Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens

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1 Deception and the rhetoric of Athenian identity

British statesmen and public men have never at any time used mendacity as an instrument of war, still less have they uttered such praises of lying as Hitler has done in *Mein Kampf* . . . In Great Britain we believe in the ultimate power of Truth.¹

Viscount Maugham, formerly the British Lord Chancellor, wrote these (partly mendacious) words in a pamphlet published in 1941 entitled *Lies as allies: or Hitler at war*. Hitler was happy to declare the usefulness of deception as a means of achieving his ends and despite the availability of *Mein Kampf* in Britain at the time, Neville Chamberlain had believed the dictator’s guarantees of peace in 1938. It makes sense to us now that an establishment pamphleteer would want to represent Hitler’s ‘praises of lying’ as anathema to ‘Britishness’ and propagate the falsehood that, in contrast to Hitler, British statesmen had never used mendacity as an instrument of war. But Maugham’s propaganda, whilst unsurprising, underscores some important points which I will be making in this chapter. Firstly, Maugham mobilises the ideology of ‘national character’ in his argument. Regardless of the realities of British military and political history, he is able to represent Great Britain as a nation committed to ‘Truth’. Secondly, Maugham’s contrast between Hitler and ‘Britishness’ draws its persuasive force from a premise that was essentially true from a British point of view: Hitler had praised lying in his writings and he had proved himself a liar on the international stage. We can characterise the statement as ‘propagandistic’, ‘ideological’ or even as occupying the realm of the ‘imaginary’ in its claims concerning Britishness, but it draws upon aspects of Hitler’s philosophy and behaviour which could be documented and understood as accurate or true at the time.² Thirdly, the contrast be-

¹ Maugham (1941) 11–12.
² Maugham’s statement about British honesty exemplifies a definition of propaganda offered by the Cambridge classicist Francis Cornford in 1922: ‘that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends without quite deceiving your enemies’ (recalled in Guthrie’s preface to Cornford (1953)).
tween Hitler the Liar and Britain the True obviously relies on a basic assumption that deception is morally wrong and truth-telling is morally good. Finally, the contrast is hardly an adequate or complete guide to British representations of military deceit or national character at the time or in subsequent years. Britain did not shirk from deploying tactics of deception and disinformation against the Axis powers during the Second World War, nor was there a British public outcry when such tactics were revealed after the event.³

The points concerning ‘national character’ and ‘morality’ in relation to deceit serve to introduce my argument that the representation of deceptive behaviour and communication is an important component in the construction and reproduction of an ideal Athenian citizen identity. I take certain texts that exemplify or relate to this discourse of identity as my starting point because modern scholarship has tended to characterise ancient Greek culture as much more accepting of deceptive behaviour than modern western civic societies. For example, Detienne and Vernant have traced the connotations and valorisation of métis (‘cunning intelligence’) in a wide range of texts spanning ten centuries from Homer down to Oppian.⁴ It would be hard to dismiss the many positive associations which this category of thought is given in the classical period and it is equally hard to find analogues for the concept in modern cultures. It is certainly true that classical Athenian texts offer us many positive evaluations of deceit in certain contexts and I will have much to say about these positive treatments in later chapters. Anthropological studies on rural communities in Greece and elsewhere in the Mediterranean since the Second World War have also been applied to archaic Greece and classical Athens in order to claim that the ancients were not so different from their modern ancestors in prized and practising deception with vigour.⁵ Here, lying is seen to be especially crucial to the conduct of what Cohen calls the ‘politics of reputation’.⁶ I have already discussed the dangers and advantages of this comparative approach in my introduction. But this chapter attempts to show that in the public spaces of Athenian civic and democratic exchange, there was a strong and persistent ideological construction of deceit and trickery as negative categories of communication.

³ See Barnes (1994) 23–9; Cruickshank (1979); Cave-Brown (1976).
⁴ Detienne and Vernant (1978).
⁵ See Walcot (1970), (1977); Scheibe (1979) 83.
⁶ Cohen (1991) 36. See also 96 where Cohen concedes that ‘[F]or Athens we do not have the kind of evidence needed’ to demonstrate that deception fulfilled the function of reconciling a need for privacy and the sanctions of public codes described in modern rural Greece by du Boulay (1974).
and behaviour which served to define what it meant to be a good Athenian male citizen. Despite comparative approaches which suggest that deception was a crucial strategy in Athens’ ‘surveillance culture’ and the undeniable value which ancient Greek texts place on ‘cunning intelligence’ as a category of thought, the democratic and civic culture of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries develops powerful representations of deceptive communication as inimical to its very existence.

Where Viscount Maugham was able to forge an image of Britain the True through a contrast with documented examples of Hitler the Liar, we will see that Athenian constructions of ‘honest national character’ are also often drawing their force from contrasts with solid preconceptions about the attitudes and practices of an enemy. The assertion of a contrast between the ‘deceptive other’ to the Athenian ‘self’ is sustained by reference to demonstrable features of that enemy’s political, cultural and military regimen and past Athenian dealings with it. This ‘demonstrability’ is important: it is through such demonstrations that Athenian texts can posit the enemy’s reliance on deceit as symptomatic of a failure to understand what it is to be (and make) a good citizen.

Maugham’s projected image of Britain as a nation that would never deceive an enemy was clearly at odds with the realities of British tactics. It will become clear that Athenian projections of an ‘honest’ self-image were almost certainly divorced from reality. However, I will have little to say about the extent to which the Athenian ideology of deceit and ‘real’ practice diverged: as my introduction suggested, this extent of divergence is difficult to gauge given the nature of the evidence available.

