Table of contents for Corporate governance regimes : convergence and diversity / edited by Joseph A. McCahery ... [et al.]
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1. Introduction, J. McCahery and L. Renneboog
2. I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes The Case Against Global Cross Reference, W. Bratton and J. McCahery
3. Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?, H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman
4. Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control?, J. Coffee
5. Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, M. Roe
6. Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom, B. Cheffins
7. II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?, K. Hopt
8. The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act, T. Raaijmakers
9. Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?, E. Wymeersch
10. III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe Prediction of Control Concentration in German and UK Initial Public Offerings, M. Goergen and L. Renneboog
11. Who Controls German Corporations?, E. Boehmer
12. Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands, P. Moerland
13. Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies, I.Dherment and L. Renneboog
14. IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures How Do Financial Systems Affect Economic Performance?, W. Carlin and C. Mayer
15. Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model, D. Lombardo and M. Pagano
16. Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for Product and Capital Market Competition, E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden
17. Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth, M. Maher and T. Andersson
18. V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm The Value of a Vote in the Market for Corporate Control: Canadian Evidence, C. Robinson, J. Rumsey, and A. White
19. Managerial Disciplining and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK, J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog
20. A Comparison of English and American Bankruptcy Procedures, J. Franks and W. Torous
21. Reorganization Law and Dilution Threats in Different Financial Systems, U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral
22. Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy, L. Bebchuk
23. VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance Less is More; Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of Corporate Governance, R. Romano
24. Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders, G. Stapledon and J. Bates
25. Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds, M. Faccio and M. Lasfer
26. VII. Executive Compensation Stock-Based Executive Compensation, M. Conyon and K. Murphy
27. Cash-Based Executive Compensation in Spain and the UK, R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog
28. Employee Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands, P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom
Library of Congress subject headings for this publication:
Corporate governance -- Law and legislation.
Corporate governance -- Law and legislation -- Europe.
Corporate governance.
Corporate governance -- Europe.