the mechanism is what matters. It provides understanding whereas prediction at most offers control.8

Additionally, while statistical approaches rely on aggregation, the mechanism approach applied here operates at the individual level.

The mechanism approach subsumes rational choice. As several practi-

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7 As Elster has elaborated, one of the major reasons for the nonpredictability of mechanisms is that two equally valid but opposing mechanisms (e.g., “absence makes the heart grow fonder” and “out of sight out of mind”) may be operating at the same time, but an observer cannot predict which one will determine action in any given situation. Given these difficulties, we may be able to isolate mechanisms, but we can seldom know “the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the various mechanisms are switched on.” Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 9. Although Elster clearly does not oppose the search for triggering conditions, he believes the ability to identify them is extremely difficult. As a result, his efforts and priorities lie in development of the logic and plausibility of the mechanisms themselves rather than the conditions that trigger those mechanisms and allow prediction.

8 Ibid., p. 10.
tioners have pointed out, rational choice is a method based not on the search for laws but rather on the specification of mechanism.9 As seen in the preceding list, instrumental rationality is only one mechanism among many. Seeking parsimony, rational-choice theorists restrict their analysis to this one mechanism. The method employed here is an explicit rejection of oversimplification of the causes and processes underlying resistance and rebellion. Rational or instrumental behavior is certainly one part of the story, but so are norms and irrational psychological mechanisms.

Restating the Central Question

The central question of this book can be rephrased in terms of the spectrum presented in Figure 1.3: what mechanisms move individuals from one point on the spectrum to another? The key movements and their accompanying mechanisms are noted in Figure 1.3. Triggering mechanisms work to first push the individual out of neutrality into opposition and, in a second step, into organized opposition.10 The movement to the critical +2 position understandably takes up a significant part of this book. Of course, the organized opposition must stay organized if the rebellion is to continue. There are different mechanisms preventing individuals from leaving organized resistance, which are termed sustaining mechanisms. The bulk of this book examines the two sets of triggering mechanisms that move individuals from 0 to +1 and then from +1 to +2. Other movements on the spectrum, for example, the movement from +2 to +3, and the movement into collaboration roles, are only briefly discussed in the chapters that follow.

Sustained rebellion is produced by a sequencing of mechanisms or, in other terms, a process. By insights gained through fieldwork or secondary material, this project hypothesizes which mechanisms apply at which stage of the process. The following chapter outlines in detail these mechanisms and their logic and implications. Here, I simply summarize the key mechanisms in order to address some fundamental methodological issues:

10 Some clarifying distinctions can be made between riots, rebellions, and revolutions. Riots are unsustained violence; rebellions are sustained violence; revolutions are defined by the amount of social change produced and are not necessarily violent. The focus here is on rebellion and how violence is sustained. I use the term “resistance” to encompass both passive and violent antiregime action.
From 0 to +1 (Triggering Mechanisms, Stage One)
1. Resentment formation.
2. Threshold-based safety calculations with society-wide referents.
3. Status considerations linked to local community.
4. Focal points.

From +1 to +2 (Triggering Mechanisms, Stage Two)
1. Threshold-based safety calculations based on community referents.
2. Community-based norms of reciprocity.

Remaining at +2 (Sustaining Mechanisms)
1. Threats.
2. Irrational psychological mechanisms.
   a. The value of small victories.
   b. The tyranny of sunk costs.
   c. Wishful thinking.

This mechanism-based story aims for generality. None of the specified mechanisms or their hypothesized sequence is unique to any nation, state, or culture. This sequence of mechanisms can, and will, be used as a template to compare the development of resistance and rebellion in a variety of cases.

In essence, the book tells a specified story, something similar to the analytical narratives of Margaret Levi, Barry Weingast, Avner Greif, and others. These practitioners of analytic narrative “seek to explore concrete historical cases,” they “wish to examine the choices of individuals who are embedded in specific settings,” they “wish to trace the sequences of actions, decisions, and responses that generate events and outcomes.” Furthermore, the analytic narrative is a mechanism approach; it does not seek covering laws but rather pursues “a complex middle ground between ideographic and nomothetic reasoning.” In a similar vein, I tell narratives of occupations and periods of resistance; however, although the narrative goals are the same, the breadth of the analysis differs. Seeking parsimony and falsifiability, Levi, Weingast, Greif, et al. base their analysis almost entirely on rational choice and mechanisms identified through game theory. In contrast, the range of mechanisms in the preceding sequence is far broader. Although rational choice and game theory play important roles in the analysis of the cases that follow, these devices are too limited to explain crucial actions that create and

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sustain resistance and violent rebellion against ruthless regimes. Any realistic treatment of these events must also rely on mechanisms identified in psychology and other social sciences.

This expansion of scope does not mean that parsimony and falsifiability are not valued goals. Given the complexity of the subject, the list of mechanisms is parsimonious. The development of resistance and violent rebellion is explained by reference to only ten mechanisms. Furthermore, these ten mechanisms are sequentially ordered to produce one general process. As Elster states, the mechanism approach is intermediary between laws and description. There is no discussion of laws of rebellion in this work, but neither is there only description of cases. Rather, the goal is to use this relatively short and connected sequence of mechanisms to advance the understanding of important violent events. This specified sequence of mechanisms also provides a measure of falsifiability. If irrational psychological mechanisms are driving individual action in the early stages of resistance, then the hypothesized sequence does not apply. The same could be said concerning threats or other mechanisms.

This sequence also proposes a bold hypothesis regarding the development of sustained rebellion against powerful regimes. Notice that the mechanisms driving individuals to the crucial +2 position are hypothesized to be community-based norms and thresholds. Without the presence of strong communities that provide the conditions to trigger these mechanisms, violent rebellion is unlikely to obtain. As outlined in the next chapter, most of the mechanisms driving individuals from the 0 to the +1 position are not community-based. An implication follows: societies without strong communities may create passive forms of resistance, but they are unlikely to create the locally organized rebellion structures that would be able to spawn sustained violent action against a powerful regime. Clearly, community plays a central role in this work.

Community

Rebellion, or moving to the right on the spectrum, involves the acceptance of risk. Strong regimes threaten harsh penalties against those organized at the +2 level. In the cases that follow, these penalties were generally death or deportation. Strong communities produce mechanisms that are able to drive individuals into these dangerous roles and keep them there despite the possible high costs. Strong communities, as defined directly, promote rebellion by producing accessible information, reducing communication costs, and fa-