I have also stressed that Maugham’s image of Britain the True cannot be taken as a complete or adequate guide to the British representation of military deceit during or after the Second World War. If Britain needed to be reassured by the ‘ultimate power of Truth’ and boosted by an image of itself as an embodiment of Truth, there would be other occasions during and after the war where British Cleverness, Cunning and Duplicity towards enemies would be paraded as virtues without any fear that the two images would be felt to contradict each other. In my second chapter, the Athenian image of military deceit will also reveal itself to be negotiable and open to positive representation. It is crucial to understand, however, that military trickery becomes an area of theoretical anxiety for classical Greek writers. That anxiety will be seen to arise, in part, from a perceived tension between Athenian and Spartan notions of what makes a good citizen-soldier. I will begin by examining how and why that tension is formulated in Athenian public discourse.
Honest hoplites and tricky Spartans

For the Athenian citizen male, his role as a soldier or sailor in wartime was an important component of his civic identity and status: ‘in the classical period, military organisation merged with civic organisation; it was not as a warrior that the citizen governed the city, but it was as a citizen that the Athenian went to war’. It was the hoplite class of citizens who formed the nucleus of the citizen land army. To be a hoplite, a citizen had to be able to pay for his heavy armour and, because of this degree of financial qualification, he would probably have belonged to one of ‘the three highest classes in the Solonian hierarchy’. This meant that members of the hoplite class tended to be farmers; the sort of men who are caricatured and transformed into comic heroes in the texts of Aristophanes.

The question of how many men made up this class of citizens is difficult to answer with any certainty or precision; the figures given by fifth-century historians may often be generalised or exaggerated. Furthermore, an account of numbers of hoplites or thetes present at a battle may not represent the full muster that was possible. Drawing on evidence from Herodotus, Thucydides and the varied estimates of scholars, Stockton traces an increase in numbers of hoplites deployed in the field from 9,000 at the battle of Marathon in 490 to a figure of 13,000 in 431. The latter estimate is put forward by Thucydides (2.13.6–8) and in addition to this field army, he writes of a further 16,000 hoplites in the forts of Attica and guarding the circuit of the Long Walls. This defensive army was made up of men of metic status.

7 Vidal-Naquet (1986a) 85. From a different tradition of scholarship, Pritchett (1971) 27 expresses this merging of the civic and military identity in terms of patriotism: ‘The Athenian citizen identified his own interest with that of the state. His patriotism was shown no less in devotion on the battlefield than in financial sacrifice.’ See also Vernant (1968) passim; Davies (1978) 31f.; Goldhill (1988a) 47–56. For the Athenian funeral ceremonies (epitaphioi) and funeral speeches (epitaphioi logoi) as instantiations of the idea that to die fighting for the polis is the finest civic act, see Clairmont (1983) and Loraux (1986).

8 Vidal-Naquet (1986a) 89. Citizens who were or had been hoplites were known as zeugites.

9 See especially Trygaeus in Aristophanes’ Peace: the only Aristophanic hero who is an active hoplite. Although many hoplites were farmers, it is dangerous to generalise about military organisation in fifth-century Athens. The exigencies of the Peloponnesian War and Athens’ expanding naval power meant that hoplites often fought at sea. There is also evidence that members of the poorer class of thetes were sometimes equipped for hoplite battle through state finance. We also know that both the hoplite army and the fleet sometimes used metics, free barbarians and slaves. For these and other complexities of fifth-century military arrangements, see Ridley (1979); Vidal-Naquet (1986a) 88f.; Loraux (1986) 32–7.

and citizens who were above or below field-service age. Unfortunately, there is no indication of the proportions of citizens and non-citizens in this second group. Stockton estimates a figure of 18,000 thetes for this time. Even if these figures are exaggerations it seems probable that, from the mid-fifth century onwards, more than half of the male citizen population of Attica had the economic status of a hoplite. In the 430s an older man may have been beyond field-service age but nevertheless retained his hoplite identity. For many, hoplite status was perhaps newly acquired; Jones argues that many thetes became hoplites because of increased prosperity in the mid-fifth century and the possibility that property assessments lagged behind inflationary trends.\footnote{Jones (1978) 166f.}

It is indisputable that the fifth-century Athenian empire derived its growth and security from a powerful navy rather than its hoplite land army. Nevertheless, Athenian political discourse tended to valorise hoplite identity as opposed to that of the poorer rowing class, and it is clear that to be a hoplite was to be part of a burgeoning ‘middle class’ whose property and strength in numbers made them the dominant social group in the polis.\footnote{The ‘hoplite bias’ of public Athenian ideological projections is traced in the epitaphioi logoi by Loraux (1986) 155–71. But it would be wrong to suggest that the navy’s role in empire and democracy is effaced in Athenian public culture: see Ar. Vesp. 1093ff. and Eq. 1265–71. Rose (1995) and Rosenbloom (1995) demonstrate how Sophocles’ Ajax and Aeschylean tragedy engage with the relationship between leadership, politics, sea-power and empire. Naval lists have survived from the fourth century which show that many Athenian triremes were named after key ideological concepts, categories of thought and cultural forms (e.g. ‘Demokratia’ – given to four ships over fifty-five years, ‘Nike’, ‘Eunomia’, ‘Eleatheria’, ‘Dikaiosune’, ‘Sophia’, ‘Mneme’, ‘Technê’, ‘Tragoidia’, ‘Comoidia’). See Casson (1971) 350–4 for further examples and discussion. See also Strauss (1996) for an excellent discussion of thetes’ ideology and naval service as democratic political education.}

I will begin by discussing the Athenian projection of an ideology of hoplite endeavour and the representation of apatê (deception, trickery) within that projection.

For my purposes, there are two important points about Athenian hoplite warfare that must be stressed. The first point is that a hoplite army was only suited to a set-piece battle, fought in the open and on a site agreed upon by both sides.\footnote{See the amazement of the Persian Mardonius at Hdt. 7.9.31: ‘Besides, from all I hear, the Greeks usually wage war in an extremely stupid fashion, because they are ignorant and incompetent. When they declare war on one another they seek out the best, most level piece of land, and that is where they go to fight. The upshot is that the victors leave the battlefield with massive losses, not to mention the losers, who are completely wiped out’ (translation by Waterfield (1998)).} It is clear from accounts of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars that battles were fought on a seasonal basis, beginning in Spring and ending in Autumn. Ideally, hoplite warfare involved an open, prearranged contest between two similarly equipped
and similarly arranged armies. During and after the Peloponnesian War, archers, lightly armed troops and ambushes were used increasingly and with devastating effect against heavily armed and relatively immobile hoplite units. Thucydides recounts instances where Athenian generals attempted to adapt the lineaments of hoplite practice in order to cope with a stealthy enemy that did not announce itself before engagement. Several texts of the fifth and fourth centuries attest to reflection and debate over the relative merits of archery and hoplite fighting. Nevertheless, it seems clear that ‘proper’ hoplite fighting was meant to be a face-to-face trial of strength and courage. This kind of ‘up front’ massed confrontation was the antithesis of other forms of fifth-century land warfare. For the hoplite there was none of the trickery associated with ambushes, the protection and distance afforded to the archer or the mobility allowed to lightly armed and mounted units. In my second chapter I will argue that this ideological opposition was not always maintained with respect to trickery. For the present discussion, however, it is important to recognise that the ideal of hoplite practice often excluded the possibility of military trickery from either side of a conflict.

