Table of contents for The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind / edited by Brian P. McLaughlin with Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter.

Bibliographic record and links to related information available from the Library of Congress catalog

Information from electronic data provided by the publisher. May be incomplete or contain other coding.


I. The Place of Mind in Nature
1. Dualism, E. J. Lowe, (Durham University)
2. Idealism, Howard Robinson, (Central European University)
3. Mental Causation, Jaegwon Kim, (Brown University)
4. The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism, David Papineau, (King's College London)
5. Epiphenomenalism, Sven Walter, (University of Osnabrueck)
6. Functionalism, Robert Van Gulick, (Syracuse University)
7. Nonreductive Materialism, Lynne Rudder Baker, (University of Massachusetts at Amherst)
8. Anomalous Monism, Julie Yoo, (Lafayette College)
9. What Is the Physical?, Barbara Montero, (City University of New York)
10. What Is Property Physicalism?, Ansgar Beckermann, (University of Bielefeld)
11. Panpsychism, William Seager, (University of Toronto)
II. The Place of Consciousness in Nature
12. The Explanatory Gap, Joseph Levine, (University of Massachusetts at Amherst)
13. Higher-order Theories of Consciousness, David Rosenthal, (City University of New York)
14. Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities, Alex Byrne, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
15. Representationalist Theories of Consciousness, Michael Tye, (The University of Texas at Austin)
16. Subjectivity, John Perry, (Stanford University)
17. The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism, David Chalmers, (Australian National University)
18. Phenomenal Concepts, Kati Balog, (Yale University)
III. Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content
19. Intentionalism, Tim Crane, (University of College London)
20. Intentional Systems Theory, Daniel Dennett, (Tufts University)
21. Information-theoretic Semantics, Fred Dretske, (Professor Emertius, Stanford University)
22. Biosemantics, Ruth Millikan, (University of Connecticut)
23. The Normativity of the Intentional, Ralph Wedgwood, (Merton College, Oxford)
24. Advertisement for a Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes, Robert Matthews, (Rutgers University)
25. Concepts and Possession Conditions, Christopher Peacocke, (Columbia University)
26. Wide Content, Frances Egan, (Rutgers University)
27. Narrow Content, Gabriel Segal, (King's College London)
28. The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content, Jose Luis Bermudez, (Washington University in St Louis)
29. The Content of Perceptual Experience, Michelle Montague, (St John's College, Oxford)
30. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind, George Graham, (Wake Forest University), Terence Horgan, (University of Arizona), and John Tienson, (University of Memphis)
IV. Mental Capacities
31. Thinking, Louise Antony, (University of Massachusetts at Amherst)
32. Memory, Krista Lawlor, (Stanford University)
33. Imagination, Colin McGinn, (University of Miami)
34. Language and Thought, John Heil, (Washington University in St Louis)
35. Consciousness and Reference, John Campbell, (University of California, Berkeley)
36. Emotions: Motivating Feelings, Jesse Prinz, (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
V. Epistemic Issues
37. Folk Psychology, Adam Morton, (University of Alberta)
38. Other Minds, Anita Avramides, (St Hilda's College, Oxford)
39. Introspection, Cynthia Macdonald
40. Self-deception, Kent Bach, (San Francisco State University)
41. Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge, Jessica Brown, (The University of St Andrews)
VI. Self, Personhood, and Agency
42. Unity of Consciousness, Paul Raymont and Andrew Brook, (Carleton University)
43. Personal Identity and Metaphysics, Tamar Szabo Gendler, (Yale University)
44. Selves, Galen Strawson
45. Intention and Intentional Action, Alfred Mele, (Florida State University)

Library of Congress subject headings for this publication:
Philosophy of mind.