Commentators have also laid emphasis on the collective nature of the hoplite phalanx. Although other non-democratic Greek cities also had hoplite armies, it is clear that for post-Cleisthenic Athens the citizen phalanx served as an important paradigm for Athens’ developing ideology of democracy, civic participation and collective responsibility. The phalanx was only effective and secure if all its members acted as

14 See Thuc. 3.96–8, where Demosthenes’ hoplites are wiped out in Aitolia because of the mobility of their lightly armed opponents.
15 See Thuc. 4.30–2 where Demosthenes is said to have learnt from his experiences in Aitolia. See also his use of cunning at 3.112 and the ruse of Paches at 3.34 which I discuss in more detail in the next chapter. For further references to non-hoplitic tactics in the Peloponnesian War see Said and Tréde (1985). Heza (1974) argues that the prevalence of ruses in Thucydidean accounts of warfare indicate a change in military mentality during the Peloponnesian War.
16 For a sense of this collective responsibility embodied in hoplite organisation we should note the first four elements of the ephebic oath cited by Siewert (1977) 102–3: 1. ‘I will not disgrace these sacred arms’ (αὐτὰ ἱερὰ ἀρμάτα); 2. ‘I will not desert the comrade beside me wherever I shall be stationed in a battle-line’ (ἐν τοῖς ὀπαστασίν χωρὶς διήμετρον); 3. ‘I will defend our sacred and public institutions’ (ἧμών δὲ καὶ ἦσσον ἐκ τῶν τῶν ἱππαρχῶν); 4. ‘And I will not pass on (to the descendants) my fatherland smaller, but greater and better, so far as I am able, by myself or with the help of all’ (καὶ οἷς ἔλαττῶν παραβαίνω τὴν πατρίδα, πλέον δὲ καὶ ἄρειον κατὰ τὰ ἱππαρχῶν καὶ μετὰ ἱππαρχῶν). The sentiment of the closely-packed phalanx is already found in the poetry of the archaic polis: see Tyr. 8.11–13 and 9.15–19 in the edition of Prato (1968). For discussion of Tyrtaeus’ expression of collective ideology, see Jaeger (1966); Shey (1976); Tarkow (1983); Goldhill (1991) 126–8.
one tightly-packed unit. To leave your position in this unit was to lay it open to destruction: ‘the values of a hoplite are necessarily tied to a sense of collective endeavour’.18

A major text, often cited for evidence of these ideal notions of collective action, duty to the polis and the value of the citizen army, is Pericles’ funeral speech in the second book of Thucydides. In this speech, the Thucydidean Pericles explicitly contrasts Athenian military values with those of the Spartans. I want to cite a section of the speech in order to illustrate three intertwined strands in the Athenian ideological construction of trickery and deceit as occupying the realm of the ‘other’ in the second half of the fifth century:

And then we are different to our opponents with regard to military preparations in the following ways. Our city is open to the world, and we have no periodic deportations of foreigners in order to prevent people seeing or learning secrets which might be of military advantage to the enemy. This is because we rely, not on preparations and deceits but on our own real courage with respect to deeds (πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὰ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ή τῷ ὁφεὶ ἕμων αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἐφύσκει). There is a difference too in our systems of education. The Spartans, from boyhood are submitted to the most laborious training in courage (οὐ μὲν ἐπιπόνοῳ διακήψει εὐθύς νεύι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχομαι), whereas we pass our lives without such restrictions but we are no less ready to face the same dangers as they are. (Thucydides 2.39.1)

This passage has been remarked upon for the extreme emphasis it places on the merits of Athenian non-professionalism.19 Yet, to use the phrase ‘non-professionalism’ perhaps introduces a distinction which misses the force of Pericles’ statements about Athenian military conduct. He is not so much stressing the non-mercenary aspect of Athenian military participation as emphasising its lack of reliance on acquired knowledge through training. Pericles marks a contrast between the enforced military education and the ‘learned courage’ of the Spartans on the one hand, and a representation of the Athenians as naturally endowed with courage on the other.20

This idea of a natural disposition towards prowess in the Athenian character is a commonplace of the funeral orations we have: most

19 See Loraux (1986) 150: ‘… the funeral oration is the privileged locus of Athenian “non-professionalism” in military matters, finding its most extended expression in Pericles’ epitaphios but referred to in all the orations’. See also Vidal-Naquet (1986a) 89f.
20 As Mills (1997) 74 points out, this emphasis on Athens’ lack of strict and extensive military training allows Pericles to trumpet the fact that Athenians have time for higher concerns: ‘We love beauty without extravagance and wisdom (philosophoumen) without softness’ (Thuc. 2.40.2).
graphically Gorgias’ funeral speech attributes ‘innate Ares’ to the Athenians.\footnote{See Gorgias DK 82 b6. As a foreigner Gorgias is unlikely to have delivered this speech in person at an actual ceremony and it may have been a rhetorical exercise. See also Lys. 2.63.} Despite a lack of formal training, Pericles boasts that the Athenians have seldom been proved incapable of defeating the Peloponnesian forces.\footnote{Thuc. 2.39.2. The author commonly known as the Old Oligarch offers a much less flattering view of the Athenian hoplite force ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 2.1).} But Pericles also defines the Athenians as trusting in their natural courage as opposed to ‘prearranged devices and deceits’ (πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ἡ τῷ ἀφ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὑψήχον). This and the preceding description of Athens as an ‘open’ and unsecretive city clearly imply a contrast with Spartan practice in military matters. Extensive training, preparation, secrecy and deception are being associated with each other and are being given decidedly negative connotations.

Hornblower finds this chapter of Thucydides ‘puzzling’: ‘its message is that Athenian military arrangements are easy-going and unprofessional by comparison with Sparta’s – not a very encouraging thing to be told, one would have thought ... Surely neither Thucydides nor Pericles, who is made to say at 1.142 that naval warfare was a matter of long training, can have thought anything so silly as that effortless superiority could be achieved in land fighting’.\footnote{Hornblower (1991) 303–4.} Hornblower goes on to point out that there may have been more military training at Athens than Thucydides makes Pericles imply and suggests that this passage is explained by the influence of ‘the insouciant, oligarchic attitudes of the cavalry class’ on its author.

It is certainly true that the existence and nature of an Athenian cadet-training system (ἐφήβεια) in fifth-century Athens remains an open question.\footnote{For arguments in favour of the probability of a fifth-century ἐφήβεια, see Cawkwell (1972) 262 and (1989) 380; Siewert (1977); Vidal-Naquet (1986a) 97ff.; Winkler (1990a) 20f. Wilamowitz (1893) 193–4 used Thuc. 2.39.1 to argue against a fifth-century ἐφήβεια.} But there is clear evidence that there was some proto-military training for aspiring Athenian hoplites in the form of disciplined ‘war dances’.\footnote{See Winkler (1990a) 54f. on the ἡμνοπαιδική and the πυρρική as institutional ephebic dances akin to ‘martial arts’. For further discussion of controversies surrounding the Athenian ephebate see below in this section and pp. 86–9.} It is also true that, in reality, Athenian naval warfare required careful training and preparation. Hornblower might have added evidence for the use of deceptive tactics and the need for cunning intelligence in fifth-century descriptions of Athenian naval
conduct. But it is precisely the suppression of ‘realities’ that makes this chapter of the funeral speech so interesting. Pericles is represented as constructing ideal oppositions between Spartan training and Athenian ‘natural courage’ and between Spartan deceit and Athenian openness. If he suppresses the elements of Athenian naval tactics that involve deception and specialised knowledge, and if he downplays any possible realities concerning Athenian military training, it is because, at the level of ideology, Thucydides’ Pericles wants to use an occasion where ‘homage to the dead and celebration of the “entire nation” went hand in hand’ in order to construct an image of the city for the city which defines it as ‘naturally’ courageous in contrast to its enemies. Loraux regards this construction, common to virtually all the epitaphioi logoi, as another example of the ‘aristocratic thinking’ that lies behind these speeches. While the oration of Pericles is ‘careful not to transform too overtly all Athenian combatants into hoplites and prefers to remain vague’ it imbues the Athenian land army with a kind of superior nobility. Pericles ‘reserves true glory to hereditary heroism and disdains acquired, and therefore necessarily imperfect, virtues’. Here we see the natural courage of the Athenian collective being given a sharper focus and a stronger emphasis through a construction of the enemy as relying upon contrivance and preparation. The deployment of deception is welded to this idea of acquired and therefore inferior military ability. It would be simplistic to say that military trickery is a completely unproblematic component within the notion of natural, inherited and heroic excellence in Homeric poetry and archaic texts. Nevertheless, the Iliad represents the ambush (lochos) as an engagement which should be reserved for the ‘best of the Achaeans’. By contrast, Thucydides’ representation of Pericles’ speech emphatically divorces military trickery from the grammar of Athenian excellence and courage on the grounds that it connotes characteristics that are uninherited and not inherent. It can also be argued that the Athenian public ideology of military courage excludes apatē because of a very un-Homeric association between trickery of an enemy and fear of the enemy. I will return to this association and its implications in my next chapter.

26 Detienne and Vernant (1978) 296–9 discuss details and sources concerning the deceptive naval manoeuvres known as the periplous and the diekplous which the Athenian navy successfully deployed.
I have already alluded to another motivation behind Pericles’ con-
tраст between Athens’ openness and the Spartan enemy’s reliance on
deception and secrecy, namely the negative relation of notions of
trickery to the ideology of hoplite endeavour. As Winkler remarks, the
contrast between hoplite warfare and the tactics of deception is partic-
ularly important: ‘enemy armies might camp quite close to each other
without fear of surprise attack . . . ambuscades and night attacks were a
serious violation of honour, at least between Greeks’. Winkler makes
these comments to emphasise the transgressive nature of the myth of
trickery associated with the Apatouria festival, an occasion which
marked the entry of Athenian adolescents into adult life. Winkler fol-
lows Vidal-Naquet’s famous analysis of this myth of trickery and its
association with a ‘coming of age ceremony’. I will briefly summarise
Vidal-Naquet’s findings because many of my arguments concerning
apatē and its placement on the terrain of Athenian ideology constitute
an explicit engagement with his work.

As I noted above, there is disagreement over the possible existence of
an Athenian institution of cadet-training (ephebeia), but there is an in-
scription from Acharnae of an ephebic oath whose language and style
suggest an archaic origin. To be an ephebe was to be at a transitional
stage between childhood and full citizenship with all its military, civic
and familial responsibilities. For many youths, then, the transforma-
tion into adulthood meant the adoption of the military and civic status
of a hoplite.

The beginning of a young man’s ephebic status was celebrated ritu-
ally by the sacrifice of his long hair on the third day of the Apatouria. It
was also at this festival that youths were sworn into their phratry. But it
is the aetiological myth of the festival and Vidal-Naquet’s analysis of it
which are instructive. The story of the myth occurs at the frontier between Athens and Boeotia where (there are differing versions) some
form of border dispute develops. The Boeotian king is Xanthus (‘Fair
One’) and the Athenian king is Thymoeites, a descendant of Theseus.
It is agreed to settle the dispute by a duel but Thymoeites appoints a
champion, Melanthus (‘Black One’), to fight in his place. Melanthus
defeats his opponent by means of a deception. He cries out ‘Xanthus,
you do not play according to the rules – there is someone beside you!’

30 Winkler (1990a) 33. For general condemnations of deception as a military tactic in
Greek drama see [Eur.] Rhes. 510–11 and Soph. Trach. 270–80 where we are told that
Zeus exiled Heracles for killing Iphitus by dolos.
31 See Siewert (1977) and the text contained in n. 17 above.
32 See Vidal-Naquet (1986a) 108f. He gives an extensive list of sources dating from the
fifth century BC through to the Byzantine period.
Xanthus looks round in surprise and Melanthus takes the opportunity to kill him. In one account, Melanthus prays to Zeus Apa¯tenor (Zeus ‘deceiver’). Many of the sources mention an intervention by ‘Dionysus of the black goatskin’, a god who is associated with the deception, but all of them explain the name of the Apatouria through a ‘paronomastic etymology’: the festival commemorates Melanthus’ original apatē.44

In reaction to this myth, Vidal-Naquet asks himself why the story’s stress on apatē should be offered to ephebes whose oath will bind them to a contrary model of behaviour; ‘we have single combat (mono-machia) and trickery contrasted with fair hoplite fighting on even terms’. Drawing on the insights of Jeanmaire, Lloyd, Lévi-Strauss and Van Gennep, Vidal-Naquet points out that the myth of Melanthus’ apatē is analogous to the Spartan ephebic institution of the krupteia in that it is symmetrically opposite to the life of the hoplite. Through its dramatisation of a negative paradigm, it marks the transition from the marginal status of the ephebe to the positive position of the adult citizen hoplite.45 Vidal-Naquet’s study demonstrates that linguistic and tactical deception are built into the very processes by which young Athenians position themselves for the first time as citizens and hoplites. Melanthus’ apatē is opposed to the hoplite citizen ideal and yet integral to continuing realisations of citizen identity. This negative position for military trickery clearly informs the Periclean antithesis between Athenian and Spartan character.46

Loraux’s analysis of the way in which the funeral speeches appropriate aristocratic modes of thought to construct an image of ‘natural superiority’ is excellent. But where does Pericles’ condemnation of Spartan deceit fit into all this? Loraux translates ἀπατέας as ‘stratagems’ (les stratagèmes) but it is clear from historical and dramatic texts written during the Peloponnesian War that accusations and narrations of Spartan deception and duplicity are common. Indeed there is a strong case for arguing, on the basis of Thucydides’ funeral speech and other texts, that the Spartan enemy were being constructed as a para-

43 Lexica Segueriana s.v. apatouria in Bekker (1814) 416–17.
44 As Vidal-Naquet points out, the etymology cannot be dismissed as mere play on words since there was another initiation ritual for young girls which took place at the temple of Athena Apaturia where the founding story of apatē involved the union of Aethra and Poseidon. See Schmitt-Pantel (1977).
45 See Winkler (1990a) 33: ‘The ephebe therefore contains . . . rites and fictions which dramatise the difference between what ephebes were (boys) and what they will become (men).’
46 Vidal-Naquet himself hints at a link between Thuc. 2.39.1 and his reading of the myth of Melanthus. See Vidal-Naquet (1986b) 141 n. 8. See also Heza (1974) 44.
digm of ‘the deceptive other’ in order to mark a difference between these two Greek states who had once been allies.

Alfred Bradford has recently charted the construction of ‘the duplicitous Spartan’ in a number of fifth-century texts. Although he does not cite Pericles’ condemnation of the Spartan deception, Bradford concentrates on the extent to which Thucydides attributes duplicity and hidden motives to Spartan policy and the actions of certain Spartan leaders. He identifies an important distinction within the Athenian representation of Spartan national character. Firstly there is a Spartan ‘type’, defined primarily in terms of duplicity, and assumed by Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides and, to a much lesser extent, Herodotus. But there are also individual Spartans who are ‘described by Athenian authors sometimes according to type, sometimes not.’

The former category of representation is strikingly evident from the fact that fifth-century texts frequently express the idea that Spartans say one thing while thinking another.

The idea that the Spartan speaks with forked tongue was clearly popular in the second half of the fifth century, but it sometimes surfaces in a context where the prejudicial or ‘propagandistic’ quality of the idea is foregrounded. For example, Thucydides claims that in 420 Alcibiades tricked Spartan envoys into lying to the Athenian assembly that they had not arrived with full powers to negotiate on behalf of their city. They had previously said the opposite to the Boule, but Alcibiades promised to give them Pylos if they lied. Alcibiades’ aim was to destabilise the Peace of Nicias and to establish a new alliance with Argos. Thucydides tells us that Alcibiades’ plan was ‘to drive a wedge between Nicias and the Spartans, and he also intended by attacking them in the assembly for having no sincerity (ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν) and for

38 Bradford (1994) 78.
39 See Hdt. 9.54.1 where the Athenians ‘were well aware of the Spartan tendency to say one thing and think something quite different’ (ἐπιστάμενοι τα Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα ὡς ἄλλα φρονεῖται καὶ ἄλλα λεγόται). See also Eur. Andr 453–2 and Ar. Lys. 1233–5. In the last example the Athenian commonplace that Spartans ‘say one thing and think another’ is being explicitly criticised by Lysistrata as wrong-headed. See also Ar. Pax 1063 and Ach. 308 (where the chorus vilify Dicaeopolis for making peace with oath-breaking Spartans). After Spartan troops were sent to Epidaurus in 419 and Argos was threatened, the Athenians inscribed ‘the Spartans have not kept their oaths’ on the base of the stele that had been engraved with the peace treaty between Sparta and Athens in 421 (Thuc. 5.56.1–3). Thucydidean accounts of Spartan treachery or betrayal: the massacre of Platanean prisoners (3.68.1); the slaughter of helots where, in a manner similar to Menelaus’ trickery in Euripides’ Andromache, prominent helots are coaxed out of hiding with false promises (4.80); the betrayal of Scione (5.18.7). See Bradford (1994) and Powell (1989) for further examples in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon and Plutarch.
never saying the same thing twice (σύδε λέγουσιν σύδεπτε ταύτά) to bring about the alliance with Argos, Elis and Mantinea’ (5.45.3). The historian explains that the Athenians were already feeling cheated by the Spartans. Alcibiades exploits this mood and the commonplace of Spartan duplicity to enact his own trick. The Spartans are tricked into living up to the Athenian prejudice and the Athenian assembly are also deceived by Alcibiades’ ruse. This is Alcibiades’ first political act in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War and it exemplifies the historian’s initial description of him as an ambitious and competitive young aristocrat who sees Nicias as a rival and feels slighted that he had not been approached by the Spartans. Consequently Alcibiades wants to renew hostilities with Sparta but ultimately wishes to revive the strong relationship of proxenia which used to exist between the Spartans and his family (5.45.3).

The Thucydidean Alcibiades is always a law unto himself. But in the light of the Periclean construction of Athenian ‘openness’ and Spartan ‘dishonesty’ which he has presented in book 2, it is striking that the historian presents us with an example of the way in which a prominent young Athenian uses dissimulation to further his own ends and does so by both parading and perpetuating the negative image of Spartans as habitually untrustworthy. While I am primarily concerned here to trace the workings and connotations of the ‘ideal’, it is important to remember that Thucydides sometimes ‘deconstructs’ that ideal. In his account of Alcibiades’ ruse, the historian narrates an unmasking of the way in which national stereotypes are reproduced and given authority. Alcibiades’ lies turn the Spartans into liars and the Athenians are duped because their prejudices are thus confirmed.

Bradford demonstrates the pervasiveness of the ‘tricky Spartan’ in Athenian authors but he does not ask why or how this stereotype is deployed. It is precisely in Pericles’ words that we see the terms in which Spartan trickery is opposed to Athenian openness. Deception is not simply attributed to the Spartan enemy. Rather, deception is construed in terms of its incompatibility with the ideal Athenian’s identity as a hoplite-citizen who is born with the attributes of military excellence and manliness. To stereotype Spartans as deceptive is to imply that they lack natural courage and military excellence and to question their commitment to the honourable lineaments of hoplite battle.

The Athenian construction of Spartans as deceitful in general, and Pericles’ comments in particular, also draw their force from perceptions and evaluations of Spartan training and education (paideia).

40 On this, see Ostwald (1986) 298–333.
When he refers to the ‘laborious askēsis’ of the Spartan system of education, the Thucydidean Pericles is clearly referring to what scholars commonly refer to as the agōgē and the krupteia.\textsuperscript{41} Taken together, these two aspects of Spartan paideia were the means by which the Spartan state perpetuated its unique reputation as a rigorous authoritarian community of disciplined soldier-citizens. Greek writers of the fourth century evince a persistent fascination with these two extraordinary institutions. As part of the agōgē the Spartans were said to have trained young boys from the age of seven for adulthood by forcing them to steal food through hunger and by issuing them with only one cloak. If they were caught stealing from the adult sussitia (‘common mess’) the boys were whipped. This was supposed to instil qualities of military courage, hardness and resourcefulness (panourgia).\textsuperscript{42} The agōgē contained one ritual where boys had to compete in two groups to steal the most votive cheeses from the altar of Artemis Orthia and they were whipped in the process. Xenophon actually argues that this education in deception was designed by Lycurgus to make boys ‘more resourceful’ and ‘better at waging war’.\textsuperscript{43} When these boys reached adulthood it seems that some or all of them trained in the krupteia.\textsuperscript{44} Those boys who go into the krupteia supposedly endure pain by going without shoes and bedding, even in winter.\textsuperscript{45} They go out into the countryside for a year. With the minimum of food and clothing they had to survive off the land without being caught and in solitude. In a related but separate procedure, the best youths hide by day and kill unwanted helots under the cover of night.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{41} As Kennell (1995) 113 points out, the word agōgē is never used in extant texts to denote Spartan education until the Hellenistic age: ‘writers of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. rightly presented the rituals of initiation and acculturation as wholly integrated into the unique Spartan way of life, but never attached to it any particular name’. In this book I will nevertheless retain the later term to describe Spartan training practices attested in the classical period.


\textsuperscript{43} In the \textit{Lac. Pol.} passage, Xenophon claims that it was the Spartan law-giver Lycurgus who instituted the exercise in theft and trickery.


\textsuperscript{45} Cartledge (1987) 30–1 argues that ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ versions of this institution are presented in ancient sources. See also Lévy (1988) and Kennell (1995) 131–2, who both argue that the krupteia denotes the one-year period of isolation in the countryside for all trainees and not (as is often assumed) the elite helot-killing police duties.

\textsuperscript{46} Pl. \textit{Leg.} 1.633b–c.

\textsuperscript{46} Plut. \textit{Lycurg.} 28.1–7. On the possible initiatory and symbolic significance of these covert ‘police actions’ see Lévy (1988); Vernant (1992) 238–9.
Given that Spartan paideia was seen to be almost exclusively geared towards the achievement of military excellence and that many aspects of that training involved the practice and rehearsal of theft and trickery, it is hard to resist the conclusion that Pericles’ Funeral Speech is exploiting these well-known features of Spartan askésis (‘training’, ‘regimen’) and apatê in order to define Athenians as naturally courageous and unreliable on ‘preparations and deceptions’. But there is more to Pericles’ contrast than the construction of Spartan apatê as a symptom of anti-hoplitic values and a lack of natural courage which requires rigorous paideia as a substitute. There are other texts which suggest that Spartan paideia and its emphasis on trickery produce a dysfunctional citizenry. Fifth-century Athenian texts hint at these connections between Spartan duplicity and Spartan education. In the fourth century, we find the connections being more explicitly presented and theorised.\footnote{I will be returning to Xenophon’s and Plato’s confrontation with the educational role and representation of deceit in later chapters. See my discussion of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia below at pp. 122–42 and Plato’s Laws and Republic at pp. 151–62.}

A line in Euripides’ Supplices (or Suppliant Women) offers us a tantalising clue as to how and why Spartan training in duplicity can be figured as the antithesis of Athenian civic and military ideals. More than most Attic tragedies, this play has been seen to resonate with contemporary political and religious significance. We have no secure date for Supplices but Angus Bowie has recently argued that it offers a complex ‘filtering’ of historical events.\footnote{Bowie (1997) 45–56. See also Collard (1975) 10. Regardless of whether or not they see this play as referring to specific historical events, most critics date this play to the 420s.} In the play, the Argive Adrastus appeals to Athens for help when the Thebans refuse to relinquish the bodies of the Seven and the ensuing action can be read as a response to the Thebans’ initial refusal to return Athenian bodies after the campaign at Delium in 424. Even if we do not accept that the play has a relationship with events at Delium, there is no doubt that Theseus’ encomium of democracy in the play intersects with contemporary Athenian democratic ideology and public discourse.\footnote{For Theseus’ praise of Athens and the critique of the Theban herald at Eur. Supp. 399–597, see Smith (1967); Shaw (1982); Collard (1972); Burian (1985b); Mills (1997) 97ff.} Early on in the play Adrastus explains why he has come to Athens rather than Sparta to seek assistance: Σπάρτη μὲν ὡμή καὶ πεποίκιλται τρόπους (‘Sparta is wild and intricate in its ways’).\footnote{Eur. Supp. 187. As the ensuing discussion will illustrate, my translation of this sentence is necessarily inadequate since it fails to capture the multiple connotations of ‘ὡμή καὶ πεποίκιλται τρόπους’.} As a passing comment from a tragedy
written and performed at some point during the Peloponnesian War, Adrastus’ complaint offers some key ideas which inform Athenian denigrations of Spartan duplicity. The phrase πεποίκειται τρόποις perhaps draws some force from the Homeric epithet πολύτροπος (‘of many ways’, ‘of many turns’) as applied to Odysseus and Hermes and fifth-century discussions of its meaning.51 For the sophist Antisthenes, this epithet did not mean that Odysseus was often changing character and was therefore unscrupulous.52 Rather, it denoted his sophia (‘wisdom’, ‘cleverness’) and his skill in adopting figures or manners of speech (tropoi) to particular listeners at particular times.53 For Stanford this is a measure of the extent to which moral problems had come to dominate the evaluation and interpretation of the Homeric Odysseus in that period.54 Antisthenes may actually be formulating an equation between sophia and polytropic skills because of his admiration for Spartan national character and behaviour.55 In the case of Adrastus’ complaint in Supplices, it seems that Spartans are being negatively

52 Antisthenes is commonly described as a ‘sophist’ but while we have evidence that he taught rhetoric, his fragments and doxography suggest that he became close to Socrates. For Antisthenes’ ‘Socratic’ interests, see Rankin (1986). Socrates himself was described or represented as a sophist both before and after his death. See Ar. Nub. 627–888; Aeschin. 1.173.
53 Antisthenes fr. 51 (Caizzi) = Porphy. schol. ad Hom. Od. 1.1. The fragment also describes Pythagoras as ‘πολύτροπος’ because he adapted his style of speech according to whether he was talking to children, women, archons or ephesians. Odysseus and Pythagoras are two among many sophoi who ‘if they are clever at dialogue, also understand how to express the same thought in accordance with many tropoi’ (σε δὲ σοφοὶ διανεὰ σιὰ διαλέγονται, καὶ είπτανται τὸ αὐτὰ νόμῳ κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους λέγειν). Caizzi (1966) 106–7 compares this fragment’s description of Odysseus’ ability to associate with anyone to Socrates’ teasing characterisation of Antisthenes’ ‘networking’ abilities at Xen. Symp. 4.64. See also the Antisthenic tone of Xen. Mem. 4.6, where Socrates describes Odysseus as a rhètēr. See also Rankin (1986) 66; Pucci (1987) 51ff. and Goldhill (1991) 3. Rankin sees fr. 51 as influenced by Socratic and Prodican philosophy. Pucci applies Antisthenes’ interpretation to the original polyvalent meaning of the Homeric epithet but Goldhill points out that this sense of the word is not attested before the fifth century.
55 See Antisthenes fr. 195 (Caizzi) = Theon Progymn. 33, where Antisthenes is reported to have described Sparta as the men’s living space and Athens as the women’s quarters. Rankin (1986) 114–16 argues that certain fragments display ‘laconising’ tendencies but is far from convincing.
constructed as changeable and slippery in terms of both character and rhetoric.

Adrastus’ association between the quality of *poikilia* and notions of deceit, intricacy, fabrication and beguilement also goes back to Homer. *Poikilia* is commonly used to describe the variegated and shining surface of objects that have been elaborately wrought or woven. Often it is used in the context of female cunning and know-how. In the *Iliad* Aphrodite gives Hera a girdle with which to beguile Zeus erotically and distract him from her interference in the war (14.215f.). This garment is described as *ποικίλον* (*poikilon*) by the narrator, for all enchantments (*θελκτήρια*) are figured on it. Aphrodite herself stresses that the girdle is *ποικίλον* in a speech which seems to be outlining its enchanting qualities (220).56 In the Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease* the verb *ποικίλλω* is used to imply the deceptive and fictional character of explanations offered by those who believe that the Sacred Disease is caused by the gods.57 So the use of *πεποικίλται* at *Supp.* 187 connotes ever-changing and intricate fabrication, fiction and deception.

But in Adrastus’ one-line condemnation of the Spartans, the combination of wildness and slippery sophistication in itself seems rather strange. The adjective *ὡμή* (*ōme¯*) connotes rawness, savagery and wild, bestial or uncivilised behaviour.58 Adrastus’ use of the word in conjunction with Spartan deceit perhaps draws its force from ideologically informed Athenian perceptions of the way in which the Spartan *agoge¯* and *krupteia* moulded the identity of their pupils. Strong associations between trickery, cunning and those animals that acquire food by stalking and hunting prey are to be found in Greek thought. In animals such as foxes and wolves, there is precisely this combination of sophisticated covert method and savage execution.59 Where Spartan boys

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56 See also Hom. *Od.* 15.105f. where the Spartan Helen has made ‘most intricate robes’ (*πέπλαι παμποικίλαι*) and tries to give Telemachus a robe which is ‘loveliest in intricate workings’ (*κάλλιστος παμποικίλασιν*). At *Od.* 8.447 the witch Circe has taught Odysseus the ‘intricate knot’ (*ποικίλον δίσωμι*) with which he seals a chest of gifts. Furthermore, the Homeric Odysseus is given the epithet *poikilmētēs* (Il. 11.482; *Od.* 3.163, 13.293). For a fuller, though by no means comprehensive, discussion of the concept of *poikilia*, see Detienne and Vernant (1978) 18ff. Collard (1975) 157 cites examples where this concept is used to express ‘disapproval and moral inconsistency’ in tragedy.


58 See Goldhill (1988a) 187: ‘It is a word associated with the world of beasts or with attitudes at odds with the norms of human behaviour in society.’ At Hom. *Il.* 22.347 the frenzied Achilles desires to eat Hector’s ‘raw’ flesh. See also these connotations of the word at Soph. *Ant.* 471–2 and *Aj.* 548.

59 See Detienne and Vernant (1978) 34ff. for Greek literature’s treatment of *mētis* and deception in animals of prey.
Honest hoplites and tricky Spartans

were forced to steal from the *sussitia* without being seen or face a beating if they are caught, Vernant sees a comparison with 'wild animals' and 'beasts of prey': 'the whip does not punish their crime of thievery and its lowness; it denounces ... those who are not able to acquire, as is expected of them, the dangerous qualities of a predator'. Of particular importance here are those elements of the *agögē* where stealing was accompanied with physical punishment. Xenophon stresses that in the cheese-stealing ritual, the boys who are the most cunning and swift receive the fewest blows from the whip. Vernant sums up the name of the game in this ritual test: 'the best policy is to adopt the roles of the sly Fox and the ferocious Wolf, two animals who have thievery in the blood'.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle criticises these practices and regards them as indicative of flawed Spartan ethics. The Spartans mistake one element of virtue, namely courage or 'manliness' (*andreia*), for virtue itself and by being so preoccupied with the instilling of courage into the young they 'render them like wild animals' (*thērōdeis*) (8.1338b12). Aristotle goes on to argue that the Spartan system of training is not to be emulated because 'what is noble (to *kalon*) must take priority over what is beast-like (to *thērōdeis*). For it is neither a wolf nor any other wild animal that will venture to confront a noble danger; it is only the good man, the brave man' (*anēr agathos*) (8.1338b29–32). The Spartan education fails to instil true 'nobility' and courage as required of the Greek male in battle precisely because it makes him like a beast which cannot display these ethical qualities. The institutions of Spartan training are associated with the behaviour of wild animals, despite (or because of) their emphasis on the deployment of cunning, concealment and deception.

The male chorus of Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* make a similar charge: the men of Laconia ‘can no more be trusted than can a ravening wolf’

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60 Vernant (1992) 236.
63 Arist. *Pol.* 2.1271b2–6, 7.1333b11–21, 8.1338b11–19.
64 ὅστι τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ θηρίαδες δεῖ πρωτογονιστῆν αὐτῇ γὰρ λύκος αὐτῷ. αὕτη γὰρ ζῶντος αὐτῷ ἄλλας μάλλον ἄνηρ ἄγαθος. See Loraux (1986) for the honourable description of the Athenian war-dead as *agathoi* ('brave', 'good') in surviving funeral orations.
65 See Vernant (1992) 242 on this passage: ‘An excess of *andreia* runs the risk of resulting in *anaideia* and *hubris*, a shamelessness and unrestrained audacity. Without the tempering and softening effects of *sôphronnt*, moderation, the kind of excellence to which the tests of trickery, violence and brutality in the *agögē* are directed shows itself to be perverted and deformed, taking on the form of a bestial savagery, a terrifying monstrosity.’
Again, Spartan identity is being constructed in terms of duplicity and the savagery of a (cunning) animal, the wolf. Of course, these statements from comedy are put into the mouths of blustering and bellicose caricatures of Athenian citizenry. As this and other choruses reproduce such stereotyping (and stereotypical) sentiments, it is perhaps the prejudicial character of the ‘deceptive Spartan’ paradigm that is foregrounded.

Thus it is a perceived affinity between the institutional formation of a Spartan’s identity and the behaviour of animals of prey which Adrastus’ rhetoric exploits. He glosses the ‘raw’ or ‘savage’ liminal period of a young Spartan’s training and its similarity to the existence of cunning animals of prey as constituting the character of Spartans of all ages. Spartan ‘otherness’ to Athens is not simply formulated in terms of a deceptive, slippery national character. It is a particular wild and animalistic form of deceptiveness which is being stressed as antithetical to the civilised conduct of Athens. I will have cause to return to this association between Spartan training and uncivilised cunning in the next chapter when discussing Xenophon’s anxious treatment of military trickery in the *Cyropaedia*.

In addition to this conjunction of savagery and cunning, Adrastus’ use of ‘φωμή’ and ‘πεποίκιλται’ may have a force deriving from medical terminology which further consolidates Spartan identity as negative. A famous section of Thucydides (3.82.1) describes the progress of civil strife (*stasis*) as φωμή. Hornblower shows that this phrase (όυτος φωμή ἢ στάσις προχώρησε) has a medical flavour and other critics have interpreted Thucydides as using the terminology of the Hippocratic writings to describe *stasis* as a kind of illness affecting the ‘body politic’.

The adjective φωμός is frequently used in the Hippocratic corpus to describe bodily discharges which have a ‘crude’ quality. Such raw discharges are symptomatic of worsening fever and disease.
charges which are ποικίλος ('variegated') also indicate disease and in the treatise *Humours*, dangerous discharges from the womb are described as ὀμην and ποικίλα. There may be a sense in which Adrastus' assertion of the crudeness and ποικιλία of the Spartans associates their roughness and propensity for the ever changing formations of trickery with a disordered and diseased condition. The possible play between these different usages of ὀμην and πεποικίλται τρόπους emphasises that these wild and yet slippery Spartans are not functioning as humans should.

The Thucydidean Pericles' funeral speech, then, is informed by three interrelated components which constitute an Athenian rejection of military *apate*. Firstly, deception is contrasted with notions of natural courage and inherited, inherent excellence. Secondly, deception is incompatible with an ideal image of hoplite endeavour. Thirdly, the speech's association of deceit with the Spartan enemy, whilst it can be explained in terms of the first two components, can also be related to a wider discourse of 'ethnic stereotyping'. This discourse specifically denigrates the Spartan national character as duplicitous by invoking certain aspects of Spartan education and culture which could be described as 'uncivilised' or 'wild'. Of course, the Spartans utilised hoplite warfare as much as any other Greek state. But the Athenian representation of them as duplicitous was integral to a civic discourse of self-definition.

I have argued that the concepts of deceit and dissimulation were important negative elements of Athens' developing democratic ideology. In the next section I will examine the invocation of similar considerations in Demosthenes' earliest legal oration, *Against Leptines*. In this speech dishonesty is constructed as 'unAthenian' and attributed to his Athenian opponent's proposals and performances. The speech will reappear throughout this study. For it contains some unique and extremely telling strategies of argument. These strategies invoke deceit's (im)morality and ideological significance in relation to three of its most problematic possible trajectories and uses: deceit of the demos, deceit of an enemy, and deceit as a socially or politically beneficial fiction. It might be objected that one should be suspicious of a speech which contains representations and evaluations of deceit which are unparalleled in the rest of Attic oratory. I would reply that in my third chapter it is precisely the exceptional nature of one of these representations

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71 From the concordance of Maloney and Frohn (1984) it is clear that ποικίλος is especially used of urine. For one example see Hipp. Ἑπιδ. 1.10.20. On discharges from the womb see Hipp. Ημι. 3.3–4.